linux-stable/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
Linus Torvalds ceb3074745 y2038: syscall implementation cleanups
This is a series of cleanups for the y2038 work, mostly intended
 for namespace cleaning: the kernel defines the traditional
 time_t, timeval and timespec types that often lead to y2038-unsafe
 code. Even though the unsafe usage is mostly gone from the kernel,
 having the types and associated functions around means that we
 can still grow new users, and that we may be missing conversions
 to safe types that actually matter.
 
 There are still a number of driver specific patches needed to
 get the last users of these types removed, those have been
 submitted to the respective maintainers.
 
 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191108210236.1296047-1-arnd@arndb.de/
 Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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Merge tag 'y2038-cleanups-5.5' of git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground

Pull y2038 cleanups from Arnd Bergmann:
 "y2038 syscall implementation cleanups

  This is a series of cleanups for the y2038 work, mostly intended for
  namespace cleaning: the kernel defines the traditional time_t, timeval
  and timespec types that often lead to y2038-unsafe code. Even though
  the unsafe usage is mostly gone from the kernel, having the types and
  associated functions around means that we can still grow new users,
  and that we may be missing conversions to safe types that actually
  matter.

  There are still a number of driver specific patches needed to get the
  last users of these types removed, those have been submitted to the
  respective maintainers"

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191108210236.1296047-1-arnd@arndb.de/

* tag 'y2038-cleanups-5.5' of git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground: (26 commits)
  y2038: alarm: fix half-second cut-off
  y2038: ipc: fix x32 ABI breakage
  y2038: fix typo in powerpc vdso "LOPART"
  y2038: allow disabling time32 system calls
  y2038: itimer: change implementation to timespec64
  y2038: move itimer reset into itimer.c
  y2038: use compat_{get,set}_itimer on alpha
  y2038: itimer: compat handling to itimer.c
  y2038: time: avoid timespec usage in settimeofday()
  y2038: timerfd: Use timespec64 internally
  y2038: elfcore: Use __kernel_old_timeval for process times
  y2038: make ns_to_compat_timeval use __kernel_old_timeval
  y2038: socket: use __kernel_old_timespec instead of timespec
  y2038: socket: remove timespec reference in timestamping
  y2038: syscalls: change remaining timeval to __kernel_old_timeval
  y2038: rusage: use __kernel_old_timeval
  y2038: uapi: change __kernel_time_t to __kernel_old_time_t
  y2038: stat: avoid 'time_t' in 'struct stat'
  y2038: ipc: remove __kernel_time_t reference from headers
  y2038: vdso: powerpc: avoid timespec references
  ...
2019-12-01 14:00:59 -08:00

