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21 commits
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2ec3a12a66 |
cachefiles_write_page(): switch to __kernel_write()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
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696382f938 |
cachefiles: remove two unused pagevecs.
These two have been unused since
commit
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55881bc76f |
fs: cachefiles: use add_to_page_cache_lru()
This code used to have its own lru cache pagevec up until
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a0b8cab3b9 |
mm: remove lru parameter from __pagevec_lru_add and remove parts of pagevec API
Now that the LRU to add a page to is decided at LRU-add time, remove the misleading lru parameter from __pagevec_lru_add. A consequence of this is that the pagevec_lru_add_file, pagevec_lru_add_anon and similar helpers are misleading as the caller no longer has direct control over what LRU the page is added to. Unused helpers are removed by this patch and existing users of pagevec_lru_add_file() are converted to use lru_cache_add_file() directly and use the per-cpu pagevecs instead of creating their own pagevec. Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Alexey Lyahkov <alexey.lyashkov@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Perepechko <anserper@ya.ru> Cc: Robin Dong <sanbai@taobao.com> Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Bernd Schubert <bernd.schubert@fastmail.fm> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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03d95eb2f2 |
lift sb_start_write() out of ->write()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
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b4cf1e08c8 |
CacheFiles: Add missing retrieval completions
CacheFiles is missing some calls to fscache_retrieval_complete() in the error handling/collision paths of its reader functions. This can be seen by the following assertion tripping in fscache_put_operation() whereby the operation being destroyed is still in the in-progress state and has not been cancelled or completed: FS-Cache: Assertion failed 3 == 5 is false ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/fscache/operation.c:408! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU 2 Modules linked in: xfs ioatdma dca loop joydev evdev psmouse dcdbas pcspkr serio_raw i5000_edac edac_core i5k_amb shpchp pci_hotplug sg sr_mod] Pid: 8062, comm: httpd Not tainted 3.1.0-rc8 #1 Dell Inc. PowerEdge 1950/0DT097 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81197b24>] [<ffffffff81197b24>] fscache_put_operation+0x304/0x330 RSP: 0018:ffff880062f739d8 EFLAGS: 00010296 RAX: 0000000000000025 RBX: ffff8800c5122e84 RCX: ffffffff81ddf040 RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 0000000000000082 RDI: ffffffff81ddef30 RBP: ffff880062f739f8 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8800c5122e40 R13: ffff880037a2cd20 R14: ffff880087c7a058 R15: ffff880087c7a000 FS: 00007f63dcf636e0(0000) GS:ffff88022fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f0c0a91f000 CR3: 0000000062ec2000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process httpd (pid: 8062, threadinfo ffff880062f72000, task ffff880087e58000) Stack: ffff880062f73bf8 0000000000000000 ffff880062f73bf8 ffff880037a2cd20 ffff880062f73a68 ffffffff8119aa7e ffff88006540e000 ffff880062f73ad4 ffff88008e9a4308 ffff880037a2cd20 ffff880062f73a48 ffff8800c5122e40 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8119aa7e>] __fscache_read_or_alloc_pages+0x1fe/0x530 [<ffffffff81250780>] __nfs_readpages_from_fscache+0x70/0x1c0 [<ffffffff8123142a>] nfs_readpages+0xca/0x1e0 [<ffffffff815f3c06>] ? rpc_do_put_task+0x36/0x50 [<ffffffff8122755b>] ? alloc_nfs_open_context+0x4b/0x110 [<ffffffff815ecd1a>] ? rpc_call_sync+0x5a/0x70 [<ffffffff810e7e9a>] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x1ca/0x270 [<ffffffff810e7f61>] ra_submit+0x21/0x30 [<ffffffff810e818d>] ondemand_readahead+0x11d/0x250 [<ffffffff810e83b6>] page_cache_sync_readahead+0x36/0x60 [<ffffffff810dffa4>] generic_file_aio_read+0x454/0x770 [<ffffffff81224ce1>] nfs_file_read+0xe1/0x130 [<ffffffff81121bd9>] do_sync_read+0xd9/0x120 [<ffffffff8114088f>] ? mntput+0x1f/0x40 [<ffffffff811238cb>] ? fput+0x1cb/0x260 [<ffffffff81122938>] vfs_read+0xc8/0x180 [<ffffffff81122af5>] sys_read+0x55/0x90 Reported-by: Mark Moseley <moseleymark@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
