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![Fabian Frederick](/assets/img/avatar_default.png)
Use kernel.h macro definition. Thanks to Julia Lawall for Coccinelle scripting support. Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
882 lines
22 KiB
C
882 lines
22 KiB
C
/*
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* Common NFSv4 ACL handling code.
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2002, 2003 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Marius Aamodt Eriksen <marius@umich.edu>
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* Jeff Sedlak <jsedlak@umich.edu>
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* J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its
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* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
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* from this software without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
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* WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
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* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
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* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
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* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
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* BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
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* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
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* NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
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* SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/nfs_fs.h>
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#include "nfsfh.h"
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#include "nfsd.h"
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#include "acl.h"
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#include "vfs.h"
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#define NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT 0x01
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#define NFS4_ACL_DIR 0x02
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#define NFS4_ACL_OWNER 0x04
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/* mode bit translations: */
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#define NFS4_READ_MODE (NFS4_ACE_READ_DATA)
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#define NFS4_WRITE_MODE (NFS4_ACE_WRITE_DATA | NFS4_ACE_APPEND_DATA)
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#define NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE NFS4_ACE_EXECUTE
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#define NFS4_ANYONE_MODE (NFS4_ACE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | NFS4_ACE_READ_ACL | NFS4_ACE_SYNCHRONIZE)
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#define NFS4_OWNER_MODE (NFS4_ACE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES | NFS4_ACE_WRITE_ACL)
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/* flags used to simulate posix default ACLs */
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#define NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS (NFS4_ACE_FILE_INHERIT_ACE \
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| NFS4_ACE_DIRECTORY_INHERIT_ACE)
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#define NFS4_SUPPORTED_FLAGS (NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS \
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| NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE \
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| NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP)
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static u32
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mask_from_posix(unsigned short perm, unsigned int flags)
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{
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int mask = NFS4_ANYONE_MODE;
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if (flags & NFS4_ACL_OWNER)
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mask |= NFS4_OWNER_MODE;
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if (perm & ACL_READ)
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mask |= NFS4_READ_MODE;
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if (perm & ACL_WRITE)
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mask |= NFS4_WRITE_MODE;
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if ((perm & ACL_WRITE) && (flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR))
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mask |= NFS4_ACE_DELETE_CHILD;
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if (perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
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mask |= NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE;
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return mask;
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}
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static u32
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deny_mask_from_posix(unsigned short perm, u32 flags)
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{
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u32 mask = 0;
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if (perm & ACL_READ)
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mask |= NFS4_READ_MODE;
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if (perm & ACL_WRITE)
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mask |= NFS4_WRITE_MODE;
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if ((perm & ACL_WRITE) && (flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR))
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mask |= NFS4_ACE_DELETE_CHILD;
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if (perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
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mask |= NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE;
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return mask;
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}
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/* XXX: modify functions to return NFS errors; they're only ever
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* used by nfs code, after all.... */
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/* We only map from NFSv4 to POSIX ACLs when setting ACLs, when we err on the
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* side of being more restrictive, so the mode bit mapping below is
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* pessimistic. An optimistic version would be needed to handle DENY's,
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* but we espect to coalesce all ALLOWs and DENYs before mapping to mode
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* bits. */
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static void
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low_mode_from_nfs4(u32 perm, unsigned short *mode, unsigned int flags)
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{
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u32 write_mode = NFS4_WRITE_MODE;
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if (flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR)
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write_mode |= NFS4_ACE_DELETE_CHILD;
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*mode = 0;
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if ((perm & NFS4_READ_MODE) == NFS4_READ_MODE)
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*mode |= ACL_READ;
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if ((perm & write_mode) == write_mode)
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*mode |= ACL_WRITE;
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if ((perm & NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE) == NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE)
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*mode |= ACL_EXECUTE;
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}