397 lines
10 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Copyright (c) 2012-2014 Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
*
* Based on the original implementation which is:
* Copyright (C) 2001 Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@suse.de> SuSE
* Copyright 2003 Andi Kleen, SuSE Labs.
*
* Parts of the original code have been moved to arch/x86/vdso/vma.c
*
* This file implements vsyscall emulation. vsyscalls are a legacy ABI:
* Userspace can request certain kernel services by calling fixed
* addresses. This concept is problematic:
*
* - It interferes with ASLR.
* - It's awkward to write code that lives in kernel addresses but is
* callable by userspace at fixed addresses.
* - The whole concept is impossible for 32-bit compat userspace.
* - UML cannot easily virtualize a vsyscall.
*
* As of mid-2014, I believe that there is no new userspace code that
* will use a vsyscall if the vDSO is present. I hope that there will
* soon be no new userspace code that will ever use a vsyscall.
*
* The code in this file emulates vsyscalls when notified of a page
* fault to a vsyscall address.
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/timer.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/mm_types.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include <asm/vsyscall.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include "vsyscall_trace.h"
static enum { EMULATE, XONLY, NONE } vsyscall_mode __ro_after_init =
#ifdef CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE
NONE;
#elif defined(CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY)
XONLY;
#else
EMULATE;
#endif
static int __init vsyscall_setup(char *str)
{
if (str) {
if (!strcmp("emulate", str))
vsyscall_mode = EMULATE;
else if (!strcmp("xonly", str))
vsyscall_mode = XONLY;
else if (!strcmp("none", str))
vsyscall_mode = NONE;
else
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
early_param("vsyscall", vsyscall_setup);
static void warn_bad_vsyscall(const char *level, struct pt_regs *regs,
const char *message)
{
if (!show_unhandled_signals)
return;
printk_ratelimited("%s%s[%d] %s ip:%lx cs:%lx sp:%lx ax:%lx si:%lx di:%lx\n",
level, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
message, regs->ip, regs->cs,
regs->sp, regs->ax, regs->si, regs->di);
}
static int addr_to_vsyscall_nr(unsigned long addr)
{
int nr;
if ((addr & ~0xC00UL) != VSYSCALL_ADDR)
return -EINVAL;
nr = (addr & 0xC00UL) >> 10;
if (nr >= 3)
return -EINVAL;
return nr;
}
static bool write_ok_or_segv(unsigned long ptr, size_t size)
{
/*
* XXX: if access_ok, get_user, and put_user handled
* sig_on_uaccess_err, this could go away.
*/
if (!access_ok((void __user *)ptr, size)) {
struct thread_struct *thread = &current->thread;
thread->error_code = X86_PF_USER | X86_PF_WRITE;
thread->cr2 = ptr;
thread->trap_nr = X86_TRAP_PF;
force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR, (void __user *)ptr);
return false;
} else {
return true;
}
}
bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long error_code,
struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
unsigned long caller;
int vsyscall_nr, syscall_nr, tmp;
int prev_sig_on_uaccess_err;
long ret;
unsigned long orig_dx;
/* Write faults or kernel-privilege faults never get fixed up. */
if ((error_code & (X86_PF_WRITE | X86_PF_USER)) != X86_PF_USER)
return false;
if (!(error_code & X86_PF_INSTR)) {
/* Failed vsyscall read */
if (vsyscall_mode == EMULATE)
return false;
/*
* User code tried and failed to read the vsyscall page.
*/
warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_INFO, regs, "vsyscall read attempt denied -- look up the vsyscall kernel parameter if you need a workaround");
return false;
}
/*
* No point in checking CS -- the only way to get here is a user mode
* trap to a high address, which means that we're in 64-bit user code.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(address != regs->ip);
if (vsyscall_mode == NONE) {
warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_INFO, regs,
"vsyscall attempted with vsyscall=none");
return false;
}
vsyscall_nr = addr_to_vsyscall_nr(address);
trace_emulate_vsyscall(vsyscall_nr);
if (vsyscall_nr < 0) {
warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_WARNING, regs,
"misaligned vsyscall (exploit attempt or buggy program) -- look up the vsyscall kernel parameter if you need a workaround");
goto sigsegv;
}
if (get_user(caller, (unsigned long __user *)regs->sp) != 0) {
warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_WARNING, regs,
"vsyscall with bad stack (exploit attempt?)");
goto sigsegv;
}
tsk = current;
/*
* Check for access_ok violations and find the syscall nr.
*
* NULL is a valid user pointer (in the access_ok sense) on 32-bit and
* 64-bit, so we don't need to special-case it here. For all the
* vsyscalls, NULL means "don't write anything" not "write it at
* address 0".
*/
switch (vsyscall_nr) {
case 0:
if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(struct __kernel_old_timeval)) ||
!write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(struct timezone))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto check_fault;
}
syscall_nr = __NR_gettimeofday;
break;
case 1:
if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(__kernel_old_time_t))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto check_fault;
}
syscall_nr = __NR_time;
break;
case 2:
if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(unsigned)) ||
!write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(unsigned))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto check_fault;
}
syscall_nr = __NR_getcpu;
break;
}
/*
* Handle seccomp. regs->ip must be the original value.
* See seccomp_send_sigsys and Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst.
*
* We could optimize the seccomp disabled case, but performance
* here doesn't matter.
*/
regs->orig_ax = syscall_nr;
regs->ax = -ENOSYS;
tmp = secure_computing();
if ((!tmp && regs->orig_ax != syscall_nr) || regs->ip != address) {
warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_DEBUG, regs,
"seccomp tried to change syscall nr or ip");
do_exit(SIGSYS);
}
regs->orig_ax = -1;
if (tmp)
goto do_ret; /* skip requested */
/*
* With a real vsyscall, page faults cause SIGSEGV. We want to
* preserve that behavior to make writing exploits harder.
*/
prev_sig_on_uaccess_err = current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err;
current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err = 1;
ret = -EFAULT;
switch (vsyscall_nr) {
case 0:
/* this decodes regs->di and regs->si on its own */
ret = __x64_sys_gettimeofday(regs);
break;
case 1:
/* this decodes regs->di on its own */
ret = __x64_sys_time(regs);
break;
case 2:
/* while we could clobber regs->dx, we didn't in the past... */
orig_dx = regs->dx;
regs->dx = 0;
/* this decodes regs->di, regs->si and regs->dx on its own */
ret = __x64_sys_getcpu(regs);
regs->dx = orig_dx;
break;
}
current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err = prev_sig_on_uaccess_err;
check_fault:
if (ret == -EFAULT) {
/* Bad news -- userspace fed a bad pointer to a vsyscall. */
warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_INFO, regs,
"vsyscall fault (exploit attempt?)");
/*
* If we failed to generate a signal for any reason,
* generate one here. (This should be impossible.)
*/
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sigismember(&tsk->pending.signal, SIGBUS) &&
!sigismember(&tsk->pending.signal, SIGSEGV)))
goto sigsegv;
return true; /* Don't emulate the ret. */
}
regs->ax = ret;
do_ret:
/* Emulate a ret instruction. */
regs->ip = caller;
regs->sp += 8;
return true;
sigsegv:
force_sig(SIGSEGV);
return true;
}
/*
* A pseudo VMA to allow ptrace access for the vsyscall page. This only
* covers the 64bit vsyscall page now. 32bit has a real VMA now and does
* not need special handling anymore:
*/
static const char *gate_vma_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
return "[vsyscall]";
}
static const struct vm_operations_struct gate_vma_ops = {
.name = gate_vma_name,
};
static struct vm_area_struct gate_vma __ro_after_init = {
.vm_start = VSYSCALL_ADDR,
.vm_end = VSYSCALL_ADDR + PAGE_SIZE,
.vm_page_prot = PAGE_READONLY_EXEC,
.vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC,
.vm_ops = &gate_vma_ops,
};
struct vm_area_struct *get_gate_vma(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (!mm || mm->context.ia32_compat)
return NULL;
#endif
if (vsyscall_mode == NONE)
return NULL;
return &gate_vma;
}
int in_gate_area(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma = get_gate_vma(mm);
if (!vma)
return 0;
return (addr >= vma->vm_start) && (addr < vma->vm_end);
}
/*
* Use this when you have no reliable mm, typically from interrupt
* context. It is less reliable than using a task's mm and may give
* false positives.
*/
int in_gate_area_no_mm(unsigned long addr)
{
return vsyscall_mode != NONE && (addr & PAGE_MASK) == VSYSCALL_ADDR;
}
/*
* The VSYSCALL page is the only user-accessible page in the kernel address
* range. Normally, the kernel page tables can have _PAGE_USER clear, but
* the tables covering VSYSCALL_ADDR need _PAGE_USER set if vsyscalls
* are enabled.
*
* Some day we may create a "minimal" vsyscall mode in which we emulate
* vsyscalls but leave the page not present. If so, we skip calling
* this.
*/
void __init set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(pgd_t *root)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
p4d_t *p4d;
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
pgd = pgd_offset_pgd(root, VSYSCALL_ADDR);
set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(pgd_val(*pgd) | _PAGE_USER));
p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, VSYSCALL_ADDR);
#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS >= 5
set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(p4d_val(*p4d) | _PAGE_USER));
#endif
pud = pud_offset(p4d, VSYSCALL_ADDR);
set_pud(pud, __pud(pud_val(*pud) | _PAGE_USER));
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, VSYSCALL_ADDR);
set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(pmd_val(*pmd) | _PAGE_USER));
}
void __init map_vsyscall(void)
{
extern char __vsyscall_page;
unsigned long physaddr_vsyscall = __pa_symbol(&__vsyscall_page);
/*
* For full emulation, the page needs to exist for real. In
* execute-only mode, there is no PTE at all backing the vsyscall
* page.
*/
if (vsyscall_mode == EMULATE) {
__set_fixmap(VSYSCALL_PAGE, physaddr_vsyscall,
PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR);
set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(swapper_pg_dir);
}
if (vsyscall_mode == XONLY)
gate_vma.vm_flags = VM_EXEC;
BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)__fix_to_virt(VSYSCALL_PAGE) !=
(unsigned long)VSYSCALL_ADDR);
}