Commit graph

58 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Paul Durrant
3991f35805 KVM: x86/xen: allow vcpu_info to be mapped by fixed HVA
If the guest does not explicitly set the GPA of vcpu_info structure in
memory then, for guests with 32 vCPUs or fewer, the vcpu_info embedded
in the shared_info page may be used. As described in a previous commit,
the shared_info page is an overlay at a fixed HVA within the VMM, so in
this case it also more optimal to activate the vcpu_info cache with a
fixed HVA to avoid unnecessary invalidation if the guest memory layout
is modified.

Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240215152916.1158-14-paul@xen.org
[sean: use kvm_gpc_is_{gpa,hva}_active()]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22 07:01:17 -08:00
Paul Durrant
b9220d3279 KVM: x86/xen: allow shared_info to be mapped by fixed HVA
The shared_info page is not guest memory as such. It is a dedicated page
allocated by the VMM and overlaid onto guest memory in a GFN chosen by the
guest and specified in the XENMEM_add_to_physmap hypercall. The guest may
even request that shared_info be moved from one GFN to another by
re-issuing that hypercall, but the HVA is never going to change.

Because the shared_info page is an overlay the memory slots need to be
updated in response to the hypercall. However, memory slot adjustment is
not atomic and, whilst all vCPUs are paused, there is still the possibility
that events may be delivered (which requires the shared_info page to be
updated) whilst the shared_info GPA is absent. The HVA is never absent
though, so it makes much more sense to use that as the basis for the
kernel's mapping.

Hence add a new KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_SHARED_INFO_HVA attribute type for this
purpose and a KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_SHARED_INFO_HVA flag to advertize its
availability. Don't actually advertize it yet though. That will be done in
a subsequent patch, which will also add tests for the new attribute type.

Also update the KVM API documentation with the new attribute and also fix
it up to consistently refer to 'shared_info' (with the underscore).

Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240215152916.1158-13-paul@xen.org
[sean: store "hva" as a user pointer, use kvm_gpc_is_{gpa,hva}_active()]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22 07:00:52 -08:00
Paolo Bonzini
6bda055d62 KVM: define __KVM_HAVE_GUEST_DEBUG unconditionally
Since all architectures (for historical reasons) have to define
struct kvm_guest_debug_arch, and since userspace has to check
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG) anyway, there is
no advantage in masking the capability #define itself.  Remove
the #define __KVM_HAVE_GUEST_DEBUG from architecture-specific
headers.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-02-08 08:41:06 -05:00
Paolo Bonzini
8886640dad kvm: replace __KVM_HAVE_READONLY_MEM with Kconfig symbol
KVM uses __KVM_HAVE_* symbols in the architecture-dependent uapi/asm/kvm.h to mask
unused definitions in include/uapi/linux/kvm.h.  __KVM_HAVE_READONLY_MEM however
was nothing but a misguided attempt to define KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM only on
architectures where KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM) could possibly
return nonzero.  This however does not make sense, and it prevented userspace
from supporting this architecture-independent feature without recompilation.

Therefore, these days __KVM_HAVE_READONLY_MEM does not mask anything and
is only used in virt/kvm/kvm_main.c.  Userspace does not need to test it
and there should be no need for it to exist.  Remove it and replace it
with a Kconfig symbol within Linux source code.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-02-08 08:41:06 -05:00
Paolo Bonzini
bcac047727 KVM: x86: move x86-specific structs to uapi/asm/kvm.h
Several capabilities that exist only on x86 nevertheless have their
structs defined in include/uapi/linux/kvm.h.  Move them to
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h for cleanliness.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-02-08 08:41:04 -05:00
Paolo Bonzini
458822416a kvm: x86: use a uapi-friendly macro for GENMASK
Change uapi header uses of GENMASK to instead use the uapi/linux/bits.h bit
macros, since GENMASK is not defined in uapi headers.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-02-08 08:41:04 -05:00
Dionna Glaze
882dd4aee3 kvm: x86: use a uapi-friendly macro for BIT
Change uapi header uses of BIT to instead use the uapi/linux/const.h bit
macros, since BIT is not defined in uapi headers.

The PMU mask uses _BITUL since it targets a 32 bit flag field, whereas
the longmode definition is meant for a 64 bit flag field.

Cc: Sean Christophersen <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: Dionna Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231207001142.3617856-1-dionnaglaze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-02-08 08:41:03 -05:00
Sean Christopherson
89ea60c2c7 KVM: x86: Add support for "protected VMs" that can utilize private memory
Add a new x86 VM type, KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM, to serve as a development
and testing vehicle for Confidential (CoCo) VMs, and potentially to even
become a "real" product in the distant future, e.g. a la pKVM.

The private memory support in KVM x86 is aimed at AMD's SEV-SNP and
Intel's TDX, but those technologies are extremely complex (understatement),
difficult to debug, don't support running as nested guests, and require
hardware that's isn't universally accessible.  I.e. relying SEV-SNP or TDX
for maintaining guest private memory isn't a realistic option.

At the very least, KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM will enable a variety of
selftests for guest_memfd and private memory support without requiring
unique hardware.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-24-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2023-11-14 08:01:05 -05:00
Oliver Upton
e65733b5c5 KVM: x86: Redefine 'longmode' as a flag for KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL
The 'longmode' field is a bit annoying as it blows an entire __u32 to
represent a boolean value. Since other architectures are looking to add
support for KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL, now is probably a good time to clean it
up.

