linux-stable/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
Linus Torvalds 6304672b7f Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86/pti updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Another set of melted spectrum related changes:

   - Code simplifications and cleanups for RSB and retpolines.

   - Make the indirect calls in KVM speculation safe.

   - Whitelist CPUs which are known not to speculate from Meltdown and
     prepare for the new CPUID flag which tells the kernel that a CPU is
     not affected.

   - A less rigorous variant of the module retpoline check which merily
     warns when a non-retpoline protected module is loaded and reflects
     that fact in the sysfs file.

   - Prepare for Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier support.

   - Prepare for exposure of the Speculation Control MSRs to guests, so
     guest OSes which depend on those "features" can use them. Includes
     a blacklist of the broken microcodes. The actual exposure of the
     MSRs through KVM is still being worked on"

* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()
  x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()
  x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags
  x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional
  x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg
  x86/nospec: Fix header guards names
  x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers
  x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support
  x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes
  x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown
  x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs
  x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control
  x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control
  x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf
  module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module
  KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe
  KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe
2018-01-29 19:08:02 -08:00

81 lines
2 KiB
C

/*
* Routines to identify additional cpu features that are scattered in
* cpuid space.
*/
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <asm/pat.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
struct cpuid_bit {
u16 feature;
u8 reg;
u8 bit;
u32 level;
u32 sub_leaf;
};
/* Please keep the leaf sorted by cpuid_bit.level for faster search. */
static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, CPUID_ECX, 0, 0x00000006, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_EPB, CPUID_ECX, 3, 0x00000006, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_CAT_L3, CPUID_EBX, 1, 0x00000010, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_CAT_L2, CPUID_EBX, 2, 0x00000010, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3, CPUID_ECX, 2, 0x00000010, 1 },
{ X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2, CPUID_ECX, 2, 0x00000010, 2 },
{ X86_FEATURE_MBA, CPUID_EBX, 3, 0x00000010, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE, CPUID_EDX, 7, 0x80000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_CPB, CPUID_EDX, 9, 0x80000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK, CPUID_EDX, 11, 0x80000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_SME, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x8000001f, 0 },
{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
};
void init_scattered_cpuid_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u32 max_level;
u32 regs[4];
const struct cpuid_bit *cb;
for (cb = cpuid_bits; cb->feature; cb++) {
/* Verify that the level is valid */
max_level = cpuid_eax(cb->level & 0xffff0000);
if (max_level < cb->level ||
max_level > (cb->level | 0xffff))
continue;
cpuid_count(cb->level, cb->sub_leaf, &regs[CPUID_EAX],
&regs[CPUID_EBX], &regs[CPUID_ECX],
&regs[CPUID_EDX]);
if (regs[cb->reg] & (1 << cb->bit))
set_cpu_cap(c, cb->feature);
}
}
u32 get_scattered_cpuid_leaf(unsigned int level, unsigned int sub_leaf,
enum cpuid_regs_idx reg)
{
const struct cpuid_bit *cb;
u32 cpuid_val = 0;
for (cb = cpuid_bits; cb->feature; cb++) {
if (level > cb->level)
continue;
if (level < cb->level)
break;
if (reg == cb->reg && sub_leaf == cb->sub_leaf) {
if (cpu_has(&boot_cpu_data, cb->feature))
cpuid_val |= BIT(cb->bit);
}
}
return cpuid_val;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_scattered_cpuid_leaf);