Since the kretprobe replaces the function return address with
the kretprobe_trampoline on the stack, x86 unwinders can not
continue the stack unwinding at that point, or record
kretprobe_trampoline instead of correct return address.
To fix this issue, find the correct return address from task's
kretprobe_instances as like as function-graph tracer does.
With this fix, the unwinder can correctly unwind the stack
from kretprobe event on x86, as below.
<...>-135 [003] ...1 6.722338: r_full_proxy_read_0: (vfs_read+0xab/0x1a0 <- full_proxy_read)
<...>-135 [003] ...1 6.722377: <stack trace>
=> kretprobe_trace_func+0x209/0x2f0
=> kretprobe_dispatcher+0x4a/0x70
=> __kretprobe_trampoline_handler+0xca/0x150
=> trampoline_handler+0x44/0x70
=> kretprobe_trampoline+0x2a/0x50
=> vfs_read+0xab/0x1a0
=> ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0
=> do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
=> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/163163055130.489837.5161749078833497255.stgit@devnote2
Reported-by: Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Merge tag 'fork-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull fork cleanups from Christian Brauner:
"This is cleanup series from when we reworked a chunk of the process
creation paths in the kernel and switched to struct
{kernel_}clone_args.
High-level this does two main things:
- Remove the double export of both do_fork() and _do_fork() where
do_fork() used the incosistent legacy clone calling convention.
Now we only export _do_fork() which is based on struct
kernel_clone_args.
- Remove the copy_thread_tls()/copy_thread() split making the
architecture specific HAVE_COYP_THREAD_TLS config option obsolete.
This switches all remaining architectures to select
HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS and thus to the copy_thread_tls() calling
convention. The current split makes the process creation codepaths
more convoluted than they need to be. Each architecture has their own
copy_thread() function unless it selects HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS then it
has a copy_thread_tls() function.
The split is not needed anymore nowadays, all architectures support
CLONE_SETTLS but quite a few of them never bothered to select
HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS and instead simply continued to use copy_thread()
and use the old calling convention. Removing this split cleans up the
process creation codepaths and paves the way for implementing clone3()
on such architectures since it requires the copy_thread_tls() calling
convention.
After having made each architectures support copy_thread_tls() this
series simply renames that function back to copy_thread(). It also
switches all architectures that call do_fork() directly over to
_do_fork() and the struct kernel_clone_args calling convention. This
is a corollary of switching the architectures that did not yet support
it over to copy_thread_tls() since do_fork() is conditional on not
supporting copy_thread_tls() (Mostly because it lacks a separate
argument for tls which is trivial to fix but there's no need for this
function to exist.).
The do_fork() removal is in itself already useful as it allows to to
remove the export of both do_fork() and _do_fork() we currently have
in favor of only _do_fork(). This has already been discussed back when
we added clone3(). The legacy clone() calling convention is - as is
probably well-known - somewhat odd:
#
# ABI hall of shame
#
config CLONE_BACKWARDS
config CLONE_BACKWARDS2
config CLONE_BACKWARDS3
that is aggravated by the fact that some architectures such as sparc
follow the CLONE_BACKWARDSx calling convention but don't really select
the corresponding config option since they call do_fork() directly.
So do_fork() enforces a somewhat arbitrary calling convention in the
first place that doesn't really help the individual architectures that
deviate from it. They can thus simply be switched to _do_fork()
enforcing a single calling convention. (I really hope that any new
architectures will __not__ try to implement their own calling
conventions...)
Most architectures already have made a similar switch (m68k comes to
mind).
Overall this removes more code than it adds even with a good portion
of added comments. It simplifies a chunk of arch specific assembly
either by moving the code into C or by simply rewriting the assembly.
Architectures that have been touched in non-trivial ways have all been
actually boot and stress tested: sparc and ia64 have been tested with
Debian 9 images. They are the two architectures which have been
touched the most. All non-trivial changes to architectures have seen
acks from the relevant maintainers. nios2 with a custom built
buildroot image. h8300 I couldn't get something bootable to test on
but the changes have been fairly automatic and I'm sure we'll hear
people yell if I broke something there.
