linux-stable/arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c
Linus Torvalds aefcf2f4b5 Merge branch 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
 "This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
  Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.

  From the original description:

    This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
    intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
    When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
    Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
    kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
    enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.

    The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
    of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
    doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
    to not requiring external patches.

  There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:

   - Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
     covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/

   -  Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
      module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
      rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.

  The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
  policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
  tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
  permitted.

  The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
  policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
  level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:

    lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}

  Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
  that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
  confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
  confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.

  This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
  overriden by kernel configuration.

  New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
  lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
  include/linux/security.h for details.

  The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
  across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
  weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.

  Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf ("bpf: Restrict bpf
  when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
  Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
  this under category (c) of the DCO"

* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
  kexec: Fix file verification on S390
  security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
  lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
  efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
  tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
  debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
  kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
  lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
  bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
  lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
  lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
  x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
  lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
  lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
  lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
  acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
  acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
  x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
  ...
2019-09-28 08:14:15 -07:00

416 lines
10 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#define BOOT_CTYPE_H
#include "misc.h"
#include "error.h"
#include "../string.h"
#include <linux/numa.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <asm/efi.h>
/*
* Longest parameter of 'acpi=' is 'copy_dsdt', plus an extra '\0'
* for termination.
*/
#define MAX_ACPI_ARG_LENGTH 10
/*
* Immovable memory regions representation. Max amount of memory regions is
* MAX_NUMNODES*2.
*/
struct mem_vector immovable_mem[MAX_NUMNODES*2];
/*
* Max length of 64-bit hex address string is 19, prefix "0x" + 16 hex
* digits, and '\0' for termination.
*/
#define MAX_ADDR_LEN 19
static acpi_physical_address get_cmdline_acpi_rsdp(void)
{
acpi_physical_address addr = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
char val[MAX_ADDR_LEN] = { };
int ret;
ret = cmdline_find_option("acpi_rsdp", val, MAX_ADDR_LEN);