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9dc8d9bfe4 |
CacheFiles: Implement invalidation
Implement invalidation for CacheFiles. This is in two parts: (1) Provide an invalidation method (which just truncates the backing file). (2) Abort attempts to copy anything read from the backing file whilst invalidation is in progress. Question: CacheFiles uses truncation in a couple of places. It has been using notify_change() rather than sys_truncate() or something similar. This means it bypasses a bunch of checks and suchlike that it possibly should be making (security, file locking, lease breaking, vfsmount write). Should it be using vfs_truncate() as added by a preceding patch or should it use notify_write() and assume that anyone poking around in the cache files on disk gets everything they deserve? Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
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9f10523f89 |
FS-Cache: Fix operation state management and accounting
Fix the state management of internal fscache operations and the accounting of what operations are in what states. This is done by: (1) Give struct fscache_operation a enum variable that directly represents the state it's currently in, rather than spreading this knowledge over a bunch of flags, who's processing the operation at the moment and whether it is queued or not. This makes it easier to write assertions to check the state at various points and to prevent invalid state transitions. (2) Add an 'operation complete' state and supply a function to indicate the completion of an operation (fscache_op_complete()) and make things call it. The final call to fscache_put_operation() can then check that an op in the appropriate state (complete or cancelled). (3) Adjust the use of object->n_ops, ->n_in_progress, ->n_exclusive to better govern the state of an object: (a) The ->n_ops is now the number of extant operations on the object and is now decremented by fscache_put_operation() only. (b) The ->n_in_progress is simply the number of objects that have been taken off of the object's pending queue for the purposes of being run. This is decremented by fscache_op_complete() only. (c) The ->n_exclusive is the number of exclusive ops that have been submitted and queued or are in progress. It is decremented by fscache_op_complete() and by fscache_cancel_op(). fscache_put_operation() and fscache_operation_gc() now no longer try to clean up ->n_exclusive and ->n_in_progress. That was leading to double decrements against fscache_cancel_op(). fscache_cancel_op() now no longer decrements ->n_ops. That was leading to double decrements against fscache_put_operation(). fscache_submit_exclusive_op() now decides whether it has to queue an op based on ->n_in_progress being > 0 rather than ->n_ops > 0 as the latter will persist in being true even after all preceding operations have been cancelled or completed. Furthermore, if an object is active and there are runnable ops against it, there must be at least one op running. (4) Add a remaining-pages counter (n_pages) to struct fscache_retrieval and provide a function to record completion of the pages as they complete. When n_pages reaches 0, the operation is deemed to be complete and fscache_op_complete() is called. Add calls to fscache_retrieval_complete() anywhere we've finished with a page we've been given to read or allocate for. This includes places where we just return pages to the netfs for reading from the server and where accessing the cache fails and we discard the proposed netfs page. The bugs in the unfixed state management manifest themselves as oopses like the following where the operation completion gets out of sync with return of the cookie by the netfs. This is possible because the cache unlocks and returns all the netfs pages before recording its completion - which means that there's nothing to stop the netfs discarding them and returning the cookie. FS-Cache: Cookie 'NFS.fh' still has outstanding reads ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/fscache/cookie.c:519! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU 1 Modules linked in: cachefiles nfs fscache auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd sunrpc Pid: 400, comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 3.1.0-rc7-fsdevel+ #1090 /DG965RY RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa007050a>] [<ffffffffa007050a>] __fscache_relinquish_cookie+0x170/0x343 [fscache] RSP: 0018:ffff8800368cfb00 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 000000000000003c RBX: ffff880023cc8790 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000002f2e RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffff813ab86c RBP: ffff8800368cfb50 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff88003a1b7890 R11: ffff88001df6e488 R12: ffff880023d8ed98 R13: ffff880023cc8798 R14: 0000000000000004 R15: ffff88003b8bf370 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88003bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 00000000008ba008 CR3: 0000000023d93000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process kswapd0 (pid: 400, threadinfo ffff8800368ce000, task ffff88003b8bf040) Stack: ffff88003b8bf040 ffff88001df6e528 ffff88001df6e528 ffffffffa00b46b0 ffff88003b8bf040 ffff88001df6e488 ffff88001df6e620 ffffffffa00b46b0 ffff88001ebd04c8 0000000000000004 ffff8800368cfb70 ffffffffa00b2c91 Call Trace: [<ffffffffa00b2c91>] nfs_fscache_release_inode_cookie+0x3b/0x47 [nfs] [<ffffffffa008f25f>] nfs_clear_inode+0x3c/0x41 [nfs] [<ffffffffa0090df1>] nfs4_evict_inode+0x2f/0x33 [nfs] [<ffffffff810d8d47>] evict+0xa1/0x15c [<ffffffff810d8e2e>] dispose_list+0x2c/0x38 [<ffffffff810d9ebd>] prune_icache_sb+0x28c/0x29b [<ffffffff810c56b7>] prune_super+0xd5/0x140 [<ffffffff8109b615>] shrink_slab+0x102/0x1ab [<ffffffff8109d690>] balance_pgdat+0x2f2/0x595 [<ffffffff8103e009>] ? process_timeout+0xb/0xb [<ffffffff8109dba3>] kswapd+0x270/0x289 [<ffffffff8104c5ea>] ? __init_waitqueue_head+0x46/0x46 [<ffffffff8109d933>] ? balance_pgdat+0x595/0x595 [<ffffffff8104bf7a>] kthread+0x7f/0x87 [<ffffffff813ad6b4>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 [<ffffffff81026b98>] ? finish_task_switch+0x45/0xc0 [<ffffffff813abcdd>] ? retint_restore_args+0xe/0xe [<ffffffff8104befb>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x53/0x53 [<ffffffff813ad6b0>] ? gs_change+0xb/0xb Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
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37491a1339 |
CacheFiles: Make some debugging statements conditional
Downgrade some debugging statements to not unconditionally print stuff, but rather be conditional on the appropriate module parameter setting. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
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5f4f9f4af1 |
CacheFiles: Downgrade the requirements passed to the allocator
Downgrade the requirements passed to the allocator in the gfp flags parameter. FS-Cache/CacheFiles can handle OOM conditions simply by aborting the attempt to store an object or a page in the cache. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
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c4d6d8dbf3 |
CacheFiles: Fix the marking of cached pages
Under some circumstances CacheFiles defers the marking of pages with PG_fscache so that it can take advantage of pagevecs to reduce the number of calls to fscache_mark_pages_cached() and the netfs's hook to keep track of this. There are, however, two problems with this: (1) It can lead to the PG_fscache mark being applied _after_ the page is set PG_uptodate and unlocked (by the call to fscache_end_io()). (2) CacheFiles's ref on the page is dropped immediately following fscache_end_io() - and so may not still be held when the mark is applied. This can lead to the page being passed back to the allocator before the mark is applied. Fix this by, where appropriate, marking the page before calling fscache_end_io() and releasing the page. This means that we can't take advantage of pagevecs and have to make a separate call for each page to the marking routines. The symptoms of this are Bad Page state errors cropping up under memory pressure, for example: BUG: Bad page state in process tar pfn:002da page:ffffea0000009fb0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x1447 page flags: 0x1000(private_2) Pid: 4574, comm: tar Tainted: G W 3.1.0-rc4-fsdevel+ #1064 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8109583c>] ? dump_page+0xb9/0xbe [<ffffffff81095916>] bad_page+0xd5/0xea [<ffffffff81095d82>] get_page_from_freelist+0x35b/0x46a [<ffffffff810961f3>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x362/0x662 [<ffffffff810989da>] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x13a/0x267 [<ffffffff81098942>] ? __do_page_cache_readahead+0xa2/0x267 [<ffffffff81098d7b>] ra_submit+0x1c/0x20 [<ffffffff8109900a>] ondemand_readahead+0x28b/0x29a [<ffffffff81098ee2>] ? ondemand_readahead+0x163/0x29a [<ffffffff810990ce>] page_cache_sync_readahead+0x38/0x3a [<ffffffff81091d8a>] generic_file_aio_read+0x2ab/0x67e [<ffffffffa008cfbe>] nfs_file_read+0xa4/0xc9 [nfs] [<ffffffff810c22c4>] do_sync_read+0xba/0xfa [<ffffffff81177a47>] ? security_file_permission+0x7b/0x84 [<ffffffff810c25dd>] ? rw_verify_area+0xab/0xc8 [<ffffffff810c29a4>] vfs_read+0xaa/0x13a [<ffffffff810c2a79>] sys_read+0x45/0x6c [<ffffffff813ac37b>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b As can be seen, PG_private_2 (== PG_fscache) is set in the page flags. Instrumenting fscache_mark_pages_cached() to verify whether page->mapping was set appropriately showed that sometimes it wasn't. This led to the discovery that sometimes the page has apparently been reclaimed by the time the marker got to see it. Reported-by: M. Stevens <m@tippett.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> |
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98c350cda2 |
fs: cachefiles: add support for large files in filesystem caching
Support the caching of large files. Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=31182 Signed-off-by: Justin Lecher <jlec@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.com> Tested-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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765927b2d5 |
switch dentry_open() to struct path, make it grab references itself
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
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8af7c12436 |
fscache: convert operation to use workqueue instead of slow-work
Make fscache operation to use only workqueue instead of combination of workqueue and slow-work. FSCACHE_OP_SLOW is dropped and FSCACHE_OP_FAST is renamed to FSCACHE_OP_ASYNC and uses newly added fscache_op_wq workqueue to execute op->processor(). fscache_operation_init_slow() is dropped and fscache_operation_init() now takes @processor argument directly. * Unbound workqueue is used. * fscache_retrieval_work() is no longer necessary as OP_ASYNC now does the equivalent thing. * sysctl fscache.operation_max_active added to control concurrency. The default value is nr_cpus clamped between 2 and WQ_UNBOUND_MAX_ACTIVE. * debugfs support is dropped for now. Tracing API based debug facility is planned to be added. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
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5a0e3ad6af |
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com> |
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b65a9cfc2c |
Untangling ima mess, part 2: deal with counters
* do ima_get_count() in __dentry_open() * stop doing that in followups * move ima_path_check() to right after nameidata_to_filp() * don't bump counters on it Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
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3350b2acdd |
CacheFiles: Update IMA counters when using dentry_open
When IMA is active, using dentry_open without updating the IMA counters will result in free/open imbalance errors when fput is eventually called. Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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5e929b33c3 |
CacheFiles: Handle truncate unlocking the page we're reading
Handle truncate unlocking the page we're attempting to read from the backing device before the read has completed. This was causing reports like the following to occur: Pid: 4765, comm: kslowd Not tainted 2.6.30.1 #1 Call Trace: [<ffffffffa0331d7a>] ? cachefiles_read_waiter+0xd9/0x147 [cachefiles] [<ffffffff804b74bd>] ? __wait_on_bit+0x60/0x6f [<ffffffff8022bbbb>] ? __wake_up_common+0x3f/0x71 [<ffffffff8022cc32>] ? __wake_up+0x30/0x44 [<ffffffff8024a41f>] ? __wake_up_bit+0x28/0x2d [<ffffffffa003a793>] ? ext3_truncate+0x4d7/0x8ed [ext3] [<ffffffff80281f90>] ? pagevec_lookup+0x17/0x1f [<ffffffff8028c2ff>] ? unmap_mapping_range+0x59/0x1ff [<ffffffff8022cc32>] ? __wake_up+0x30/0x44 [<ffffffff8028e286>] ? vmtruncate+0xc2/0xe2 [<ffffffff802b82cf>] ? inode_setattr+0x22/0x10a [<ffffffffa003baa5>] ? ext3_setattr+0x17b/0x1e6 [ext3] [<ffffffff802b853d>] ? notify_change+0x186/0x2c9 [<ffffffffa032d9de>] ? cachefiles_attr_changed+0x133/0x1cd [cachefiles] [<ffffffffa032df7f>] ? cachefiles_lookup_object+0xcf/0x12a [cachefiles] [<ffffffffa0318165>] ? fscache_lookup_object+0x110/0x122 [fscache] [<ffffffffa03188c3>] ? fscache_object_slow_work_execute+0x590/0x6bc [fscache] [<ffffffff80278f82>] ? slow_work_thread+0x285/0x43a [<ffffffff8024a446>] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x2e [<ffffffff80278cfd>] ? slow_work_thread+0x0/0x43a [<ffffffff8024a317>] ? kthread+0x54/0x81 [<ffffffff8020c93a>] ? child_rip+0xa/0x20 [<ffffffff8024a2c3>] ? kthread+0x0/0x81 [<ffffffff8020c930>] ? child_rip+0x0/0x20 CacheFiles: I/O Error: Readpage failed on backing file 200000000000810 FS-Cache: Cache cachefiles stopped due to I/O error Reported-by: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de> Reported-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Reported-by: Duc Le Minh <duclm.vn@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
