Commit graph

535 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Eric Paris
788084aba2 Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory
is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable.  This patch causes SELinux to
ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how
much space the LSM should protect.

The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux
permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by
CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.

This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason
being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux
controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to
map some area of low memory.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-17 15:09:11 +10:00
Eric Paris
8cf948e744 SELinux: call cap_file_mmap in selinux_file_mmap
Currently SELinux does not check CAP_SYS_RAWIO in the file_mmap hook.  This
means there is no DAC check on the ability to mmap low addresses in the
memory space.  This function adds the DAC check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO while
maintaining the selinux check on mmap_zero.  This means that processes
which need to mmap low memory will need CAP_SYS_RAWIO and mmap_zero but will
NOT need the SELinux sys_rawio capability.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-17 15:08:48 +10:00
James Morris
314dabb83a SELinux: fix memory leakage in /security/selinux/hooks.c
Fix memory leakage in /security/selinux/hooks.c

The buffer always needs to be freed here; we either error
out or allocate more memory.

Reported-by: iceberg <strakh@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2009-08-11 08:37:13 +10:00
David S. Miller
9cbc1cb8cd Merge branch 'master' of master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6
Conflicts:
	Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt
	drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe.c
	net/core/drop_monitor.c
	net/core/net-traces.c
2009-06-15 03:02:23 -07:00
Eric Dumazet
adf30907d6 net: skb->dst accessors
Define three accessors to get/set dst attached to a skb

struct dst_entry *skb_dst(const struct sk_buff *skb)

void skb_dst_set(struct sk_buff *skb, struct dst_entry *dst)

void skb_dst_drop(struct sk_buff *skb)
This one should replace occurrences of :
dst_release(skb->dst)
skb->dst = NULL;

Delete skb->dst field

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2009-06-03 02:51:04 -07:00
Eric Paris
850b0cee16 SELinux: define audit permissions for audit tree netlink messages
Audit trees defined 2 new netlink messages but the netlink mapping tables for
selinux permissions were not set up.  This patch maps these 2 new operations
to AUDIT_WRITE.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-03 07:44:53 +10:00
Stephen Smalley
c5642f4bba selinux: remove obsolete read buffer limit from sel_read_bool
On Tue, 2009-05-19 at 00:05 -0400, Eamon Walsh wrote:
> Recent versions of coreutils have bumped the read buffer size from 4K to
> 32K in several of the utilities.
>
> This means that "cat /selinux/booleans/xserver_object_manager" no longer
> works, it returns "Invalid argument" on F11.  getsebool works fine.
>
> sel_read_bool has a check for "count > PAGE_SIZE" that doesn't seem to
> be present in the other read functions.  Maybe it could be removed?

Yes, that check is obsoleted by the conversion of those functions to
using simple_read_from_buffer(), which will reduce count if necessary to
what is available in the buffer.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-19 23:56:11 +10:00
Eric Paris
75834fc3b6 SELinux: move SELINUX_MAGIC into magic.h
The selinuxfs superblock magic is used inside the IMA code, but is being
defined in two places and could someday get out of sync.  This patch moves the
declaration into magic.h so it is only done once.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-19 08:19:00 +10:00
James Morris
d254117099 Merge branch 'master' into next 2009-05-08 17:56:47 +10:00
Stephen Smalley
65c90bca0d selinux: Fix send_sigiotask hook
The CRED patch incorrectly converted the SELinux send_sigiotask hook to
use the current task SID rather than the target task SID in its
permission check, yielding the wrong permission check.  This fixes the
hook function.  Detected by the ltp selinux testsuite and confirmed to
correct the test failure.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-05 08:31:03 +10:00
Oleg Nesterov
ecd6de3c88 selinux: selinux_bprm_committed_creds() should wake up ->real_parent, not ->parent.
We shouldn't worry about the tracer if current is ptraced, exec() must not
succeed if the tracer has no rights to trace this task after cred changing.
But we should notify ->real_parent which is, well, real parent.