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static short ace2type(struct nfs4_ace *);
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static void _posix_to_nfsv4_one(struct posix_acl *, struct nfs4_acl *,
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unsigned int);
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int
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nfsd4_get_nfs4_acl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct dentry *dentry,
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struct nfs4_acl **acl)
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{
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struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
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int error = 0;
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struct posix_acl *pacl = NULL, *dpacl = NULL;
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unsigned int flags = 0;
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int size = 0;
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pacl = get_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
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if (!pacl)
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pacl = posix_acl_from_mode(inode->i_mode, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (IS_ERR(pacl))
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return PTR_ERR(pacl);
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/* allocate for worst case: one (deny, allow) pair each: */
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size += 2 * pacl->a_count;
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if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
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flags = NFS4_ACL_DIR;
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dpacl = get_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
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if (IS_ERR(dpacl)) {
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error = PTR_ERR(dpacl);
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goto rel_pacl;
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}
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if (dpacl)
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size += 2 * dpacl->a_count;
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}
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*acl = kmalloc(nfs4_acl_bytes(size), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (*acl == NULL) {
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error = -ENOMEM;
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goto out;
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}
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(*acl)->naces = 0;
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_posix_to_nfsv4_one(pacl, *acl, flags & ~NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
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if (dpacl)
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_posix_to_nfsv4_one(dpacl, *acl, flags | NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
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out:
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posix_acl_release(dpacl);
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rel_pacl:
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posix_acl_release(pacl);
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return error;
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}
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struct posix_acl_summary {
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unsigned short owner;
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unsigned short users;
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unsigned short group;
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unsigned short groups;
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unsigned short other;
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unsigned short mask;
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};
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static void
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summarize_posix_acl(struct posix_acl *acl, struct posix_acl_summary *pas)
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{
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struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe;
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/*
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* Only pas.users and pas.groups need initialization; previous
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* posix_acl_valid() calls ensure that the other fields will be
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* initialized in the following loop. But, just to placate gcc:
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*/
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memset(pas, 0, sizeof(*pas));
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pas->mask = 07;
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pe = acl->a_entries + acl->a_count;
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FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) {
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switch (pa->e_tag) {
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case ACL_USER_OBJ:
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pas->owner = pa->e_perm;
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break;
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case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
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pas->group = pa->e_perm;
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break;
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case ACL_USER:
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pas->users |= pa->e_perm;
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break;
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case ACL_GROUP:
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pas->groups |= pa->e_perm;
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break;
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case ACL_OTHER:
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pas->other = pa->e_perm;
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break;
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case ACL_MASK:
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pas->mask = pa->e_perm;
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break;
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}
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}
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/* We'll only care about effective permissions: */
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pas->users &= pas->mask;
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pas->group &= pas->mask;
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pas->groups &= pas->mask;
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}
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/* We assume the acl has been verified with posix_acl_valid. */
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static void
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_posix_to_nfsv4_one(struct posix_acl *pacl, struct nfs4_acl *acl,
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unsigned int flags)
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{
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struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *group_owner_entry;
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struct nfs4_ace *ace;
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struct posix_acl_summary pas;
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unsigned short deny;
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int eflag = ((flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT) ?
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NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS | NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE : 0);
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BUG_ON(pacl->a_count < 3);
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summarize_posix_acl(pacl, &pas);
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pa = pacl->a_entries;