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a17754fb8c |
CacheFiles: Don't write a full page if there's only a partial page to cache
cachefiles_write_page() writes a full page to the backing file for the last page of the netfs file, even if the netfs file's last page is only a partial page. This causes the EOF on the backing file to be extended beyond the EOF of the netfs, and thus the backing file will be truncated by cachefiles_attr_changed() called from cachefiles_lookup_object(). So we need to limit the write we make to the backing file on that last page such that it doesn't push the EOF too far. Also, if a backing file that has a partial page at the end is expanded, we discard the partial page and refetch it on the basis that we then have a hole in the file with invalid data, and should the power go out... A better way to deal with this could be to record a note that the partial page contains invalid data until the correct data is written into it. This isn't a problem for netfs's that discard the whole backing file if the file size changes (such as NFS). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
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4fbf4291aa |
FS-Cache: Allow the current state of all objects to be dumped
Allow the current state of all fscache objects to be dumped by doing: cat /proc/fs/fscache/objects By default, all objects and all fields will be shown. This can be restricted by adding a suitable key to one of the caller's keyrings (such as the session keyring): keyctl add user fscache:objlist "<restrictions>" @s The <restrictions> are: K Show hexdump of object key (don't show if not given) A Show hexdump of object aux data (don't show if not given) And paired restrictions: C Show objects that have a cookie c Show objects that don't have a cookie B Show objects that are busy b Show objects that aren't busy W Show objects that have pending writes w Show objects that don't have pending writes R Show objects that have outstanding reads r Show objects that don't have outstanding reads S Show objects that have slow work queued s Show objects that don't have slow work queued If neither side of a restriction pair is given, then both are implied. For example: keyctl add user fscache:objlist KB @s shows objects that are busy, and lists their object keys, but does not dump their auxiliary data. It also implies "CcWwRrSs", but as 'B' is given, 'b' is not implied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
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9ae326a690 |
CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem
Add an FS-Cache cache-backend that permits a mounted filesystem to be used as a backing store for the cache. CacheFiles uses a userspace daemon to do some of the cache management - such as reaping stale nodes and culling. This is called cachefilesd and lives in /sbin. The source for the daemon can be downloaded from: http://people.redhat.com/~dhowells/cachefs/cachefilesd.c And an example configuration from: http://people.redhat.com/~dhowells/cachefs/cachefilesd.conf The filesystem and data integrity of the cache are only as good as those of the filesystem providing the backing services. Note that CacheFiles does not attempt to journal anything since the journalling interfaces of the various filesystems are very specific in nature. CacheFiles creates a misc character device - "/dev/cachefiles" - that is used to communication with the daemon. Only one thing may have this open at once, and whilst it is open, a cache is at least partially in existence. The daemon opens this and sends commands down it to control the cache. CacheFiles is currently limited to a single cache. CacheFiles attempts to maintain at least a certain percentage of free space on the filesystem, shrinking the cache by culling the objects it contains to make space if necessary - see the "Cache Culling" section. This means it can be placed on the same medium as a live set of data, and will