The test in ovl_dentry_version_inc() was out-dated and did not include
the case where readdir cache is used on a non-merge dir that has origin
xattr, indicating that it may contain leftover whiteouts.
To make the code more robust, use the same helper ovl_dir_is_real()
to determine if readdir cache should be used and if readdir cache should
be invalidated.
Fixes: b79e05aaa1 ("ovl: no direct iteration for dir with origin xattr")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/CAOQ4uxht70nODhNHNwGFMSqDyOKLXOKrY0H6g849os4BQ7cokA@mail.gmail.com/
Cc: Chris Murphy <lists@colorremedies.com>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
A typo is found out by codespell tool:
$ codespell ./fs/overlayfs/
./fs/overlayfs/util.c:217: dependig ==> depending
Fix a typo found by codespell.
Signed-off-by: Xiong Zhenwu <xiong.zhenwu@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdfhttps://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
1d7b902e28
In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
that port has been done correctly.
The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
mounts based on file descriptors only.
Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
path resolution.
While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.
With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
projects.
There is a simple tool available at
https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped
that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
decide to pull this in the following weeks:
Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
directory:
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: mnt/my-file
# owner: u1001
# group: u1001
user::rw-
user:u1001:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
# owner: ubuntu
# group: ubuntu
user::rw-
user:ubuntu:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--"
* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
xfs: support idmapped mounts
ext4: support idmapped mounts
fat: handle idmapped mounts
tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
fs: add mount_setattr()
fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
fs: split out functions to hold writers
namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ima: handle idmapped mounts
apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
exec: handle idmapped mounts
would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
...
Overlayfs's volatile option allows the user to bypass all forced sync calls
to the upperdir filesystem. This comes at the cost of safety. We can never
ensure that the user's data is intact, but we can make a best effort to
expose whether or not the data is likely to be in a bad state.
The best way to handle this in the time being is that if an overlayfs's
upperdir experiences an error after a volatile mount occurs, that error
will be returned on fsync, fdatasync, sync, and syncfs. This is
contradictory to the traditional behaviour of VFS which fails the call
once, and only raises an error if a subsequent fsync error has occurred,
and been raised by the filesystem.
One awkward aspect of the patch is that we have to manually set the
superblock's errseq_t after the sync_fs callback as opposed to just
returning an error from syncfs. This is because the call chain looks
something like this:
sys_syncfs ->
sync_filesystem ->
__sync_filesystem ->
/* The return value is ignored here
sb->s_op->sync_fs(sb)
_sync_blockdev
/* Where the VFS fetches the error to raise to userspace */
errseq_check_and_advance
Because of this we call errseq_set every time the sync_fs callback occurs.
Due to the nature of this seen / unseen dichotomy, if the upperdir is an
inconsistent state at the initial mount time, overlayfs will refuse to
mount, as overlayfs cannot get a snapshot of the upperdir's errseq that
will increment on error until the user calls syncfs.
Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Suggested-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Fixes: c86243b090 ("ovl: provide a mount option "volatile"")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
The inode_owner_or_capable() helper determines whether the caller is the
owner of the inode or is capable with respect to that inode. Allow it to
handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped
mount it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks
are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is
passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical
behavior as before.
Similarly, allow the inode_init_owner() helper to handle idmapped
mounts. It initializes a new inode on idmapped mounts by mapping the
fsuid and fsgid of the caller from the mount's user namespace. If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-7-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The two helpers inode_permission() and generic_permission() are used by
the vfs to perform basic permission checking by verifying that the
caller is privileged over an inode. In order to handle idmapped mounts
we extend the two helpers with an additional user namespace argument.
On idmapped mounts the two helpers will make sure to map the inode
according to the mount's user namespace and then peform identical
permission checks to inode_permission() and generic_permission(). If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-6-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
When looking up an inode on the lower layer for which the mounter lacks
read permisison the metacopy check will fail. This causes the lookup to
fail as well, even though the directory is readable.
So ignore EACCES for the "userxattr" case and assume no metacopy for the
unreadable file.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Optionally allow using "user.overlay." namespace instead of
"trusted.overlay."
This is necessary for overlayfs to be able to be mounted in an unprivileged
namepsace.
Make the option explicit, since it makes the filesystem format be
incompatible.
