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https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
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abf75a5033
Based on a patch from Ernie Petrides During security research, Red Hat discovered a behavioral flaw in core dump handling. A local user could create a program that would cause a core file to be dumped into a directory they would not normally have permissions to write to. This could lead to a denial of service (disk consumption), or allow the local user to gain root privileges. The prctl() system call should never allow to set "dumpable" to the value 2. Especially not for non-privileged users. This can be split into three cases: 1) running as root -- then core dumps will already be done as root, and so prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 2) is not useful 2) running as non-root w/setuid-to-root -- this is the debatable case 3) running as non-root w/setuid-to-non-root -- then you definitely do NOT want "dumpable" to get set to 2 because you have the privilege escalation vulnerability With case #2, the only potential usefulness is for a program that has designed to run with higher privilege (than the user invoking it) that wants to be able to create root-owned root-validated core dumps. This might be useful as a debugging aid, but would only be safe if the program had done a chdir() to a safe directory. There is no benefit to a production setuid-to-root utility, because it shouldn't be dumping core in the first place. If this is true, then the same debugging aid could also be accomplished with the "suid_dumpable" sysctl. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2064 lines
49 KiB
C
2064 lines
49 KiB
C
/*
|
||
* linux/kernel/sys.c
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||
*
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* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
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*/
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||
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/utsname.h>
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#include <linux/mman.h>
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#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
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#include <linux/notifier.h>
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#include <linux/reboot.h>
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#include <linux/prctl.h>
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#include <linux/highuid.h>
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/kexec.h>
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#include <linux/workqueue.h>
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <linux/device.h>
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#include <linux/key.h>
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#include <linux/times.h>
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#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/dcookies.h>
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#include <linux/suspend.h>
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#include <linux/tty.h>
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#include <linux/signal.h>
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#include <linux/cn_proc.h>
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#include <linux/compat.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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#include <linux/kprobes.h>
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#include <asm/uaccess.h>
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#include <asm/io.h>
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#include <asm/unistd.h>
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#ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL
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# define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
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#endif
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#ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL
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# define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
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#endif
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#ifndef SET_FPEMU_CTL
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# define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
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#endif
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#ifndef GET_FPEMU_CTL
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# define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
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#endif
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#ifndef SET_FPEXC_CTL
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# define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
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#endif
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#ifndef GET_FPEXC_CTL
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# define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
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#endif
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#ifndef GET_ENDIAN
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# define GET_ENDIAN(a,b) (-EINVAL)
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#endif
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#ifndef SET_ENDIAN
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# define SET_ENDIAN(a,b) (-EINVAL)
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#endif
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/*
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* this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for
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* architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past
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*/
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int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID;
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int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID;
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#ifdef CONFIG_UID16
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid);
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid);
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#endif
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/*
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* the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit
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* UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures
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*/
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int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID;
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int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID;
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid);
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid);
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/*
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* this indicates whether you can reboot with ctrl-alt-del: the default is yes
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*/
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||
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int C_A_D = 1;
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int cad_pid = 1;
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/*
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* Notifier list for kernel code which wants to be called
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* at shutdown. This is used to stop any idling DMA operations
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* and the like.
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*/
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static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(reboot_notifier_list);
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/*
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* Notifier chain core routines. The exported routines below
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* are layered on top of these, with appropriate locking added.
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*/
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||
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static int notifier_chain_register(struct notifier_block **nl,
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struct notifier_block *n)
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{
|
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while ((*nl) != NULL) {
|
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if (n->priority > (*nl)->priority)
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break;
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||
nl = &((*nl)->next);
|
||
}
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n->next = *nl;
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rcu_assign_pointer(*nl, n);
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return 0;
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}
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||
|
||
static int notifier_chain_unregister(struct notifier_block **nl,
|
||
struct notifier_block *n)
|
||
{
|
||
while ((*nl) != NULL) {
|
||
if ((*nl) == n) {
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||
rcu_assign_pointer(*nl, n->next);
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||
return 0;
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||
}
|
||
nl = &((*nl)->next);
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}
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return -ENOENT;
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}
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static int __kprobes notifier_call_chain(struct notifier_block **nl,
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unsigned long val, void *v)
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{
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int ret = NOTIFY_DONE;
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struct notifier_block *nb, *next_nb;
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|
||
nb = rcu_dereference(*nl);
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while (nb) {
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next_nb = rcu_dereference(nb->next);
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ret = nb->notifier_call(nb, val, v);
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if ((ret & NOTIFY_STOP_MASK) == NOTIFY_STOP_MASK)
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break;
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nb = next_nb;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Atomic notifier chain routines. Registration and unregistration
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* use a mutex, and call_chain is synchronized by RCU (no locks).
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*/
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/**
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* atomic_notifier_chain_register - Add notifier to an atomic notifier chain
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* @nh: Pointer to head of the atomic notifier chain
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* @n: New entry in notifier chain
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*
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* Adds a notifier to an atomic notifier chain.
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*
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* Currently always returns zero.
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*/
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int atomic_notifier_chain_register(struct atomic_notifier_head *nh,
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struct notifier_block *n)
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{
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unsigned long flags;
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int ret;
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spin_lock_irqsave(&nh->lock, flags);
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ret = notifier_chain_register(&nh->head, n);
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spin_unlock_irqrestore(&nh->lock, flags);
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(atomic_notifier_chain_register);
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/**
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* atomic_notifier_chain_unregister - Remove notifier from an atomic notifier chain
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* @nh: Pointer to head of the atomic notifier chain
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* @n: Entry to remove from notifier chain
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*
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* Removes a notifier from an atomic notifier chain.
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*
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* Returns zero on success or %-ENOENT on failure.
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*/
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int atomic_notifier_chain_unregister(struct atomic_notifier_head *nh,
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struct notifier_block *n)
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{
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unsigned long flags;
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int ret;
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spin_lock_irqsave(&nh->lock, flags);
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ret = notifier_chain_unregister(&nh->head, n);
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spin_unlock_irqrestore(&nh->lock, flags);
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synchronize_rcu();
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(atomic_notifier_chain_unregister);
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/**
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* atomic_notifier_call_chain - Call functions in an atomic notifier chain
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* @nh: Pointer to head of the atomic notifier chain
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* @val: Value passed unmodified to notifier function
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* @v: Pointer passed unmodified to notifier function
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*
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* Calls each function in a notifier chain in turn. The functions
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* run in an atomic context, so they must not block.
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* This routine uses RCU to synchronize with changes to the chain.
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*
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* If the return value of the notifier can be and'ed
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* with %NOTIFY_STOP_MASK then atomic_notifier_call_chain
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* will return immediately, with the return value of
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* the notifier function which halted execution.
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* Otherwise the return value is the return value
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* of the last notifier function called.
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*/
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int atomic_notifier_call_chain(struct atomic_notifier_head *nh,
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unsigned long val, void *v)
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{
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int ret;
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rcu_read_lock();
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ret = notifier_call_chain(&nh->head, val, v);
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(atomic_notifier_call_chain);
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/*
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* Blocking notifier chain routines. All access to the chain is
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* synchronized by an rwsem.
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*/
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/**
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* blocking_notifier_chain_register - Add notifier to a blocking notifier chain
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* @nh: Pointer to head of the blocking notifier chain
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* @n: New entry in notifier chain
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*
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* Adds a notifier to a blocking notifier chain.