expand to make use of spare space and automatically contract when the set of data requires more space. ============ REQUIREMENTS ============ The use of CacheFiles and its daemon requires the following features to be available in the system and in the cache filesystem: - dnotify. - extended attributes (xattrs). - openat() and friends. - bmap() support on files in the filesystem (FIBMAP ioctl). - The use of bmap() to detect a partial page at the end of the file. It is strongly recommended that the "dir_index" option is enabled on Ext3 filesystems being used as a cache. ============= CONFIGURATION ============= The cache is configured by a script in /etc/cachefilesd.conf. These commands set up cache ready for use. The following script commands are available: (*) brun <N>% (*) bcull <N>% (*) bstop <N>% (*) frun <N>% (*) fcull <N>% (*) fstop <N>% Configure the culling limits. Optional. See the section on culling The defaults are 7% (run), 5% (cull) and 1% (stop) respectively. The commands beginning with a 'b' are file space (block) limits, those beginning with an 'f' are file count limits. (*) dir <path> Specify the directory containing the root of the cache. Mandatory. (*) tag <name> Specify a tag to FS-Cache to use in distinguishing multiple caches. Optional. The default is "CacheFiles". (*) debug <mask> Specify a numeric bitmask to control debugging in the kernel module. Optional. The default is zero (all off). The following values can be OR'd into the mask to collect various information: 1 Turn on trace of function entry (_enter() macros) 2 Turn on trace of function exit (_leave() macros) 4 Turn on trace of internal debug points (_debug()) This mask can also be set through sysfs, eg: echo 5 >/sys/modules/cachefiles/parameters/debug ================== STARTING THE CACHE ================== The cache is started by running the daemon. The daemon opens the cache device, configures the cache and tells it to begin caching. At that point the cache binds to fscache and the cache becomes live. The daemon is run as follows: /sbin/cachefilesd [-d]* [-s] [-n] [-f <configfile>] The flags are: (*) -d Increase the debugging level. This can be specified multiple times and is cumulative with itself. (*) -s Send messages to stderr instead of syslog. (*) -n Don't daemonise and go into background. (*) -f <configfile> Use an alternative configuration file rather than the default one. =============== THINGS TO AVOID =============== Do not mount other things within the cache as this will cause problems. The kernel module contains its own very cut-down path walking facility that ignores mountpoints, but the daemon can't avoid them. Do not create, rename or unlink files and directories in the cache whilst the cache is active, as this may cause the state to become uncertain. Renaming files in the cache might make objects appear to be other objects (the filename is part of the lookup key). Do not change or remove the extended attributes attached to cache files by the cache as this will cause the cache state management to get confused. Do not create files or directories in the cache, lest the cache get confused or serve incorrect data. Do not chmod files in the cache. The module creates things with minimal permissions to prevent random users being able to access them directly. ============= CACHE CULLING ============= The cache may need culling occasionally to make space. This involves discarding objects from the cache that have been used less recently than anything else. Culling is based on the access time of data objects. Empty directories are culled if not in use. Cache culling is done on the basis of the percentage of blocks and the percentage of files available in the underlying filesystem. There are six "limits": (*) brun (*) frun If the amount of free space and the number of available files in the cache rises above both these limits, then culling is turned off. (*) bcull (*) fcull If the amount of available space or the number of available files in the cache falls below either of these limits, then culling is started. (*) bstop (*) fstop If the amount of available space or the number of available files in the cache falls below either of these limits, then no further allocation of disk space or files is permitted until culling has raised things above these limits again. These must be configured thusly: 0 <= bstop < bcull < brun < 100 0 <= fstop < fcull < frun < 100 Note that these are percentages of available space and available files, and do _not_ appear as 