Disable redirect_dir and metacopy options, because these would allow
privilege escalation through direct manipulation of the
"user.overlay.redirect" or "user.overlay.metacopy" xattrs.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH is required by open_by_handle_at(2) so check it in
ovl_decode_real_fh() as well to prevent privilege escalation for
unprivileged overlay mounts.
[Amir] If the mounter is not capable in init ns, ovl_check_origin() and
ovl_verify_index() will not function as expected and this will break index
and nfs export features. So check capability in ovl_can_decode_fh(), to
auto disable those features.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
This will be used in next patch to be able to change uuid checks and add
uuid nullification based on ofs->config.index for a new "uuid=off" mode.
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Instead of passing the xattr name down to the ovl_do_*xattr() accessor
functions, pass an enumerated value. The enum can use the same names as
the the previous #define for each xattr name.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Use the convention of calling ovl_do_foo() for operations which are overlay
specific.
This patch is a no-op, and will have significance for supporting
"user.overlay." xattr namespace.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
This is a partial revert (with some cleanups) of commit 993a0b2aec ("ovl:
Do not lose security.capability xattr over metadata file copy-up"), which
introduced ovl_getxattr() in the first place.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
ovl_getattr() returns the value of an xattr in a kmalloced buffer. There
are two callers:
ovl_copy_up_meta_inode_data() (copy_up.c)
ovl_get_redirect_xattr() (util.c)
This patch just copies ovl_getxattr() to copy_up.c, the following patches
will deal with the differences in idividual callers.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Check permission before opening a real file.
ovl_path_open() is used by readdir and copy-up routines.
ovl_permission() theoretically already checked copy up permissions, but it
doesn't hurt to re-do these checks during the actual copy-up.
For directory reading ovl_permission() only checks access to topmost
underlying layer. Readdir on a merged directory accesses layers below the
topmost one as well. Permission wasn't checked for these layers.
Note: modifying ovl_permission() to perform this check would be far more
complex and hence more bug prone. The result is less precise permissions
returned in access(2). If this turns out to be an issue, we can revisit
this bug.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Share inode with different whiteout files for saving inode and speeding up
delete operation.
If EMLINK is encountered when linking a shared whiteout, create a new one.
In case of any other error, disable sharing for this super block.
Note: ofs->whiteout is protected by inode lock on workdir.
Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@mykernel.net>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
No reason to prevent upper layer being a remote filesystem. Do the
revalidation in that case, just as we already do for lower layers.
This lets virtiofs be used as upper layer, which appears to be a real use
case.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Allow completely skipping ->revalidate() on a per-dentry basis, in case the
underlying layers used for a dentry do not themselves have ->revalidate().
E.g. negative overlay dentry has no underlying layers, hence revalidate is
unnecessary. Or if lower layer is remote but overlay dentry is pure-upper,
then can skip revalidate.
The following places need to update whether the dentry needs revalidate or
not:
- fill-super (root dentry)
- lookup
- create
- fh_to_dentry
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Following patch will allow remote as upper layer, but not overlay stacked
on upper layer. Separate the two concepts.
This patch is doesn't change behavior.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Move i_ino initialization to ovl_inode_init() to avoid the dance of setting
i_ino in ovl_fill_inode() sometimes on the first call and sometimes on the
seconds call.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
ovl_inode_update() is no longer called from create object code path.
Fixes: 01b39dcc95 ("ovl: use inode_insert5() to hash a newly...")
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
ovl_inode_lock() is interruptible. When inode_lock() in ovl_llseek()
was replaced with ovl_inode_lock(), we did not add a check for error.
Fix this by making ovl_inode_lock() uninterruptible and change the
existing call sites to use an _interruptible variant.
Reported-by: syzbot+66a9752fa927f745385e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: b1f9d3858f ("ovl: use ovl_inode_lock in ovl_llseek()")
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
No code uses the sb returned from this helper, so make it retrun a boolean
and rename it to ovl_same_fs().
The xino mode is irrelevant when all layers are on same fs, so instead of
describing samefs with mode OVL_XINO_OFF, use a new xino_mode state, which
is 0 in the case of samefs, -1 in the case of xino=off and > 0 with xino
enabled.
Create a new helper ovl_same_dev(), to use instead of the common check for
(ovl_same_fs() || xinobits).
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation #
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Overlapping overlay layers are not supported and can cause unexpected
behavior, but overlayfs does not currently check or warn about these
configurations.
User is not supposed to specify the same directory for upper and
lower dirs or for different lower layers and user is not supposed to
specify directories that are descendants of each other for overlay
layers, but that is exactly what this zysbot repro did:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=12c7a94f400000
Moving layer root directories into other layers while overlayfs
is mounted could also result in unexpected behavior.
This commit places "traps" in the overlay inode hash table.
Those traps are dummy overlay inodes that are hashed by the layers
root inodes.
On mount, the hash table trap entries are used to verify that overlay
layers are not overlapping. While at it, we also verify that overlay
layers are not overlapping with directories "in-use" by other overlay
instances as upperdir/workdir.
On lookup, the trap entries are used to verify that overlay layers
root inodes have not been moved into other layers after mount.
Some examples:
$ ./run --ov --samefs -s
...
( mkdir -p base/upper/0/u base/upper/0/w base/lower lower upper mnt
mount -o bind base/lower lower
mount -o bind base/upper upper
mount -t overlay none mnt ...
-o lowerdir=lower,upperdir=upper/0/u,workdir=upper/0/w)
$ umount mnt
$ mount -t overlay none mnt ...
-o lowerdir=base,upperdir=upper/0/u,workdir=upper/0/w
[ 94.434900] overlayfs: overlapping upperdir path
mount: mount overlay on mnt failed: Too many levels of symbolic links
$ mount -t overlay none mnt ...
-o lowerdir=upper/0/u,upperdir=upper/0/u,workdir=upper/0/w
[ 151.350132] overlayfs: conflicting lowerdir path
mount: none is already mounted or mnt busy
$ mount -t overlay none mnt ...
-o lowerdir=lower:lower/a,upperdir=upper/0/u,workdir=upper/0/w
[ 201.205045] overlayfs: overlapping lowerdir path
mount: mount overlay on mnt failed: Too many levels of symbolic links
$ mount -t overlay none mnt ...
-o lowerdir=lower,upperdir=upper/0/u,workdir=upper/0/w
$ mv base/upper/0/ base/lower/
$ find mnt/0
mnt/0
mnt/0/w
find: 'mnt/0/w/work': Too many levels of symbolic links
find: 'mnt/0/u': Too many levels of symbolic links
Reported-by: syzbot+9c69c282adc4edd2b540@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
If a file has been copied up metadata only, and later data is copied up,
upper loses any security.capability xattr it has (underlying filesystem
clears it as upon file write).
From a user's point of view, this is just a file copy-up and that should
not result in losing security.capability xattr. Hence, before data copy
up, save security.capability xattr (if any) and restore it on upper after
data copy up is complete.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Fixes: 0c28887493 ("ovl: A new xattr OVL_XATTR_METACOPY for file on upper")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
It just makes the interface strange without adding any significant value.
The only case where locked is false and return value is 0 is in
ovl_rename() when new is negative, so handle that case explicitly in
ovl_rename().
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
We use uuid to associate an overlay lower file handle with a lower layer,
so we can accept lower fs with null uuid as long as all lower layers with
null uuid are on the same fs.
This change allows enabling index and nfs_export features for the setup of
single lower fs of type squashfs - squashfs supports file handles, but has
a null uuid. This change also allows enabling index and nfs_export features
for nested overlayfs, where the lower overlay has nfs_export enabled.
Enabling the index feature with single lower squashfs fixes the
unionmount-testsuite test:
./run --ov --squashfs --verify
As a by-product, if, like the lower squashfs, upper fs also uses the
generic export_encode_fh() implementation to export 32bit inode file
handles (e.g. ext4), then the xino_auto config/module/mount option will
enable unique overlay inode numbers.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
The memory leak was detected by kmemleak when running xfstests
overlay/051,053
Fixes: caf70cb2ba ("ovl: cleanup orphan index entries")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Right now we seem to check redirect only if upperdentry is found. But it
is possible that there is no upperdentry but later we found an index.
We need to check redirect on index as well and set it in
ovl_inode->redirect. Otherwise link code can assume that dentry does not
have redirect and place a new one which breaks things. In my testing
overlay/033 test started failing in xfstests. Following are the details.
For example do following.
$ mkdir lower upper work merged
- Make lower dir with 4 links.
$ echo "foo" > lower/l0.txt
$ ln lower/l0.txt lower/l1.txt
$ ln lower/l0.txt lower/l2.txt
$ ln lower/l0.txt lower/l3.txt
- Mount with index on and metacopy on.
$ mount -t overlay -o lowerdir=lower,upperdir=upper,workdir=work,\
index=on,metacopy=on none merged
- Link lower
$ ln merged/l0.txt merged/l4.txt
(This will metadata copy up of l0.txt and put an absolute redirect
/l0.txt)
$ echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop/caches
$ ls merged/l1.txt
(Now l1.txt will be looked up. There is no upper dentry but there is
lower dentry and index will be found. We don't check for redirect on
index, hence ovl_inode->redirect will be NULL.)
- Link Upper
$ ln merged/l4.txt merged/l5.txt
(Lookup of l4.txt will use inode from l1.txt lookup which is still in
cache. It has ovl_inode->redirect NULL, hence link will put a new
redirect and replace /l0.txt with /l4.txt
- Drop caches.
echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
- List l1.txt and it returns -ESTALE
$ ls merged/l0.txt
(It returns stale because, we found a metacopy of l0.txt in upper and it
has redirect l4.txt but there is no file named l4.txt in lower layer.
So lower data copy is not found and -ESTALE is returned.)
So problem here is that we did not process redirect on index. Check
redirect on index as well and then problem is fixed.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
If a dentry has copy up origin, we set flag OVL_PATH_ORIGIN. So far this
decision was easy that we had to check only for oe->numlower and if it is
non-zero, we knew there is copy up origin. (For non-dir we installed
origin dentry in lowerstack[0]).
But we don't create ORGIN xattr for broken hardlinks (index=off). And with
metacopy feature it is possible that we will install lowerstack[0] but
ORIGIN xattr is not there. It is data dentry of upper metacopy dentry
which has been found using regular name based lookup or using REDIRECT. So
with addition of this new case, just presence of oe->numlower is not
sufficient to guarantee that ORIGIN xattr is present.
So to differentiate between two cases, look at OVL_CONST_INO flag. If this
flag is set and upperdentry is there, that means it can be marked as type
ORIGIN. OVL_CONST_INO is not set if lower hardlink is broken or will be
broken over copy up.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Right now OVL_PATH_MERGE is used only for merged directories. But
conceptually, a metacopy dentry (backed by a lower data dentry) is a merged
entity as well.
So mark metacopy dentries as OVL_PATH_MERGE and ovl_rename() makes use of
this property later to set redirect on a metacopy file.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Add an helper to retrieve real data inode associated with overlay inode.
This helper will ignore all metacopy inodes and will return only the real
inode which has data.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Right now ovl_inode stores inode pointer for lower inode. This helps with
quickly getting lower inode given overlay inode (ovl_inode_lower()).
Now with metadata only copy-up, we can have metacopy inode in middle layer
as well and inode containing data can be different from ->lower. I need to
be able to open the real file in ovl_open_realfile() and for that I need to
quickly find the lower data inode.
Hence store lower data inode also in ovl_inode. Also provide an helper
ovl_inode_lowerdata() to access this field.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
If an inode has been copied up metadata only, then we need to query the
number of blocks from lower and fill up the stat->st_blocks.
We need to be careful about races where we are doing stat on one cpu and
data copy up is taking place on other cpu. We want to return
stat->st_blocks either from lower or stable upper and not something in
between. Hence, ovl_has_upperdata() is called first to figure out whether
block reporting will take place from lower or upper.
We now support metacopy dentries in middle layer. That means number of
blocks reporting needs to come from lowest data dentry and this could be
different from lower dentry. Hence we end up making a separate
vfs_getxattr() call for metacopy dentries to get number of blocks.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Now we have the notion of data dentry and metacopy dentry.
ovl_dentry_lower() will return uppermost lower dentry, but it could be
either data or metacopy dentry. Now we support metacopy dentries in lower
layers so it is possible that lowerstack[0] is metacopy dentry while
lowerstack[1] is actual data dentry.
So add an helper which returns lowest most dentry which is supposed to be
data dentry.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
So far lower could not be a meta inode. So whenever it was time to copy up
data of a meta inode, we could copy it up from top most lower dentry.