Redefine the field (and the remaining padding) as a set of flags.
Preserve the existing ABI by using bit 0 to indicate if the guest was in
long mode and requiring that the remaining 31 bits must be zero.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230404154050.2270077-2-oliver.upton@linux.dev
2023-04-05 12:07:41 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini
157ed9cb04 KVM x86 PMU changes for 6.3:
- Add support for created masked events for the PMU filter to allow
    userspace to heavily restrict what events the guest can use without
    needing to create an absurd number of events
 
  - Clean up KVM's handling of "PMU MSRs to save", especially when vPMU
    support is disabled
 
  - Add PEBS support for Intel SPR
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Merge tag 'kvm-x86-pmu-6.3' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD

KVM x86 PMU changes for 6.3:

 - Add support for created masked events for the PMU filter to allow
   userspace to heavily restrict what events the guest can use without
   needing to create an absurd number of events

 - Clean up KVM's handling of "PMU MSRs to save", especially when vPMU
   support is disabled

 - Add PEBS support for Intel SPR
2023-02-15 08:23:24 -05:00
Aaron Lewis
14329b825f KVM: x86/pmu: Introduce masked events to the pmu event filter
When building a list of filter events, it can sometimes be a challenge
to fit all the events needed to adequately restrict the guest into the
limited space available in the pmu event filter.  This stems from the
fact that the pmu event filter requires each event (i.e. event select +
unit mask) be listed, when the intention might be to restrict the
event select all together, regardless of it's unit mask.  Instead of
increasing the number of filter events in the pmu event filter, add a
new encoding that is able to do a more generalized match on the unit mask.

Introduce masked events as another encoding the pmu event filter
understands.  Masked events has the fields: mask, match, and exclude.
When filtering based on these events, the mask is applied to the guest's
unit mask to see if it matches the match value (i.e. umask & mask ==
match).  The exclude bit can then be used to exclude events from that
match.  E.g. for a given event select, if it's easier to say which unit
mask values shouldn't be filtered, a masked event can be set up to match
all possible unit mask values, then another masked event can be set up to
match the unit mask values that shouldn't be filtered.

Userspace can query to see if this feature exists by looking for the
capability, KVM_CAP_PMU_EVENT_MASKED_EVENTS.

This feature is enabled by setting the flags field in the pmu event
filter to KVM_PMU_EVENT_FLAG_MASKED_EVENTS.

Events can be encoded by using KVM_PMU_ENCODE_MASKED_ENTRY().

It is an error to have a bit set outside the valid bits for a masked
event, and calls to KVM_SET_PMU_EVENT_FILTER will return -EINVAL in
such cases, including the high bits of the event select (35:32) if
called on Intel.

With these updates the filter matching code has been updated to match on
a common event.  Masked events were flexible enough to handle both event
types, so they were used as the common event.  This changes how guest
events get filtered because regardless of the type of event used in the
uAPI, they will be converted to masked events.  Because of this there
could be a slight performance hit because instead of matching the filter
event with a lookup on event select + unit mask, it does a lookup on event
select then walks the unit masks to find the match.  This shouldn't be a
big problem because I would expect the set of common event selects to be
small, and if they aren't the set can likely be reduced by using masked
events to generalize the unit mask.  Using one type of event when
filtering guest events allows for a common code path to be used.

Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221220161236.555143-5-aaronlewis@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-01-24 10:06:12 -08:00
Kees Cook
6213b701a9 KVM: x86: Replace 0-length arrays with flexible arrays
Zero-length arrays are deprecated[1]. Replace struct kvm_nested_state's
"data" union 0-length arrays with flexible arrays. (How are the
sizes of these arrays verified?) Detected with GCC 13, using
-fstrict-flex-arrays=3:

arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c: In function 'svm_get_nested_state':
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c:1536:17: error: array subscript 0 is outside array bounds of 'struct kvm_svm_nested_state_data[0]' [-Werror=array-bounds=]
 1536 |                 &user_kvm_nested_state->data.svm[0];
      |                 ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from include/uapi/linux/kvm.h:15,
                 from include/linux/kvm_host.h:40,
                 from arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c:18:
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h:511:50: note: while referencing 'svm'
  511 |                 struct kvm_svm_nested_state_data svm[0];
      |                                                  ^~~

[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#zero-length-and-one-element-arrays

Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230105190548.never.323-kees@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230118195905.gonna.693-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-01-24 10:05:18 -08:00
Javier Martinez Canillas
66a9221d73 KVM: Delete all references to removed KVM_SET_MEMORY_ALIAS ioctl
The documentation says that the ioctl has been deprecated, but it has been
actually removed and the remaining references are just left overs.

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221202105011.185147-3-javierm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-12-02 12:54:40 -05:00
Aaron Lewis
8aff460f21 KVM: x86: Add a VALID_MASK for the flags in kvm_msr_filter_range
Add the mask KVM_MSR_FILTER_RANGE_VALID_MASK for the flags in the
struct kvm_msr_filter_range.  This simplifies checks that validate
these flags, and makes it easier to introduce new flags in the future.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220921151525.904162-5-aaronlewis@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-09 12:31:30 -05:00
Aaron Lewis
c1340fe359 KVM: x86: Add a VALID_MASK for the flag in kvm_msr_filter
Add the mask KVM_MSR_FILTER_VALID_MASK for the flag in the struct
kvm_msr_filter.  This makes it easier to introduce new flags in the
future.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220921151525.904162-4-aaronlewis@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-09 12:31:29 -05:00
Aaron Lewis
be83794210 KVM: x86: Disallow the use of KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_ALLOW in the kernel
Protect the kernel from using the flag KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_ALLOW.
Its value is 0, and using it incorrectly could have unintended
consequences. E.g. prevent someone in the kernel from writing something
like this.

if (filter.flags & KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_ALLOW)
        <allow the MSR>

and getting confused when it doesn't work.

It would be more ideal to remove this flag altogether, but userspace
may already be using it, so protecting the kernel is all that can
reasonably be done at this point.

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220921151525.904162-2-aaronlewis@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-09 12:31:28 -05:00
Linus Torvalds
7c5c3a6177 ARM:
* Unwinder implementations for both nVHE modes (classic and
   protected), complete with an overflow stack
 
 * Rework of the sysreg access from userspace, with a complete
   rewrite of the vgic-v3 view to allign with the rest of the
   infrastructure
 
 * Disagregation of the vcpu flags in separate sets to better track
   their use model.
 