100 minus the percentage displayed by the "df" program. The userspace daemon scans the cache to build up a table of cullable objects. These are then culled in least recently used order. A new scan of the cache is started as soon as space is made in the table. Objects will be skipped if their atimes have changed or if the kernel module says it is still using them. =============== CACHE STRUCTURE =============== The CacheFiles module will create two directories in the directory it was given: (*) cache/ (*) graveyard/ The active cache objects all reside in the first directory. The CacheFiles kernel module moves any retired or culled objects that it can't simply unlink to the graveyard from which the daemon will actually delete them. The daemon uses dnotify to monitor the graveyard directory, and will delete anything that appears therein. The module represents index objects as directories with the filename "I..." or "J...". Note that the "cache/" directory is itself a special index. Data objects are represented as files if they have no children, or directories if they do. Their filenames all begin "D..." or "E...". If represented as a directory, data objects will have a file in the directory called "data" that actually holds the data. Special objects are similar to data objects, except their filenames begin "S..." or "T...". If an object has children, then it will be represented as a directory. Immediately in the representative directory are a collection of directories named for hash values of the child object keys with an '@' prepended. Into this directory, if possible, will be placed the representations of the child objects: INDEX INDEX INDEX DATA FILES ========= ========== ================================= ================ cache/@4a/I03nfs/@30/Ji000000000000000--fHg8hi8400 cache/@4a/I03nfs/@30/Ji000000000000000--fHg8hi8400/@75/Es0g000w...DB1ry cache/@4a/I03nfs/@30/Ji000000000000000--fHg8hi8400/@75/Es0g000w...N22ry cache/@4a/I03nfs/@30/Ji000000000000000--fHg8hi8400/@75/Es0g000w...FP1ry If the key is so long that it exceeds NAME_MAX with the decorations added on to it, then it will be cut into pieces, the first few of which will be used to make a nest of directories, and the last one of which will be the objects inside the last directory. The names of the intermediate directories will have '+' prepended: J1223/@23/+xy...z/+kl...m/Epqr Note that keys are raw data, and not only may they exceed NAME_MAX in size, they may also contain things like '/' and NUL characters, and so they may not be suitable for turning directly into a filename. To handle this, CacheFiles will use a suitably printable filename directly and "base-64" encode ones that aren't directly suitable. The two versions of object filenames indicate the encoding: OBJECT TYPE PRINTABLE ENCODED =============== =============== =============== Index "I..." "J..." Data "D..." "E..." Special "S..." "T..." Intermediate directories are always "@" or "+" as appropriate. Each object in the cache has an extended attribute label that holds the object type ID (required to distinguish special objects) and the auxiliary data from the netfs. The latter is used to detect stale objects in the cache and update or retire them. Note that CacheFiles will erase from the cache any file it doesn't recognise or any file of an incorrect type (such as a FIFO file or a device file). ========================== SECURITY MODEL AND SELINUX ========================== CacheFiles is implemented to deal properly with the LSM security features of the Linux kernel and the SELinux facility. One of the problems that CacheFiles faces is that it is generally acting on behalf of a process, and running in that process's context, and that includes a security context that is not appropriate for accessing the cache - either because the files in the cache are inaccessible to that process, or because if the process creates a file in the cache, that file may be inaccessible to other processes. The way CacheFiles works is to temporarily change the security context (fsuid, fsgid and actor security label) that the process acts as - without changing the security context of the process when it the target of an operation performed by some other process (so signalling and suchlike still work correctly). When the CacheFiles module is asked to bind to its cache, it: (1) Finds the security label attached to the root cache directory and uses that as the security label with which it will create files. By default, this is: cachefiles_var_t (2) Finds the security label of the process which issued the bind request (presumed to be the cachefilesd daemon), which by default will be: cachefilesd_t and asks LSM to supply a security ID as which it should act given the daemon's label. By default, this will be: cachefiles_kernel_t SELinux transitions the daemon's security ID to the module's security ID based on a rule of this form in the policy. type_transition <daemon's-ID> kernel_t : process <module's-ID>; For instance: type_transition cachefilesd_t kernel_t : process cachefiles_kernel_t; The module's security ID gives it permission to create, move and remove files and directories in the cache, to find and access directories and files in the cache, to set and access extended attributes on cache objects, and to read and write files in the cache. The daemon's security ID gives it only a very restricted set of permissions: it may scan directories, stat files and erase files and directories. It may not read or write files in the cache, and so it is precluded from accessing the data cached therein; nor is it permitted to create new files in the cache. There are policy source files available in: http://people.redhat.com/~dhowells/fscache/cachefilesd-0.8.tar.bz2 and later versions. In that tarball, see the files: cachefilesd.te cachefilesd.fc cachefilesd.if They are built and installed directly by the RPM. If a non-RPM based system is being used, then copy the above files to their own directory and run: make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile semodule -i cachefilesd.pp You will need checkpolicy and selinux-policy-devel installed prior to the build. By default, the cache is located in /var/fscache, but if it is desirable that it should be elsewhere, than either the above policy files must be altered, or an auxiliary policy must be installed to label the alternate location of the cache. For instructions on how to add an auxiliary policy to enable the cache to be located elsewhere when SELinux is in enforcing mode, please see: /usr/share/doc/cachefilesd-*/move-cache.txt When the cachefilesd rpm is installed; alternatively, the document can be found in the sources. ================== A NOTE ON SECURITY ================== CacheFiles makes use of the split security in the task_struct. It allocates its own task_security structure, and redirects current->act_as to point to it when it acts on behalf of another process, in that process's context. The reason it does this is that it calls vfs_mkdir() and suchlike rather than bypassing security and calling inode ops directly. Therefore the VFS and LSM may deny the CacheFiles access to the cache data because under some circumstances the caching code is running in the security context of whatever process issued the original syscall on the netfs. Furthermore, should CacheFiles create a file or directory, the security parameters with that object is created (UID, GID, security label) would be derived from that process that issued the system call, thus potentially preventing other processes from accessing the cache - including CacheFiles's cache management daemon (cachefilesd). What is required is to temporarily override the security of the process that issued the system call. We can't, however, just do an in-place change of the security data as that affects the process as an object, not just as a subject. This means it may lose signals or ptrace events for example, and affects what the process looks like in /proc. So CacheFiles makes use of a logical split in the security between the objective security (task->sec) and the subjective security (task->act_as). The objective security holds the intrinsic security properties of a process and is never overridden. This is what appears in /proc, and is what is used when a process is the target of an operation by some other process (SIGKILL for example). The subjective security holds the active security properties of a process, and may be overridden. This is not seen externally, and is used whan a process acts upon another object, for example SIGKILLing another process or opening a file. LSM hooks exist that allow SELinux (or Smack or whatever) to reject a request for CacheFiles to run in a context of a specific security label, or to create files and directories with another security label. This documentation is added by the patch to: Documentation/filesystems/caching/cachefiles.txt Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Tested-by: Daire Byrne <Daire.Byrne@framestore.com> |