commit 983d8e60f5 upstream.
The old ALLOCSP/FREESP ioctls in XFS can be used to preallocate space at
the end of files, just like fallocate and RESVSP. Make the behavior
consistent with the other ioctls.
Reported-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 012e332286 upstream.
Make sure that finish_mount_kattr() is called after mount_kattr was
succesfully built in both the success and failure case to prevent
leaking any references we took when we built it. We returned early if
path lookup failed thereby risking to leak an additional reference we
took when building mount_kattr when an idmapped mount was requested.
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 9caccd4154 ("fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP")
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3cfef1b612 upstream.
The order of these two parameters is just reversed. gcc didn't warn on
that, probably because 'void *' can be converted from or to other
pointer types without warning.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3d3c950467 ("netfs: Provide readahead and readpage netfs helpers")
Fixes: e1b1240c1f ("netfs: Add write_begin helper")
Signed-off-by: Jeffle Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211207031449.100510-1-jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com/ # v1
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5598b24efaf4892741c798b425d543e4bed357a1 upstream.
As Wenqing Liu reported in bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215235
- Overview
page fault in f2fs_setxattr() when mount and operate on corrupted image
- Reproduce
tested on kernel 5.16-rc3, 5.15.X under root
1. unzip tmp7.zip
2. ./single.sh f2fs 7
Sometimes need to run the script several times
- Kernel dump
loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 131072
F2FS-fs (loop0): Found nat_bits in checkpoint
F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 7548c2ee
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe47bc7123f48
RIP: 0010:kfree+0x66/0x320
Call Trace:
__f2fs_setxattr+0x2aa/0xc00 [f2fs]
f2fs_setxattr+0xfa/0x480 [f2fs]
__f2fs_set_acl+0x19b/0x330 [f2fs]
__vfs_removexattr+0x52/0x70
__vfs_removexattr_locked+0xb1/0x140
vfs_removexattr+0x56/0x100
removexattr+0x57/0x80
path_removexattr+0xa3/0xc0
__x64_sys_removexattr+0x17/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x37/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The root cause is in __f2fs_setxattr(), we missed to do sanity check on
last xattr entry, result in out-of-bound memory access during updating
inconsistent xattr data of target inode.
After the fix, it can detect such xattr inconsistency as below:
F2FS-fs (loop11): inode (7) has invalid last xattr entry, entry_size: 60676
F2FS-fs (loop11): inode (8) has corrupted xattr
F2FS-fs (loop11): inode (8) has corrupted xattr
F2FS-fs (loop11): inode (8) has invalid last xattr entry, entry_size: 47736
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Wenqing Liu <wenqingliu0120@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 83912d6d55 upstream.
According to the official Microsoft MS-SMB2 document section 3.3.5.4, this
flag should be used only for 3.0 and 3.0.2 dialects. Setting it for 3.1.1
is a violation of the specification.
This causes my Windows 10 client to detect an anomaly in the negotiation,
and disable encryption entirely despite being explicitly enabled in ksmbd,
causing all data transfers to go in plain text.
Fixes: e2f34481b2 ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.15
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcos Del Sol Vives <marcos@orca.pet>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f2e78affc4 upstream.
No check for if "rc" is an error code for build_sec_desc().
This can cause problems with using uninitialized pntsd_size.
Fixes: e2f34481b2 ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.15
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ef399469d9 upstream.
This is a failure path and it should return -EINVAL instead of success.
Otherwise it could result in the caller using uninitialized memory.
Fixes: 303fff2b8c ("ksmbd: add validation for ndr read/write functions")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.15
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 7b9762a5e8 ]
io_uring supports using offset == -1 for using the current file position,
and we read that in as part of read/write command setup. For the non-iter
read/write types we pass in NULL for the position pointer, but for the
iter types we should not be passing any anything but 0 for the position
for a stream.
Clear kiocb->ki_pos if the file is a stream, don't leave it as -1. If we
do, then the request will error with -ESPIPE.
Fixes: ba04291eb6 ("io_uring: allow use of offset == -1 to mean file position")
Link: https://github.com/axboe/liburing/discussions/501
Reported-by: Samuel Williams <samuel.williams@oriontransfer.co.nz>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 53b1119a6e upstream.
If a client sends a READDIR count argument that is too small (say,
zero), then the buffer size calculation in the new init_dirlist
helper functions results in an underflow, allowing the XDR stream
functions to write beyond the actual buffer.
This calculation has always been suspect. NFSD has never sanity-
checked the READDIR count argument, but the old entry encoders
managed the problem correctly.
With the commits below, entry encoding changed, exposing the
underflow to the pointer arithmetic in xdr_reserve_space().
Modern NFS clients attempt to retrieve as much data as possible
for each READDIR request. Also, we have no unit tests that
exercise the behavior of READDIR at the lower bound of @count
values. Thus this case was missed during testing.
Reported-by: Anatoly Trosinenko <anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com>
Fixes: f5dcccd647 ("NFSD: Update the NFSv2 READDIR entry encoder to use struct xdr_stream")
Fixes: 7f87fc2d34 ("NFSD: Update NFSv3 READDIR entry encoders to use struct xdr_stream")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9c6e071913 upstream.
Now that we can check out overlapping extents in leaf block and
out-of-order index extents in index block. But the .ee_block in the
first extent of one leaf block should equal to the .ei_block in it's
parent index extent entry. This patch add a check to verify such
inconsistent between the index and leaf block.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210908120850.4012324-3-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8dd27feced upstream.