 * A fix for the GICv2-on-v3 selftest
 
 * A small set of cosmetic fixes
 
 RISC-V:
 
 * Track ISA extensions used by Guest using bitmap
 
 * Added system instruction emulation framework
 
 * Added CSR emulation framework
 
 * Added gfp_custom flag in struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache
 
 * Added G-stage ioremap() and iounmap() functions
 
 * Added support for Svpbmt inside Guest
 
 s390:
 
 * add an interface to provide a hypervisor dump for secure guests
 
 * improve selftests to use TAP interface
 
 * enable interpretive execution of zPCI instructions (for PCI passthrough)
 
 * First part of deferred teardown
 
 * CPU Topology
 
 * PV attestation
 
 * Minor fixes
 
 x86:
 
 * Permit guests to ignore single-bit ECC errors
 
 * Intel IPI virtualization
 
 * Allow getting/setting pending triple fault with KVM_GET/SET_VCPU_EVENTS
 
 * PEBS virtualization
 
 * Simplify PMU emulation by just using PERF_TYPE_RAW events
 
 * More accurate event reinjection on SVM (avoid retrying instructions)
 
 * Allow getting/setting the state of the speaker port data bit
 
 * Refuse starting the kvm-intel module if VM-Entry/VM-Exit controls are inconsistent
 
 * "Notify" VM exit (detect microarchitectural hangs) for Intel
 
 * Use try_cmpxchg64 instead of cmpxchg64
 
 * Ignore benign host accesses to PMU MSRs when PMU is disabled
 
 * Allow disabling KVM's "MONITOR/MWAIT are NOPs!" behavior
 
 * Allow NX huge page mitigation to be disabled on a per-vm basis
 
 * Port eager page splitting to shadow MMU as well
 
 * Enable CMCI capability by default and handle injected UCNA errors
 
 * Expose pid of vcpu threads in debugfs
 
 * x2AVIC support for AMD
 
 * cleanup PIO emulation
 
 * Fixes for LLDT/LTR emulation
 
 * Don't require refcounted "struct page" to create huge SPTEs
 
 * Miscellaneous cleanups:
 ** MCE MSR emulation
 ** Use separate namespaces for guest PTEs and shadow PTEs bitmasks
 ** PIO emulation
 ** Reorganize rmap API, mostly around rmap destruction
 ** Do not workaround very old KVM bugs for L0 that runs with nesting enabled
 ** new selftests API for CPUID
 
 Generic:
 
 * Fix races in gfn->pfn cache refresh; do not pin pages tracked by the cache
 
 * new selftests API using struct kvm_vcpu instead of a (vm, id) tuple
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm

Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "Quite a large pull request due to a selftest API overhaul and some
  patches that had come in too late for 5.19.

  ARM:

   - Unwinder implementations for both nVHE modes (classic and
     protected), complete with an overflow stack

   - Rework of the sysreg access from userspace, with a complete rewrite
     of the vgic-v3 view to allign with the rest of the infrastructure

   - Disagregation of the vcpu flags in separate sets to better track
     their use model.

   - A fix for the GICv2-on-v3 selftest

   - A small set of cosmetic fixes

  RISC-V:

   - Track ISA extensions used by Guest using bitmap

   - Added system instruction emulation framework

   - Added CSR emulation framework

   - Added gfp_custom flag in struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache

   - Added G-stage ioremap() and iounmap() functions

   - Added support for Svpbmt inside Guest

  s390:

   - add an interface to provide a hypervisor dump for secure guests

   - improve selftests to use TAP interface

   - enable interpretive execution of zPCI instructions (for PCI
     passthrough)

   - First part of deferred teardown

   - CPU Topology

   - PV attestation

   - Minor fixes

  x86:

   - Permit guests to ignore single-bit ECC errors

   - Intel IPI virtualization

   - Allow getting/setting pending triple fault with
     KVM_GET/SET_VCPU_EVENTS

   - PEBS virtualization

   - Simplify PMU emulation by just using PERF_TYPE_RAW events

   - More accurate event reinjection on SVM (avoid retrying
     instructions)

   - Allow getting/setting the state of the speaker port data bit

   - Refuse starting the kvm-intel module if VM-Entry/VM-Exit controls
     are inconsistent

   - "Notify" VM exit (detect microarchitectural hangs) for Intel

   - Use try_cmpxchg64 instead of cmpxchg64

   - Ignore benign host accesses to PMU MSRs when PMU is disabled

   - Allow disabling KVM's "MONITOR/MWAIT are NOPs!" behavior

   - Allow NX huge page mitigation to be disabled on a per-vm basis

   - Port eager page splitting to shadow MMU as well

   - Enable CMCI capability by default and handle injected UCNA errors

   - Expose pid of vcpu threads in debugfs

   - x2AVIC support for AMD

   - cleanup PIO emulation

   - Fixes for LLDT/LTR emulation

   - Don't require refcounted "struct page" to create huge SPTEs

   - Miscellaneous cleanups:
      - MCE MSR emulation
      - Use separate namespaces for guest PTEs and shadow PTEs bitmasks
      - PIO emulation
      - Reorganize rmap API, mostly around rmap destruction
      - Do not workaround very old KVM bugs for L0 that runs with nesting enabled
      - new selftests API for CPUID

  Generic:

   - Fix races in gfn->pfn cache refresh; do not pin pages tracked by
     the cache

