linux-stable/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
Michal Hocko a7c3e901a4 mm: introduce kv[mz]alloc helpers
Patch series "kvmalloc", v5.

There are many open coded kmalloc with vmalloc fallback instances in the
tree.  Most of them are not careful enough or simply do not care about
the underlying semantic of the kmalloc/page allocator which means that
a) some vmalloc fallbacks are basically unreachable because the kmalloc
part will keep retrying until it succeeds b) the page allocator can
invoke a really disruptive steps like the OOM killer to move forward
which doesn't sound appropriate when we consider that the vmalloc
fallback is available.

As it can be seen implementing kvmalloc requires quite an intimate
knowledge if the page allocator and the memory reclaim internals which
strongly suggests that a helper should be implemented in the memory
subsystem proper.

Most callers, I could find, have been converted to use the helper
instead.  This is patch 6.  There are some more relying on __GFP_REPEAT
in the networking stack which I have converted as well and Eric Dumazet
was not opposed [2] to convert them as well.

[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170130094940.13546-1-mhocko@kernel.org
[2] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485273626.16328.301.camel@edumazet-glaptop3.roam.corp.google.com

This patch (of 9):

Using kmalloc with the vmalloc fallback for larger allocations is a
common pattern in the kernel code.  Yet we do not have any common helper
for that and so users have invented their own helpers.  Some of them are
really creative when doing so.  Let's just add kv[mz]alloc and make sure
it is implemented properly.  This implementation makes sure to not make
a large memory pressure for > PAGE_SZE requests (__GFP_NORETRY) and also
to not warn about allocation failures.  This also rules out the OOM
killer as the vmalloc is a more approapriate fallback than a disruptive
user visible action.

This patch also changes some existing users and removes helpers which
are specific for them.  In some cases this is not possible (e.g.
ext4_kvmalloc, libcfs_kvzalloc) because those seems to be broken and
require GFP_NO{FS,IO} context which is not vmalloc compatible in general
(note that the page table allocation is GFP_KERNEL).  Those need to be
fixed separately.

While we are at it, document that __vmalloc{_node} about unsupported gfp
mask because there seems to be a lot of confusion out there.
kvmalloc_node will warn about GFP_KERNEL incompatible (which are not
superset) flags to catch new abusers.  Existing ones would have to die
slowly.

[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: f2fs fixup]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320163735.332e64b7@canb.auug.org.au
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306103032.2540-2-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>	[ext4 part]
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-05-08 17:15:12 -07:00

183 lines
5 KiB
C

/*
* AppArmor security module
*
* This file contains AppArmor lib definitions
*
* 2017 Canonical Ltd.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
* License.
*/
#ifndef __AA_LIB_H
#define __AA_LIB_H
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include "match.h"
/* Provide our own test for whether a write lock is held for asserts
* this is because on none SMP systems write_can_lock will always
* resolve to true, which is what you want for code making decisions
* based on it, but wrong for asserts checking that the lock is held
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
#define write_is_locked(X) !write_can_lock(X)
#else
#define write_is_locked(X) (1)
#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
/*
* DEBUG remains global (no per profile flag) since it is mostly used in sysctl
* which is not related to profile accesses.
*/
#define DEBUG_ON (aa_g_debug)
#define dbg_printk(__fmt, __args...) pr_debug(__fmt, ##__args)
#define AA_DEBUG(fmt, args...) \
do { \
if (DEBUG_ON) \
pr_debug_ratelimited("AppArmor: " fmt, ##args); \
} while (0)
#define AA_WARN(X) WARN((X), "APPARMOR WARN %s: %s\n", __func__, #X)
#define AA_BUG(X, args...) AA_BUG_FMT((X), "" args)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_ASSERTS
#define AA_BUG_FMT(X, fmt, args...) \
WARN((X), "AppArmor WARN %s: (" #X "): " fmt, __func__, ##args)
#else
#define AA_BUG_FMT(X, fmt, args...)
#endif
#define AA_ERROR(fmt, args...) \
pr_err_ratelimited("AppArmor: " fmt, ##args)
/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
extern int apparmor_initialized;
/* fn's in lib */
char *aa_split_fqname(char *args, char **ns_name);
const char *aa_splitn_fqname(const char *fqname, size_t n, const char **ns_name,
size_t *ns_len);
void aa_info_message(const char *str);
/**
* aa_strneq - compare null terminated @str to a non null terminated substring
* @str: a null terminated string
* @sub: a substring, not necessarily null terminated
* @len: length of @sub to compare
*
* The @str string must be full consumed for this to be considered a match
*/
static inline bool aa_strneq(const char *str, const char *sub, int len)
{
return !strncmp(str, sub, len) && !str[len];
}
/**
* aa_dfa_null_transition - step to next state after null character
* @dfa: the dfa to match against
* @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
*
* aa_dfa_null_transition transitions to the next state after a null
* character which is not used in standard matching and is only
* used to separate pairs.
*/
static inline unsigned int aa_dfa_null_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
unsigned int start)
{
/* the null transition only needs the string's null terminator byte */
return aa_dfa_next(dfa, start, 0);
}
static inline bool path_mediated_fs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
return !(dentry->d_sb->s_flags & MS_NOUSER);
}
/* struct aa_policy - common part of both namespaces and profiles
* @name: name of the object
* @hname - The hierarchical name
* @list: list policy object is on
* @profiles: head of the profiles list contained in the object
*/
struct aa_policy {
const char *name;
const char *hname;
struct list_head list;
struct list_head profiles;
};
/**
* basename - find the last component of an hname
* @name: hname to find the base profile name component of (NOT NULL)
*
* Returns: the tail (base profile name) name component of an hname
*/
static inline const char *basename(const char *hname)
{
char *split;
hname = strim((char *)hname);
for (split = strstr(hname, "//"); split; split = strstr(hname, "//"))
hname = split + 2;
return hname;
}
/**
* __policy_find - find a policy by @name on a policy list
* @head: list to search (NOT NULL)
* @name: name to search for (NOT NULL)
*
* Requires: rcu_read_lock be held
*
* Returns: unrefcounted policy that match @name or NULL if not found
*/
static inline struct aa_policy *__policy_find(struct list_head *head,
const char *name)
{
struct aa_policy *policy;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(policy, head, list) {
if (!strcmp(policy->name, name))
return policy;
}
return NULL;
}
/**
* __policy_strn_find - find a policy that's name matches @len chars of @str
* @head: list to search (NOT NULL)
* @str: string to search for (NOT NULL)
* @len: length of match required
*
* Requires: rcu_read_lock be held
*
* Returns: unrefcounted policy that match @str or NULL if not found
*
* if @len == strlen(@strlen) then this is equiv to __policy_find
* other wise it allows searching for policy by a partial match of name
*/
static inline struct aa_policy *__policy_strn_find(struct list_head *head,
const char *str, int len)
{
struct aa_policy *policy;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(policy, head, list) {
if (aa_strneq(policy->name, str, len))
return policy;
}
return NULL;
}
bool aa_policy_init(struct aa_policy *policy, const char *prefix,
const char *name, gfp_t gfp);
void aa_policy_destroy(struct aa_policy *policy);
#endif /* AA_LIB_H */