All other architectures that have been touched in trivial ways have
been compile tested for each single patch of the series via git rebase
-x "make ..." v5.8-rc2. arm{64} and x86{_64} have been boot tested
even though they have just been trivially touched (removal of the
HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS macro from their Kconfig) because well they are
basically "core architectures" and since it is trivial to get your
hands on a useable image"
* tag 'fork-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
arch: rename copy_thread_tls() back to copy_thread()
arch: remove HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS
unicore: switch to copy_thread_tls()
sh: switch to copy_thread_tls()
nds32: switch to copy_thread_tls()
microblaze: switch to copy_thread_tls()
hexagon: switch to copy_thread_tls()
c6x: switch to copy_thread_tls()
alpha: switch to copy_thread_tls()
fork: remove do_fork()
h8300: select HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS, switch to kernel_clone_args
nios2: enable HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS, switch to kernel_clone_args
ia64: enable HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS, switch to kernel_clone_args
sparc: unconditionally enable HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS
sparc: share process creation helpers between sparc and sparc64
sparc64: enable HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS
fork: fold legacy_clone_args_valid() into _do_fork()
To allow the kernel not to play games with set_fs to call exec
implement kernel_execve. The function kernel_execve takes pointers
into kernel memory and copies the values pointed to onto the new
userspace stack.
The calls with arguments from kernel space of do_execve are replaced
with calls to kernel_execve.
The calls do_execve and do_execveat are made static as there are now
no callers outside of exec.
The comments that mention do_execve are updated to refer to
kernel_execve or execve depending on the circumstances. In addition
to correcting the comments, this makes it easy to grep for do_execve
and verify it is not used.
Inspired-by: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200627072704.2447163-1-hch@lst.de
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87wo365ikj.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Now that HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS has been removed, rename copy_thread_tls()
back simply copy_thread(). It's a simpler name, and doesn't imply that only
tls is copied here. This finishes an outstanding chunk of internal process
creation work since we've added clone3().
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>A
Acked-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>A
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The entry rework moved interrupt entry code from the irqentry to the
noinstr section which made the irqentry section empty.
This breaks boundary checks which rely on the __irqentry_text_start/end
markers to find out whether a function in a stack trace is
interrupt/exception entry code. This affects the function graph tracer and
filter_irq_stacks().
As the IDT entry points are all sequentialy emitted this is rather simple
to unbreak by injecting __irqentry_text_start/end as global labels.
To make this work correctly:
- Remove the IRQENTRY_TEXT section from the x86 linker script
- Define __irqentry so it breaks the build if it's used
- Adjust the entry mirroring in PTI
- Remove the redundant kprobes and unwinder bound checks
Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
There's some daring kernel code out there which dumps the stack of
another task without first making sure the task is inactive. If the
task happens to be running while the unwinder is reading the stack,
unusual unwinder warnings can result.
There's no race-free way for the unwinder to know whether such a warning
is legitimate, so just disable unwinder warnings for all non-current
tasks.
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Jones <dsj@fb.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ec424a2aea1d461eb30cab48a28c6433de2ab784.1587808742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Currently pt_regs on x86_32 has an oddity in that kernel regs
(!user_mode(regs)) are short two entries (esp/ss). This means that any
code trying to use them (typically: regs->sp) needs to jump through
some unfortunate hoops.
Change the entry code to fix this up and create a full pt_regs frame.
This then simplifies various trampolines in ftrace and kprobes, the
stack unwinder, ptrace, kdump and kgdb.
Much thanks to Josh for help with the cleanups!
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:
- Have no license information of any form
- Have EXPORT_.*_SYMBOL_GPL inside which was used in the
initial scan/conversion to ignore the file
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:
GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When the frame unwinder is invoked for an oops caused by a call to NULL, it
currently skips the parent function because BP still points to the parent's
stack frame; the (nonexistent) current function only has the first half of
a stack frame, and BP doesn't point to it yet.
Add a special case for IP==0 that calculates a fake BP from SP, then uses
the real BP for the next frame.
Note that this handles first_frame specially: Return information about the
parent function as long as the saved IP is >=first_frame, even if the fake
BP points below it.
With an artificially-added NULL call in prctl_set_seccomp(), before this
patch, the trace is:
Call Trace:
? prctl_set_seccomp+0x3a/0x50
__x64_sys_prctl+0x457/0x6f0
? __ia32_sys_prctl+0x750/0x750
do_syscall_64+0x72/0x160
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
After this patch, the trace is:
Call Trace:
prctl_set_seccomp+0x3a/0x50
__x64_sys_prctl+0x457/0x6f0
? __ia32_sys_prctl+0x750/0x750
do_syscall_64+0x72/0x160
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: syzbot <syzbot+ca95b2b7aef9e7cbd6ab@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Michal Marek <michal.lkml@markovi.net>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190301031201.7416-1-jannh@google.com
x86-32 doesn't have stack validation, so in most cases it doesn't make
sense to warn about bad frame pointers.
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Cc: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: LKP <lkp@01.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a69658760800bf281e6353248c23e0fa0acf5230.1507597785.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
When printing the unwinder dump, the stack pointer could be unaligned,
for one of two reasons:
- stack corruption; or
- GCC created an unaligned stack.
There's no way for the unwinder to tell the difference between the two,
so we have to assume one or the other. GCC unaligned stacks are very
rare, and have only been spotted before GCC 5. Presumably, if we're
doing an unwinder stack dump, stack corruption is more likely than a
GCC unaligned stack. So always align the stack before starting the
dump.
Reported-and-tested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-and-tested-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Cc: LKP <lkp@01.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2f540c515946ab09ed267e1a1d6421202a0cce08.1507597785.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
On x86-32, Tetsuo Handa and Fengguang Wu reported unwinder warnings
like:
WARNING: kernel stack regs at f60bb9c8 in swapper:1 has bad 'bp' value 0ba00000
And also there were some stack dumps with a bunch of unreliable '?'
symbols after an apic_timer_interrupt symbol, meaning the unwinder got
confused when it tried to read the regs.
The cause of those issues is that, with GCC 4.8 (and possibly older),
there are cases where GCC misaligns the stack pointer in a leaf function
for no apparent reason:
c124a388 <acpi_rs_move_data>:
c124a388: 55 push %ebp
c124a389: 89 e5 mov %esp,%ebp
c124a38b: 57 push %edi
c124a38c: 56 push %esi
c124a38d: 89 d6 mov %edx,%esi
c124a38f: 53 push %ebx
c124a390: 31 db xor %ebx,%ebx
c124a392: 83 ec 03 sub $0x3,%esp
...
c124a3e3: 83 c4 03 add $0x3,%esp
c124a3e6: 5b pop %ebx
c124a3e7: 5e pop %esi
c124a3e8: 5f pop %edi
c124a3e9: 5d pop %ebp
c124a3ea: c3 ret
If an interrupt occurs in such a function, the regs on the stack will be
unaligned, which breaks the frame pointer encoding assumption. So on
32-bit, use the MSB instead of the LSB to encode the regs.
This isn't an issue on 64-bit, because interrupts align the stack before
writing to it.
Reported-and-tested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-and-tested-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Cc: LKP <lkp@01.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/279a26996a482ca716605c7dbc7f2db9d8d91e81.1507597785.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull x86 asm updates from Ingo Molnar:
- Introduce the ORC unwinder, which can be enabled via
CONFIG_ORC_UNWINDER=y.
The ORC unwinder is a lightweight, Linux kernel specific debuginfo
implementation, which aims to be DWARF done right for unwinding.
Objtool is used to generate the ORC unwinder tables during build, so
the data format is flexible and kernel internal: there's no
dependency on debuginfo created by an external toolchain.
The ORC unwinder is almost two orders of magnitude faster than the
(out of tree) DWARF unwinder - which is important for perf call graph
profiling. It is also significantly simpler and is coded defensively:
there has not been a single ORC related kernel crash so far, even
with early versions. (knock on wood!)
But the main advantage is that enabling the ORC unwinder allows
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTERS to be turned off - which speeds up the kernel
measurably:
With frame pointers disabled, GCC does not have to add frame pointer
instrumentation code to every function in the kernel. The kernel's
.text size decreases by about 3.2%, resulting in better cache
utilization and fewer instructions executed, resulting in a broad
kernel-wide speedup. Average speedup of system calls should be
roughly in the 1-3% range - measurements by Mel Gorman [1] have shown
a speedup of 5-10% for some function execution intense workloads.
The main cost of the unwinder is that the unwinder data has to be
stored in RAM: the memory cost is 2-4MB of RAM, depending on kernel
config - which is a modest cost on modern x86 systems.
Given how young the ORC unwinder code is it's not enabled by default
- but given the performance advantages the plan is to eventually make
it the default unwinder on x86.
See Documentation/x86/orc-unwinder.txt for more details.