After commit 5946d08937 ("ext4: check for overlapping extents in
ext4_valid_extent_entries()"), we can check out the overlapping extent
entry in leaf extent blocks. But the out-of-order extent entry in index
extent blocks could also trigger bad things if the filesystem is
inconsistent. So this patch add a check to figure out the out-of-order
index extents and return error.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210908120850.4012324-2-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0f2f87d51a upstream.
In the most error path of current extents updating operations are not
roll back partial updates properly when some bad things happens(.e.g in
ext4_ext_insert_extent()). So we may get an inconsistent extents tree
if journal has been aborted due to IO error, which may probability lead
to BUGON later when we accessing these extent entries in errors=continue
mode. This patch drop extent buffer's verify flag before updatng the
contents in ext4_ext_get_access(), and reset it after updating in
__ext4_ext_dirty(). After this patch we could force to check the extent
buffer if extents tree updating was break off, make sure the extents are
consistent.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210908120850.4012324-4-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d800c65c2d upstream.
We have two io-wq creation paths:
- On queue enqueue
- When a worker goes to sleep
The latter invokes worker creation with the wqe->lock held, but that can
run into problems if we end up exiting and need to cancel the queued work.
syzbot caught this:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
5.16.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
iou-wrk-6468/6471 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88801aa98018 (&wqe->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: io_worker_cancel_cb+0xb7/0x210 fs/io-wq.c:187
but task is already holding lock:
ffff88801aa98018 (&wqe->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: io_wq_worker_sleeping+0xb6/0x140 fs/io-wq.c:700
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&wqe->lock);
lock(&wqe->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
1 lock held by iou-wrk-6468/6471:
#0: ffff88801aa98018 (&wqe->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: io_wq_worker_sleeping+0xb6/0x140 fs/io-wq.c:700
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 6471 Comm: iou-wrk-6468 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1dc/0x2d8 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_deadlock_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2956 [inline]
check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2999 [inline]
validate_chain+0x5984/0x8240 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3788
__lock_acquire+0x1382/0x2b00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5027
lock_acquire+0x19f/0x4d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5637
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x2a/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
io_worker_cancel_cb+0xb7/0x210 fs/io-wq.c:187
io_wq_cancel_tw_create fs/io-wq.c:1220 [inline]
io_queue_worker_create+0x3cf/0x4c0 fs/io-wq.c:372
io_wq_worker_sleeping+0xbe/0x140 fs/io-wq.c:701
sched_submit_work kernel/sched/core.c:6295 [inline]
schedule+0x67/0x1f0 kernel/sched/core.c:6323
schedule_timeout+0xac/0x300 kernel/time/timer.c:1857
wait_woken+0xca/0x1b0 kernel/sched/wait.c:460
unix_msg_wait_data net/unix/unix_bpf.c:32 [inline]
unix_bpf_recvmsg+0x7f9/0xe20 net/unix/unix_bpf.c:77
unix_stream_recvmsg+0x214/0x2c0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2832
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:944 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:962 [inline]
sock_read_iter+0x3a7/0x4d0 net/socket.c:1035
call_read_iter include/linux/fs.h:2156 [inline]
io_iter_do_read fs/io_uring.c:3501 [inline]
io_read fs/io_uring.c:3558 [inline]
io_issue_sqe+0x144c/0x9590 fs/io_uring.c:6671
io_wq_submit_work+0x2d8/0x790 fs/io_uring.c:6836
io_worker_handle_work+0x808/0xdd0 fs/io-wq.c:574
io_wqe_worker+0x395/0x870 fs/io-wq.c:630
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
We can safely drop the lock before doing work creation, making the two
contexts the same in that regard.
Reported-by: syzbot+b18b8be69df33a3918e9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 71a8538754 ("io-wq: check for wq exit after adding new worker task_work")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 71a8538754 upstream.
We check IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT before attempting to create a new worker, and
wq exit cancels pending work if we have any. But it's possible to have
a race between the two, where creation checks exit finding it not set,
but we're in the process of exiting. The exit side will cancel pending
creation task_work, but there's a gap where we add task_work after we've
canceled existing creations at exit time.
Fix this by checking the EXIT bit post adding the creation task_work.
If it's set, run the same cancelation that exit does.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+b60c982cb0efc5e05a47@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Hao Xu <haoxu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e47498afec upstream.
There's a small race here where the task_work could finish and drop
the worker itself, so that by the time that task_work_add() returns
with a successful addition we've already put the worker.
The worker callbacks clear this bit themselves, so we don't actually
need to manually clear it in the caller. Get rid of it.
Reported-by: syzbot+b60c982cb0efc5e05a47@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1f5573cfe7 upstream.
Syzbot triggered the following warning in ovl_workdir_create() ->
ovl_create_real():
if (!err && WARN_ON(!newdentry->d_inode)) {
The reason is that the cgroup2 filesystem returns from mkdir without
instantiating the new dentry.
Weird filesystems such as this will be rejected by overlayfs at a later
stage during setup, but to prevent such a warning, call ovl_mkdir_real()
directly from ovl_workdir_create() and reject this case early.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+75eab84fd0af9e8bf66b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a31080899d upstream.
mount.cifs can pass a device with multiple delimiters in it. This will
cause rename(2) to fail with ENOENT.
