linux-stable/security
Matthias Kaehlcke 3f805f8cc2 LoadPin: Enable loading from trusted dm-verity devices
Extend LoadPin to allow loading of kernel files from trusted dm-verity [1]
devices.

This change adds the concept of trusted verity devices to LoadPin. LoadPin
maintains a list of root digests of verity devices it considers trusted.
Userspace can populate this list through an ioctl on the new LoadPin
securityfs entry 'dm-verity'. The ioctl receives a file descriptor of
a file with verity digests as parameter. Verity reads the digests from
this file after confirming that the file is located on the pinned root.
The digest file must contain one digest per line. The list of trusted
digests can only be set up once, which is typically done at boot time.

When a kernel file is read LoadPin first checks (as usual) whether the file
is located on the pinned root, if so the file can be loaded. Otherwise, if
the verity extension is enabled, LoadPin determines whether the file is
located on a verity backed device and whether the root digest of that
device is in the list of trusted digests. The file can be loaded if the
verity device has a trusted root digest.

Background:

As of now LoadPin restricts loading of kernel files to a single pinned
filesystem, typically the rootfs. This works for many systems, however it
can result in a bloated rootfs (and OTA updates) on platforms where
multiple boards with different hardware configurations use the same rootfs
image. Especially when 'optional' files are large it may be preferable to
download/install them only when they are actually needed by a given board.
Chrome OS uses Downloadable Content (DLC) [2] to deploy certain 'packages'
at runtime. As an example a DLC package could contain firmware for a
peripheral that is not present on all boards. DLCs use dm-verity to verify
the integrity of the DLC content.

[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/device-mapper/verity.html
[2] https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/platform2/+/HEAD/dlcservice/docs/developer.md

Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220627083512.v7.2.I01c67af41d2f6525c6d023101671d7339a9bc8b5@changeid
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2022-07-08 10:46:53 -07:00
..
apparmor linux-kselftest-kunit-5.19-rc1 2022-05-25 11:32:53 -07:00
bpf
integrity integrity-v5.19 2022-05-24 13:50:39 -07:00
keys KEYS: trusted: tpm2: Fix migratable logic 2022-06-08 14:12:13 +03:00
landlock landlock: Add support for file reparenting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER 2022-05-23 13:27:59 +02:00
loadpin LoadPin: Enable loading from trusted dm-verity devices 2022-07-08 10:46:53 -07:00
lockdown
safesetid LSM: SafeSetID: Mark safesetid_initialized as __initdata 2021-06-10 09:52:32 -07:00
selinux selinux: free contexts previously transferred in selinux_add_opt() 2022-06-15 21:20:45 -04:00
smack Cleanups (and one fix) around struct mount handling. 2022-06-04 19:00:05 -07:00
tomoyo LSM: Remove double path_rename hook calls for RENAME_EXCHANGE 2022-05-23 13:27:58 +02:00
yama
commoncap.c fs: support mapped mounts of mapped filesystems 2021-12-05 10:28:57 +01:00
device_cgroup.c bpf: Make BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY return -err instead of allow boolean 2022-01-19 12:51:30 -08:00
inode.c
Kconfig usercopy: Remove HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN 2022-04-13 12:15:52 -07:00
Kconfig.hardening randstruct: Enable Clang support 2022-05-08 01:33:07 -07:00
lsm_audit.c selinux: log anon inode class name 2022-05-03 16:09:03 -04:00
Makefile security: remove unneeded subdir-$(CONFIG_...) 2021-09-03 08:17:20 +09:00
min_addr.c
security.c Landlock updates for v5.19-rc1 2022-05-24 13:09:13 -07:00