- Remove lguest support: its intended role was that of a temporary
proof of concept for virtualization, plus its removal will enable the
reduction (removal) of the paravirt API as well, so Rusty agreed to
its removal. (Juergen Gross)
- Clean up and fix FSGS related functionality (Andy Lutomirski)
- Clean up IO access APIs (Andy Shevchenko)
- Enhance the symbol namespace (Jiri Slaby)
* 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (47 commits)
objtool: Handle GCC stack pointer adjustment bug
x86/entry/64: Use ENTRY() instead of ALIGN+GLOBAL for stub32_clone()
x86/fpu/math-emu: Add ENDPROC to functions
x86/boot/64: Extract efi_pe_entry() from startup_64()
x86/boot/32: Extract efi_pe_entry() from startup_32()
x86/lguest: Remove lguest support
x86/paravirt/xen: Remove xen_patch()
objtool: Fix objtool fallthrough detection with function padding
x86/xen/64: Fix the reported SS and CS in SYSCALL
objtool: Track DRAP separately from callee-saved registers
objtool: Fix validate_branch() return codes
x86: Clarify/fix no-op barriers for text_poke_bp()
x86/switch_to/64: Rewrite FS/GS switching yet again to fix AMD CPUs
selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test selectors 1, 2, and 3
x86/fsgsbase/64: Report FSBASE and GSBASE correctly in core dumps
x86/fsgsbase/64: Fully initialize FS and GS state in start_thread_common
x86/asm: Fix UNWIND_HINT_REGS macro for older binutils
x86/asm/32: Fix regs_get_register() on segment registers
x86/xen/64: Rearrange the SYSCALL entries
x86/asm/32: Remove a bunch of '& 0xffff' from pt_regs segment reads
...
Generate irqentry and softirqentry text sections without
any Kconfig dependencies. This will add extra sections, but
there should be no performace impact.
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: David S . Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Francis Deslauriers <francis.deslauriers@efficios.com>
Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-cris-kernel@axis.com
Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/150172789110.27216.3955739126693102122.stgit@devbox
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add the new ORC unwinder which is enabled by CONFIG_ORC_UNWINDER=y.
It plugs into the existing x86 unwinder framework.
It relies on objtool to generate the needed .orc_unwind and
.orc_unwind_ip sections.
For more details on why ORC is used instead of DWARF, see
Documentation/x86/orc-unwinder.txt - but the short version is
that it's a simplified, fundamentally more robust debugninfo
data structure, which also allows up to two orders of magnitude
faster lookups than the DWARF unwinder - which matters to
profiling workloads like perf.
Thanks to Andy Lutomirski for the performance improvement ideas:
splitting the ORC unwind table into two parallel arrays and creating a
fast lookup table to search a subset of the unwind table.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0a6cbfb40f8da99b7a45a1a8302dc6aef16ec812.1500938583.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
[ Extended the changelog. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Dave Jones and Steven Rostedt reported unwinder warnings like the
following:
WARNING: kernel stack frame pointer at ffff8800bda0ff30 in sshd:1090 has bad value 000055b32abf1fa8
In both cases, the unwinder was attempting to unwind from an ftrace
handler into entry code. The callchain was something like:
syscall entry code
C function
ftrace handler
save_stack_trace()
The problem is that the unwinder's end-of-stack logic gets confused by
the way ftrace lays out the stack frame (with fentry enabled).
I was able to recreate this warning with:
echo call_usermodehelper_exec_async:stacktrace > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/set_ftrace_filter
(exit login session)
I considered fixing this by changing the ftrace code to rewrite the
stack to make the unwinder happy. But that seemed too intrusive after I
implemented it. Instead, just add another check to the unwinder's
end-of-stack logic to detect this special case.
Side note: We could probably get rid of these end-of-stack checks by
encoding the frame pointer for syscall entry just like we do for
interrupt entry. That would be simpler, but it would also be a lot more
intrusive since it would slightly affect the performance of every
syscall.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Reported-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c32c47c68a ("x86/unwind: Warn on bad frame pointer")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/671ba22fbc0156b8f7e0cfa5ab2a795e08bc37e1.1495553739.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull livepatch updates from Jiri Kosina:
- a per-task consistency model is being added for architectures that
support reliable stack dumping (extending this, currently rather
trivial set, is currently in the works).