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* Must be called in process context.
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*
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* Currently always returns zero.
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*/
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int blocking_notifier_chain_register(struct blocking_notifier_head *nh,
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struct notifier_block *n)
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{
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int ret;
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/*
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* This code gets used during boot-up, when task switching is
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* not yet working and interrupts must remain disabled. At
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* such times we must not call down_write().
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*/
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if (unlikely(system_state == SYSTEM_BOOTING))
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return notifier_chain_register(&nh->head, n);
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down_write(&nh->rwsem);
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ret = notifier_chain_register(&nh->head, n);
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up_write(&nh->rwsem);
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blocking_notifier_chain_register);
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/**
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* blocking_notifier_chain_unregister - Remove notifier from a blocking notifier chain
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* @nh: Pointer to head of the blocking notifier chain
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* @n: Entry to remove from notifier chain
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*
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* Removes a notifier from a blocking notifier chain.
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* Must be called from process context.
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*
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* Returns zero on success or %-ENOENT on failure.
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*/
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int blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(struct blocking_notifier_head *nh,
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struct notifier_block *n)
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{
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int ret;
|
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/*
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* This code gets used during boot-up, when task switching is
|
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* not yet working and interrupts must remain disabled. At
|
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* such times we must not call down_write().
|
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*/
|
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if (unlikely(system_state == SYSTEM_BOOTING))
|
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return notifier_chain_unregister(&nh->head, n);
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down_write(&nh->rwsem);
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ret = notifier_chain_unregister(&nh->head, n);
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up_write(&nh->rwsem);
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blocking_notifier_chain_unregister);
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|
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/**
|
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* blocking_notifier_call_chain - Call functions in a blocking notifier chain
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* @nh: Pointer to head of the blocking notifier chain
|
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* @val: Value passed unmodified to notifier function
|
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* @v: Pointer passed unmodified to notifier function
|
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*
|
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* Calls each function in a notifier chain in turn. The functions
|
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* run in a process context, so they are allowed to block.
|
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*
|
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* If the return value of the notifier can be and'ed
|
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* with %NOTIFY_STOP_MASK then blocking_notifier_call_chain
|
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* will return immediately, with the return value of
|
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* the notifier function which halted execution.
|
||
* Otherwise the return value is the return value
|
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* of the last notifier function called.
|
||
*/
|
||
|
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int blocking_notifier_call_chain(struct blocking_notifier_head *nh,
|
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unsigned long val, void *v)
|
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{
|
||
int ret;
|
||
|
||
down_read(&nh->rwsem);
|
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ret = notifier_call_chain(&nh->head, val, v);
|
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up_read(&nh->rwsem);
|
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return ret;
|
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}
|
||
|
||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blocking_notifier_call_chain);
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Raw notifier chain routines. There is no protection;
|
||
* the caller must provide it. Use at your own risk!
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* raw_notifier_chain_register - Add notifier to a raw notifier chain
|
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* @nh: Pointer to head of the raw notifier chain
|
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* @n: New entry in notifier chain
|
||
*
|
||
* Adds a notifier to a raw notifier chain.
|
||
* All locking must be provided by the caller.
|
||
*
|
||
* Currently always returns zero.
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
int raw_notifier_chain_register(struct raw_notifier_head *nh,
|
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struct notifier_block *n)
|
||
{
|
||
return notifier_chain_register(&nh->head, n);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(raw_notifier_chain_register);
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* raw_notifier_chain_unregister - Remove notifier from a raw notifier chain
|
||
* @nh: Pointer to head of the raw notifier chain
|
||
* @n: Entry to remove from notifier chain
|
||
*
|
||
* Removes a notifier from a raw notifier chain.
|
||
* All locking must be provided by the caller.
|
||
*
|
||
* Returns zero on success or %-ENOENT on failure.
|
||
*/
|
||
int raw_notifier_chain_unregister(struct raw_notifier_head *nh,
|
||
struct notifier_block *n)
|
||
{
|
||
return notifier_chain_unregister(&nh->head, n);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(raw_notifier_chain_unregister);
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* raw_notifier_call_chain - Call functions in a raw notifier chain
|
||
* @nh: Pointer to head of the raw notifier chain
|
||
* @val: Value passed unmodified to notifier function
|
||
* @v: Pointer passed unmodified to notifier function
|
||
*
|
||
* Calls each function in a notifier chain in turn. The functions
|
||
* run in an undefined context.
|
||
* All locking must be provided by the caller.
|
||
*
|
||
* If the return value of the notifier can be and'ed
|
||
* with %NOTIFY_STOP_MASK then raw_notifier_call_chain
|
||
* will return immediately, with the return value of
|
||
* the notifier function which halted execution.
|
||
* Otherwise the return value is the return value
|
||
* of the last notifier function called.
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
int raw_notifier_call_chain(struct raw_notifier_head *nh,
|
||
unsigned long val, void *v)
|
||
{
|
||
return notifier_call_chain(&nh->head, val, v);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(raw_notifier_call_chain);
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* register_reboot_notifier - Register function to be called at reboot time
|
||
* @nb: Info about notifier function to be called
|
||
*
|
||
* Registers a function with the list of functions
|
||
* to be called at reboot time.
|
||
*
|
||
* Currently always returns zero, as blocking_notifier_chain_register
|
||
* always returns zero.
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
int register_reboot_notifier(struct notifier_block * nb)
|
||
{
|
||
return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&reboot_notifier_list, nb);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_reboot_notifier);
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* unregister_reboot_notifier - Unregister previously registered reboot notifier
|
||
* @nb: Hook to be unregistered
|
||
*
|
||
* Unregisters a previously registered reboot
|
||
* notifier function.
|
||
*
|
||
* Returns zero on success, or %-ENOENT on failure.
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
int unregister_reboot_notifier(struct notifier_block * nb)
|
||
{
|
||
return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&reboot_notifier_list, nb);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_reboot_notifier);
|
||
|
||
static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error)
|
||
{
|
||
int no_nice;
|
||
|
||
if (p->uid != current->euid &&
|
||
p->euid != current->euid && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
|
||
error = -EPERM;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, niceval)) {
|
||
error = -EACCES;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval);
|
||
if (no_nice) {
|
||
error = no_nice;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
if (error == -ESRCH)
|
||
error = 0;
|
||
set_user_nice(p, niceval);
|
||
out:
|
||
return error;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_setpriority(int which, int who, int niceval)
|
||
{
|
||
struct task_struct *g, *p;
|
||
struct user_struct *user;
|
||
int error = -EINVAL;
|
||
|
||
if (which > 2 || which < 0)
|
||
goto out;
|
||
|
||
/* normalize: avoid signed division (rounding problems) */
|
||
error = -ESRCH;
|
||
if (niceval < -20)
|
||
niceval = -20;
|
||
if (niceval > 19)
|
||
niceval = 19;
|
||
|
||
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
|
||
switch (which) {
|
||
case PRIO_PROCESS:
|
||
if (!who)
|
||
who = current->pid;
|
||
p = find_task_by_pid(who);
|
||
if (p)
|
||
error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
|
||
break;
|
||
case PRIO_PGRP:
|
||
if (!who)
|
||
who = process_group(current);
|
||
do_each_task_pid(who, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
|
||
error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
|
||
} while_each_task_pid(who, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
|
||
break;
|
||
case PRIO_USER:
|
||
user = current->user;
|
||
if (!who)
|
||
who = current->uid;
|
||
else
|
||
if ((who != current->uid) && !(user = find_user(who)))
|
||
goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */
|
||
|
||
do_each_thread(g, p)
|
||
if (p->uid == who)
|
||
error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
|
||
while_each_thread(g, p);
|
||
if (who != current->uid)
|
||
free_uid(user); /* For find_user() */
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
out_unlock:
|
||
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
|
||
out:
|
||
return error;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will
|
||
* not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that
|
||
* has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19)
|
||
* to stay compatible.
|
||
*/
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_getpriority(int which, int who)
|
||
{
|
||
struct task_struct *g, *p;
|
||
struct user_struct *user;
|
||
long niceval, retval = -ESRCH;
|
||
|
||
if (which > 2 || which < 0)
|
||
return -EINVAL;
|
||
|
||
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
|
||
switch (which) {
|
||
case PRIO_PROCESS:
|
||
if (!who)
|
||
who = current->pid;
|
||
p = find_task_by_pid(who);
|
||
if (p) {
|
||
niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
|
||
if (niceval > retval)
|
||
retval = niceval;
|
||
}
|
||
break;
|
||
case PRIO_PGRP:
|
||
if (!who)
|
||
who = process_group(current);
|
||
do_each_task_pid(who, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
|
||
niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
|
||
if (niceval > retval)
|
||
retval = niceval;
|
||
} while_each_task_pid(who, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
|
||
break;
|
||
case PRIO_USER:
|
||
user = current->user;
|
||
if (!who)
|
||
who = current->uid;
|
||
else
|
||
if ((who != current->uid) && !(user = find_user(who)))
|
||
goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */
|
||
|
||
do_each_thread(g, p)
|
||
if (p->uid == who) {
|
||
niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
|
||
if (niceval > retval)
|
||
retval = niceval;
|
||
}
|
||
while_each_thread(g, p);
|
||
if (who != current->uid)
|
||
free_uid(user); /* for find_user() */
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
out_unlock:
|
||
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
|
||
|
||
return retval;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* emergency_restart - reboot the system
|
||
*
|
||
* Without shutting down any hardware or taking any locks
|
||
* reboot the system. This is called when we know we are in
|
||
* trouble so this is our best effort to reboot. This is
|
||
* safe to call in interrupt context.
|
||
*/
|
||
void emergency_restart(void)
|
||
{
|
||
machine_emergency_restart();
|
||
}
|
||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(emergency_restart);
|
||
|
||
static void kernel_restart_prepare(char *cmd)
|
||
{
|
||
blocking_notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_RESTART, cmd);
|
||
system_state = SYSTEM_RESTART;
|
||
device_shutdown();
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* kernel_restart - reboot the system
|
||
* @cmd: pointer to buffer containing command to execute for restart
|
||
* or %NULL
|
||
*
|
||
* Shutdown everything and perform a clean reboot.
|
||
* This is not safe to call in interrupt context.
|
||
*/
|
||
void kernel_restart(char *cmd)
|
||
{
|
||
kernel_restart_prepare(cmd);
|
||
if (!cmd) {
|
||
printk(KERN_EMERG "Restarting system.\n");
|
||
} else {
|
||
printk(KERN_EMERG "Restarting system with command '%s'.\n", cmd);
|
||
}
|
||
printk(".\n");
|
||
machine_restart(cmd);
|
||
}
|
||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_restart);
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* kernel_kexec - reboot the system
|
||
*
|
||
* Move into place and start executing a preloaded standalone
|
||
* executable. If nothing was preloaded return an error.
|
||
*/
|
||
static void kernel_kexec(void)
|
||
{
|
||
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
|
||
struct kimage *image;
|
||
image = xchg(&kexec_image, NULL);
|
||
if (!image) {
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
kernel_restart_prepare(NULL);
|
||
printk(KERN_EMERG "Starting new kernel\n");
|
||
machine_shutdown();
|
||
machine_kexec(image);
|
||
#endif
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
void kernel_shutdown_prepare(enum system_states state)
|
||
{
|
||
blocking_notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list,
|
||
(state == SYSTEM_HALT)?SYS_HALT:SYS_POWER_OFF, NULL);
|
||
system_state = state;
|
||
device_shutdown();
|
||
}
|
||
/**
|
||
* kernel_halt - halt the system
|
||
*
|
||
* Shutdown everything and perform a clean system halt.
|
||
*/
|
||
void kernel_halt(void)
|
||
{
|
||
kernel_shutdown_prepare(SYSTEM_HALT);
|
||
printk(KERN_EMERG "System halted.\n");
|
||
machine_halt();
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_halt);
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* kernel_power_off - power_off the system
|
||
*
|
||
* Shutdown everything and perform a clean system power_off.
|
||
*/
|
||
void kernel_power_off(void)
|
||
{
|
||
kernel_shutdown_prepare(SYSTEM_POWER_OFF);
|
||
printk(KERN_EMERG "Power down.\n");
|
||
machine_power_off();
|
||
}
|
||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_power_off);
|
||
/*
|
||
* Reboot system call: for obvious reasons only root may call it,
|
||
* and even root needs to set up some magic numbers in the registers
|
||
* so that some mistake won't make this reboot the whole machine.
|
||
* You can also set the meaning of the ctrl-alt-del-key here.
|
||
*
|
||
* reboot doesn't sync: do that yourself before calling this.
|
||
*/
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_reboot(int magic1, int magic2, unsigned int cmd, void __user * arg)
|
||
{
|
||
char buffer[256];
|
||
|
||
/* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
|
||
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT))
|
||
return -EPERM;
|
||
|
||
/* For safety, we require "magic" arguments. */
|
||
if (magic1 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC1 ||
|
||
(magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2 &&
|
||
magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2A &&
|
||
magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2B &&
|
||
magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2C))
|
||
return -EINVAL;
|
||
|
||
/* Instead of trying to make the power_off code look like
|
||
* halt when pm_power_off is not set do it the easy way.
|
||
*/
|
||
if ((cmd == LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWER_OFF) && !pm_power_off)
|
||
cmd = LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT;
|
||
|
||
lock_kernel();
|
||
switch (cmd) {
|
||
case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART:
|
||
kernel_restart(NULL);
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_ON:
|
||
C_A_D = 1;
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_OFF:
|
||
C_A_D = 0;
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT:
|
||
kernel_halt();
|
||
unlock_kernel();
|
||
do_exit(0);
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWER_OFF:
|
||
kernel_power_off();
|
||
unlock_kernel();
|
||
do_exit(0);
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART2:
|
||
if (strncpy_from_user(&buffer[0], arg, sizeof(buffer) - 1) < 0) {
|
||
unlock_kernel();
|
||
return -EFAULT;
|
||
}
|
||
buffer[sizeof(buffer) - 1] = '\0';
|
||
|
||
kernel_restart(buffer);
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC:
|
||
kernel_kexec();
|
||
unlock_kernel();
|
||
return -EINVAL;
|
||
|
||
#ifdef CONFIG_SOFTWARE_SUSPEND
|
||
case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_SW_SUSPEND:
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = software_suspend();
|
||
unlock_kernel();
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
default:
|
||
unlock_kernel();
|
||
return -EINVAL;
|
||
}
|
||
unlock_kernel();
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static void deferred_cad(void *dummy)
|
||
{
|
||
kernel_restart(NULL);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* This function gets called by ctrl-alt-del - ie the keyboard interrupt.
|
||
* As it's called within an interrupt, it may NOT sync: the only choice
|
||
* is whether to reboot at once, or just ignore the ctrl-alt-del.
|
||
*/
|
||
void ctrl_alt_del(void)
|
||
{
|
||
static DECLARE_WORK(cad_work, deferred_cad, NULL);
|
||
|
||
if (C_A_D)
|
||
schedule_work(&cad_work);
|
||
else
|
||
kill_proc(cad_pid, SIGINT, 1);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid
|
||
* or vice versa. (BSD-style)
|
||
*
|
||
* If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not
|
||
* equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid.
|
||
*
|
||
* This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its
|
||
* privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
|
||
* a security audit over a program.
|
||
*
|
||
* The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be
|
||
* 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be
|
||
* 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs.
|
||
*
|
||
* SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem
|
||
* operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned).
|
||
*/
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid)
|
||
{
|
||
int old_rgid = current->gid;
|
||
int old_egid = current->egid;
|
||
int new_rgid = old_rgid;
|
||
int new_egid = old_egid;
|
||
int retval;
|
||
|
||
retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE);
|
||
if (retval)
|
||
return retval;
|
||
|
||
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
|
||
if ((old_rgid == rgid) ||
|
||
(current->egid==rgid) ||
|
||
capable(CAP_SETGID))
|
||
new_rgid = rgid;
|
||
else
|
||
return -EPERM;
|
||
}
|
||
if (egid != (gid_t) -1) {
|
||
if ((old_rgid == egid) ||
|
||
(current->egid == egid) ||
|
||
(current->sgid == egid) ||
|
||
capable(CAP_SETGID))
|
||
new_egid = egid;
|
||
else {
|
||
return -EPERM;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
if (new_egid != old_egid)
|
||
{
|
||
current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
|
||
smp_wmb();
|
||
}
|
||
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 ||
|
||
(egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old_rgid))
|
||
current->sgid = new_egid;
|
||
current->fsgid = new_egid;
|
||
current->egid = new_egid;
|
||
current->gid = new_rgid;
|
||
key_fsgid_changed(current);
|
||
proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_GID);
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS
|
||
*
|
||
* SMP: Same implicit races as above.
|
||
*/
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_setgid(gid_t gid)
|
||
{
|
||
int old_egid = current->egid;
|
||
int retval;
|
||
|
||
retval = security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID);
|
||
if (retval)
|
||
return retval;
|
||
|
||
if (capable(CAP_SETGID))
|
||
{
|
||
if(old_egid != gid)
|
||
{
|
||
current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
|
||
smp_wmb();
|
||
}
|
||
current->gid = current->egid = current->sgid = current->fsgid = gid;
|
||
}
|
||
else if ((gid == current->gid) || (gid == current->sgid))
|
||
{
|
||
if(old_egid != gid)
|
||
{
|
||
current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
|
||
smp_wmb();
|
||
}
|
||
current->egid = current->fsgid = gid;
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
return -EPERM;
|
||
|
||
key_fsgid_changed(current);
|
||
proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_GID);
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static int set_user(uid_t new_ruid, int dumpclear)
|
||
{
|
||
struct user_struct *new_user;
|
||
|
||
new_user = alloc_uid(new_ruid);
|
||
if (!new_user)
|
||
return -EAGAIN;
|
||
|
||
if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >=
|
||
current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur &&
|
||
new_user != &root_user) {
|
||
free_uid(new_user);
|
||
return -EAGAIN;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
switch_uid(new_user);
|
||
|
||
if(dumpclear)
|
||
{
|
||
current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
|
||
smp_wmb();
|
||
}
|
||
current->uid = new_ruid;
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid
|
||
* or vice versa. (BSD-style)
|
||
*
|
||
* If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not
|
||
* equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid.
|
||
*
|
||
* This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its
|
||
* privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
|
||
* a security audit over a program.
|
||
*
|
||
* The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be
|
||
* 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be
|
||
* 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs.
|
||
*/
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
|
||
{
|
||
int old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, new_ruid, new_euid;
|
||
int retval;
|
||
|
||
retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE);
|
||
if (retval)
|
||
return retval;
|
||
|
||
new_ruid = old_ruid = current->uid;
|
||
new_euid = old_euid = current->euid;
|
||
old_suid = current->suid;
|
||
|
||
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
|
||
new_ruid = ruid;
|
||
if ((old_ruid != ruid) &&
|
||
(current->euid != ruid) &&
|
||
!capable(CAP_SETUID))
|
||
return -EPERM;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (euid != (uid_t) -1) {
|
||
new_euid = euid;
|
||
if ((old_ruid != euid) &&
|
||
(current->euid != euid) &&
|
||
(current->suid != euid) &&
|
||
!capable(CAP_SETUID))
|
||
return -EPERM;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (new_ruid != old_ruid && set_user(new_ruid, new_euid != old_euid) < 0)
|
||
return -EAGAIN;
|
||
|
||
if (new_euid != old_euid)
|
||
{
|
||
current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
|
||
smp_wmb();
|
||
}
|
||
current->fsuid = current->euid = new_euid;
|
||
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 ||
|
||
(euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old_ruid))
|
||
current->suid = current->euid;
|
||
current->fsuid = current->euid;
|
||
|
||
key_fsuid_changed(current);
|
||
proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_UID);
|
||
|
||
return security_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_RE);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS
|
||
*
|
||
* Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program
|
||
* like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal
|
||
* user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets
|
||
* the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people
|
||
* in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid()
|
||
* will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to
|
||
* regain them by swapping the real and effective uid.
|
||
*/
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_setuid(uid_t uid)
|
||
{
|
||
int old_euid = current->euid;
|
||
int old_ruid, old_suid, new_ruid, new_suid;
|
||
int retval;
|
||
|
||
retval = security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID);
|
||
if (retval)
|
||
return retval;
|
||
|
||
old_ruid = new_ruid = current->uid;
|
||
old_suid = current->suid;
|
||
new_suid = old_suid;
|
||
|
||
if (capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
|
||
if (uid != old_ruid && set_user(uid, old_euid != uid) < 0)
|
||
return -EAGAIN;
|
||
new_suid = uid;
|
||
} else if ((uid != current->uid) && (uid != new_suid))
|
||
return -EPERM;
|
||
|
||
if (old_euid != uid)
|
||
{
|
||
current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
|
||
smp_wmb();
|
||
}
|
||
current->fsuid = current->euid = uid;
|
||
current->suid = new_suid;
|
||
|
||
key_fsuid_changed(current);
|
||
proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_UID);
|
||
|
||
return security_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_ID);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid,
|
||
* and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid().
|
||
*/
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
|
||
{
|
||
int old_ruid = current->uid;
|
||
int old_euid = current->euid;
|
||
int old_suid = current->suid;
|
||
int retval;
|
||
|
||
retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
|
||
if (retval)
|
||
return retval;
|
||
|
||
if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
|
||
if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && (ruid != current->uid) &&
|
||
(ruid != current->euid) && (ruid != current->suid))
|
||
return -EPERM;
|
||
if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && (euid != current->uid) &&
|
||
(euid != current->euid) && (euid != current->suid))
|
||
return -EPERM;
|
||
if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && (suid != current->uid) &&
|
||
(suid != current->euid) && (suid != current->suid))
|
||
return -EPERM;
|
||
}
|
||
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
|
||
if (ruid != current->uid && set_user(ruid, euid != current->euid) < 0)
|
||
return -EAGAIN;
|
||
}
|
||
if (euid != (uid_t) -1) {
|
||
if (euid != current->euid)
|
||
{
|
||
current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
|
||
smp_wmb();
|
||
}
|
||
current->euid = euid;
|
||
}
|
||
current->fsuid = current->euid;
|
||
if (suid != (uid_t) -1)
|
||
current->suid = suid;
|
||
|
||
key_fsuid_changed(current);
|
||
proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_UID);
|
||
|
||
return security_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_getresuid(uid_t __user *ruid, uid_t __user *euid, uid_t __user *suid)
|
||
{
|
||
int retval;
|
||
|
||
if (!(retval = put_user(current->uid, ruid)) &&
|
||
!(retval = put_user(current->euid, euid)))
|
||
retval = put_user(current->suid, suid);
|
||
|
||
return retval;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid.
|
||
*/
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid)
|
||
{
|
||
int retval;
|
||
|
||
retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, sgid, LSM_SETID_RES);
|
||
if (retval)
|
||
return retval;
|
||
|
||
if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
|
||
if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && (rgid != current->gid) &&
|
||
(rgid != current->egid) && (rgid != current->sgid))
|
||
return -EPERM;
|
||
if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && (egid != current->gid) &&
|
||
(egid != current->egid) && (egid != current->sgid))
|
||
return -EPERM;
|
||
if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && (sgid != current->gid) &&
|
||
(sgid != current->egid) && (sgid != current->sgid))
|
||
return -EPERM;
|
||
}
|
||
if (egid != (gid_t) -1) {
|
||
if (egid != current->egid)
|
||
{
|
||
current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
|
||
smp_wmb();
|
||
}
|
||
current->egid = egid;
|
||
}
|
||
current->fsgid = current->egid;
|
||
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
|
||
current->gid = rgid;
|
||
if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
|
||
current->sgid = sgid;
|
||
|
||
key_fsgid_changed(current);
|
||
proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_GID);
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_getresgid(gid_t __user *rgid, gid_t __user *egid, gid_t __user *sgid)
|
||
{
|
||
int retval;
|
||
|
||
if (!(retval = put_user(current->gid, rgid)) &&
|
||
!(retval = put_user(current->egid, egid)))
|
||
retval = put_user(current->sgid, sgid);
|
||
|
||
return retval;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This
|
||
* is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at
|
||
* whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when
|
||
* explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access..
|
||
*/
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid)
|
||
{
|
||
int old_fsuid;
|
||
|
||
old_fsuid = current->fsuid;
|
||
if (security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS))
|
||
return old_fsuid;
|
||
|
||
if (uid == current->uid || uid == current->euid ||
|
||
uid == current->suid || uid == current->fsuid ||
|
||
capable(CAP_SETUID))
|
||
{
|
||
if (uid != old_fsuid)
|
||
{
|
||
current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
|
||
smp_wmb();
|
||
}
|
||
current->fsuid = uid;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
key_fsuid_changed(current);
|
||
proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_UID);
|
||
|
||
security_task_post_setuid(old_fsuid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS);
|
||
|
||
return old_fsuid;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Samma p<> svenska..
|
||
*/
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid)
|
||
{
|
||
int old_fsgid;
|
||
|
||
old_fsgid = current->fsgid;
|
||
if (security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS))
|
||
return old_fsgid;
|
||
|
||
if (gid == current->gid || gid == current->egid ||
|
||
gid == current->sgid || gid == current->fsgid ||
|
||
capable(CAP_SETGID))
|
||
{
|
||
if (gid != old_fsgid)
|
||
{
|
||
current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
|
||
smp_wmb();
|
||
}
|
||
current->fsgid = gid;
|
||
key_fsgid_changed(current);
|
||
proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_GID);
|
||
}
|
||
return old_fsgid;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_times(struct tms __user * tbuf)
|
||
{
|
||
/*
|
||
* In the SMP world we might just be unlucky and have one of
|
||
* the times increment as we use it. Since the value is an
|
||
* atomically safe type this is just fine. Conceptually its
|
||
* as if the syscall took an instant longer to occur.
|
||
*/
|
||
if (tbuf) {
|
||
struct tms tmp;
|
||
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
|
||
struct task_struct *t;
|
||
cputime_t utime, stime, cutime, cstime;
|
||
|
||
spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
|
||
utime = tsk->signal->utime;
|
||
stime = tsk->signal->stime;
|
||
t = tsk;
|
||
do {
|
||
utime = cputime_add(utime, t->utime);
|
||
stime = cputime_add(stime, t->stime);
|
||
t = next_thread(t);
|
||
} while (t != tsk);
|
||
|
||
cutime = tsk->signal->cutime;
|
||
cstime = tsk->signal->cstime;
|
||
spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
|
||
|
||
tmp.tms_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(utime);
|
||
tmp.tms_stime = cputime_to_clock_t(stime);
|
||
tmp.tms_cutime = cputime_to_clock_t(cutime);
|
||
tmp.tms_cstime = cputime_to_clock_t(cstime);
|
||
if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms)))
|
||
return -EFAULT;
|
||
}
|
||
return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* This needs some heavy checking ...
|
||
* I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully
|
||
* understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it.
|
||
*
|
||
* OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really
|
||
* only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user
|
||
* can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91
|
||
*
|
||
* Auch. Had to add the 'did_exec' flag to conform completely to POSIX.
|
||
* LBT 04.03.94
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_setpgid(pid_t pid, pid_t pgid)
|
||
{
|
||
struct task_struct *p;
|
||
struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader;
|
||
int err = -EINVAL;
|
||
|
||
if (!pid)
|
||
pid = group_leader->pid;
|
||
if (!pgid)
|
||
pgid = pid;
|
||
if (pgid < 0)
|
||
return -EINVAL;
|
||
|
||
/* From this point forward we keep holding onto the tasklist lock
|
||
* so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM
|
||
*/
|
||
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
||
|
||
err = -ESRCH;
|
||
p = find_task_by_pid(pid);
|
||
if (!p)
|
||
goto out;
|
||
|
||
err = -EINVAL;
|
||
if (!thread_group_leader(p))
|
||
goto out;
|
||
|
||
if (p->real_parent == group_leader) {
|
||
err = -EPERM;
|
||
if (p->signal->session != group_leader->signal->session)
|
||
goto out;
|
||
err = -EACCES;
|
||
if (p->did_exec)
|
||
goto out;
|
||
} else {
|
||
err = -ESRCH;
|
||
if (p != group_leader)
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
err = -EPERM;
|
||
if (p->signal->leader)
|
||
goto out;
|
||
|
||
if (pgid != pid) {
|
||
struct task_struct *p;
|
||
|
||
do_each_task_pid(pgid, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
|
||
if (p->signal->session == group_leader->signal->session)
|
||
goto ok_pgid;
|
||
} while_each_task_pid(pgid, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ok_pgid:
|
||
err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
goto out;
|
||
|
||
if (process_group(p) != pgid) {
|
||
detach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID);
|
||
p->signal->pgrp = pgid;
|
||
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pgid);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
err = 0;
|
||
out:
|
||
/* All paths lead to here, thus we are safe. -DaveM */
|
||
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_getpgid(pid_t pid)
|
||
{
|
||
if (!pid) {
|
||
return process_group(current);
|
||
} else {
|
||
int retval;
|
||
struct task_struct *p;
|
||
|
||
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
|
||
p = find_task_by_pid(pid);
|
||
|
||
retval = -ESRCH;
|
||
if (p) {
|
||
retval = security_task_getpgid(p);
|
||
if (!retval)
|
||
retval = process_group(p);
|
||
}
|
||
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
|
||
return retval;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP
|
||
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_getpgrp(void)
|
||
{
|
||
/* SMP - assuming writes are word atomic this is fine */
|
||
return process_group(current);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_getsid(pid_t pid)
|
||
{
|
||
if (!pid) {
|
||
return current->signal->session;
|
||
} else {
|
||
int retval;
|
||
struct task_struct *p;
|
||
|
||
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
|
||
p = find_task_by_pid(pid);
|
||
|
||
retval = -ESRCH;
|
||
if(p) {
|
||
retval = security_task_getsid(p);
|
||
if (!retval)
|
||
retval = p->signal->session;
|
||
}
|
||
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
|
||
return retval;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_setsid(void)
|
||
{
|
||
struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader;
|
||
pid_t session;
|
||
int err = -EPERM;
|
||
|
||
mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
|
||
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
||
|
||
/* Fail if I am already a session leader */
|
||
if (group_leader->signal->leader)
|
||
goto out;
|
||
|
||
session = group_leader->pid;
|
||
/* Fail if a process group id already exists that equals the
|
||
* proposed session id.
|
||
*
|
||
* Don't check if session id == 1 because kernel threads use this
|
||
* session id and so the check will always fail and make it so
|
||
* init cannot successfully call setsid.
|
||
*/
|
||
if (session > 1 && find_task_by_pid_type(PIDTYPE_PGID, session))
|
||
goto out;
|
||
|
||
group_leader->signal->leader = 1;
|
||
__set_special_pids(session, session);
|
||
group_leader->signal->tty = NULL;
|
||
group_leader->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
|
||
err = process_group(group_leader);
|
||
out:
|
||
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
||
mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Supplementary group IDs
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
/* init to 2 - one for init_task, one to ensure it is never freed */
|
||
struct group_info init_groups = { .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(2) };
|
||
|
||
struct group_info *groups_alloc(int gidsetsize)
|
||
{
|
||
struct group_info *group_info;
|
||
int nblocks;
|
||
int i;
|
||
|
||
nblocks = (gidsetsize + NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK - 1) / NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK;
|
||
/* Make sure we always allocate at least one indirect block pointer */
|
||
nblocks = nblocks ? : 1;
|
||
group_info = kmalloc(sizeof(*group_info) + nblocks*sizeof(gid_t *), GFP_USER);
|
||
if (!group_info)
|
||
return NULL;
|
||
group_info->ngroups = gidsetsize;
|
||
group_info->nblocks = nblocks;
|
||
atomic_set(&group_info->usage, 1);
|
||
|
||
if (gidsetsize <= NGROUPS_SMALL) {
|
||
group_info->blocks[0] = group_info->small_block;
|
||
} else {
|
||
for (i = 0; i < nblocks; i++) {
|
||
gid_t *b;
|
||
b = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_USER);
|
||
if (!b)
|
||
goto out_undo_partial_alloc;
|
||
group_info->blocks[i] = b;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
return group_info;
|
||
|
||
out_undo_partial_alloc:
|
||
while (--i >= 0) {
|
||
free_page((unsigned long)group_info->blocks[i]);
|
||
}
|
||
kfree(group_info);
|
||
return NULL;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
EXPORT_SYMBOL(groups_alloc);
|
||
|
||
void groups_free(struct group_info *group_info)
|
||
{
|
||
if (group_info->blocks[0] != group_info->small_block) {
|
||
int i;
|
||
for (i = 0; i < group_info->nblocks; i++)
|
||
free_page((unsigned long)group_info->blocks[i]);
|
||
}
|
||
kfree(group_info);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
EXPORT_SYMBOL(groups_free);
|
||
|
||
/* export the group_info to a user-space array */
|
||
static int groups_to_user(gid_t __user *grouplist,
|
||
struct group_info *group_info)
|
||
{
|
||
int i;
|
||
int count = group_info->ngroups;
|
||
|
||
for (i = 0; i < group_info->nblocks; i++) {
|
||
int cp_count = min(NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK, count);
|
||
int off = i * NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK;
|
||
int len = cp_count * sizeof(*grouplist);
|
||
|
||
if (copy_to_user(grouplist+off, group_info->blocks[i], len))
|
||
return -EFAULT;
|
||
|
||
count -= cp_count;
|
||
}
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* fill a group_info from a user-space array - it must be allocated already */
|
||
static int groups_from_user(struct group_info *group_info,
|
||
gid_t __user *grouplist)
|
||
{
|
||
int i;
|
||
int count = group_info->ngroups;
|
||
|
||
for (i = 0; i < group_info->nblocks; i++) {
|
||
int cp_count = min(NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK, count);
|
||
int off = i * NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK;
|
||
int len = cp_count * sizeof(*grouplist);
|
||
|
||
if (copy_from_user(group_info->blocks[i], grouplist+off, len))
|
||
return -EFAULT;
|
||
|
||
count -= cp_count;
|
||
}
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* a simple Shell sort */
|
||
static void groups_sort(struct group_info *group_info)
|
||
{
|
||
int base, max, stride;
|
||
int gidsetsize = group_info->ngroups;
|
||
|
||
for (stride = 1; stride < gidsetsize; stride = 3 * stride + 1)
|
||
; /* nothing */
|
||
stride /= 3;
|
||
|
||
while (stride) {
|
||
max = gidsetsize - stride;
|
||
for (base = 0; base < max; base++) {
|
||
int left = base;
|
||
int right = left + stride;
|
||
gid_t tmp = GROUP_AT(group_info, right);
|
||
|
||
while (left >= 0 && GROUP_AT(group_info, left) > tmp) {
|
||
GROUP_AT(group_info, right) =
|
||
GROUP_AT(group_info, left);
|
||
right = left;
|
||
left -= stride;
|
||
}
|
||
GROUP_AT(group_info, right) = tmp;
|
||
}
|
||
stride /= 3;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* a simple bsearch */
|
||
int groups_search(struct group_info *group_info, gid_t grp)
|
||
{
|
||
unsigned int left, right;
|
||
|
||
if (!group_info)
|
||
return 0;
|
||
|
||
left = 0;
|
||
right = group_info->ngroups;
|
||
while (left < right) {
|
||
unsigned int mid = (left+right)/2;
|
||
int cmp = grp - GROUP_AT(group_info, mid);
|
||
if (cmp > 0)
|
||
left = mid + 1;
|
||
else if (cmp < 0)
|
||
right = mid;
|
||
else
|
||
return 1;
|
||
}
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* validate and set current->group_info */
|
||
int set_current_groups(struct group_info *group_info)
|
||
{
|
||
int retval;
|
||
struct group_info *old_info;
|
||
|
||
retval = security_task_setgroups(group_info);
|
||
if (retval)
|
||
return retval;
|
||
|
||
groups_sort(group_info);
|
||
get_group_info(group_info);
|
||
|
||
task_lock(current);
|
||
old_info = current->group_info;
|
||
current->group_info = group_info;
|
||
task_unlock(current);
|
||
|
||
put_group_info(old_info);
|
||
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_current_groups);
|
||
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_getgroups(int gidsetsize, gid_t __user *grouplist)
|
||
{
|
||
int i = 0;
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* SMP: Nobody else can change our grouplist. Thus we are
|
||
* safe.
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
if (gidsetsize < 0)
|
||
return -EINVAL;
|
||
|
||
/* no need to grab task_lock here; it cannot change */
|
||
i = current->group_info->ngroups;
|
||
if (gidsetsize) {
|
||
if (i > gidsetsize) {
|
||
i = -EINVAL;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
if (groups_to_user(grouplist, current->group_info)) {
|
||
i = -EFAULT;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
out:
|
||
return i;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* SMP: Our groups are copy-on-write. We can set them safely
|
||
* without another task interfering.
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_setgroups(int gidsetsize, gid_t __user *grouplist)
|
||
{
|
||
struct group_info *group_info;
|
||
int retval;
|
||
|
||
if (!capable(CAP_SETGID))
|
||
return -EPERM;
|
||
if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
|
||
return -EINVAL;
|
||
|
||
group_info = groups_alloc(gidsetsize);
|
||
if (!group_info)
|
||
return -ENOMEM;
|
||
retval = groups_from_user(group_info, grouplist);
|
||
if (retval) {
|
||
put_group_info(group_info);
|
||
return retval;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
retval = set_current_groups(group_info);
|
||
put_group_info(group_info);
|
||
|
||
return retval;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Check whether we're fsgid/egid or in the supplemental group..
|
||
*/
|
||
int in_group_p(gid_t grp)
|
||
{
|
||
int retval = 1;
|
||
if (grp != current->fsgid) {
|
||
retval = groups_search(current->group_info, grp);
|
||
}
|
||
return retval;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
EXPORT_SYMBOL(in_group_p);
|
||
|
||
int in_egroup_p(gid_t grp)
|
||
{
|
||
int retval = 1;
|
||
if (grp != current->egid) {
|
||
retval = groups_search(current->group_info, grp);
|
||
}
|
||
return retval;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
EXPORT_SYMBOL(in_egroup_p);
|
||
|
||
DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem);
|
||
|
||
EXPORT_SYMBOL(uts_sem);
|
||
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_newuname(struct new_utsname __user * name)
|
||
{
|
||
int errno = 0;
|
||
|
||
down_read(&uts_sem);
|
||
if (copy_to_user(name,&system_utsname,sizeof *name))
|
||
errno = -EFAULT;
|
||
up_read(&uts_sem);
|
||
return errno;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_sethostname(char __user *name, int len)
|
||
{
|
||
int errno;
|
||
char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
|
||
|
||
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
||
return -EPERM;
|
||
if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
|
||
return -EINVAL;
|
||
down_write(&uts_sem);
|
||
errno = -EFAULT;
|
||
if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
|
||
memcpy(system_utsname.nodename, tmp, len);
|
||
system_utsname.nodename[len] = 0;
|
||
errno = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
up_write(&uts_sem);
|
||
return errno;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETHOSTNAME
|
||
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_gethostname(char __user *name, int len)
|
||
{
|
||
int i, errno;
|
||
|
||
if (len < 0)
|
||
return -EINVAL;
|
||
down_read(&uts_sem);
|
||
i = 1 + strlen(system_utsname.nodename);
|
||
if (i > len)
|
||
i = len;
|
||
errno = 0;
|
||
if (copy_to_user(name, system_utsname.nodename, i))
|
||
errno = -EFAULT;
|
||
up_read(&uts_sem);
|
||
return errno;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling
|
||
* uname()
|
||
*/
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_setdomainname(char __user *name, int len)
|
||
{
|
||
int errno;
|
||
char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
|
||
|
||
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
||
return -EPERM;
|
||
if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
|
||
return -EINVAL;
|
||
|
||
down_write(&uts_sem);
|
||
errno = -EFAULT;
|
||
if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
|
||
memcpy(system_utsname.domainname, tmp, len);
|
||
system_utsname.domainname[len] = 0;
|
||
errno = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
up_write(&uts_sem);
|
||
return errno;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_getrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit __user *rlim)
|
||
{
|
||
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
|
||
return -EINVAL;
|
||
else {
|
||
struct rlimit value;
|
||
task_lock(current->group_leader);
|
||
value = current->signal->rlim[resource];
|
||
task_unlock(current->group_leader);
|
||
return copy_to_user(rlim, &value, sizeof(*rlim)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps.
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_old_getrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit __user *rlim)
|
||
{
|
||
struct rlimit x;
|
||
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
|
||
return -EINVAL;
|
||
|
||
task_lock(current->group_leader);
|
||
x = current->signal->rlim[resource];
|
||
task_unlock(current->group_leader);
|
||
if(x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF)
|
||
x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF;
|
||
if(x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF)
|
||
x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF;
|
||
return copy_to_user(rlim, &x, sizeof(x))?-EFAULT:0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit __user *rlim)
|
||
{
|
||
struct rlimit new_rlim, *old_rlim;
|
||
unsigned long it_prof_secs;
|
||
int retval;
|
||
|
||
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
|
||
return -EINVAL;
|
||
if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim)))
|
||
return -EFAULT;
|
||
if (new_rlim.rlim_cur > new_rlim.rlim_max)
|
||
return -EINVAL;
|
||
old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
|
||
if ((new_rlim.rlim_max > old_rlim->rlim_max) &&
|
||
!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
|
||
return -EPERM;
|
||
if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE && new_rlim.rlim_max > NR_OPEN)
|
||
return -EPERM;
|
||
|
||
retval = security_task_setrlimit(resource, &new_rlim);
|
||
if (retval)
|
||
return retval;
|
||
|
||
task_lock(current->group_leader);
|
||
*old_rlim = new_rlim;
|
||
task_unlock(current->group_leader);
|
||
|
||
if (resource != RLIMIT_CPU)
|
||
goto out;
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* RLIMIT_CPU handling. Note that the kernel fails to return an error
|
||
* code if it rejected the user's attempt to set RLIMIT_CPU. This is a
|
||
* very long-standing error, and fixing it now risks breakage of
|
||
* applications, so we live with it
|
||
*/
|
||
if (new_rlim.rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY)
|
||
goto out;
|
||
|
||
it_prof_secs = cputime_to_secs(current->signal->it_prof_expires);
|
||
if (it_prof_secs == 0 || new_rlim.rlim_cur <= it_prof_secs) {
|
||
unsigned long rlim_cur = new_rlim.rlim_cur;
|
||
cputime_t cputime;
|
||
|
||
if (rlim_cur == 0) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* The caller is asking for an immediate RLIMIT_CPU
|
||
* expiry. But we use the zero value to mean "it was
|
||
* never set". So let's cheat and make it one second
|
||
* instead
|
||
*/
|
||
rlim_cur = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
cputime = secs_to_cputime(rlim_cur);
|
||
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
|
||
spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
|
||
set_process_cpu_timer(current, CPUCLOCK_PROF, &cputime, NULL);
|
||
spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
|
||
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
|
||
}
|
||
out:
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct,
|
||
* except that would make the task_struct be *really big*. After
|
||
* task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would
|
||
* make sense to do this. It will make moving the rest of the information
|
||
* a lot simpler! (Which we're not doing right now because we're not
|
||
* measuring them yet).
|
||
*
|
||
* When sampling multiple threads for RUSAGE_SELF, under SMP we might have
|
||
* races with threads incrementing their own counters. But since word
|
||
* reads are atomic, we either get new values or old values and we don't
|
||
* care which for the sums. We always take the siglock to protect reading
|
||
* the c* fields from p->signal from races with exit.c updating those
|
||
* fields when reaping, so a sample either gets all the additions of a
|
||
* given child after it's reaped, or none so this sample is before reaping.
|
||
*
|
||
* Locking:
|
||
* We need to take the siglock for CHILDEREN, SELF and BOTH
|
||
* for the cases current multithreaded, non-current single threaded
|
||
* non-current multithreaded. Thread traversal is now safe with
|
||
* the siglock held.
|
||
* Strictly speaking, we donot need to take the siglock if we are current and
|
||
* single threaded, as no one else can take our signal_struct away, no one
|
||
* else can reap the children to update signal->c* counters, and no one else
|
||
* can race with the signal-> fields. If we do not take any lock, the
|
||
* signal-> fields could be read out of order while another thread was just
|
||
* exiting. So we should place a read memory barrier when we avoid the lock.
|
||
* On the writer side, write memory barrier is implied in __exit_signal
|
||
* as __exit_signal releases the siglock spinlock after updating the signal->
|
||
* fields. But we don't do this yet to keep things simple.
|
||
*
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
static void k_getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r)
|
||
{
|
||
struct task_struct *t;
|
||
unsigned long flags;
|
||
cputime_t utime, stime;
|
||
|
||
memset((char *) r, 0, sizeof *r);
|
||
utime = stime = cputime_zero;
|
||
|
||
rcu_read_lock();
|
||
if (!lock_task_sighand(p, &flags)) {
|
||
rcu_read_unlock();
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
switch (who) {
|
||
case RUSAGE_BOTH:
|
||
case RUSAGE_CHILDREN:
|
||
utime = p->signal->cutime;
|
||
stime = p->signal->cstime;
|
||
r->ru_nvcsw = p->signal->cnvcsw;
|
||
r->ru_nivcsw = p->signal->cnivcsw;
|
||
r->ru_minflt = p->signal->cmin_flt;
|
||
r->ru_majflt = p->signal->cmaj_flt;
|
||
|
||
if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN)
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case RUSAGE_SELF:
|
||
utime = cputime_add(utime, p->signal->utime);
|
||
stime = cputime_add(stime, p->signal->stime);
|
||
r->ru_nvcsw += p->signal->nvcsw;
|
||
r->ru_nivcsw += p->signal->nivcsw;
|
||
r->ru_minflt += p->signal->min_flt;
|
||
r->ru_majflt += p->signal->maj_flt;
|
||
t = p;
|
||
do {
|
||
utime = cputime_add(utime, t->utime);
|
||
stime = cputime_add(stime, t->stime);
|
||
r->ru_nvcsw += t->nvcsw;
|
||
r->ru_nivcsw += t->nivcsw;
|
||
r->ru_minflt += t->min_flt;
|
||
r->ru_majflt += t->maj_flt;
|
||
t = next_thread(t);
|
||
} while (t != p);
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
default:
|
||
BUG();
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
|
||
rcu_read_unlock();
|
||
|
||
cputime_to_timeval(utime, &r->ru_utime);
|
||
cputime_to_timeval(stime, &r->ru_stime);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
int getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage __user *ru)
|
||
{
|
||
struct rusage r;
|
||
k_getrusage(p, who, &r);
|
||
return copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(r)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_getrusage(int who, struct rusage __user *ru)
|
||
{
|
||
if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN)
|
||
return -EINVAL;
|
||
return getrusage(current, who, ru);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_umask(int mask)
|
||
{
|
||
mask = xchg(¤t->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO);
|
||
return mask;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
|
||
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
|
||
{
|
||
long error;
|
||
|
||
error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
||
if (error)
|
||
return error;
|
||
|
||
switch (option) {
|
||
case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG:
|
||
if (!valid_signal(arg2)) {
|
||
error = -EINVAL;
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
current->pdeath_signal = arg2;
|
||
break;
|
||
case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG:
|
||
error = put_user(current->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2);
|
||
break;
|
||
case PR_GET_DUMPABLE:
|
||
error = current->mm->dumpable;
|
||
break;
|
||
case PR_SET_DUMPABLE:
|
||
if (arg2 < 0 || arg2 > 1) {
|
||
error = -EINVAL;
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
current->mm->dumpable = arg2;
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case PR_SET_UNALIGN:
|
||
error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(current, arg2);
|
||
break;
|
||
case PR_GET_UNALIGN:
|
||
error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(current, arg2);
|
||
break;
|
||
case PR_SET_FPEMU:
|
||
error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(current, arg2);
|
||
break;
|
||
case PR_GET_FPEMU:
|
||
error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(current, arg2);
|
||
break;
|
||
case PR_SET_FPEXC:
|
||
error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(current, arg2);
|
||
break;
|
||
case PR_GET_FPEXC:
|
||
error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(current, arg2);
|
||
break;
|
||
case PR_GET_TIMING:
|
||
error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL;
|
||
break;
|
||
case PR_SET_TIMING:
|
||
if (arg2 == PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL)
|
||
error = 0;
|
||
else
|
||
error = -EINVAL;
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
|
||
if (current->keep_capabilities)
|
||
error = 1;
|
||
break;
|
||
case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS:
|
||
if (arg2 != 0 && arg2 != 1) {
|
||
error = -EINVAL;
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
current->keep_capabilities = arg2;
|
||
break;
|
||
case PR_SET_NAME: {
|
||
struct task_struct *me = current;
|
||
unsigned char ncomm[sizeof(me->comm)];
|
||
|
||
ncomm[sizeof(me->comm)-1] = 0;
|
||
if (strncpy_from_user(ncomm, (char __user *)arg2,
|
||
sizeof(me->comm)-1) < 0)
|
||
return -EFAULT;
|
||
set_task_comm(me, ncomm);
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
case PR_GET_NAME: {
|
||
struct task_struct *me = current;
|
||
unsigned char tcomm[sizeof(me->comm)];
|
||
|
||
get_task_comm(tcomm, me);
|
||
if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, tcomm, sizeof(tcomm)))
|
||
return -EFAULT;
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
case PR_GET_ENDIAN:
|
||
error = GET_ENDIAN(current, arg2);
|
||
break;
|
||
case PR_SET_ENDIAN:
|
||
error = SET_ENDIAN(current, arg2);
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
default:
|
||
error = -EINVAL;
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
return error;
|
||
}
|