V2:
- Make sanitize_path more readable.
- Fix multiple delimiters between UNC and prepath.
- Avoid a memory leak if a bad user starts putting a lot of delimiters
in the path on purpose.
BugLink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2031200
Fixes: 24e0a1eff9 ("cifs: switch to new mount api")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.11+
Acked-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Rafael Becker <trbecker@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8ffea2599f upstream.
Add MODULE_ALIAS_FS() to load the module automatically when you do "mount
-t zonefs".
Fixes: 8dcc1a9d90 ("fs: New zonefs file system")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.6+
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jth@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4989d4a0ae upstream.
The function btrfs_scan_one_device() calls blkdev_get_by_path() and
blkdev_put() to get and release its target block device. However, when
btrfs_sb_log_location_bdev() fails, blkdev_put() is not called and the
block device is left without clean up. This triggered failure of fstests
generic/085. Fix the failure path of btrfs_sb_log_location_bdev() to
call blkdev_put().
Fixes: 12659251ca ("btrfs: implement log-structured superblock for ZONED mode")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15+
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 651740a502 upstream.
Filipe reported a hang when we have errors on btrfs. This turned out to
be a side-effect of my fix c2e3930529 ("btrfs: clear extent buffer
uptodate when we fail to write it") which made it so we clear
EXTENT_BUFFER_UPTODATE on an eb when we fail to write it out.
Below is a paste of Filipe's analysis he got from using drgn to debug
the hang
"""
btree readahead code calls read_extent_buffer_pages(), sets ->io_pages to
a value while writeback of all pages has not yet completed:
--> writeback for the first 3 pages finishes, we clear
EXTENT_BUFFER_UPTODATE from eb on the first page when we get an
error.
--> at this point eb->io_pages is 1 and we cleared Uptodate bit from the
first 3 pages
--> read_extent_buffer_pages() does not see EXTENT_BUFFER_UPTODATE() so
it continues, it's able to lock the pages since we obviously don't
hold the pages locked during writeback
--> read_extent_buffer_pages() then computes 'num_reads' as 3, and sets
eb->io_pages to 3, since only the first page does not have Uptodate
bit set at this point
--> writeback for the remaining page completes, we ended decrementing
eb->io_pages by 1, resulting in eb->io_pages == 2, and therefore
never calling end_extent_buffer_writeback(), so
EXTENT_BUFFER_WRITEBACK remains in the eb's flags
--> of course, when the read bio completes, it doesn't and shouldn't
call end_extent_buffer_writeback()
--> we should clear EXTENT_BUFFER_UPTODATE only after all pages of
the eb finished writeback? or maybe make the read pages code
wait for writeback of all pages of the eb to complete before
checking which pages need to be read, touch ->io_pages, submit
read bio, etc
writeback bit never cleared means we can hang when aborting a
transaction, at:
btrfs_cleanup_one_transaction()
btrfs_destroy_marked_extents()
wait_on_extent_buffer_writeback()
"""
This is a problem because our writes are not synchronized with reads in
any way. We clear the UPTODATE flag and then we can easily come in and
try to read the EB while we're still waiting on other bio's to
complete.
We have two options here, we could lock all the pages, and then check to
see if eb->io_pages != 0 to know if we've already got an outstanding
write on the eb.
Or we can simply check to see if we have WRITE_ERR set on this extent
buffer. We set this bit _before_ we clear UPTODATE, so if the read gets
triggered because we aren't UPTODATE because of a write error we're
guaranteed to have WRITE_ERR set, and in this case we can simply return
-EIO. This will fix the reported hang.
Reported-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Fixes: c2e3930529 ("btrfs: clear extent buffer uptodate when we fail to write it")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 33fab97249 upstream.
When creating a subvolume, at create_subvol(), we allocate an anonymous
device and later call btrfs_get_new_fs_root(), which in turn just calls
btrfs_get_root_ref(). There we call btrfs_init_fs_root() which assigns
the anonymous device to the root, but if after that call there's an error,
when we jump to 'fail' label, we call btrfs_put_root(), which frees the
anonymous device and then returns an error that is propagated back to
create_subvol(). Than create_subvol() frees the anonymous device again.
When this happens, if the anonymous device was not reallocated after
the first time it was freed with btrfs_put_root(), we get a kernel
message like the following:
(...)
[13950.282466] BTRFS: error (device dm-0) in create_subvol:663: errno=-5 IO failure
[13950.283027] ida_free called for id=65 which is not allocated.
[13950.285974] BTRFS info (device dm-0): forced readonly
(...)
If the anonymous device gets reallocated by another btrfs filesystem
or any other kernel subsystem, then bad things can happen.
So fix this by setting the root's anonymous device to 0 at
btrfs_get_root_ref(), before we call btrfs_put_root(), if an error
happened.
Fixes: 2dfb1e43f5 ("btrfs: preallocate anon block device at first phase of snapshot creation")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f35838a693 upstream.
Line 1169 (#3) allocates a memory chunk for victim_name by kmalloc(),
but when the function returns in line 1184 (#4) victim_name allocated
by line 1169 (#3) is not freed, which will lead to a memory leak.
There is a similar snippet of code in this function as allocating a memory
chunk for victim_name in line 1104 (#1) as well as releasing the memory
in line 1116 (#2).
We should kfree() victim_name when the return value of backref_in_log()
is less than zero and before the function returns in line 1184 (#4).