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ace = acl->aces + acl->naces;
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/* We could deny everything not granted by the owner: */
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deny = ~pas.owner;
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/*
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* but it is equivalent (and simpler) to deny only what is not
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* granted by later entries:
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*/
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deny &= pas.users | pas.group | pas.groups | pas.other;
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if (deny) {
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ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE;
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ace->flag = eflag;
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ace->access_mask = deny_mask_from_posix(deny, flags);
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ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_OWNER;
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ace++;
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acl->naces++;
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}
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ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE;
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ace->flag = eflag;
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ace->access_mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm, flags | NFS4_ACL_OWNER);
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ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_OWNER;
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ace++;
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acl->naces++;
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pa++;
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while (pa->e_tag == ACL_USER) {
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deny = ~(pa->e_perm & pas.mask);
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deny &= pas.groups | pas.group | pas.other;
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if (deny) {
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ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE;
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ace->flag = eflag;
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ace->access_mask = deny_mask_from_posix(deny, flags);
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ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED;
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ace->who_uid = pa->e_uid;
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ace++;
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acl->naces++;
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}
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ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE;
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ace->flag = eflag;
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ace->access_mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm & pas.mask,
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flags);
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ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED;
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ace->who_uid = pa->e_uid;
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ace++;
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acl->naces++;
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pa++;
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}
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/* In the case of groups, we apply allow ACEs first, then deny ACEs,
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* since a user can be in more than one group. */
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/* allow ACEs */
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group_owner_entry = pa;
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ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE;
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ace->flag = eflag;
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ace->access_mask = mask_from_posix(pas.group, flags);
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ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP;
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ace++;
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acl->naces++;
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pa++;
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while (pa->e_tag == ACL_GROUP) {
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ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE;
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ace->flag = eflag | NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP;
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ace->access_mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm & pas.mask,
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flags);
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ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED;
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ace->who_gid = pa->e_gid;
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ace++;
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acl->naces++;
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pa++;
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}
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/* deny ACEs */
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pa = group_owner_entry;
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deny = ~pas.group & pas.other;
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if (deny) {
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ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE;
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ace->flag = eflag;
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ace->access_mask = deny_mask_from_posix(deny, flags);
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ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP;
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ace++;
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acl->naces++;
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}
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pa++;
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while (pa->e_tag == ACL_GROUP) {
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deny = ~(pa->e_perm & pas.mask);
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deny &= pas.other;
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if (deny) {
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ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE;
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ace->flag = eflag | NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP;
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ace->access_mask = deny_mask_from_posix(deny, flags);
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ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED;
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ace->who_gid = pa->e_gid;
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ace++;
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acl->naces++;
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}
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pa++;
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}
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if (pa->e_tag == ACL_MASK)
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pa++;
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ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE;
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ace->flag = eflag;
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ace->access_mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm, flags);
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ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_EVERYONE;
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acl->naces++;
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}
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static bool