This extends the nature of the types of patches that can be applied
by live patching infrastructure. The code stems from the design
proposal made [1] back in November 2014. It's a hybrid of SUSE's
kGraft and RH's kpatch, combining advantages of both: it uses
kGraft's per-task consistency and syscall barrier switching combined
with kpatch's stack trace switching. There are also a number of
fallback options which make it quite flexible.
Most of the heavy lifting done by Josh Poimboeuf with help from
Miroslav Benes and Petr Mladek
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141107140458.GA21774@suse.cz
- module load time patch optimization from Zhou Chengming
- a few assorted small fixes
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/livepatching:
livepatch: add missing printk newlines
livepatch: Cancel transition a safe way for immediate patches
livepatch: Reduce the time of finding module symbols
livepatch: make klp_mutex proper part of API
livepatch: allow removal of a disabled patch
livepatch: add /proc/<pid>/patch_state
livepatch: change to a per-task consistency model
livepatch: store function sizes
livepatch: use kstrtobool() in enabled_store()
livepatch: move patching functions into patch.c
livepatch: remove unnecessary object loaded check
livepatch: separate enabled and patched states
livepatch/s390: add TIF_PATCH_PENDING thread flag
livepatch/s390: reorganize TIF thread flag bits
livepatch/powerpc: add TIF_PATCH_PENDING thread flag
livepatch/x86: add TIF_PATCH_PENDING thread flag
livepatch: create temporary klp_update_patch_state() stub
x86/entry: define _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK flags explicitly
stacktrace/x86: add function for detecting reliable stack traces
Currently unwind_dump() dumps only the most recently accessed stack.
But it has a few issues.
In some cases, 'first_sp' can get out of sync with 'stack_info', causing
unwind_dump() to start from the wrong address, flood the printk buffer,
and eventually read a bad address.
In other cases, dumping only the most recently accessed stack doesn't
give enough data to diagnose the error.
Fix both issues by dumping *all* stacks involved in the trace, not just
the last one.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 8b5e99f022 ("x86/unwind: Dump stack data on warnings")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/016d6a9810d7d1bfc87ef8c0e6ee041c6744c909.1493171120.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Borislav Petkov reported the following unwinder warning:
WARNING: kernel stack regs at ffffc9000024fea8 in udevadm:92 has bad 'bp' value 00007fffc4614d30
unwind stack type:0 next_sp: (null) mask:0x6 graph_idx:0
ffffc9000024fea8: 000055a6100e9b38 (0x55a6100e9b38)
ffffc9000024feb0: 000055a6100e9b35 (0x55a6100e9b35)
ffffc9000024feb8: 000055a6100e9f68 (0x55a6100e9f68)
ffffc9000024fec0: 000055a6100e9f50 (0x55a6100e9f50)
ffffc9000024fec8: 00007fffc4614d30 (0x7fffc4614d30)
ffffc9000024fed0: 000055a6100eaf50 (0x55a6100eaf50)
ffffc9000024fed8: 0000000000000000 ...
ffffc9000024fee0: 0000000000000100 (0x100)
ffffc9000024fee8: ffff8801187df488 (0xffff8801187df488)
ffffc9000024fef0: 00007ffffffff000 (0x7ffffffff000)
ffffc9000024fef8: 0000000000000000 ...
ffffc9000024ff10: ffffc9000024fe98 (0xffffc9000024fe98)
ffffc9000024ff18: 00007fffc4614d00 (0x7fffc4614d00)
ffffc9000024ff20: ffffffffffffff10 (0xffffffffffffff10)
ffffc9000024ff28: ffffffff811c6c1f (SyS_newlstat+0xf/0x10)
ffffc9000024ff30: 0000000000000010 (0x10)
ffffc9000024ff38: 0000000000000296 (0x296)
ffffc9000024ff40: ffffc9000024ff50 (0xffffc9000024ff50)
ffffc9000024ff48: 0000000000000018 (0x18)
ffffc9000024ff50: ffffffff816b2e6a (entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x18/0xa8)
...
It unwinded from an interrupt which came in right after entry code
called into a C syscall handler, before it had a chance to set up the
frame pointer, so regs->bp still had its user space value.
Add a check to silence warnings in such a case, where an interrupt
has occurred and regs->sp is almost at the end of the stack.
Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: c32c47c68a ("x86/unwind: Warn on bad frame pointer")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c695f0d0d4c2cfe6542b90e2d0520e11eb901eb5.1493171120.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
In unwind_dump(), the stack mask value is printed in hex, but is
confusingly not prepended with '0x'.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e7fe41be19d73c9f99f53082486473febfe08ffa.1492520933.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
On x86-32, 32-bit stack values printed by unwind_dump() are confusingly
zero-padded to 16 characters (64 bits):
unwind stack type:0 next_sp: (null) mask:a graph_idx:0
f50cdebc: 00000000f50cdec4 (0xf50cdec4)
f50cdec0: 00000000c40489b7 (irq_exit+0x87/0xa0)
...
Instead, base the field width on the size of a long integer so that it
looks right on both x86-32 and x86-64.
x86-32:
unwind stack type:1 next_sp: (null) mask:0x2 graph_idx:0
c0ee9d98: c0ee9de0 (init_thread_union+0x1de0/0x2000)
c0ee9d9c: c043fd90 (__save_stack_trace+0x50/0xe0)
...
x86-64:
unwind stack type:1 next_sp: (null) mask:0x2 graph_idx:0
ffffffff81e03b88: ffffffff81e03c10 (init_thread_union+0x3c10/0x4000)
ffffffff81e03b90: ffffffff81048f8e (__save_stack_trace+0x5e/0x100)
...
Reported-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/36b743812e7eb291d74af4e5067736736622daad.1492520933.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
A few people have reported unwinder warnings like the following:
WARNING: kernel stack frame pointer at ffffc90000fe7ff0 in rsync:1157 has bad value (null)
unwind stack type:0 next_sp: (null) mask:2 graph_idx:0
ffffc90000fe7f98: ffffc90000fe7ff0 (0xffffc90000fe7ff0)
ffffc90000fe7fa0: ffffffffb7000f56 (trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c)
ffffc90000fe7fa8: 0000000000000246 (0x246)
ffffc90000fe7fb0: 0000000000000000 ...
ffffc90000fe7fc0: 00007ffe3af639bc (0x7ffe3af639bc)
ffffc90000fe7fc8: 0000000000000006 (0x6)
ffffc90000fe7fd0: 00007f80af433fc5 (0x7f80af433fc5)
ffffc90000fe7fd8: 00007ffe3af638e0 (0x7ffe3af638e0)
ffffc90000fe7fe0: 00007ffe3af638e0 (0x7ffe3af638e0)
ffffc90000fe7fe8: 00007ffe3af63970 (0x7ffe3af63970)
ffffc90000fe7ff0: 0000000000000000 ...
ffffc90000fe7ff8: ffffffffb7b74b9a (entry_SYSCALL_64_after_swapgs+0x17/0x4f)
This warning can happen when unwinding a code path where an interrupt
occurred in x86 entry code before it set up the first stack frame.
Silently ignore any warnings for this case.
Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Fixes: c32c47c68a ("x86/unwind: Warn on bad frame pointer")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/dbd6838826466a60dc23a52098185bc973ce2f1e.1492020577.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Instead of reading the return address when unwind_get_return_address()
is called, read it from update_stack_state() and store it in the unwind
state. This enables the next patch to check the return address from
unwind_next_frame() so it can detect an entry code frame.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/af0c5e4560c49c0343dca486ea26c4fa92bc4e35.1492020577.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The __unwind_start() and unwind_next_frame() functions have some
duplicated functionality. They both call decode_frame_pointer() and set
state->regs and state->bp accordingly. Move that functionality to a
common place in update_stack_state().
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a2ee4801113f6d2300d58f08f6b69f85edf4eb43.1492020577.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pavel Machek reported the following warning on x86-32:
WARNING: kernel stack frame pointer at f50cdf98 in swapper/2:0 has bad value (null)
The warning is caused by the unwinder not realizing that it reached the
end of the stack, due to an unusual prologue which gcc sometimes
generates for aligned stacks. The prologue is based on a gcc feature
called the Dynamic Realign Argument Pointer (DRAP). It's almost always
enabled for aligned stacks when -maccumulate-outgoing-args isn't set.
This issue is similar to the one fixed by the following commit:
8023e0e2a4 ("x86/unwind: Adjust last frame check for aligned function stacks")
... but that fix was specific to x86-64.
Make the fix more generic to cover x86-32 as well, and also ensure that
the return address referred to by the frame pointer is a copy of the
original return address.
Fixes: acb4608ad1 ("x86/unwind: Create stack frames for saved syscall registers")
Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/50d4924db716c264b14f1633037385ec80bf89d2.1489465609.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
For live patching and possibly other use cases, a stack trace is only
useful if it can be assured that it's completely reliable. Add a new
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() function to achieve that.
Note that if the target task isn't the current task, and the target task
is allowed to run, then it could be writing the stack while the unwinder
is reading it, resulting in possible corruption. So the caller of
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() must ensure that the task is either
'current' or inactive.
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() relies on the x86 unwinder's detection
of pt_regs on the stack. If the pt_regs are not user-mode registers
from a syscall, then they indicate an in-kernel interrupt or exception
(e.g. preemption or a page fault), in which case the stack is considered
unreliable due to the nature of frame pointers.
It also relies on the x86 unwinder's detection of other issues, such as:
- corrupted stack data
- stack grows the wrong way
- stack walk doesn't reach the bottom
- user didn't provide a large enough entries array
Such issues are reported by checking unwind_error() and !unwind_done().
Also add CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE so arch-independent code can
determine at build time whether the function is implemented.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> # for the x86 changes
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
We are going to split <linux/sched/task_stack.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task_stack.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/task.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
There are a handful of callers to save_stack_trace_tsk() and
show_stack() which try to unwind the stack of a task other than current.
In such cases, it's remotely possible that the task is running on one
CPU while the unwinder is reading its stack from another CPU, causing
the unwinder to see stack corruption.
These cases seem to be mostly harmless. The unwinder has checks which
prevent it from following bad pointers beyond the bounds of the stack.
So it's not really a bug as long as the caller understands that
unwinding another task will not always succeed.
In such cases, it's possible that the unwinder may read a KASAN-poisoned
region of the stack. Account for that by using READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() when
reading the stack of another task.
Use READ_ONCE() when reading the stack of the current task, since KASAN
warnings can still be useful for finding bugs in that case.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4c575eb288ba9f73d498dfe0acde2f58674598f1.1483978430.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
There are a handful of callers to save_stack_trace_tsk() and
show_stack() which try to unwind the stack of a task other than current.
In such cases, it's remotely possible that the task is running on one
CPU while the unwinder is reading its stack from another CPU, causing
the unwinder to see stack corruption.
These cases seem to be mostly harmless. The unwinder has checks which
prevent it from following bad pointers beyond the bounds of the stack.
So it's not really a bug as long as the caller understands that
unwinding another task will not always succeed.
Since stack "corruption" on another task's stack isn't necessarily a
bug, silence the warnings when unwinding tasks other than current.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/00d8c50eea3446c1524a2a755397a3966629354c.1483978430.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Revert the following commit:
b6959a3621 ("x86/unwind: Detect bad stack return address")
... because Andrey Konovalov reported an unwinder warning:
WARNING: unrecognized kernel stack return address ffffffffa0000001 at ffff88006377fa18 in a.out:4467
The unwind was initiated from an interrupt which occurred while running in the
generated code for a kprobe. The unwinder printed the warning because it
expected regs->ip to point to a valid text address, but instead it pointed to
the generated code.
Eventually we may want come up with a way to identify generated kprobe
code so the unwinder can know that it's a valid return address. Until
then, just remove the warning.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/02f296848fbf49fb72dfeea706413ecbd9d4caf6.1482418739.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The unwinder warnings are good at finding unexpected unwinder issues,
but they often don't give enough data to be able to fully diagnose them.
Print a one-time stack dump when a warning is detected.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/15607370e3ddb1732b6a73d5c65937864df16ac8.1481904011.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Somehow, CONFIG_PARAVIRT=n convinces gcc to change the
x86_64_start_kernel() prologue from:
0000000000000129 <x86_64_start_kernel>:
129: 55 push %rbp
12a: 48 89 e5 mov %rsp,%rbp
to:
0000000000000124 <x86_64_start_kernel>:
124: 4c 8d 54 24 08 lea 0x8(%rsp),%r10
129: 48 83 e4 f0 and $0xfffffffffffffff0,%rsp
12d: 41 ff 72 f8 pushq -0x8(%r10)
131: 55 push %rbp
132: 48 89 e5 mov %rsp,%rbp
This is an unusual pattern which aligns rsp (though in this case it's
already aligned) and saves the start_cpu() return address again on the
stack before storing the frame pointer.