1057 static inline int __add_inode_ref(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
1058 struct btrfs_root *root,
1059 struct btrfs_path *path,
1060 struct btrfs_root *log_root,
1061 struct btrfs_inode *dir,
1062 struct btrfs_inode *inode,
1063 u64 inode_objectid, u64 parent_objectid,
1064 u64 ref_index, char *name, int namelen,
1065 int *search_done)
1066 {
1104 victim_name = kmalloc(victim_name_len, GFP_NOFS);
// #1: kmalloc (victim_name-1)
1105 if (!victim_name)
1106 return -ENOMEM;
1112 ret = backref_in_log(log_root, &search_key,
1113 parent_objectid, victim_name,
1114 victim_name_len);
1115 if (ret < 0) {
1116 kfree(victim_name); // #2: kfree (victim_name-1)
1117 return ret;
1118 } else if (!ret) {
1169 victim_name = kmalloc(victim_name_len, GFP_NOFS);
// #3: kmalloc (victim_name-2)
1170 if (!victim_name)
1171 return -ENOMEM;
1180 ret = backref_in_log(log_root, &search_key,
1181 parent_objectid, victim_name,
1182 victim_name_len);
1183 if (ret < 0) {
1184 return ret; // #4: missing kfree (victim_name-2)
1185 } else if (!ret) {
1241 return 0;
1242 }
Fixes: d3316c8233 ("btrfs: Properly handle backref_in_log retval")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jianglei Nie <niejianglei2021@163.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit ee2a095d3b ]
The smatch static checker warned about an uninitialized symbol usage in
this function, in the case where ceph_mdsc_build_path returns an error.
It turns out that that case is harmless, but it just looks sketchy.
Initialize the variable at declaration time, and remove the unneeded
setting of it later.
Fixes: a33f6432b3 ("ceph: encode inodes' parent/d_name in cap reconnect message")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 973e524563 ]
opened_inodes is incremented twice when the same inode is opened twice
with O_RDONLY and O_WRONLY respectively.
To reproduce, run this python script, then check the metrics:
import os
for _ in range(10000):
fd_r = os.open('a', os.O_RDONLY)
fd_w = os.open('a', os.O_WRONLY)
os.close(fd_r)
os.close(fd_w)
Fixes: 1dd8d47081 ("ceph: metrics for opened files, pinned caps and opened inodes")
Signed-off-by: Hu Weiwen <sehuww@mail.scut.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Commit cdccc03a8a upstream.
There were few lockdep warnings because btrfs_show_devname() was using
device_list_mutex as recorded in the commits:
0ccd05285e ("btrfs: fix a possible umount deadlock")
779bf3fefa ("btrfs: fix lock dep warning, move scratch dev out of device_list_mutex and uuid_mutex")
And finally, commit 88c14590cd ("btrfs: use RCU in btrfs_show_devname
for device list traversal") removed the device_list_mutex from
btrfs_show_devname for performance reasons.
This patch removes a stale comment about the function
btrfs_show_devname and device_list_mutex.
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit 6605fd2f39 upstream.
The test case btrfs/238 reports the warning below:
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 481 at fs/btrfs/super.c:2509 btrfs_show_devname+0x104/0x1e8 [btrfs]
CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Tainted: G W O 5.14.0-rc1-custom #72
Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Call trace:
btrfs_show_devname+0x108/0x1b4 [btrfs]
show_mountinfo+0x234/0x2c4
m_show+0x28/0x34
seq_read_iter+0x12c/0x3c4
vfs_read+0x29c/0x2c8
ksys_read+0x80/0xec
__arm64_sys_read+0x28/0x34
invoke_syscall+0x50/0xf8
do_el0_svc+0x88/0x138
el0_svc+0x2c/0x8c
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xe4
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
Reason:
While btrfs_prepare_sprout() moves the fs_devices::devices into
fs_devices::seed_list, the btrfs_show_devname() searches for the devices
and found none, leading to the warning as in above.
Fix:
latest_dev is updated according to the changes to the device list.
That means we could use the latest_dev->name to show the device name in
/proc/self/mounts, the pointer will be always valid as it's assigned
before the device is deleted from the list in remove or replace.
The RCU protection is sufficient as the device structure is freed after
synchronization.
Reported-by: Su Yue <l@damenly.su>
Tested-by: Su Yue <l@damenly.su>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit d24fa5c1da upstream.
In preparation to fix a bug in btrfs_show_devname().
Convert fs_devices::latest_bdev type from struct block_device to struct
btrfs_device and, rename the member to fs_devices::latest_dev.
So that btrfs_show_devname() can use fs_devices::latest_dev::name.
Tested-by: Su Yue <l@damenly.su>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fd84bfdddd upstream.
Ceph always inherits the SGID bit if it is set on the parent inode,
while the generic inode_init_owner does not do this in a few cases where
it can create a possible security problem (cf. [1]).
Update ceph to strip the SGID bit just as inode_init_owner would.
This bug was detected by the mapped mount testsuite in [3]. The
testsuite tests all core VFS functionality and semantics with and
without mapped mounts. That is to say it functions as a generic VFS
testsuite in addition to a mapped mount testsuite. While working on
mapped mount support for ceph, SIGD inheritance was the only failing
test for ceph after the port.
The same bug was detected by the mapped mount testsuite in XFS in
January 2021 (cf. [2]).
