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![Kees Cook](/assets/img/avatar_default.png)
CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL turns on stack initialization based on -ftrivial-auto-var-init in Clang builds, which has greater coverage than CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL. -ftrivial-auto-var-init Clang option provides trivial initializers for uninitialized local variables, variable fields and padding. It has three possible values: pattern - uninitialized locals are filled with a fixed pattern (mostly 0xAA on 64-bit platforms, see https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604 for more details, but 0x000000AA for 32-bit pointers) likely to cause crashes when uninitialized value is used; zero (it's still debated whether this flag makes it to the official Clang release) - uninitialized locals are filled with zeroes; uninitialized (default) - uninitialized locals are left intact. This patch uses only the "pattern" mode when CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL is enabled. Developers have the possibility to opt-out of this feature on a per-variable basis by using __attribute__((uninitialized)), but such use should be well justified in comments. Co-developed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
164 lines
6.1 KiB
Text
164 lines
6.1 KiB
Text
menu "Kernel hardening options"
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config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
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bool
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help
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While the kernel is built with warnings enabled for any missed
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stack variable initializations, this warning is silenced for
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anything passed by reference to another function, under the
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occasionally misguided assumption that the function will do
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the initialization. As this regularly leads to exploitable
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flaws, this plugin is available to identify and zero-initialize
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such variables, depending on the chosen level of coverage.
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This plugin was originally ported from grsecurity/PaX. More
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information at:
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* https://grsecurity.net/
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* https://pax.grsecurity.net/
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menu "Memory initialization"
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config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
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def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern)
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choice
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prompt "Initialize kernel stack variables at function entry"
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default GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && GCC_PLUGINS
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default INIT_STACK_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
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default INIT_STACK_NONE
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help
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This option enables initialization of stack variables at
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function entry time. This has the possibility to have the
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greatest coverage (since all functions can have their
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variables initialized), but the performance impact depends
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on the function calling complexity of a given workload's
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syscalls.
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This chooses the level of coverage over classes of potentially
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uninitialized variables. The selected class will be
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initialized before use in a function.
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config INIT_STACK_NONE
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bool "no automatic initialization (weakest)"
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help
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Disable automatic stack variable initialization.
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This leaves the kernel vulnerable to the standard
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classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits
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and information exposures.
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config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_USER
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bool "zero-init structs marked for userspace (weak)"
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depends on GCC_PLUGINS
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select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
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help
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Zero-initialize any structures on the stack containing
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a __user attribute. This can prevent some classes of
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uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
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exposures, like CVE-2013-2141:
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https://git.kernel.org/linus/b9e146d8eb3b9eca
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config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF
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bool "zero-init structs passed by reference (strong)"
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depends on GCC_PLUGINS
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select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
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help
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Zero-initialize any structures on the stack that may
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be passed by reference and had not already been
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explicitly initialized. This can prevent most classes
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of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
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exposures, like CVE-2017-1000410:
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https://git.kernel.org/linus/06e7e776ca4d3654
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config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
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bool "zero-init anything passed by reference (very strong)"
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depends on GCC_PLUGINS
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select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
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help
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Zero-initialize any stack variables that may be passed
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by reference and had not already been explicitly
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initialized. This is intended to eliminate all classes
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of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
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exposures.
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config INIT_STACK_ALL
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bool "0xAA-init everything on the stack (strongest)"
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depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
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help
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Initializes everything on the stack with a 0xAA
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pattern. This is intended to eliminate all classes
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of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
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exposures, even variables that were warned to have been
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left uninitialized.
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endchoice
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config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
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bool "Report forcefully initialized variables"
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depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
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depends on !COMPILE_TEST # too noisy
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help
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This option will cause a warning to be printed each time the
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structleak plugin finds a variable it thinks needs to be
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initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected
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by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings.
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config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
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bool "Poison kernel stack before returning from syscalls"
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depends on GCC_PLUGINS
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depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
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help
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This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before
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returning from system calls. This has the effect of leaving
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the stack initialized to the poison value, which both reduces
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the lifetime of any sensitive stack contents and reduces
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potential for uninitialized stack variable exploits or information
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exposures (it does not cover functions reaching the same stack
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depth as prior functions during the same syscall). This blocks
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most uninitialized stack variable attacks, with the performance
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impact being driven by the depth of the stack usage, rather than
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the function calling complexity.
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The performance impact on a single CPU system kernel compilation
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sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you
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are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before
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deploying it.
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This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
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* https://grsecurity.net/
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* https://pax.grsecurity.net/
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config STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE
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int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by STACKLEAK"
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default 100
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range 0 4096
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depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
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help
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The STACKLEAK gcc plugin instruments the kernel code for tracking
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the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes).
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It inserts the stackleak_track_stack() call for the functions with
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a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter.
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If unsure, leave the default value 100.
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config STACKLEAK_METRICS
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bool "Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system"
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depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
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depends on PROC_FS
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help
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If this is set, STACKLEAK metrics for every task are available in
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the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/<pid>/stack_depth
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shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and
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previous syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it
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can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for
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your workloads.
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config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
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bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing"
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depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
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help
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This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in
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runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with
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CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
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endmenu
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endmenu
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