The unwinder assumes the last stack frame header is at a certain offset,
but the above code breaks that assumption, resulting in the following
warning:
WARNING: kernel stack frame pointer at ffffffff82e03f40 in swapper:0 has bad value (null)
Fix it by checking for the last task stack frame at the aligned offset
in addition to the normal unaligned offset.
Fixes: acb4608ad1 ("x86/unwind: Create stack frames for saved syscall registers")
Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9d7b4eb8cf55a7d6002cb738f25c23e7429c99a0.1481904011.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Add a sanity check to ensure the stack only grows down, and print a
warning if the check fails.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161027131058.tpdffwlqipv7pcd6@treble
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
If __kernel_text_address() doesn't recognize a return address on the
stack, it probably means that it's some generated code which
__kernel_text_address() doesn't know about yet.
Otherwise there's probably some stack corruption.
Either way, warn about it.
Use printk_deferred_once() because the unwinder can be called with the
console lock by lockdep via save_stack_trace().
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2d897898f324e275943b590d160b55e482bba65f.1477496147.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Detect situations in the unwinder where the frame pointer refers to a
bad address, and print an appropriate warning.
Use printk_deferred_once() because the unwinder can be called with the
console lock by lockdep via save_stack_trace().
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/03c888f6f7414d54fa56b393ea25482be6899b5f.1477496147.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The entry code doesn't encode the pt_regs pointer for syscalls. But the
pt_regs are always at the same location, so we can add a manual check
for them.
A later patch prints them as part of the oops stack dump. They could be
useful, for example, to determine the arguments to a system call.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e176aa9272930cd3f51fda0b94e2eae356677da4.1476973742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
With frame pointers, when a task is interrupted, its stack is no longer
completely reliable because the function could have been interrupted
before it had a chance to save the previous frame pointer on the stack.
So the caller of the interrupted function could get skipped by a stack
trace.
This is problematic for live patching, which needs to know whether a
stack trace of a sleeping task can be relied upon. There's currently no
way to detect if a sleeping task was interrupted by a page fault
exception or preemption before it went to sleep.
Another issue is that when dumping the stack of an interrupted task, the
unwinder has no way of knowing where the saved pt_regs registers are, so
it can't print them.
This solves those issues by encoding the pt_regs pointer in the frame
pointer on entry from an interrupt or an exception.
This patch also updates the unwinder to be able to decode it, because
otherwise the unwinder would be broken by this change.
Note that this causes a change in the behavior of the unwinder: each
instance of a pt_regs on the stack is now considered a "frame". So
callers of unwind_get_return_address() will now get an occasional
'regs->ip' address that would have previously been skipped over.
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8b9f84a21e39d249049e0547b559ff8da0df0988.1476973742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The x86 stack dump code is a bit of a mess. dump_trace() uses
callbacks, and each user of it seems to have slightly different
requirements, so there are several slightly different callbacks floating
around.
Also there are some upcoming features which will need more changes to
the stack dump code, including the printing of stack pt_regs, reliable
stack detection for live patching, and a DWARF unwinder. Each of those
features would at least need more callbacks and/or callback interfaces,
resulting in a much bigger mess than what we have today.
Before doing all that, we should try to clean things up and replace
dump_trace() with something cleaner and more flexible.
The new unwinder is a simple state machine which was heavily inspired by
a suggestion from Andy Lutomirski:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALCETrUbNTqaM2LRyXGRx=kVLRPeY5A3Pc6k4TtQxF320rUT=w@mail.gmail.com
It's also similar to the libunwind API:
http://www.nongnu.org/libunwind/man/libunwind(3).html
Some if its advantages:
- Simplicity: no more callback sprawl and less code duplication.
- Flexibility: it allows the caller to stop and inspect the stack state
at each step in the unwinding process.
- Modularity: the unwinder code, console stack dump code, and stack
metadata analysis code are all better separated so that changing one
of them shouldn't have much of an impact on any of the others.
Two implementations are added which conform to the new unwind interface:
- The frame pointer unwinder which is used for CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=y.
- The "guess" unwinder which is used for CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=n. This
isn't an "unwinder" per se. All it does is scan the stack for kernel
text addresses. But with no frame pointers, guesses are better than
nothing in most cases.
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/6dc2f909c47533d213d0505f0a113e64585bec82.1474045023.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