[1]: commit 0fa3ecd878 ("Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories")
[2]: commit 01ea173e10 ("xfs: fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories")
[3]: https://git.kernel.org/fs/xfs/xfstests-dev.git
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5c791fe1e2 upstream.
In writeback cache mode mtime/ctime updates are cached, and flushed to the
server using the ->write_inode() callback.
Closing the file will result in a dirty inode being immediately written,
but in other cases the inode can remain dirty after all references are
dropped. This result in the inode being written back from reclaim, which
can deadlock on a regular allocation while the request is being served.
The usual mechanisms (GFP_NOFS/PF_MEMALLOC*) don't work for FUSE, because
serving a request involves unrelated userspace process(es).
Instead do the same as for dirty pages: make sure the inode is written
before the last reference is gone.
- fallocate(2)/copy_file_range(2): these call file_update_time() or
file_modified(), so flush the inode before returning from the call
- unlink(2), link(2) and rename(2): these call fuse_update_ctime(), so
flush the ctime directly from this helper
Reported-by: chenguanyou <chenguanyou@xiaomi.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: Ed Tsai <ed.tsai@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4b37498653 upstream.
We should defer eventfd_signal() to the workqueue when
eventfd_signal_allowed() return false rather than return
true.
Fixes: b542e383d8 ("eventfd: Make signal recursion protection a task bit")
Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210913111928.98-1-xieyongji@bytedance.com
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 48b27b6b51 upstream.
As people have been asking to allow non-root processes to have access to
the tracefs directory, it was considered best to only allow groups to have
access to the directory, where it is easier to just set the tracefs file
system to a specific group (as other would be too dangerous), and that way
the admins could pick which processes would have access to tracefs.
Unfortunately, this broke tooling on Android that expected the other bit
to be set. For some special cases, for non-root tools to trace the system,
tracefs would be mounted and change the permissions of the top level
directory which gave access to all running tasks permission to the
tracing directory. Even though this would be dangerous to do in a
production environment, for testing environments this can be useful.
Now with the new changes to not allow other (which is still the proper
thing to do), it breaks the testing tooling. Now more code needs to be
loaded on the system to change ownership of the tracing directory.
The real solution is to have tracefs honor the gid=xxx option when
mounting. That is,
(tracing group tracing has value 1003)
mount -t tracefs -o gid=1003 tracefs /sys/kernel/tracing
should have it that all files in the tracing directory should be of the
given group.
Copy the logic from d_walk() from dcache.c and simplify it for the mount
case of tracefs if gid is set. All the files in tracefs will be walked and
their group will be set to the value passed in.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211207171729.2a54e1b3@gandalf.local.home
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reported-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Reported-by: Yabin Cui <yabinc@google.com>
Fixes: 49d67e4457 ("tracefs: Have tracefs directories not set OTH permission bits by default")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 50252e4b5e upstream.
signalfd_poll() and binder_poll() are special in that they use a
waitqueue whose lifetime is the current task, rather than the struct
file as is normally the case. This is okay for blocking polls, since a
blocking poll occurs within one task; however, non-blocking polls
require another solution. This solution is for the queue to be cleared
before it is freed, by sending a POLLFREE notification to all waiters.
Unfortunately, only eventpoll handles POLLFREE. A second type of
non-blocking poll, aio poll, was added in kernel v4.18, and it doesn't
handle POLLFREE. This allows a use-after-free to occur if a signalfd or
binder fd is polled with aio poll, and the waitqueue gets freed.
Fix this by making aio poll handle POLLFREE.
A patch by Ramji Jiyani <ramjiyani@google.com>
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211027011834.2497484-1-ramjiyani@google.com)
tried to do this by making aio_poll_wake() always complete the request
inline if POLLFREE is seen. However, that solution had two bugs.
First, it introduced a deadlock, as it unconditionally locked the aio
context while holding the waitqueue lock, which inverts the normal
locking order. Second, it didn't consider that POLLFREE notifications
are missed while the request has been temporarily de-queued.
The second problem was solved by my previous patch. This patch then
properly fixes the use-after-free by handling POLLFREE in a
deadlock-free way. It does this by taking advantage of the fact that
freeing of the waitqueue is RCU-delayed, similar to what eventpoll does.
Fixes: 2c14fa838c ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.18+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211209010455.42744-6-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 363bee27e2 upstream.
Currently, aio_poll_wake() will always remove the poll request from the
waitqueue. Then, if aio_poll_complete_work() sees that none of the
polled events are ready and the request isn't cancelled, it re-adds the
request to the waitqueue. (This can easily happen when polling a file
that doesn't pass an event mask when waking up its waitqueue.)
This is fundamentally broken for two reasons:
1. If a wakeup occurs between vfs_poll() and the request being
re-added to the waitqueue, it will be missed because the request
wasn't on the waitqueue at the time. Therefore, IOCB_CMD_POLL
might never complete even if the polled file is ready.
2. When the request isn't on the waitqueue, there is no way to be
notified that the waitqueue is being freed (which happens when its
lifetime is shorter than the struct file's). This is supposed to
happen via the waitqueue entries being woken up with POLLFREE.
Therefore, leave the requests on the waitqueue until they are actually
completed (or cancelled). To keep track of when aio_poll_complete_work
needs to be scheduled, use new fields in struct poll_iocb. Remove the
'done' field which is now redundant.