   - new selftests API using struct kvm_vcpu instead of a (vm, id)
     tuple"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (606 commits)
  selftests: kvm: set rax before vmcall
  selftests: KVM: Add exponent check for boolean stats
  selftests: KVM: Provide descriptive assertions in kvm_binary_stats_test
  selftests: KVM: Check stat name before other fields
  KVM: x86/mmu: remove unused variable
  RISC-V: KVM: Add support for Svpbmt inside Guest/VM
  RISC-V: KVM: Use PAGE_KERNEL_IO in kvm_riscv_gstage_ioremap()
  RISC-V: KVM: Add G-stage ioremap() and iounmap() functions
  KVM: Add gfp_custom flag in struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache
  RISC-V: KVM: Add extensible CSR emulation framework
  RISC-V: KVM: Add extensible system instruction emulation framework
  RISC-V: KVM: Factor-out instruction emulation into separate sources
  RISC-V: KVM: move preempt_disable() call in kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run
  RISC-V: KVM: Make kvm_riscv_guest_timer_init a void function
  RISC-V: KVM: Fix variable spelling mistake
  RISC-V: KVM: Improve ISA extension by using a bitmap
  KVM, x86/mmu: Fix the comment around kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_leafs()
  KVM: SVM: Dump Virtual Machine Save Area (VMSA) to klog
  KVM: x86/mmu: Treat NX as a valid SPTE bit for NPT
  KVM: x86: Do not block APIC write for non ICR registers
  ...
2022-08-04 14:59:54 -07:00
Sean Christopherson
43bb9e000e KVM: x86: Tweak name of MONITOR/MWAIT #UD quirk to make it #UD specific
Add a "UD" clause to KVM_X86_QUIRK_MWAIT_NEVER_FAULTS to make it clear
that the quirk only controls the #UD behavior of MONITOR/MWAIT.  KVM
doesn't currently enforce fault checks when MONITOR/MWAIT are supported,
but that could change in the future.  SVM also has a virtualization hole
in that it checks all faults before intercepts, and so "never faults" is
already a lie when running on SVM.

Fixes: bfbcc81bb8 ("KVM: x86: Add a quirk for KVM's "MONITOR/MWAIT are NOPs!" behavior")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220711225753.1073989-4-seanjc@google.com
2022-07-13 18:14:05 -07:00
Gustavo A. R. Silva
94dfc73e7c treewide: uapi: Replace zero-length arrays with flexible-array members
There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare
having a dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure.
Kernel code should always use “flexible array members”[1] for these
cases. The older style of one-element or zero-length arrays should
no longer be used[2].

This code was transformed with the help of Coccinelle:
(linux-5.19-rc2$ spatch --jobs $(getconf _NPROCESSORS_ONLN) --sp-file script.cocci --include-headers --dir . > output.patch)

@@
identifier S, member, array;
type T1, T2;
@@

struct S {
  ...
  T1 member;
  T2 array[
- 0
  ];
};

-fstrict-flex-arrays=3 is coming and we need to land these changes
to prevent issues like these in the short future:

../fs/minix/dir.c:337:3: warning: 'strcpy' will always overflow; destination buffer has size 0,
but the source string has length 2 (including NUL byte) [-Wfortify-source]
		strcpy(de3->name, ".");
		^

Since these are all [0] to [] changes, the risk to UAPI is nearly zero. If
this breaks anything, we can use a union with a new member name.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member
[2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.16/process/deprecated.html#zero-length-and-one-element-arrays

Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/78
Build-tested-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/62b675ec.wKX6AOZ6cbE71vtF%25lkp@intel.com/
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> # For ndctl.h
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
2022-06-28 21:26:05 +02:00
Sean Christopherson
bfbcc81bb8 KVM: x86: Add a quirk for KVM's "MONITOR/MWAIT are NOPs!" behavior
Add a quirk for KVM's behavior of emulating intercepted MONITOR/MWAIT
instructions a NOPs regardless of whether or not they are supported in
guest CPUID.  KVM's current behavior was likely motiviated by a certain
fruity operating system that expects MONITOR/MWAIT to be supported
unconditionally and blindly executes MONITOR/MWAIT without first checking
CPUID.  And because KVM does NOT advertise MONITOR/MWAIT to userspace,
that's effectively the default setup for any VMM that regurgitates
KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID to KVM_SET_CPUID2.

Note, this quirk interacts with KVM_X86_QUIRK_MISC_ENABLE_NO_MWAIT.  The
behavior is actually desirable, as userspace VMMs that want to
unconditionally hide MONITOR/MWAIT from the guest can leave the
MISC_ENABLE quirk enabled.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220608224516.3788274-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-06-20 11:50:42 -04:00
Paul Durrant
b172862241 KVM: x86: PIT: Preserve state of speaker port data bit
Currently the state of the speaker port (0x61) data bit (bit 1) is not
saved in the exported state (kvm_pit_state2) and hence is lost when
re-constructing guest state.

This patch removes the 'speaker_data_port' field from kvm_kpit_state and
instead tracks the state using a new KVM_PIT_FLAGS_SPEAKER_DATA_ON flag
defined in the API.

Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com>
Message-Id: <20220531124421.1427-1-pdurrant@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-06-08 13:06:20 -04:00
Chenyi Qiang
ed2351174e KVM: x86: Extend KVM_{G,S}ET_VCPU_EVENTS to support pending triple fault
For the triple fault sythesized by KVM, e.g. the RSM path or
nested_vmx_abort(), if KVM exits to userspace before the request is
serviced, userspace could migrate the VM and lose the triple fault.

Extend KVM_{G,S}ET_VCPU_EVENTS to support pending triple fault with a
new event KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_FAULT_FAULT so that userspace can save and
restore the triple fault event. This extension is guarded by a new KVM
capability KVM_CAP_TRIPLE_FAULT_EVENT.

Note that in the set_vcpu_events path, userspace is able to set/clear
the triple fault request through triple_fault.pending field.

Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220524135624.22988-2-chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-06-08 05:20:53 -04:00
Oliver Upton
f1a9761fbb KVM: x86: Allow userspace to opt out of hypercall patching
KVM handles the VMCALL/VMMCALL instructions very strangely. Even though
both of these instructions really should #UD when executed on the wrong
vendor's hardware (i.e. VMCALL on SVM, VMMCALL on VMX), KVM replaces the
guest's instruction with the appropriate instruction for the vendor.
Nonetheless, older guest kernels without commit c1118b3602 ("x86: kvm:
use alternatives for VMCALL vs. VMMCALL if kernel text is read-only")
do not patch in the appropriate instruction using alternatives, likely
motivating KVM's intervention.

Add a quirk allowing userspace to opt out of hypercall patching. If the
quirk is disabled, KVM synthesizes a #UD in the guest.

Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220316005538.2282772-2-oupton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-04-02 05:41:10 -04:00
Paolo Bonzini
dd6e631220 KVM: x86: add system attribute to retrieve full set of supported xsave states
Because KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID is meant to be passed (by simple-minded
VMMs) to KVM_SET_CPUID2, it cannot include any dynamic xsave states that
have not been enabled.  Probing those, for example so that they can be
passed to ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM, requires a new ioctl or arch_prctl.
The latter is in fact worse, even though that is what the rest of the
API uses, because it would require supported_xcr0 to be moved from the
KVM module to the kernel just for this use.  In addition, the value
would be nonsensical (or an error would have to be returned) until
the KVM module is loaded in.

Therefore, to limit the growth of system ioctls, add a /dev/kvm
variant of KVM_{GET,HAS}_DEVICE_ATTR, and implement it in x86
with just one group (0) and attribute (KVM_X86_XCOMP_GUEST_SUPP).

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-01-28 07:33:32 -05:00
Guang Zeng
be50b2065d kvm: x86: Add support for getting/setting expanded xstate buffer
With KVM_CAP_XSAVE, userspace uses a hardcoded 4KB buffer to get/set
xstate data from/to KVM. This doesn't work when dynamic xfeatures
(e.g. AMX) are exposed to the guest as they require a larger buffer
size.

Introduce a new capability (KVM_CAP_XSAVE2). Userspace VMM gets the
required xstate buffer size via KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_XSAVE2).
KVM_SET_XSAVE is extended to work with both legacy and new capabilities
by doing properly-sized memdup_user() based on the guest fpu container.
KVM_GET_XSAVE is kept for backward-compatible reason. Instead,
KVM_GET_XSAVE2 is introduced under KVM_CAP_XSAVE2 as the preferred
interface for getting xstate buffer (4KB or larger size) from KVM
(Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/12/15/510)

Also, update the api doc with the new KVM_GET_XSAVE2 ioctl.

Signed-off-by: Guang Zeng <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-19-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-01-14 13:44:41 -05:00
Oliver Upton
828ca89628 KVM: x86: Expose TSC offset controls to userspace
To date, VMM-directed TSC synchronization and migration has been a bit
messy. KVM has some baked-in heuristics around TSC writes to infer if
the VMM is attempting to synchronize. This is problematic, as it depends
on host userspace writing to the guest's TSC within 1 second of the last
write.

A much cleaner approach to configuring the guest's views of the TSC is to
simply migrate the TSC offset for every vCPU. Offsets are idempotent,
and thus not subject to change depending on when the VMM actually
reads/writes values from/to KVM. The VMM can then read the TSC once with
KVM_GET_CLOCK to capture a (realtime, host_tsc) pair at the instant when
the guest is paused.

Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210916181538.968978-8-oupton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-10-18 14:43:45 -04:00
Maxim Levitsky
61e5f69ef0 KVM: x86: implement KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQ
KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQ will allow KVM to block all interrupts
while running.

This change is mostly intended for more robust single stepping
of the guest and it has the following benefits when enabled:

* Resuming from a breakpoint is much more reliable.
  When resuming execution from a breakpoint, with interrupts enabled,
  more often than not, KVM would inject an interrupt and make the CPU
  jump immediately to the interrupt handler and eventually return to
  the breakpoint, to trigger it again.

  From the user point of view it looks like the CPU never executed a
  single instruction and in some cases that can even prevent forward
  progress, for example, when the breakpoint is placed by an automated
  script (e.g lx-symbols), which does something in response to the
  breakpoint and then continues the guest automatically.
  If the script execution takes enough time for another interrupt to
  arrive, the guest will be stuck on the same breakpoint RIP forever.

* Normal single stepping is much more predictable, since it won't
  land the debugger into an interrupt handler.

* RFLAGS.TF has less chance to be leaked to the guest:

  We set that flag behind the guest's back to do single stepping
  but if single step lands us into an interrupt/exception handler
  it will be leaked to the guest in the form of being pushed
  to the stack.
  This doesn't completely eliminate this problem as exceptions
  can still happen, but at least this reduces the chances
  of this happening.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210811122927.900604-6-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-08-20 16:06:37 -04:00
Maxim Levitsky
6dba940352 KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_SREGS2 / KVM_SET_SREGS2
This is a new version of KVM_GET_SREGS / KVM_SET_SREGS.