Also, we don't need _irq to take tasklist, and we don't need parent's
->siglock to wake_up_interruptible(real_parent->signal->wait_chldexit).
Since we hold tasklist, real_parent->signal must be stable. Otherwise
spin_lock(siglock) is not safe too and can't help anyway.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-30 09:08:48 +10:00
David Howells
3bcac0263f SELinux: Don't flush inherited SIGKILL during execve()
Don't flush inherited SIGKILL during execve() in SELinux's post cred commit
hook.  This isn't really a security problem: if the SIGKILL came before the
credentials were changed, then we were right to receive it at the time, and
should honour it; if it came after the creds were changed, then we definitely
should honour it; and in any case, all that will happen is that the process
will be scrapped before it ever returns to userspace.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-30 09:07:13 +10:00
Eric Paris
88c48db978 SELinux: drop secondary_ops->sysctl
We are still calling secondary_ops->sysctl even though the capabilities
module does not define a sysctl operation.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-30 08:45:56 +10:00
KaiGai Kohei
8a6f83afd0 Permissive domain in userspace object manager
This patch enables applications to handle permissive domain correctly.

Since the v2.6.26 kernel, SELinux has supported an idea of permissive
domain which allows certain processes to work as if permissive mode,
even if the global setting is enforcing mode.
However, we don't have an application program interface to inform
what domains are permissive one, and what domains are not.
It means applications focuses on SELinux (XACE/SELinux, SE-PostgreSQL
and so on) cannot handle permissive domain correctly.

This patch add the sixth field (flags) on the reply of the /selinux/access
interface which is used to make an access control decision from userspace.
If the first bit of the flags field is positive, it means the required
access control decision is on permissive domain, so application should
allow any required actions, as the kernel doing.

This patch also has a side benefit. The av_decision.flags is set at
context_struct_compute_av(). It enables to check required permissions
without read_lock(&policy_rwlock).

Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
--
 security/selinux/avc.c              |    2 +-
 security/selinux/include/security.h |    4 +++-
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c        |    4 ++--
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |   30 +++++-------------------------
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-02 09:23:45 +11:00
Paul Moore
58bfbb51ff selinux: Remove the "compat_net" compatibility code
The SELinux "compat_net" is marked as deprecated, the time has come to
finally remove it from the kernel.  Further code simplifications are
likely in the future, but this patch was intended to be a simple,
straight-up removal of the compat_net code.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 15:01:37 +11:00
Paul Moore
389fb800ac netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux
The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but
only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of
standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality
imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints.  The problem is that network sockets
created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire
labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based
on the wire label of the remote peer.  The issue had to do with how IP options
were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in
relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child
sockets.  While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire
label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP
options of the remote peer.

This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook
locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming
connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook.  Besides the
correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant
is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks
which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get
ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies
the NetLabel/SELinux glue code.  In the process of developing this patch I
also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been
fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 15:01:36 +11:00
James Morris
703a3cd728 Merge branch 'master' into next 2009-03-24 10:52:46 +11:00
Eric Paris
df7f54c012 SELinux: inode_doinit_with_dentry drop no dentry printk
Drop the printk message when an inode is found without an associated
dentry.  This should only happen when userspace can't be accessing those
inodes and those labels will get set correctly on the next d_instantiate.
Thus there is no reason to send this message.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-10 08:40:02 +11:00
Eric Paris
dd34b5d75a SELinux: new permission between tty audit and audit socket
New selinux permission to separate the ability to turn on tty auditing from
the ability to set audit rules.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-06 08:50:21 +11:00
Eric Paris
6a25b27d60 SELinux: open perm for sock files
When I did open permissions I didn't think any sockets would have an open.
Turns out AF_UNIX sockets can have an open when they are bound to the
filesystem namespace.  This patch adds a new SOCK_FILE__OPEN permission.
It's safe to add this as the open perms are already predicated on
capabilities and capabilities means we have unknown perm handling so
systems should be as backwards compatible as the policy wants them to
be.

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=475224

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-06 08:50:18 +11:00
Paul Moore
d7f59dc464 selinux: Fix a panic in selinux_netlbl_inode_permission()
Rick McNeal from LSI identified a panic in selinux_netlbl_inode_permission()
caused by a certain sequence of SUNRPC operations.  The problem appears to be
due to the lack of NULL pointer checking in the function; this patch adds the
pointer checks so the function will exit safely in the cases where the socket
is not completely initialized.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-02 09:30:04 +11:00
Paul Moore
09c50b4a52 selinux: Fix the NetLabel glue code for setsockopt()
At some point we (okay, I) managed to break the ability for users to use the
setsockopt() syscall to set IPv4 options when NetLabel was not active on the
socket in question.  The problem was noticed by someone trying to use the
"-R" (record route) option of ping:

 # ping -R 10.0.0.1
 ping: record route: No message of desired type

The solution is relatively simple, we catch the unlabeled socket case and
clear the error code, allowing the operation to succeed.  Please note that we
still deny users the ability to override IPv4 options on socket's which have
NetLabel labeling active; this is done to ensure the labeling remains intact.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-23 10:05:55 +11:00
Eric Paris
26036651c5 SELinux: convert the avc cache hash list to an hlist
We do not need O(1) access to the tail of the avc cache lists and so we are
wasting lots of space using struct list_head instead of struct hlist_head.
This patch converts the avc cache to use hlists in which there is a single
pointer from the head which saves us about 4k of global memory.