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pace_gt(struct posix_acl_entry *pace1, struct posix_acl_entry *pace2)
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{
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if (pace1->e_tag != pace2->e_tag)
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return pace1->e_tag > pace2->e_tag;
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if (pace1->e_tag == ACL_USER)
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return uid_gt(pace1->e_uid, pace2->e_uid);
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if (pace1->e_tag == ACL_GROUP)
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return gid_gt(pace1->e_gid, pace2->e_gid);
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return false;
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}
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static void
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sort_pacl_range(struct posix_acl *pacl, int start, int end) {
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int sorted = 0, i;
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/* We just do a bubble sort; easy to do in place, and we're not
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* expecting acl's to be long enough to justify anything more. */
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while (!sorted) {
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sorted = 1;
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for (i = start; i < end; i++) {
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if (pace_gt(&pacl->a_entries[i],
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&pacl->a_entries[i+1])) {
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sorted = 0;
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swap(pacl->a_entries[i],
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pacl->a_entries[i + 1]);
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}
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}
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}
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}
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static void
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sort_pacl(struct posix_acl *pacl)
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{
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/* posix_acl_valid requires that users and groups be in order
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* by uid/gid. */
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int i, j;
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/* no users or groups */
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if (!pacl || pacl->a_count <= 4)
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return;
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i = 1;
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while (pacl->a_entries[i].e_tag == ACL_USER)
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i++;
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sort_pacl_range(pacl, 1, i-1);
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BUG_ON(pacl->a_entries[i].e_tag != ACL_GROUP_OBJ);
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j = ++i;
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while (pacl->a_entries[j].e_tag == ACL_GROUP)
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j++;
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sort_pacl_range(pacl, i, j-1);
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return;
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}
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/*
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* While processing the NFSv4 ACE, this maintains bitmasks representing
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* which permission bits have been allowed and which denied to a given
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* entity: */
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struct posix_ace_state {
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u32 allow;
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u32 deny;
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};
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struct posix_user_ace_state {
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union {
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kuid_t uid;
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kgid_t gid;
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};
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struct posix_ace_state perms;
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};
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struct posix_ace_state_array {
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int n;
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struct posix_user_ace_state aces[];
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};
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/*
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* While processing the NFSv4 ACE, this maintains the partial permissions
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* calculated so far: */
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struct posix_acl_state {
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int empty;
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struct posix_ace_state owner;
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struct posix_ace_state group;
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struct posix_ace_state other;
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struct posix_ace_state everyone;
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struct posix_ace_state mask; /* Deny unused in this case */
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struct posix_ace_state_array *users;
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struct posix_ace_state_array *groups;
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};
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static int
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init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt)
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{
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int alloc;
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memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct posix_acl_state));
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state->empty = 1;
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/*
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* In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct
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* named user or group, but we don't no which, so we allocate
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* enough space for either:
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*/
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alloc = sizeof(struct posix_ace_state_array)
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+ cnt*sizeof(struct posix_user_ace_state);
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state->users = kzalloc(alloc, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!state->users)
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return -ENOMEM;
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state->groups = kzalloc(alloc, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!state->groups) {
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kfree(state->users);
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return -ENOMEM;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static void
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free_state(struct posix_acl_state *state) {
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kfree(state->users);
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kfree(state->groups);
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}
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static inline void add_to_mask(struct posix_acl_state *state, struct posix_ace_state *astate)
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{
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state->mask.allow |= astate->allow;
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}