It has the following changes:
   * Has flags for future extensions
   * Has vcpu's PDPTRs, allowing to save/restore them on migration.
   * Lacks obsolete interrupt bitmap (done now via KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS)

New capability, KVM_CAP_SREGS2 is added to signal
the userspace of this ioctl.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210607090203.133058-8-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:47 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
70f094f4f0 KVM: nVMX: Properly pad 'struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_hdr'
Eliminate the probably unwanted hole in 'struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_hdr':

Pre-patch:
struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_hdr {
        __u64                      vmxon_pa;             /*     0     8 */
        __u64                      vmcs12_pa;            /*     8     8 */
        struct {
                __u16              flags;                /*    16     2 */
        } smm;                                           /*    16     2 */

        /* XXX 2 bytes hole, try to pack */

        __u32                      flags;                /*    20     4 */
        __u64                      preemption_timer_deadline; /*    24     8 */
};

Post-patch:
struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_hdr {
        __u64                      vmxon_pa;             /*     0     8 */
        __u64                      vmcs12_pa;            /*     8     8 */
        struct {
                __u16              flags;                /*    16     2 */
        } smm;                                           /*    16     2 */
        __u16                      pad;                  /*    18     2 */
        __u32                      flags;                /*    20     4 */
        __u64                      preemption_timer_deadline; /*    24     8 */
};

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210503150854.1144255-3-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-05-07 06:06:13 -04:00
Chenyi Qiang
fe6b6bc802 KVM: VMX: Enable bus lock VM exit
Virtual Machine can exploit bus locks to degrade the performance of
system. Bus lock can be caused by split locked access to writeback(WB)
memory or by using locks on uncacheable(UC) memory. The bus lock is
typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache
line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for
the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can
complete).

To address the threat, bus lock VM exit is introduced to notify the VMM
when a bus lock was acquired, allowing it to enforce throttling or other
policy based mitigations.

A VMM can enable VM exit due to bus locks by setting a new "Bus Lock
Detection" VM-execution control(bit 30 of Secondary Processor-based VM
execution controls). If delivery of this VM exit was preempted by a
higher priority VM exit (e.g. EPT misconfiguration, EPT violation, APIC
access VM exit, APIC write VM exit, exception bitmap exiting), bit 26 of
exit reason in vmcs field is set to 1.

In current implementation, the KVM exposes this capability through
KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT. The user can get the supported mode bitmap
(i.e. off and exit) and enable it explicitly (disabled by default). If
bus locks in guest are detected by KVM, exit to user space even when
current exit reason is handled by KVM internally. Set a new field
KVM_RUN_BUS_LOCK in vcpu->run->flags to inform the user space that there
is a bus lock detected in guest.

Document for Bus Lock VM exit is now available at the latest "Intel
Architecture Instruction Set Extensions Programming Reference".

Document Link:
https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/download/intel-architecture-instruction-set-extensions-programming-reference.html

Co-developed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20201106090315.18606-4-chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-04 05:27:21 -05:00
Peter Xu
fb04a1eddb KVM: X86: Implement ring-based dirty memory tracking
This patch is heavily based on previous work from Lei Cao
<lei.cao@stratus.com> and Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>. [1]

KVM currently uses large bitmaps to track dirty memory.  These bitmaps
are copied to userspace when userspace queries KVM for its dirty page
information.  The use of bitmaps is mostly sufficient for live
migration, as large parts of memory are be dirtied from one log-dirty
pass to another.  However, in a checkpointing system, the number of
dirty pages is small and in fact it is often bounded---the VM is
paused when it has dirtied a pre-defined number of pages. Traversing a
large, sparsely populated bitmap to find set bits is time-consuming,
as is copying the bitmap to user-space.

A similar issue will be there for live migration when the guest memory
is huge while the page dirty procedure is trivial.  In that case for
each dirty sync we need to pull the whole dirty bitmap to userspace
and analyse every bit even if it's mostly zeros.

The preferred data structure for above scenarios is a dense list of
guest frame numbers (GFN).  This patch series stores the dirty list in
kernel memory that can be memory mapped into userspace to allow speedy
harvesting.

This patch enables dirty ring for X86 only.  However it should be
easily extended to other archs as well.

[1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10471409/

Signed-off-by: Lei Cao <lei.cao@stratus.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201001012222.5767-1-peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-11-15 09:49:15 -05:00
Alexander Graf
1a155254ff KVM: x86: Introduce MSR filtering
It's not desireable to have all MSRs always handled by KVM kernel space. Some
MSRs would be useful to handle in user space to either emulate behavior (like
uCode updates) or differentiate whether they are valid based on the CPU model.

To allow user space to specify which MSRs it wants to see handled by KVM,
this patch introduces a new ioctl to push filter rules with bitmaps into
KVM. Based on these bitmaps, KVM can then decide whether to reject MSR access.
With the addition of KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR it can also deflect the
denied MSR events to user space to operate on.

If no filter is populated, MSR handling stays identical to before.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>

Message-Id: <20200925143422.21718-8-graf@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-09-28 07:58:08 -04:00
Alexander Graf
51de8151bd KVM: x86: Add infrastructure for MSR filtering
In the following commits we will add pieces of MSR filtering.
To ensure that code compiles even with the feature half-merged, let's add
a few stubs and struct definitions before the real patches start.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>

Message-Id: <20200925143422.21718-4-graf@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-09-28 07:58:05 -04:00
Paolo Bonzini
83d31e5271 KVM: nVMX: fixes for preemption timer migration
Commit 850448f35a ("KVM: nVMX: Fix VMX preemption timer migration",
2020-06-01) accidentally broke nVMX live migration from older version
by changing the userspace ABI.  Restore it and, while at it, ensure
that vmx->nested.has_preemption_timer_deadline is always initialized
according to the KVM_STATE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_DEADLINE flag.

Cc: Makarand Sonare <makarandsonare@google.com>
Fixes: 850448f35a ("KVM: nVMX: Fix VMX preemption timer migration")
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-07-10 06:15:36 -04:00
Peter Shier
850448f35a KVM: nVMX: Fix VMX preemption timer migration
Add new field to hold preemption timer expiration deadline
appended to struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_hdr. This is to prevent
the first VM-Enter after migration from incorrectly restarting the timer
with the full timer value instead of partially decayed timer value.
KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE restarts timer using migrated state regardless
of whether L1 sets VM_EXIT_SAVE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER.

Fixes: cf8b84f48a ("kvm: nVMX: Prepare for checkpointing L2 state")

Signed-off-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Makarand Sonare <makarandsonare@google.com>
Message-Id: <20200526215107.205814-2-makarandsonare@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-06-01 04:26:10 -04:00
Paolo Bonzini
cc440cdad5 KVM: nSVM: implement KVM_GET_NESTED_STATE and KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE
Similar to VMX, the state that is captured through the currently available
IOCTLs is a mix of L1 and L2 state, dependent on whether the L2 guest was
running at the moment when the process was interrupted to save its state.

In particular, the SVM-specific state for nested virtualization includes
the L1 saved state (including the interrupt flag), the cached L2 controls,
and the GIF.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-06-01 04:26:05 -04:00
Oliver Upton
5ef8acbdd6 KVM: nVMX: Emulate MTF when performing instruction emulation
Since commit 5f3d45e7f2 ("kvm/x86: add support for
MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG"), KVM has allowed an L1 guest to use the monitor trap
flag processor-based execution control for its L2 guest. KVM simply
forwards any MTF VM-exits to the L1 guest, which works for normal
instruction execution.

However, when KVM needs to emulate an instruction on the behalf of an L2
guest, the monitor trap flag is not emulated. Add the necessary logic to
kvm_skip_emulated_instruction() to synthesize an MTF VM-exit to L1 upon
instruction emulation for L2.

Fixes: 5f3d45e7f2 ("kvm/x86: add support for MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG")
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-02-23 09:36:23 +01:00
Eric Hankland
30cd860432 KVM: x86: Add fixed counters to PMU filter
Updates KVM_CAP_PMU_EVENT_FILTER so it can also whitelist or blacklist
fixed counters.

Signed-off-by: Eric Hankland <ehankland@google.com>
[No need to check padding fields for zero. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-07-20 09:00:48 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini
a45ff5994c KVM/arm updates for 5.3
- Add support for chained PMU counters in guests
 - Improve SError handling
 - Handle Neoverse N1 erratum #1349291
 - Allow side-channel mitigation status to be migrated
 - Standardise most AArch64 system register accesses to msr_s/mrs_s
 - Fix host MPIDR corruption on 32bit
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Merge tag 'kvm-arm-for-5.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm updates for 5.3

- Add support for chained PMU counters in guests
- Improve SError handling
- Handle Neoverse N1 erratum #1349291
- Allow side-channel mitigation status to be migrated
- Standardise most AArch64 system register accesses to msr_s/mrs_s
- Fix host MPIDR corruption on 32bit
2019-07-11 15:14:16 +02:00
Eric Hankland
66bb8a065f KVM: x86: PMU Event Filter
Some events can provide a guest with information about other guests or the
host (e.g. L3 cache stats); providing the capability to restrict access
to a "safe" set of events would limit the potential for the PMU to be used
in any side channel attacks. This change introduces a new VM ioctl that
sets an event filter. If the guest attempts to program a counter for
any blacklisted or non-whitelisted event, the kernel counter won't be
created, so any RDPMC/RDMSR will show 0 instances of that event.

Signed-off-by: Eric Hankland <ehankland@google.com>
[Lots of changes. All remaining bugs are probably mine. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-07-11 15:08:28 +02:00
Liran Alon
6ca00dfafd KVM: x86: Modify struct kvm_nested_state to have explicit fields for data
Improve the KVM_{GET,SET}_NESTED_STATE structs by detailing the format
of VMX nested state data in a struct.

In order to avoid changing the ioctl values of
KVM_{GET,SET}_NESTED_STATE, there is a need to preserve
sizeof(struct kvm_nested_state). This is done by defining the data
struct as "data.vmx[0]". It was the most elegant way I found to
preserve struct size while still keeping struct readable and easy to
maintain. It does have a misfortunate side-effect that now it has to be
accessed as "data.vmx[0]" rather than just "data.vmx".

Because we are already modifying these structs, I also modified the
following:
* Define the "format" field values as macros.
* Rename vmcs_pa to vmcs12_pa for better readability.

Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
[Remove SVM stubs, add KVM_STATE_NESTED_VMX_VMCS12_SIZE. - Paolo]
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-06-19 16:11:52 +02:00
Wanpeng Li
511a8556e3 KVM: X86: Emulate MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE MWAIT bit
MSR IA32_MISC_ENABLE bit 18, according to SDM:

| When this bit is set to 0, the MONITOR feature flag is not set (CPUID.01H:ECX[bit 3] = 0).
| This indicates that MONITOR/MWAIT are not supported.
|
| Software attempts to execute MONITOR/MWAIT will cause #UD when this bit is 0.
|
| When this bit is set to 1 (default), MONITOR/MWAIT are supported (CPUID.01H:ECX[bit 3] = 1).

The CPUID.01H:ECX[bit 3] ought to mirror the value of the MSR bit,
CPUID.01H:ECX[bit 3] is a better guard than kvm_mwait_in_guest().
kvm_mwait_in_guest() affects the behavior of MONITOR/MWAIT, not its
guest visibility.

This patch implements toggling of the CPUID bit based on guest writes
to the MSR.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
[Fixes for backwards compatibility - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-06-04 19:29:09 +02:00
Sean Christopherson
8764ed55c9 KVM: x86: Whitelist port 0x7e for pre-incrementing %rip
KVM's recent bug fix to update %rip after emulating I/O broke userspace
that relied on the previous behavior of incrementing %rip prior to
exiting to userspace.  When running a Windows XP guest on AMD hardware,
Qemu may patch "OUT 0x7E" instructions in reaction to the OUT itself.
Because KVM's old behavior was to increment %rip before exiting to
userspace to handle the I/O, Qemu manually adjusted %rip to account for
the OUT instruction.

Arguably this is a userspace bug as KVM requires userspace to re-enter
the kernel to complete instruction emulation before taking any other
actions.  That being said, this is a bit of a grey area and breaking
userspace that has worked for many years is bad.

Pre-increment %rip on OUT to port 0x7e before exiting to userspace to
hack around the issue.