Resulted in about a 1.5% decrease in time spent in avc_has_perm_noaudit based
on oprofile sampling of tbench.  Although likely within the noise....

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-14 09:23:48 +11:00
Eric Paris
edf3d1aecd SELinux: code readability with avc_cache
The code making use of struct avc_cache was not easy to read thanks to liberal
use of &avc_cache.{slots_lock,slots}[hvalue] throughout.  This patch simply
creates local pointers and uses those instead of the long global names.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-14 09:23:45 +11:00
Eric Paris
f1c6381a6e SELinux: remove unused av.decided field
It appears there was an intention to have the security server only decide
certain permissions and leave other for later as some sort of a portential
performance win.  We are currently always deciding all 32 bits of
permissions and this is a useless couple of branches and wasted space.
This patch completely drops the av.decided concept.

This in a 17% reduction in the time spent in avc_has_perm_noaudit
based on oprofile sampling of a tbench benchmark.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-14 09:23:08 +11:00
Eric Paris
21193dcd1f SELinux: more careful use of avd in avc_has_perm_noaudit
we are often needlessly jumping through hoops when it comes to avd
entries in avc_has_perm_noaudit and we have extra initialization and memcpy
which are just wasting performance.  Try to clean the function up a bit.

This patch resulted in a 13% drop in time spent in avc_has_perm_noaudit in my
oprofile sampling of a tbench benchmark.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-14 09:23:04 +11:00
Eric Paris
906d27d9d2 SELinux: remove the unused ae.used
Currently SELinux code has an atomic which was intended to track how many
times an avc entry was used and to evict entries when they haven't been
used recently.  Instead we never let this atomic get above 1 and evict when
it is first checked for eviction since it hits zero.  This is a total waste
of time so I'm completely dropping ae.used.

This change resulted in about a 3% faster avc_has_perm_noaudit when running
oprofile against a tbench benchmark.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-14 09:22:37 +11:00
Eric Paris
a5dda68332 SELinux: check seqno when updating an avc_node
The avc update node callbacks do not check the seqno of the caller with the
seqno of the node found.  It is possible that a policy change could happen
(although almost impossibly unlikely) in which a permissive or
permissive_domain decision is not valid for the entry found.  Simply pass
and check that the seqno of the caller and the seqno of the node found
match.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-14 09:22:34 +11:00
Eric Paris
4cb912f1d1 SELinux: NULL terminate al contexts from disk
When a context is pulled in from disk we don't know that it is null
terminated.  This patch forecebly null terminates contexts when we pull
them from disk.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-14 09:22:30 +11:00
Eric Paris
4ba0a8ad63 SELinux: better printk when file with invalid label found
Currently when an inode is read into the kernel with an invalid label
string (can often happen with removable media) we output a string like:

SELinux: inode_doinit_with_dentry:  context_to_sid([SOME INVALID LABEL])
returned -22 dor dev=[blah] ino=[blah]

Which is all but incomprehensible to all but a couple of us.  Instead, on
EINVAL only, I plan to output a much more user friendly string and I plan to
ratelimit the printk since many of these could be generated very rapidly.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-14 09:22:27 +11:00
Eric Paris
200ac532a4 SELinux: call capabilities code directory
For cleanliness and efficiency remove all calls to secondary-> and instead
call capabilities code directly.  capabilities are the only module that
selinux stacks with and so the code should not indicate that other stacking
might be possible.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-14 09:22:24 +11:00
James Morris
cb5629b10d Merge branch 'master' into next
Conflicts:
	fs/namei.c