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static struct posix_acl *
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posix_state_to_acl(struct posix_acl_state *state, unsigned int flags)
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{
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struct posix_acl_entry *pace;
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struct posix_acl *pacl;
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int nace;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ACLs with no ACEs are treated differently in the inheritable
|
|
* and effective cases: when there are no inheritable ACEs,
|
|
* calls ->set_acl with a NULL ACL structure.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (state->empty && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* When there are no effective ACEs, the following will end
|
|
* up setting a 3-element effective posix ACL with all
|
|
* permissions zero.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!state->users->n && !state->groups->n)
|
|
nace = 3;
|
|
else /* Note we also include a MASK ACE in this case: */
|
|
nace = 4 + state->users->n + state->groups->n;
|
|
pacl = posix_acl_alloc(nace, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!pacl)
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
|
|
|
pace = pacl->a_entries;
|
|
pace->e_tag = ACL_USER_OBJ;
|
|
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->owner.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags);
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < state->users->n; i++) {
|
|
pace++;
|
|
pace->e_tag = ACL_USER;
|
|
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->users->aces[i].perms.allow,
|
|
&pace->e_perm, flags);
|
|
pace->e_uid = state->users->aces[i].uid;
|
|
add_to_mask(state, &state->users->aces[i].perms);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pace++;
|
|
pace->e_tag = ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
|
|
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->group.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags);
|
|
add_to_mask(state, &state->group);
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < state->groups->n; i++) {
|
|
pace++;
|
|
pace->e_tag = ACL_GROUP;
|
|
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->groups->aces[i].perms.allow,
|
|
&pace->e_perm, flags);
|
|
pace->e_gid = state->groups->aces[i].gid;
|
|
add_to_mask(state, &state->groups->aces[i].perms);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (state->users->n || state->groups->n) {
|
|
pace++;
|
|
pace->e_tag = ACL_MASK;
|
|
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->mask.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pace++;
|
|
pace->e_tag = ACL_OTHER;
|
|
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->other.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags);
|
|
|
|
return pacl;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline void allow_bits(struct posix_ace_state *astate, u32 mask)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Allow all bits in the mask not already denied: */
|
|
astate->allow |= mask & ~astate->deny;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline void deny_bits(struct posix_ace_state *astate, u32 mask)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Deny all bits in the mask not already allowed: */
|
|
astate->deny |= mask & ~astate->allow;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int find_uid(struct posix_acl_state *state, kuid_t uid)
|
|
{
|
|
struct posix_ace_state_array *a = state->users;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < a->n; i++)
|
|
if (uid_eq(a->aces[i].uid, uid))
|
|
return i;
|
|
/* Not found: */
|
|
a->n++;
|
|
a->aces[i].uid = uid;
|
|
a->aces[i].perms.allow = state->everyone.allow;
|
|
a->aces[i].perms.deny = state->everyone.deny;
|
|
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int find_gid(struct posix_acl_state *state, kgid_t gid)
|
|
{
|
|
struct posix_ace_state_array *a = state->groups;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < a->n; i++)
|
|
if (gid_eq(a->aces[i].gid, gid))
|
|
return i;
|
|
/* Not found: */
|
|
a->n++;
|
|
a->aces[i].gid = gid;
|
|
a->aces[i].perms.allow = state->everyone.allow;
|
|
a->aces[i].perms.deny = state->everyone.deny;
|
|
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void deny_bits_array(struct posix_ace_state_array *a, u32 mask)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < a->n; i++)
|
|
deny_bits(&a->aces[i].perms, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void allow_bits_array(struct posix_ace_state_array *a, u32 mask)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < a->n; i++)
|
|
allow_bits(&a->aces[i].perms, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,
|
|
struct nfs4_ace *ace)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 mask = ace->access_mask;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
state->empty = 0;
|
|
|
|
switch (ace2type(ace)) {
|
|
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
|
|
if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) {
|
|
allow_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
} else {
|
|
deny_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_USER:
|
|
i = find_uid(state, ace->who_uid);
|
|
if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) {
|
|
allow_bits(&state->users->aces[i].perms, mask);
|
|
} else {
|
|
deny_bits(&state->users->aces[i].perms, mask);
|
|
mask = state->users->aces[i].perms.deny;
|
|
deny_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
|
|
if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) {
|
|
allow_bits(&state->group, mask);
|
|
} else {
|
|
deny_bits(&state->group, mask);
|
|
mask = state->group.deny;
|
|
deny_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
deny_bits(&state->everyone, mask);
|
|
deny_bits_array(state->users, mask);
|
|
deny_bits_array(state->groups, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_GROUP:
|
|
i = find_gid(state, ace->who_gid);
|
|
if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) {
|
|
allow_bits(&state->groups->aces[i].perms, mask);
|
|
} else {
|
|
deny_bits(&state->groups->aces[i].perms, mask);
|
|
mask = state->groups->aces[i].perms.deny;
|
|
deny_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
deny_bits(&state->group, mask);
|
|
deny_bits(&state->everyone, mask);
|
|
deny_bits_array(state->users, mask);
|
|
deny_bits_array(state->groups, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_OTHER:
|
|
if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) {
|
|
allow_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
allow_bits(&state->group, mask);
|
|
allow_bits(&state->other, mask);
|
|
allow_bits(&state->everyone, mask);
|
|
allow_bits_array(state->users, mask);
|
|
allow_bits_array(state->groups, mask);
|
|
} else {
|
|
deny_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
deny_bits(&state->group, mask);
|
|
deny_bits(&state->other, mask);
|
|
deny_bits(&state->everyone, mask);
|
|
deny_bits_array(state->users, mask);
|
|
deny_bits_array(state->groups, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl,
|
|
struct posix_acl **pacl, struct posix_acl **dpacl,
|
|
unsigned int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
struct posix_acl_state effective_acl_state, default_acl_state;
|
|
struct nfs4_ace *ace;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = init_state(&effective_acl_state, acl->naces);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
ret = init_state(&default_acl_state, acl->naces);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out_estate;
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
for (ace = acl->aces; ace < acl->aces + acl->naces; ace++) {
|
|
if (ace->type != NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE &&
|
|
ace->type != NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE)
|
|
goto out_dstate;
|
|
if (ace->flag & ~NFS4_SUPPORTED_FLAGS)
|
|
goto out_dstate;
|
|
if ((ace->flag & NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS) == 0) {
|
|
process_one_v4_ace(&effective_acl_state, ace);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!(flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR))
|
|
goto out_dstate;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note that when only one of FILE_INHERIT or DIRECTORY_INHERIT
|
|
* is set, we're effectively turning on the other. That's OK,
|
|
* according to rfc 3530.
|
|
*/
|
|
process_one_v4_ace(&default_acl_state, ace);
|
|
|
|
if (!(ace->flag & NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE))
|
|
process_one_v4_ace(&effective_acl_state, ace);
|
|
}
|
|
*pacl = posix_state_to_acl(&effective_acl_state, flags);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(*pacl)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(*pacl);
|
|
*pacl = NULL;
|
|
goto out_dstate;
|
|
}
|
|
*dpacl = posix_state_to_acl(&default_acl_state,
|
|
flags | NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(*dpacl)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(*dpacl);
|
|
*dpacl = NULL;
|
|
posix_acl_release(*pacl);
|
|
*pacl = NULL;
|
|
goto out_dstate;
|
|
}
|
|
sort_pacl(*pacl);
|
|
sort_pacl(*dpacl);
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
out_dstate:
|
|
free_state(&default_acl_state);
|
|
out_estate:
|
|
free_state(&effective_acl_state);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
__be32
|
|
nfsd4_set_nfs4_acl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp,
|
|
struct nfs4_acl *acl)
|
|
{
|
|
__be32 error;
|
|
int host_error;
|
|
struct dentry *dentry;
|
|
struct inode *inode;
|
|
struct posix_acl *pacl = NULL, *dpacl = NULL;
|
|
unsigned int flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Get inode */
|
|
error = fh_verify(rqstp, fhp, 0, NFSD_MAY_SATTR);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
|
|
inode = d_inode(dentry);
|
|
|
|
if (!inode->i_op->set_acl || !IS_POSIXACL(inode))
|
|
return nfserr_attrnotsupp;
|
|
|
|
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
|
|
flags = NFS4_ACL_DIR;
|
|
|
|
host_error = nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(acl, &pacl, &dpacl, flags);
|
|
if (host_error == -EINVAL)
|
|
return nfserr_attrnotsupp;
|
|
if (host_error < 0)
|
|
goto out_nfserr;
|
|
|
|
host_error = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, pacl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
|
|
if (host_error < 0)
|
|
goto out_release;
|
|
|
|
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
|
|
host_error = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, dpacl,
|
|
ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out_release:
|
|
posix_acl_release(pacl);
|
|
posix_acl_release(dpacl);
|
|
out_nfserr:
|
|
if (host_error == -EOPNOTSUPP)
|
|
return nfserr_attrnotsupp;
|
|
else
|
|
return nfserrno(host_error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static short
|
|
ace2type(struct nfs4_ace *ace)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (ace->whotype) {
|
|
case NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED:
|
|
return (ace->flag & NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP ?
|
|
ACL_GROUP : ACL_USER);
|
|
case NFS4_ACL_WHO_OWNER:
|
|
return ACL_USER_OBJ;
|
|
case NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP:
|
|
return ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
|
|
case NFS4_ACL_WHO_EVERYONE:
|
|
return ACL_OTHER;
|
|
}
|
|
BUG();
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* return the size of the struct nfs4_acl required to represent an acl
|
|
* with @entries entries.
|
|
*/
|
|
int nfs4_acl_bytes(int entries)
|
|
{
|
|
return sizeof(struct nfs4_acl) + entries * sizeof(struct nfs4_ace);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct {
|
|
char *string;
|
|
int stringlen;
|
|
int type;
|
|
} s2t_map[] = {
|
|
{
|
|
.string = "OWNER@",
|
|
.stringlen = sizeof("OWNER@") - 1,
|
|
.type = NFS4_ACL_WHO_OWNER,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.string = "GROUP@",
|
|
.stringlen = sizeof("GROUP@") - 1,
|
|
.type = NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.string = "EVERYONE@",
|
|
.stringlen = sizeof("EVERYONE@") - 1,
|
|
.type = NFS4_ACL_WHO_EVERYONE,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
nfs4_acl_get_whotype(char *p, u32 len)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(s2t_map); i++) {
|
|
if (s2t_map[i].stringlen == len &&
|
|
0 == memcmp(s2t_map[i].string, p, len))
|
|
return s2t_map[i].type;
|
|
}
|
|
return NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
__be32 nfs4_acl_write_who(struct xdr_stream *xdr, int who)
|
|
{
|
|
__be32 *p;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(s2t_map); i++) {
|
|
if (s2t_map[i].type != who)
|
|
continue;
|
|
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, s2t_map[i].stringlen + 4);
|
|
if (!p)
|
|
return nfserr_resource;
|
|
p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, s2t_map[i].string,
|
|
s2t_map[i].stringlen);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
|
|
return nfserr_serverfault;
|
|
}
|