But now lower itself can be a metacopy inode. That means data copy up
needs to take place from a data inode in metacopy inode chain. Find lower
data inode in the chain and use that for data copy up.
Introduced a helper called ovl_path_lowerdata() to find the lower data
inode chain.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
This patch modifies ovl_lookup() and friends to lookup metacopy dentries.
It also allows for presence of metacopy dentries in lower layer.
During lookup, check for presence of OVL_XATTR_METACOPY and if not present,
set OVL_UPPERDATA bit in flags.
We don't support metacopy feature with nfs_export. So in nfs_export code,
we set OVL_UPPERDATA flag set unconditionally if upper inode exists.
Do not follow metacopy origin if we find a metacopy only inode and metacopy
feature is not enabled for that mount. Like redirect, this can have
security implications where an attacker could hand craft upper and try to
gain access to file on lower which it should not have to begin with.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Now we will have the capability to have upper inodes which might be only
metadata copy up and data is still on lower inode. So add a new xattr
OVL_XATTR_METACOPY to distinguish between two cases.
Presence of OVL_XATTR_METACOPY reflects that file has been copied up
metadata only and and data will be copied up later from lower origin. So
this xattr is set when a metadata copy takes place and cleared when data
copy takes place.
We also use a bit in ovl_inode->flags to cache OVL_UPPERDATA which reflects
whether ovl inode has data or not (as opposed to metadata only copy up).
If a file is copied up metadata only and later when same file is opened for
WRITE, then data copy up takes place. We copy up data, remove METACOPY
xattr and then set the UPPERDATA flag in ovl_inode->flags. While all these
operations happen with oi->lock held, read side of oi->flags can be
lockless. That is another thread on another cpu can check if UPPERDATA
flag is set or not.
So this gives us an ordering requirement w.r.t UPPERDATA flag. That is, if
another cpu sees UPPERDATA flag set, then it should be guaranteed that
effects of data copy up and remove xattr operations are also visible.
For example.
CPU1 CPU2
ovl_open() acquire(oi->lock)
ovl_open_maybe_copy_up() ovl_copy_up_data()
open_open_need_copy_up() vfs_removexattr()
ovl_already_copied_up()
ovl_dentry_needs_data_copy_up() ovl_set_flag(OVL_UPPERDATA)
ovl_test_flag(OVL_UPPERDATA) release(oi->lock)
Say CPU2 is copying up data and in the end sets UPPERDATA flag. But if
CPU1 perceives the effects of setting UPPERDATA flag but not the effects of
preceding operations (ex. upper that is not fully copied up), it will be a
problem.
Hence this patch introduces smp_wmb() on setting UPPERDATA flag operation
and smp_rmb() on UPPERDATA flag test operation.
May be some other lock or barrier is already covering it. But I am not sure
what that is and is it obvious enough that we will not break it in future.
So hence trying to be safe here and introducing barriers explicitly for
UPPERDATA flag/bit.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
There are couple of places where we need to know if file is already copied
up (in lockless manner). Right now its open coded and there are only two
conditions to check. Soon this patch series will introduce another
condition to check and Amir wants to introduce one more. So introduce a
helper instead to check this so that code is easier to read.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
On inode creation copy certain inode flags from the underlying real inode
to the overlay inode.
This is in preparation for moving overlay functionality out of the VFS.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Copy up mtime and ctime to overlay inode after times in real object are
modified. Be careful not to dirty cachelines when not necessary.
This is in preparation for moving overlay functionality out of the VFS.
This patch shouldn't have any observable effect.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
On 64bit systems, when overlay layers are not all on the same fs, but
all inode numbers of underlying fs are not using the high bits, use the
high bits to partition the overlay st_ino address space. The high bits
hold the fsid (upper fsid is 0). This way overlay inode numbers are unique
and all inodes use overlay st_dev. Inode numbers are also persistent
for a given layer configuration.
Currently, our only indication for available high ino bits is from a
filesystem that supports file handles and uses the default encode_fh()
operation, which encodes a 32bit inode number.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Instead of allocating an anonymous bdev per lower layer, allocate
one anonymous bdev per every unique lower fs that is different than
upper fs.
Every unique lower fs is assigned an fsid > 0 and the number of
unique lower fs are stored in ofs->numlowerfs.
The assigned fsid is stored in the lower layer struct and will be
used also for inode number multiplexing.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