Manually merged per:

diff --cc fs/namei.c
index 734f2b5,bbc15c2..0000000
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@@ -860,9 -848,8 +849,10 @@@ static int __link_path_walk(const char
  		nd->flags |= LOOKUP_CONTINUE;
  		err = exec_permission_lite(inode);
  		if (err == -EAGAIN)
- 			err = vfs_permission(nd, MAY_EXEC);
+ 			err = inode_permission(nd->path.dentry->d_inode,
+ 					       MAY_EXEC);
 +		if (!err)
 +			err = ima_path_check(&nd->path, MAY_EXEC);
   		if (err)
  			break;

@@@ -1525,14 -1506,9 +1509,14 @@@ int may_open(struct path *path, int acc
  		flag &= ~O_TRUNC;
  	}

- 	error = vfs_permission(nd, acc_mode);
+ 	error = inode_permission(inode, acc_mode);
  	if (error)
  		return error;
 +
- 	error = ima_path_check(&nd->path,
++	error = ima_path_check(path,
 +			       acc_mode & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
 +	if (error)
 +		return error;
  	/*
  	 * An append-only file must be opened in append mode for writing.
  	 */

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-06 11:01:45 +11:00
James Morris
5626d3e861 selinux: remove hooks which simply defer to capabilities
Remove SELinux hooks which do nothing except defer to the capabilites
hooks (or in one case, replicates the function).

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2009-02-02 09:20:34 +11:00
James Morris
95c14904b6 selinux: remove secondary ops call to shm_shmat
Remove secondary ops call to shm_shmat, which is
a noop in capabilities.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30 08:55:16 +11:00
James Morris
5c4054ccfa selinux: remove secondary ops call to unix_stream_connect
Remove secondary ops call to unix_stream_connect, which is
a noop in capabilities.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30 08:55:15 +11:00
James Morris
2cbbd19812 selinux: remove secondary ops call to task_kill
Remove secondary ops call to task_kill, which is
a noop in capabilities.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30 08:55:14 +11:00
James Morris
ef76e748fa selinux: remove secondary ops call to task_setrlimit
Remove secondary ops call to task_setrlimit, which is
a noop in capabilities.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30 08:55:13 +11:00
James Morris
ca5143d3ff selinux: remove unused cred_commit hook
Remove unused cred_commit hook from SELinux.   This
currently calls into the capabilities hook, which is a noop.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30 08:55:12 +11:00
James Morris
af294e41d0 selinux: remove secondary ops call to task_create
Remove secondary ops call to task_create, which is
a noop in capabilities.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30 08:55:11 +11:00
James Morris
d541bbee69 selinux: remove secondary ops call to file_mprotect
Remove secondary ops call to file_mprotect, which is
a noop in capabilities.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30 08:55:11 +11:00
James Morris
438add6b32 selinux: remove secondary ops call to inode_setattr
Remove secondary ops call to inode_setattr, which is
a noop in capabilities.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30 08:55:10 +11:00
James Morris
188fbcca9d selinux: remove secondary ops call to inode_permission
Remove secondary ops call to inode_permission, which is
a noop in capabilities.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30 08:55:09 +11:00
James Morris
f51115b9ab selinux: remove secondary ops call to inode_follow_link
Remove secondary ops call to inode_follow_link, which is
a noop in capabilities.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30 08:55:08 +11:00
James Morris
dd4907a6d4 selinux: remove secondary ops call to inode_mknod
Remove secondary ops call to inode_mknod, which is
a noop in capabilities.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30 08:55:07 +11:00
James Morris
e4737250b7 selinux: remove secondary ops call to inode_unlink
Remove secondary ops call to inode_unlink, which is
a noop in capabilities.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30 08:55:06 +11:00
James Morris
efdfac4376 selinux: remove secondary ops call to inode_link
Remove secondary ops call to inode_link, which is
a noop in capabilities.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30 08:55:06 +11:00
James Morris
97422ab9ef selinux: remove secondary ops call to sb_umount
Remove secondary ops call to sb_umount, which is
a noop in capabilities.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30 08:55:05 +11:00
James Morris
ef935b9136 selinux: remove secondary ops call to sb_mount
Remove secondary ops call to sb_mount, which is
a noop in capabilities.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30 08:55:04 +11:00
James Morris
5565b0b865 selinux: remove secondary ops call to bprm_committed_creds
Remove secondary ops call to bprm_committed_creds, which is
a noop in capabilities.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30 08:55:03 +11:00
James Morris
2ec5dbe23d selinux: remove secondary ops call to bprm_committing_creds
Remove secondary ops call to bprm_committing_creds, which is
a noop in capabilities.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-30 08:55:02 +11:00