Fixes: 45def77ebf ("KVM: x86: update %rip after emulating IO")
Reported-by: Simon Becherer <simon@becherer.de>
Reported-and-tested-by: Iakov Karpov <srid@rkmail.ru>
Reported-by: Gabriele Balducci <balducci@units.it>
Reported-by: Antti Antinoja <reader@fennosys.fi>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-04-30 21:03:42 +02:00
Jim Mattson
59073aaf6d kvm: x86: Add exception payload fields to kvm_vcpu_events
The per-VM capability KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD (to be introduced in a
later commit) adds the following fields to struct kvm_vcpu_events:
exception_has_payload, exception_payload, and exception.pending.

With this capability set, all of the details of vcpu->arch.exception,
including the payload for a pending exception, are reported to
userspace in response to KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS.

With this capability clear, the original ABI is preserved, and the
exception.injected field is set for either pending or injected
exceptions.

When userspace calls KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS with
KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD clear, exception.injected is no longer
translated to exception.pending. KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS can now only
establish a pending exception when KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD is set.

Reported-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-10-17 19:07:38 +02:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
8cab6507f6 x86/kvm/nVMX: nested state migration for Enlightened VMCS
Add support for get/set of nested state when Enlightened VMCS is in use.
A new KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS flag to indicate eVMCS on the vCPU was enabled
is added.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-10-17 00:30:19 +02:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
d176620277 x86/kvm/lapic: always disable MMIO interface in x2APIC mode
When VMX is used with flexpriority disabled (because of no support or
if disabled with module parameter) MMIO interface to lAPIC is still
available in x2APIC mode while it shouldn't be (kvm-unit-tests):

PASS: apic_disable: Local apic enabled in x2APIC mode
PASS: apic_disable: CPUID.1H:EDX.APIC[bit 9] is set
FAIL: apic_disable: *0xfee00030: 50014

The issue appears because we basically do nothing while switching to
x2APIC mode when APIC access page is not used. apic_mmio_{read,write}
only check if lAPIC is disabled before proceeding to actual write.

When APIC access is virtualized we correctly manipulate with VMX controls
in vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode() and we don't get vmexits from memory writes
in x2APIC mode so there's no issue.

Disabling MMIO interface seems to be easy. The question is: what do we
do with these reads and writes? If we add apic_x2apic_mode() check to
apic_mmio_in_range() and return -EOPNOTSUPP these reads and writes will
go to userspace. When lAPIC is in kernel, Qemu uses this interface to
inject MSIs only (see kvm_apic_mem_write() in hw/i386/kvm/apic.c). This
somehow works with disabled lAPIC but when we're in xAPIC mode we will
get a real injected MSI from every write to lAPIC. Not good.

The simplest solution seems to be to just ignore writes to the region
and return ~0 for all reads when we're in x2APIC mode. This is what this
patch does. However, this approach is inconsistent with what currently
happens when flexpriority is enabled: we allocate APIC access page and
create KVM memory region so in x2APIC modes all reads and writes go to
this pre-allocated page which is, btw, the same for all vCPUs.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-09-20 00:26:43 +02:00
Jim Mattson
8fcc4b5923 kvm: nVMX: Introduce KVM_CAP_NESTED_STATE
For nested virtualization L0 KVM is managing a bit of state for L2 guests,
this state can not be captured through the currently available IOCTLs. In
fact the state captured through all of these IOCTLs is usually a mix of L1
and L2 state. It is also dependent on whether the L2 guest was running at
the moment when the process was interrupted to save its state.

With this capability, there are two new vcpu ioctls: KVM_GET_NESTED_STATE
and KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE. These can be used for saving and restoring a VM
that is in VMX operation.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
[karahmed@ - rename structs and functions and make them ready for AMD and
             address previous comments.
           - handle nested.smm state.
           - rebase & a bit of refactoring.
           - Merge 7/8 and 8/8 into one patch. ]
Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-08-06 17:58:30 +02:00
Ken Hofsass
01643c51bf KVM: x86: KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS
This commit implements an enhanced x86 version of S390
KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS functionality. KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS "allow[s]
userspace to access certain guest registers without having
to call SET/GET_*REGS”. This reduces ioctl overhead which
is particularly important when userspace is making synchronous
guest state modifications (e.g. when emulating and/or intercepting
instructions).

Originally implemented upstream for the S390, the x86 differences
follow:
- userspace can select the register sets to be synchronized with kvm_run
using bit-flags in the kvm_valid_registers and kvm_dirty_registers
fields.
- vcpu_events is available in addition to the regs and sregs register
sets.

Signed-off-by: Ken Hofsass <hofsass@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[Removed wrapper around check for reserved kvm_valid_regs. - Radim]
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2018-03-06 18:40:43 +01:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman
6f52b16c5b License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with no license
Many user space API headers are missing licensing information, which
makes it hard for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default are files without license information under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPLV2.  Marking them GPLV2 would exclude
them from being included in non GPLV2 code, which is obviously not
intended. The user space API headers fall under the syscall exception
which is in the kernels COPYING file:

   NOTE! This copyright does *not* cover user programs that use kernel
   services by normal system calls - this is merely considered normal use
   of the kernel, and does *not* fall under the heading of "derived work".

otherwise syscall usage would not be possible.

Update the files which contain no license information with an SPDX
license identifier.  The chosen identifier is 'GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note' which is the officially assigned identifier for the
Linux syscall exception.  SPDX license identifiers are a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.  See the previous patch in this series for the
methodology of how this patch was researched.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-02 11:19:54 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini
4b4357e025 kvm: make KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_PAGE_OFFSET public
Its value has never changed; we might as well make it part of the ABI instead
of using the return value of KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_COALESCED_MMIO).

Because PPC does not always make MMIO available, the code has to be made
dependent on CONFIG_KVM_MMIO rather than KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_PAGE_OFFSET.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-07 16:49:01 +02:00