Note that this is consistent with how sys_poll() and eventpoll work;
their wakeup functions do *not* remove the waitqueue entries.
Fixes: 2c14fa838c ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.18+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211209010455.42744-5-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9537bae0da upstream.
wake_up_poll() uses nr_exclusive=1, so it's not guaranteed to wake up
all exclusive waiters. Yet, POLLFREE *must* wake up all waiters. epoll
and aio poll are fortunately not affected by this, but it's very
fragile. Thus, the new function wake_up_pollfree() has been introduced.
Convert signalfd to use wake_up_pollfree().
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fixes: d80e731eca ("epoll: introduce POLLFREE to flush ->signalfd_wqh before kfree()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211209010455.42744-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 78a7806020 upstream.
If we successfully cancel a work item but that work item needs to be
processed through task_work, then we can be sleeping uninterruptibly
in io_uring_cancel_generic() and never process it. Hence we don't
make forward progress and we end up with an uninterruptible sleep
warning.
While in there, correct a comment that should be IFF, not IIF.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+21e6887c0be14181206d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ee7f366699 upstream.
If directories in tracefs have their ownership changed, then any new files
and directories that are created under those directories should inherit
the ownership of the director they are created in.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211208075720.4855d180@gandalf.local.home
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Yabin Cui <yabinc@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4282d60689 ("tracefs: Add new tracefs file system")
Reported-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Reported: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAC_TJve8MMAv+H_NdLSJXZUSoxOEq2zB_pVaJ9p=7H6Bu3X76g@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 548ec0805c upstream.
A delegation break could arrive as soon as we've called vfs_setlease. A
delegation break runs a callback which immediately (in
nfsd4_cb_recall_prepare) adds the delegation to del_recall_lru. If we
then exit nfs4_set_delegation without hashing the delegation, it will be
freed as soon as the callback is done with it, without ever being
removed from del_recall_lru.
Symptoms show up later as use-after-free or list corruption warnings,
usually in the laundromat thread.
I suspect aba2072f45 "nfsd: grant read delegations to clients holding
writes" made this bug easier to hit, but I looked as far back as v3.0
and it looks to me it already had the same problem. So I'm not sure
where the bug was introduced; it may have been there from the beginning.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit da5e817d9d upstream.
Fstests runs on my VMs have show several kmemleak reports like the following.
unreferenced object 0xffff88811ae59080 (size 64):
comm "xfs_io", pid 12124, jiffies 4294987392 (age 6.368s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 c0 1c 00 00 00 00 00 ff cf 1c 00 00 00 00 00 ................
90 97 e5 1a 81 88 ff ff 90 97 e5 1a 81 88 ff ff ................
backtrace:
[<00000000ac0176d2>] ulist_add_merge+0x60/0x150 [btrfs]
[<0000000076e9f312>] set_state_bits+0x86/0xc0 [btrfs]
[<0000000014fe73d6>] set_extent_bit+0x270/0x690 [btrfs]
[<000000004f675208>] set_record_extent_bits+0x19/0x20 [btrfs]
[<00000000b96137b1>] qgroup_reserve_data+0x274/0x310 [btrfs]
[<0000000057e9dcbb>] btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x5c/0xa0 [btrfs]
[<0000000019c4511d>] btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space+0x1b/0xa0 [btrfs]
[<000000006d37e007>] btrfs_dio_iomap_begin+0x415/0x970 [btrfs]
[<00000000fb8a74b8>] iomap_iter+0x161/0x1e0
[<0000000071dff6ff>] __iomap_dio_rw+0x1df/0x700
[<000000002567ba53>] iomap_dio_rw+0x5/0x20
[<0000000072e555f8>] btrfs_file_write_iter+0x290/0x530 [btrfs]
[<000000005eb3d845>] new_sync_write+0x106/0x180
[<000000003fb505bf>] vfs_write+0x24d/0x2f0
[<000000009bb57d37>] __x64_sys_pwrite64+0x69/0xa0
[<000000003eba3fdf>] do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
In case brtfs_qgroup_reserve_data() or btrfs_delalloc_reserve_metadata()
fail the allocated extent_changeset will not be freed.
So in btrfs_check_data_free_space() and btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space()
free the allocated extent_changeset to get rid of the allocated memory.
The issue currently only happens in the direct IO write path, but only
after 65b3c08606e5 ("btrfs: fix ENOSPC failure when attempting direct IO
write into NOCOW range"), and also at defrag_one_locked_target(). Every
other place is always calling extent_changeset_free() even if its call
to btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space() or btrfs_check_data_free_space() has
failed.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8289ed9f93 upstream.
I hit the BUG_ON() with generic/475 test case, and to my surprise, all
callers of btrfs_del_root_ref() are already aborting transaction, thus
there is not need for such BUG_ON(), just go to @out label and caller
will properly handle the error.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 84c2544892 upstream.
There is a report of a transaction abort of -EAGAIN with the following
script.
#!/bin/sh
for d in sda sdb; do
mkfs.btrfs -d single -m single -f /dev/\${d}
done
mount /dev/sda /mnt/test
mount /dev/sdb /mnt/scratch
for dir in test scratch; do
echo 3 >/proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
fio --directory=/mnt/\${dir} --name=fio.\${dir} --rw=read --size=50G --bs=64m \
--numjobs=$(nproc) --time_based --ramp_time=5 --runtime=480 \
--group_reporting |& tee /dev/shm/fio.\${dir}
echo 3 >/proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
done
for d in sda sdb; do
umount /dev/\${d}
done
The stack trace is shown in below.