if (ret < 0)
return 0;
if (kstrtoull(val, 16, &addr))
return 0;
#endif
return addr;
}
/*
* Search EFI system tables for RSDP. If both ACPI_20_TABLE_GUID and
* ACPI_TABLE_GUID are found, take the former, which has more features.
*/
static acpi_physical_address
__efi_get_rsdp_addr(unsigned long config_tables, unsigned int nr_tables,
bool efi_64)
{
acpi_physical_address rsdp_addr = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
int i;
/* Get EFI tables from systab. */
for (i = 0; i < nr_tables; i++) {
acpi_physical_address table;
efi_guid_t guid;
if (efi_64) {
efi_config_table_64_t *tbl = (efi_config_table_64_t *)config_tables + i;
guid = tbl->guid;
table = tbl->table;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) && table >> 32) {
debug_putstr("Error getting RSDP address: EFI config table located above 4GB.\n");
return 0;
}
} else {
efi_config_table_32_t *tbl = (efi_config_table_32_t *)config_tables + i;
guid = tbl->guid;
table = tbl->table;
}
if (!(efi_guidcmp(guid, ACPI_TABLE_GUID)))
rsdp_addr = table;
else if (!(efi_guidcmp(guid, ACPI_20_TABLE_GUID)))
return table;
}
#endif
return rsdp_addr;
}
/* EFI/kexec support is 64-bit only. */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
static struct efi_setup_data *get_kexec_setup_data_addr(void)
{
struct setup_data *data;
u64 pa_data;
pa_data = boot_params->hdr.setup_data;
while (pa_data) {
data = (struct setup_data *)pa_data;
if (data->type == SETUP_EFI)
return (struct efi_setup_data *)(pa_data + sizeof(struct setup_data));
pa_data = data->next;
}
return NULL;
}
static acpi_physical_address kexec_get_rsdp_addr(void)
{
efi_system_table_64_t *systab;
struct efi_setup_data *esd;
struct efi_info *ei;
char *sig;
esd = (struct efi_setup_data *)get_kexec_setup_data_addr();
if (!esd)
return 0;
if (!esd->tables) {
debug_putstr("Wrong kexec SETUP_EFI data.\n");
return 0;
}
ei = &boot_params->efi_info;
sig = (char *)&ei->efi_loader_signature;
if (strncmp(sig, EFI64_LOADER_SIGNATURE, 4)) {
debug_putstr("Wrong kexec EFI loader signature.\n");
return 0;
}
/* Get systab from boot params. */
systab = (efi_system_table_64_t *) (ei->efi_systab | ((__u64)ei->efi_systab_hi << 32));
if (!systab)
error("EFI system table not found in kexec boot_params.");
return __efi_get_rsdp_addr((unsigned long)esd->tables, systab->nr_tables, true);
}
#else
static acpi_physical_address kexec_get_rsdp_addr(void) { return 0; }
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
static acpi_physical_address efi_get_rsdp_addr(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
unsigned long systab, config_tables;
unsigned int nr_tables;
struct efi_info *ei;
bool efi_64;
char *sig;
ei = &boot_params->efi_info;
sig = (char *)&ei->efi_loader_signature;
if (!strncmp(sig, EFI64_LOADER_SIGNATURE, 4)) {
efi_64 = true;
} else if (!strncmp(sig, EFI32_LOADER_SIGNATURE, 4)) {
efi_64 = false;
} else {
debug_putstr("Wrong EFI loader signature.\n");
return 0;
}
/* Get systab from boot params. */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
systab = ei->efi_systab | ((__u64)ei->efi_systab_hi << 32);
#else
if (ei->efi_systab_hi || ei->efi_memmap_hi) {
debug_putstr("Error getting RSDP address: EFI system table located above 4GB.\n");
return 0;
}
systab = ei->efi_systab;
#endif
if (!systab)
error("EFI system table not found.");
/* Handle EFI bitness properly */
if (efi_64) {
efi_system_table_64_t *stbl = (efi_system_table_64_t *)systab;
config_tables = stbl->tables;
nr_tables = stbl->nr_tables;
} else {
efi_system_table_32_t *stbl = (efi_system_table_32_t *)systab;
config_tables = stbl->tables;
nr_tables = stbl->nr_tables;
}
if (!config_tables)
error("EFI config tables not found.");
return __efi_get_rsdp_addr(config_tables, nr_tables, efi_64);
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
static u8 compute_checksum(u8 *buffer, u32 length)
{
u8 *end = buffer + length;
u8 sum = 0;
while (buffer < end)
sum += *(buffer++);
return sum;
}
/* Search a block of memory for the RSDP signature. */
static u8 *scan_mem_for_rsdp(u8 *start, u32 length)
{
struct acpi_table_rsdp *rsdp;
u8 *address, *end;
end = start + length;
/* Search from given start address for the requested length */
for (address = start; address < end; address += ACPI_RSDP_SCAN_STEP) {
/*
* Both RSDP signature and checksum must be correct.
* Note: Sometimes there exists more than one RSDP in memory;
* the valid RSDP has a valid checksum, all others have an
* invalid checksum.
*/
rsdp = (struct acpi_table_rsdp *)address;
/* BAD Signature */
if (!ACPI_VALIDATE_RSDP_SIG(rsdp->signature))
continue;
/* Check the standard checksum */