[3310.967991] BTRFS: error (device sda) in btrfs_commit_transaction:2341: errno=-11 unknown (Error while writing out transaction)
[3310.968060] BTRFS info (device sda): forced readonly
[3310.968064] BTRFS warning (device sda): Skipping commit of aborted transaction.
[3310.968065] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[3310.968066] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -11)
[3310.968074] WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 1684 at fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1946 btrfs_commit_transaction.cold+0x209/0x2c8
[3310.968131] CPU: 14 PID: 1684 Comm: fio Not tainted 5.14.10-300.fc35.x86_64 #1
[3310.968135] Hardware name: DIAWAY Tartu/Tartu, BIOS V2.01.B10 04/08/2021
[3310.968137] RIP: 0010:btrfs_commit_transaction.cold+0x209/0x2c8
[3310.968144] RSP: 0018:ffffb284ce393e10 EFLAGS: 00010282
[3310.968147] RAX: 0000000000000026 RBX: ffff973f147b0f60 RCX: 0000000000000027
[3310.968149] RDX: ffff974ecf098a08 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff974ecf098a00
[3310.968150] RBP: ffff973f147b0f08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb284ce393c48
[3310.968151] R10: ffffb284ce393c40 R11: ffffffff84f47468 R12: ffff973f101bfc00
[3310.968153] R13: ffff971f20cf2000 R14: 00000000fffffff5 R15: ffff973f147b0e58
[3310.968154] FS: 00007efe65468740(0000) GS:ffff974ecf080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[3310.968157] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[3310.968158] CR2: 000055691bcbe260 CR3: 000000105cfa4001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[3310.968160] PKRU: 55555554
[3310.968161] Call Trace:
[3310.968167] ? dput+0xd4/0x300
[3310.968174] btrfs_sync_file+0x3f1/0x490
[3310.968180] __x64_sys_fsync+0x33/0x60
[3310.968185] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[3310.968190] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[3310.968194] RIP: 0033:0x7efe6557329b
[3310.968200] RSP: 002b:00007ffe0236ebc0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004a
[3310.968203] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007efe6557329b
[3310.968204] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007efe58d77010 RDI: 0000000000000006
[3310.968205] RBP: 0000000004000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007efe58d77010
[3310.968207] R10: 0000000016cacc0c R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007efe5ce95980
[3310.968208] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007efe6447c790 R15: 0000000c80000000
[3310.968212] ---[ end trace 1a346f4d3c0d96ba ]---
[3310.968214] BTRFS: error (device sda) in cleanup_transaction:1946: errno=-11 unknown
The abort occurs because of a write hole while writing out freeing tree
nodes of a tree-log tree. For zoned btrfs, we re-dirty a freed tree
node to ensure btrfs can write the region and does not leave a hole on
write on a zoned device. The current code fails to re-dirty a node
when the tree-log tree's depth is greater or equal to 2. That leads to
a transaction abort with -EAGAIN.
Fix the issue by properly re-dirtying a node on walking up the tree.
Fixes: d3575156f6 ("btrfs: zoned: redirty released extent buffers")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.12+
Link: https://github.com/kdave/btrfs-progs/issues/415
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c2e3930529 upstream.
I got dmesg errors on generic/281 on our overnight fstests. Looking at
the history this happens occasionally, with errors like this
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 673217 at fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:6848 assert_eb_page_uptodate+0x3f/0x50
CPU: 0 PID: 673217 Comm: kworker/u4:13 Tainted: G W 5.16.0-rc2+ #469
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: btrfs-cache btrfs_work_helper
RIP: 0010:assert_eb_page_uptodate+0x3f/0x50
RSP: 0018:ffffae598230bc60 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0017ffffc0002112 RBX: ffffebaec4100900 RCX: 0000000000001000
RDX: ffffebaec45733c7 RSI: ffffebaec4100900 RDI: ffff9fd98919f340
RBP: 0000000000000d56 R08: ffff9fd98e300000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0001207370a91c50 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000007b0
R13: ffff9fd98919f340 R14: 0000000001500000 R15: 0000000001cb0000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9fd9fbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f549fcf8940 CR3: 0000000114908004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
extent_buffer_test_bit+0x3f/0x70
free_space_test_bit+0xa6/0xc0
load_free_space_tree+0x1d6/0x430
caching_thread+0x454/0x630
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x12/0x60
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x12/0x60
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x12/0x60
? lock_release+0x1f0/0x2d0
btrfs_work_helper+0xf2/0x3e0
? lock_release+0x1f0/0x2d0
? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0xf9/0x3a0
process_one_work+0x270/0x5a0
worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0
? process_one_work+0x5a0/0x5a0
kthread+0x174/0x1a0
? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
This happens because we're trying to read from a extent buffer page that
is !PageUptodate. This happens because we will clear the page uptodate
when we have an IO error, but we don't clear the extent buffer uptodate.
If we do a read later and find this extent buffer we'll think its valid
and not return an error, and then trip over this warning.
Fix this by also clearing uptodate on the extent buffer when this
happens, so that we get an error when we do a btrfs_search_slot() and
find this block later.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 51a08bdeca upstream.
The exit function is wrongly placed in the __init section and this leads
to a crash when the module is unloaded. Just remove both the init and
exit functions since this module does not need them.
Fixes: 71c0286324 ("cifs: fork arc4 and create a separate module...")
Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch@axis.com>
Acked-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit a226abcd5d ]
We don't want to be retrying task_work creation failure if there's
an actual signal pending for the parent task. If we do, then we can
enter an infinite loop of perpetually retrying and each retry failing
with -ERESTARTNOINTR because a signal is pending.
Fixes: 3146cba99a ("io-wq: make worker creation resilient against signals")
Reported-by: Florian Fischer <florian.fl.fischer@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/20211202165606.mqryio4yzubl7ms5@pasture/
Tested-by: Florian Fischer <florian.fl.fischer@fau.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 054aa8d439 upstream.
Jann Horn points out that there is another possible race wrt Unix domain
socket garbage collection, somewhat reminiscent of the one fixed in
commit cbcf01128d ("af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK").
See the extended comment about the garbage collection requirements added
to unix_peek_fds() by that commit for details.
The race comes from how we can locklessly look up a file descriptor just
as it is in the process of being closed, and with the right artificial
timing (Jann added a few strategic 'mdelay(500)' calls to do that), the
Unix domain socket garbage collector could see the reference count
decrement of the close() happen before fget() took its reference to the
file and the file was attached onto a new file descriptor.
This is all (intentionally) correct on the 'struct file *' side, with
RCU lookups and lockless reference counting very much part of the
design. Getting that reference count out of order isn't a problem per
se.
But the garbage collector can get confused by seeing this situation of
having seen a file not having any remaining external references and then
seeing it being attached to an fd.
In commit cbcf01128d ("af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK") the
fix was to serialize the file descriptor install with the garbage
collector by taking and releasing the unix_gc_lock.
That's not really an option here, but since this all happens when we are
in the process of looking up a file descriptor, we can instead simply
just re-check that the file hasn't been closed in the meantime, and just
re-do the lookup if we raced with a concurrent close() of the same file
descriptor.
Reported-and-tested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit a91cf0ffbc ]
When a disk has write caching disabled, we skip submission of a bio with
flush and sync requests before writing the superblock, since it's not
needed. However when the integrity checker is enabled, this results in
reports that there are metadata blocks referred by a superblock that
were not properly flushed. So don't skip the bio submission only when
the integrity checker is enabled for the sake of simplicity, since this
is a debug tool and not meant for use in non-debug builds.
fstests/btrfs/220 trigger a check-integrity warning like the following
when CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_CHECK_INTEGRITY=y and the disk with WCE=0.
btrfs: attempt to write superblock which references block M @5242880 (sdb2/5242880/0) which is not flushed out of disk's write cache (block flush_gen=1, dev->flush_gen=0)!
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 28 PID: 843680 at fs/btrfs/check-integrity.c:2196 btrfsic_process_written_superblock+0x22a/0x2a0 [btrfs]
CPU: 28 PID: 843680 Comm: umount Not tainted 5.15.0-0.rc5.39.el8.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision T7610/0NK70N, BIOS A18 09/11/2019
RIP: 0010:btrfsic_process_written_superblock+0x22a/0x2a0 [btrfs]
RSP: 0018:ffffb642afb47940 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: ffff8b722fc97d00 RDI: ffff8b722fc97d00
RBP: ffff8b5601c00000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffff7fff
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffb642afb476f8 R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffffb642afb47974 R14: ffff8b5499254c00 R15: 0000000000000003
FS: 00007f00a06d4080(0000) GS:ffff8b722fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fff5cff5ff0 CR3: 00000001c0c2a006 CR4: 00000000001706e0
Call Trace:
btrfsic_process_written_block+0x2f7/0x850 [btrfs]
__btrfsic_submit_bio.part.19+0x310/0x330 [btrfs]
? bio_associate_blkg_from_css+0xa4/0x2c0
btrfsic_submit_bio+0x18/0x30 [btrfs]
write_dev_supers+0x81/0x2a0 [btrfs]
? find_get_pages_range_tag+0x219/0x280
? pagevec_lookup_range_tag+0x24/0x30
? __filemap_fdatawait_range+0x6d/0xf0
? __raw_callee_save___native_queued_spin_unlock+0x11/0x1e
? find_first_extent_bit+0x9b/0x160 [btrfs]
? __raw_callee_save___native_queued_spin_unlock+0x11/0x1e
write_all_supers+0x1b3/0xa70 [btrfs]
? __raw_callee_save___native_queued_spin_unlock+0x11/0x1e
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x59d/0xac0 [btrfs]
close_ctree+0x11d/0x339 [btrfs]
generic_shutdown_super+0x71/0x110
kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30
btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs]
deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70
cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140
task_work_run+0x6d/0xb0
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1f0/0x200
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x46/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f009f711dfb
RSP: 002b:00007fff5cff7928 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000055b68c6c9970 RCX: 00007f009f711dfb
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000055b68c6c9b50
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000055b68c6ca900 R09: 00007f009f795580
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055b68c6c9b50
R13: 00007f00a04bf184 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
---[ end trace 2c4b82abcef9eec4 ]---
S-65536(sdb2/65536/1)
-->
M-1064960(sdb2/1064960/1)
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Wang Yugui <wangyugui@e16-tech.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