if (compute_checksum((u8 *)rsdp, ACPI_RSDP_CHECKSUM_LENGTH))
continue;
/* Check extended checksum if table version >= 2 */
if ((rsdp->revision >= 2) &&
(compute_checksum((u8 *)rsdp, ACPI_RSDP_XCHECKSUM_LENGTH)))
continue;
/* Signature and checksum valid, we have found a real RSDP */
return address;
}
return NULL;
}
/* Search RSDP address in EBDA. */
static acpi_physical_address bios_get_rsdp_addr(void)
{
unsigned long address;
u8 *rsdp;
/* Get the location of the Extended BIOS Data Area (EBDA) */
address = *(u16 *)ACPI_EBDA_PTR_LOCATION;
address <<= 4;
/*
* Search EBDA paragraphs (EBDA is required to be a minimum of
* 1K length)
*/
if (address > 0x400) {
rsdp = scan_mem_for_rsdp((u8 *)address, ACPI_EBDA_WINDOW_SIZE);
if (rsdp)
return (acpi_physical_address)(unsigned long)rsdp;
}
/* Search upper memory: 16-byte boundaries in E0000h-FFFFFh */
rsdp = scan_mem_for_rsdp((u8 *) ACPI_HI_RSDP_WINDOW_BASE,
ACPI_HI_RSDP_WINDOW_SIZE);
if (rsdp)
return (acpi_physical_address)(unsigned long)rsdp;
return 0;
}
/* Return RSDP address on success, otherwise 0. */
acpi_physical_address get_rsdp_addr(void)
{
acpi_physical_address pa;
pa = boot_params->acpi_rsdp_addr;
/*
* Try to get EFI data from setup_data. This can happen when we're a
* kexec'ed kernel and kexec(1) has passed all the required EFI info to
* us.
*/
if (!pa)
pa = kexec_get_rsdp_addr();
if (!pa)
pa = efi_get_rsdp_addr();
if (!pa)
pa = bios_get_rsdp_addr();
return pa;
}
#if defined(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) && defined(CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE)
/* Compute SRAT address from RSDP. */
static unsigned long get_acpi_srat_table(void)
{
unsigned long root_table, acpi_table;
struct acpi_table_header *header;
struct acpi_table_rsdp *rsdp;
u32 num_entries, size, len;
char arg[10];
u8 *entry;
/*
* Check whether we were given an RSDP on the command line. We don't
* stash this in boot params because the kernel itself may have
* different ideas about whether to trust a command-line parameter.
*/
rsdp = (struct acpi_table_rsdp *)get_cmdline_acpi_rsdp();
if (!rsdp)
rsdp = (struct acpi_table_rsdp *)(long)
boot_params->acpi_rsdp_addr;
if (!rsdp)
return 0;
/* Get ACPI root table from RSDP.*/
if (!(cmdline_find_option("acpi", arg, sizeof(arg)) == 4 &&
!strncmp(arg, "rsdt", 4)) &&
rsdp->xsdt_physical_address &&
rsdp->revision > 1) {
root_table = rsdp->xsdt_physical_address;
size = ACPI_XSDT_ENTRY_SIZE;
} else {
root_table = rsdp->rsdt_physical_address;
size = ACPI_RSDT_ENTRY_SIZE;
}
if (!root_table)
return 0;
header = (struct acpi_table_header *)root_table;
len = header->length;
if (len < sizeof(struct acpi_table_header) + size)
return 0;
num_entries = (len - sizeof(struct acpi_table_header)) / size;
entry = (u8 *)(root_table + sizeof(struct acpi_table_header));
while (num_entries--) {
if (size == ACPI_RSDT_ENTRY_SIZE)
acpi_table = *(u32 *)entry;
else
acpi_table = *(u64 *)entry;
if (acpi_table) {
header = (struct acpi_table_header *)acpi_table;
if (ACPI_COMPARE_NAMESEG(header->signature, ACPI_SIG_SRAT))
return acpi_table;
}
entry += size;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* count_immovable_mem_regions - Parse SRAT and cache the immovable
* memory regions into the immovable_mem array.
*
* Return the number of immovable memory regions on success, 0 on failure:
*
* - Too many immovable memory regions
* - ACPI off or no SRAT found
* - No immovable memory region found.
*/
int count_immovable_mem_regions(void)
{
unsigned long table_addr, table_end, table;
struct acpi_subtable_header *sub_table;
struct acpi_table_header *table_header;
char arg[MAX_ACPI_ARG_LENGTH];
int num = 0;
if (cmdline_find_option("acpi", arg, sizeof(arg)) == 3 &&
!strncmp(arg, "off", 3))
return 0;
table_addr = get_acpi_srat_table();
if (!table_addr)
return 0;
table_header = (struct acpi_table_header *)table_addr;
table_end = table_addr + table_header->length;
table = table_addr + sizeof(struct acpi_table_srat);
while (table + sizeof(struct acpi_subtable_header) < table_end) {
sub_table = (struct acpi_subtable_header *)table;
if (sub_table->type == ACPI_SRAT_TYPE_MEMORY_AFFINITY) {
struct acpi_srat_mem_affinity *ma;
ma = (struct acpi_srat_mem_affinity *)sub_table;
if (!(ma->flags & ACPI_SRAT_MEM_HOT_PLUGGABLE) && ma->length) {
immovable_mem[num].start = ma->base_address;
immovable_mem[num].size = ma->length;
num++;
}
if (num >= MAX_NUMNODES*2) {
debug_putstr("Too many immovable memory regions, aborting.\n");
return 0;
}
}
table += sub_table->length;
}
return num;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE && CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE */