linux-stable/fs/nfsd/export.c
Linus Torvalds 7d6beb71da idmapped-mounts-v5.12
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Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux

Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
 "This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
  time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
  directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
  with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
  filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
  maintainers.

  Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
  are just a few:

   - Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
     multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
     scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
     implementation of portable home directories in
     systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
     directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
     computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
     effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
     login time.

   - It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
     containers without having to change ownership permanently through
     chown(2).

   - It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
     mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
     user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
     Linux subsystem.

   - It is possible to share files between containers with
     non-overlapping idmappings.

   - Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
     use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
     permission checking.

   - They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
     basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
     contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
     instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
     ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
     container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
     mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
     all files.

   - Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
     idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
     to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
     take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
     simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
     especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
     files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
     directory and container and vm scenario.

   - Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
     to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
     apply as long as the mount exists.

  Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
  pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
  this:

   - systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
     in their implementation of portable home directories.

         https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/

   - container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
     host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
     containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
     containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
     a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734

   - The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
     in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
     ported.

   - ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.

  I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
  here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
  mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
  talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:

      https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
      https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/

  This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
  xfs:

      https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts

  It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
  execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
  non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
  setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
  be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
  merge this.

  In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
  user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
  map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
  By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
  The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
  idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
  testsuite.

  Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
  and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
  the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
  introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
  the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
  to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
  whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
  currently marked with.

  The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
  passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
  argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
  MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
  of extensibility.

  The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
  mount:

   - The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
     user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.

   - The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.

   - The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
     idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.

   - The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
     been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
     and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.

  The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
  kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.

  By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
  behavioral or performance changes are observed.

  The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:

      1d7b902e28

  In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
  and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
  patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
  complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
  xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
  will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
  that port has been done correctly.

  The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
  mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
  valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
  mounts based on file descriptors only.

  Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
  RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
  we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
  path resolution.

  While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
  proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
  possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
  the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.

  With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
  restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
  covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
  crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
  tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
  syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
  projects.

  There is a simple tool available at

      https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped

  that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
  patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
  decide to pull this in the following weeks:

  Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
  directory:

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 4 root   root   4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x  2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 29 root  root  4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: mnt/my-file
	# owner: u1001
	# group: u1001
	user::rw-
	user:u1001:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
	# owner: ubuntu
	# group: ubuntu
	user::rw-
	user:ubuntu:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--"

* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
  xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
  xfs: support idmapped mounts
  ext4: support idmapped mounts
  fat: handle idmapped mounts
  tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
  fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
  fs: add mount_setattr()
  fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
  fs: split out functions to hold writers
  namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
  mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
  namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
  nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
  overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ima: handle idmapped mounts
  apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
  fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
  exec: handle idmapped mounts
  would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
  ...
2021-02-23 13:39:45 -08:00

1393 lines
35 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* NFS exporting and validation.
*
* We maintain a list of clients, each of which has a list of
* exports. To export an fs to a given client, you first have
* to create the client entry with NFSCTL_ADDCLIENT, which
* creates a client control block and adds it to the hash
* table. Then, you call NFSCTL_EXPORT for each fs.
*
*
* Copyright (C) 1995, 1996 Olaf Kirch, <okir@monad.swb.de>
*/
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/exportfs.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/svc_xprt.h>
#include "nfsd.h"
#include "nfsfh.h"
#include "netns.h"
#include "pnfs.h"
#include "filecache.h"
#include "trace.h"
#define NFSDDBG_FACILITY NFSDDBG_EXPORT
/*
* We have two caches.
* One maps client+vfsmnt+dentry to export options - the export map
* The other maps client+filehandle-fragment to export options. - the expkey map
*
* The export options are actually stored in the first map, and the
* second map contains a reference to the entry in the first map.
*/
#define EXPKEY_HASHBITS 8
#define EXPKEY_HASHMAX (1 << EXPKEY_HASHBITS)
#define EXPKEY_HASHMASK (EXPKEY_HASHMAX -1)
static void expkey_put(struct kref *ref)
{
struct svc_expkey *key = container_of(ref, struct svc_expkey, h.ref);
if (test_bit(CACHE_VALID, &key->h.flags) &&
!test_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &key->h.flags))
path_put(&key->ek_path);
auth_domain_put(key->ek_client);
kfree_rcu(key, ek_rcu);
}
static int expkey_upcall(struct cache_detail *cd, struct cache_head *h)
{
return sunrpc_cache_pipe_upcall(cd, h);
}
static void expkey_request(struct cache_detail *cd,
struct cache_head *h,
char **bpp, int *blen)
{
/* client fsidtype \xfsid */
struct svc_expkey *ek = container_of(h, struct svc_expkey, h);
char type[5];
qword_add(bpp, blen, ek->ek_client->name);
snprintf(type, 5, "%d", ek->ek_fsidtype);
qword_add(bpp, blen, type);
qword_addhex(bpp, blen, (char*)ek->ek_fsid, key_len(ek->ek_fsidtype));
(*bpp)[-1] = '\n';
}
static struct svc_expkey *svc_expkey_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct svc_expkey *new,
struct svc_expkey *old);
static struct svc_expkey *svc_expkey_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, struct svc_expkey *);
static int expkey_parse(struct cache_detail *cd, char *mesg, int mlen)
{
/* client fsidtype fsid expiry [path] */
char *buf;
int len;
struct auth_domain *dom = NULL;
int err;
int fsidtype;
char *ep;
struct svc_expkey key;
struct svc_expkey *ek = NULL;
if (mesg[mlen - 1] != '\n')
return -EINVAL;
mesg[mlen-1] = 0;
buf = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!buf)
goto out;
err = -EINVAL;
if ((len=qword_get(&mesg, buf, PAGE_SIZE)) <= 0)
goto out;
err = -ENOENT;
dom = auth_domain_find(buf);
if (!dom)
goto out;
dprintk("found domain %s\n", buf);
err = -EINVAL;
if ((len=qword_get(&mesg, buf, PAGE_SIZE)) <= 0)
goto out;
fsidtype = simple_strtoul(buf, &ep, 10);
if (*ep)
goto out;
dprintk("found fsidtype %d\n", fsidtype);
if (key_len(fsidtype)==0) /* invalid type */
goto out;
if ((len=qword_get(&mesg, buf, PAGE_SIZE)) <= 0)
goto out;
dprintk("found fsid length %d\n", len);
if (len != key_len(fsidtype))
goto out;
/* OK, we seem to have a valid key */
key.h.flags = 0;
key.h.expiry_time = get_expiry(&mesg);
if (key.h.expiry_time == 0)
goto out;
key.ek_client = dom;
key.ek_fsidtype = fsidtype;
memcpy(key.ek_fsid, buf, len);
ek = svc_expkey_lookup(cd, &key);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!ek)
goto out;
/* now we want a pathname, or empty meaning NEGATIVE */
err = -EINVAL;
len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, PAGE_SIZE);
if (len < 0)
goto out;
dprintk("Path seems to be <%s>\n", buf);
err = 0;
if (len == 0) {
set_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &key.h.flags);
ek = svc_expkey_update(cd, &key, ek);
if (ek)
trace_nfsd_expkey_update(ek, NULL);
else
err = -ENOMEM;
} else {
err = kern_path(buf, 0, &key.ek_path);
if (err)
goto out;
dprintk("Found the path %s\n", buf);
ek = svc_expkey_update(cd, &key, ek);
if (ek)
trace_nfsd_expkey_update(ek, buf);
else
err = -ENOMEM;
path_put(&key.ek_path);
}
cache_flush();
out:
if (ek)
cache_put(&ek->h, cd);
if (dom)
auth_domain_put(dom);
kfree(buf);
return err;
}
static int expkey_show(struct seq_file *m,
struct cache_detail *cd,
struct cache_head *h)
{
struct svc_expkey *ek ;
int i;
if (h ==NULL) {
seq_puts(m, "#domain fsidtype fsid [path]\n");
return 0;
}
ek = container_of(h, struct svc_expkey, h);
seq_printf(m, "%s %d 0x", ek->ek_client->name,
ek->ek_fsidtype);
for (i=0; i < key_len(ek->ek_fsidtype)/4; i++)
seq_printf(m, "%08x", ek->ek_fsid[i]);
if (test_bit(CACHE_VALID, &h->flags) &&
!test_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &h->flags)) {
seq_printf(m, " ");
seq_path(m, &ek->ek_path, "\\ \t\n");
}
seq_printf(m, "\n");
return 0;
}
static inline int expkey_match (struct cache_head *a, struct cache_head *b)
{
struct svc_expkey *orig = container_of(a, struct svc_expkey, h);
struct svc_expkey *new = container_of(b, struct svc_expkey, h);
if (orig->ek_fsidtype != new->ek_fsidtype ||
orig->ek_client != new->ek_client ||
memcmp(orig->ek_fsid, new->ek_fsid, key_len(orig->ek_fsidtype)) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static inline void expkey_init(struct cache_head *cnew,
struct cache_head *citem)
{
struct svc_expkey *new = container_of(cnew, struct svc_expkey, h);
struct svc_expkey *item = container_of(citem, struct svc_expkey, h);
kref_get(&item->ek_client->ref);
new->ek_client = item->ek_client;
new->ek_fsidtype = item->ek_fsidtype;
memcpy(new->ek_fsid, item->ek_fsid, sizeof(new->ek_fsid));
}
static inline void expkey_update(struct cache_head *cnew,
struct cache_head *citem)
{
struct svc_expkey *new = container_of(cnew, struct svc_expkey, h);
struct svc_expkey *item = container_of(citem, struct svc_expkey, h);
new->ek_path = item->ek_path;
path_get(&item->ek_path);
}
static struct cache_head *expkey_alloc(void)
{
struct svc_expkey *i = kmalloc(sizeof(*i), GFP_KERNEL);
if (i)
return &i->h;
else
return NULL;
}
static void expkey_flush(void)
{
/*
* Take the nfsd_mutex here to ensure that the file cache is not
* destroyed while we're in the middle of flushing.
*/
mutex_lock(&nfsd_mutex);
nfsd_file_cache_purge(current->nsproxy->net_ns);
mutex_unlock(&nfsd_mutex);
}
static const struct cache_detail svc_expkey_cache_template = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.hash_size = EXPKEY_HASHMAX,
.name = "nfsd.fh",
.cache_put = expkey_put,
.cache_upcall = expkey_upcall,
.cache_request = expkey_request,
.cache_parse = expkey_parse,
.cache_show = expkey_show,
.match = expkey_match,
.init = expkey_init,
.update = expkey_update,
.alloc = expkey_alloc,
.flush = expkey_flush,
};
static int
svc_expkey_hash(struct svc_expkey *item)
{
int hash = item->ek_fsidtype;
char * cp = (char*)item->ek_fsid;
int len = key_len(item->ek_fsidtype);
hash ^= hash_mem(cp, len, EXPKEY_HASHBITS);
hash ^= hash_ptr(item->ek_client, EXPKEY_HASHBITS);
hash &= EXPKEY_HASHMASK;
return hash;
}
static struct svc_expkey *
svc_expkey_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, struct svc_expkey *item)
{
struct cache_head *ch;
int hash = svc_expkey_hash(item);
ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup_rcu(cd, &item->h, hash);
if (ch)
return container_of(ch, struct svc_expkey, h);
else
return NULL;
}
static struct svc_expkey *
svc_expkey_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct svc_expkey *new,
struct svc_expkey *old)
{
struct cache_head *ch;
int hash = svc_expkey_hash(new);
ch = sunrpc_cache_update(cd, &new->h, &old->h, hash);
if (ch)
return container_of(ch, struct svc_expkey, h);
else
return NULL;
}
#define EXPORT_HASHBITS 8
#define EXPORT_HASHMAX (1<< EXPORT_HASHBITS)
static void nfsd4_fslocs_free(struct nfsd4_fs_locations *fsloc)
{
struct nfsd4_fs_location *locations = fsloc->locations;
int i;
if (!locations)
return;
for (i = 0; i < fsloc->locations_count; i++) {
kfree(locations[i].path);
kfree(locations[i].hosts);
}
kfree(locations);
fsloc->locations = NULL;
}
static int export_stats_init(struct export_stats *stats)
{
stats->start_time = ktime_get_seconds();
return nfsd_percpu_counters_init(stats->counter, EXP_STATS_COUNTERS_NUM);
}
static void export_stats_reset(struct export_stats *stats)
{
nfsd_percpu_counters_reset(stats->counter, EXP_STATS_COUNTERS_NUM);
}
static void export_stats_destroy(struct export_stats *stats)
{
nfsd_percpu_counters_destroy(stats->counter, EXP_STATS_COUNTERS_NUM);
}
static void svc_export_put(struct kref *ref)
{
struct svc_export *exp = container_of(ref, struct svc_export, h.ref);
path_put(&exp->ex_path);
auth_domain_put(exp->ex_client);
nfsd4_fslocs_free(&exp->ex_fslocs);
export_stats_destroy(&exp->ex_stats);
kfree(exp->ex_uuid);
kfree_rcu(exp, ex_rcu);
}
static int svc_export_upcall(struct cache_detail *cd, struct cache_head *h)
{
return sunrpc_cache_pipe_upcall(cd, h);
}
static void svc_export_request(struct cache_detail *cd,
struct cache_head *h,
char **bpp, int *blen)
{
/* client path */
struct svc_export *exp = container_of(h, struct svc_export, h);
char *pth;
qword_add(bpp, blen, exp->ex_client->name);
pth = d_path(&exp->ex_path, *bpp, *blen);
if (IS_ERR(pth)) {
/* is this correct? */
(*bpp)[0] = '\n';
return;
}
qword_add(bpp, blen, pth);
(*bpp)[-1] = '\n';
}
static struct svc_export *svc_export_update(struct svc_export *new,
struct svc_export *old);
static struct svc_export *svc_export_lookup(struct svc_export *);
static int check_export(struct path *path, int *flags, unsigned char *uuid)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry);
/*
* We currently export only dirs, regular files, and (for v4
* pseudoroot) symlinks.
*/
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) &&
!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) &&
!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -ENOTDIR;
/*
* Mountd should never pass down a writeable V4ROOT export, but,
* just to make sure:
*/
if (*flags & NFSEXP_V4ROOT)
*flags |= NFSEXP_READONLY;
/* There are two requirements on a filesystem to be exportable.
* 1: We must be able to identify the filesystem from a number.
* either a device number (so FS_REQUIRES_DEV needed)
* or an FSID number (so NFSEXP_FSID or ->uuid is needed).
* 2: We must be able to find an inode from a filehandle.
* This means that s_export_op must be set.
* 3: We must not currently be on an idmapped mount.
*/
if (!(inode->i_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV) &&
!(*flags & NFSEXP_FSID) &&
uuid == NULL) {
dprintk("exp_export: export of non-dev fs without fsid\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!inode->i_sb->s_export_op ||
!inode->i_sb->s_export_op->fh_to_dentry) {
dprintk("exp_export: export of invalid fs type.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (mnt_user_ns(path->mnt) != &init_user_ns) {
dprintk("exp_export: export of idmapped mounts not yet supported.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (inode->i_sb->s_export_op->flags & EXPORT_OP_NOSUBTREECHK &&
!(*flags & NFSEXP_NOSUBTREECHECK)) {
dprintk("%s: %s does not support subtree checking!\n",
__func__, inode->i_sb->s_type->name);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4
static int
fsloc_parse(char **mesg, char *buf, struct nfsd4_fs_locations *fsloc)
{
int len;
int migrated, i, err;
/* more than one fsloc */
if (fsloc->locations)
return -EINVAL;
/* listsize */
err = get_uint(mesg, &fsloc->locations_count);
if (err)
return err;
if (fsloc->locations_count > MAX_FS_LOCATIONS)
return -EINVAL;
if (fsloc->locations_count == 0)
return 0;
fsloc->locations = kcalloc(fsloc->locations_count,
sizeof(struct nfsd4_fs_location),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fsloc->locations)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i=0; i < fsloc->locations_count; i++) {
/* colon separated host list */
err = -EINVAL;
len = qword_get(mesg, buf, PAGE_SIZE);
if (len <= 0)
goto out_free_all;
err = -ENOMEM;
fsloc->locations[i].hosts = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fsloc->locations[i].hosts)
goto out_free_all;
err = -EINVAL;
/* slash separated path component list */
len = qword_get(mesg, buf, PAGE_SIZE);
if (len <= 0)
goto out_free_all;
err = -ENOMEM;
fsloc->locations[i].path = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fsloc->locations[i].path)
goto out_free_all;
}
/* migrated */
err = get_int(mesg, &migrated);
if (err)
goto out_free_all;
err = -EINVAL;
if (migrated < 0 || migrated > 1)
goto out_free_all;
fsloc->migrated = migrated;
return 0;
out_free_all:
nfsd4_fslocs_free(fsloc);
return err;
}
static int secinfo_parse(char **mesg, char *buf, struct svc_export *exp)
{
struct exp_flavor_info *f;
u32 listsize;
int err;
/* more than one secinfo */
if (exp->ex_nflavors)
return -EINVAL;
err = get_uint(mesg, &listsize);
if (err)
return err;
if (listsize > MAX_SECINFO_LIST)
return -EINVAL;
for (f = exp->ex_flavors; f < exp->ex_flavors + listsize; f++) {
err = get_uint(mesg, &f->pseudoflavor);
if (err)
return err;
/*
* XXX: It would be nice to also check whether this
* pseudoflavor is supported, so we can discover the
* problem at export time instead of when a client fails
* to authenticate.
*/
err = get_uint(mesg, &f->flags);
if (err)
return err;
/* Only some flags are allowed to differ between flavors: */
if (~NFSEXP_SECINFO_FLAGS & (f->flags ^ exp->ex_flags))
return -EINVAL;
}
exp->ex_nflavors = listsize;
return 0;
}
#else /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4 */
static inline int
fsloc_parse(char **mesg, char *buf, struct nfsd4_fs_locations *fsloc){return 0;}
static inline int
secinfo_parse(char **mesg, char *buf, struct svc_export *exp) { return 0; }
#endif
static inline int
nfsd_uuid_parse(char **mesg, char *buf, unsigned char **puuid)
{
int len;
/* more than one uuid */
if (*puuid)
return -EINVAL;
/* expect a 16 byte uuid encoded as \xXXXX... */
len = qword_get(mesg, buf, PAGE_SIZE);
if (len != EX_UUID_LEN)
return -EINVAL;
*puuid = kmemdup(buf, EX_UUID_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
if (*puuid == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
static int svc_export_parse(struct cache_detail *cd, char *mesg, int mlen)
{
/* client path expiry [flags anonuid anongid fsid] */
char *buf;
int len;
int err;
struct auth_domain *dom = NULL;
struct svc_export exp = {}, *expp;
int an_int;
if (mesg[mlen-1] != '\n')
return -EINVAL;
mesg[mlen-1] = 0;
buf = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
/* client */
err = -EINVAL;
len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, PAGE_SIZE);
if (len <= 0)
goto out;
err = -ENOENT;
dom = auth_domain_find(buf);
if (!dom)
goto out;
/* path */
err = -EINVAL;
if ((len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, PAGE_SIZE)) <= 0)
goto out1;
err = kern_path(buf, 0, &exp.ex_path);
if (err)
goto out1;
exp.ex_client = dom;
exp.cd = cd;
exp.ex_devid_map = NULL;
/* expiry */
err = -EINVAL;
exp.h.expiry_time = get_expiry(&mesg);
if (exp.h.expiry_time == 0)
goto out3;
/* flags */
err = get_int(&mesg, &an_int);
if (err == -ENOENT) {
err = 0;
set_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &exp.h.flags);
} else {
if (err || an_int < 0)
goto out3;
exp.ex_flags= an_int;
/* anon uid */
err = get_int(&mesg, &an_int);
if (err)
goto out3;
exp.ex_anon_uid= make_kuid(current_user_ns(), an_int);
/* anon gid */
err = get_int(&mesg, &an_int);
if (err)
goto out3;
exp.ex_anon_gid= make_kgid(current_user_ns(), an_int);
/* fsid */
err = get_int(&mesg, &an_int);
if (err)
goto out3;
exp.ex_fsid = an_int;
while ((len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, PAGE_SIZE)) > 0) {
if (strcmp(buf, "fsloc") == 0)
err = fsloc_parse(&mesg, buf, &exp.ex_fslocs);
else if (strcmp(buf, "uuid") == 0)
err = nfsd_uuid_parse(&mesg, buf, &exp.ex_uuid);
else if (strcmp(buf, "secinfo") == 0)
err = secinfo_parse(&mesg, buf, &exp);
else
/* quietly ignore unknown words and anything
* following. Newer user-space can try to set
* new values, then see what the result was.
*/
break;
if (err)
goto out4;
}
err = check_export(&exp.ex_path, &exp.ex_flags, exp.ex_uuid);
if (err)
goto out4;
/*
* No point caching this if it would immediately expire.
* Also, this protects exportfs's dummy export from the
* anon_uid/anon_gid checks:
*/
if (exp.h.expiry_time < seconds_since_boot())
goto out4;
/*
* For some reason exportfs has been passing down an
* invalid (-1) uid & gid on the "dummy" export which it
* uses to test export support. To make sure exportfs
* sees errors from check_export we therefore need to
* delay these checks till after check_export:
*/
err = -EINVAL;
if (!uid_valid(exp.ex_anon_uid))
goto out4;
if (!gid_valid(exp.ex_anon_gid))
goto out4;
err = 0;
nfsd4_setup_layout_type(&exp);
}
expp = svc_export_lookup(&exp);
if (!expp) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out4;
}
expp = svc_export_update(&exp, expp);
if (expp) {
trace_nfsd_export_update(expp);
cache_flush();
exp_put(expp);
} else
err = -ENOMEM;
out4:
nfsd4_fslocs_free(&exp.ex_fslocs);
kfree(exp.ex_uuid);
out3:
path_put(&exp.ex_path);
out1:
auth_domain_put(dom);
out:
kfree(buf);
return err;
}
static void exp_flags(struct seq_file *m, int flag, int fsid,
kuid_t anonu, kgid_t anong, struct nfsd4_fs_locations *fslocs);
static void show_secinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct svc_export *exp);
static int is_export_stats_file(struct seq_file *m)
{
/*
* The export_stats file uses the same ops as the exports file.
* We use the file's name to determine the reported info per export.
* There is no rename in nsfdfs, so d_name.name is stable.
*/
return !strcmp(m->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, "export_stats");
}
static int svc_export_show(struct seq_file *m,
struct cache_detail *cd,
struct cache_head *h)
{
struct svc_export *exp;
bool export_stats = is_export_stats_file(m);
if (h == NULL) {
if (export_stats)
seq_puts(m, "#path domain start-time\n#\tstats\n");
else
seq_puts(m, "#path domain(flags)\n");
return 0;
}
exp = container_of(h, struct svc_export, h);
seq_path(m, &exp->ex_path, " \t\n\\");
seq_putc(m, '\t');
seq_escape(m, exp->ex_client->name, " \t\n\\");
if (export_stats) {
seq_printf(m, "\t%lld\n", exp->ex_stats.start_time);
seq_printf(m, "\tfh_stale: %lld\n",
percpu_counter_sum_positive(&exp->ex_stats.counter[EXP_STATS_FH_STALE]));
seq_printf(m, "\tio_read: %lld\n",
percpu_counter_sum_positive(&exp->ex_stats.counter[EXP_STATS_IO_READ]));
seq_printf(m, "\tio_write: %lld\n",
percpu_counter_sum_positive(&exp->ex_stats.counter[EXP_STATS_IO_WRITE]));
seq_putc(m, '\n');
return 0;
}
seq_putc(m, '(');
if (test_bit(CACHE_VALID, &h->flags) &&
!test_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &h->flags)) {
exp_flags(m, exp->ex_flags, exp->ex_fsid,
exp->ex_anon_uid, exp->ex_anon_gid, &exp->ex_fslocs);
if (exp->ex_uuid) {
int i;
seq_puts(m, ",uuid=");
for (i = 0; i < EX_UUID_LEN; i++) {
if ((i&3) == 0 && i)
seq_putc(m, ':');
seq_printf(m, "%02x", exp->ex_uuid[i]);
}
}
show_secinfo(m, exp);
}
seq_puts(m, ")\n");
return 0;
}
static int svc_export_match(struct cache_head *a, struct cache_head *b)
{
struct svc_export *orig = container_of(a, struct svc_export, h);
struct svc_export *new = container_of(b, struct svc_export, h);
return orig->ex_client == new->ex_client &&
path_equal(&orig->ex_path, &new->ex_path);
}
static void svc_export_init(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *citem)
{
struct svc_export *new = container_of(cnew, struct svc_export, h);
struct svc_export *item = container_of(citem, struct svc_export, h);
kref_get(&item->ex_client->ref);
new->ex_client = item->ex_client;
new->ex_path = item->ex_path;
path_get(&item->ex_path);
new->ex_fslocs.locations = NULL;
new->ex_fslocs.locations_count = 0;
new->ex_fslocs.migrated = 0;
new->ex_layout_types = 0;
new->ex_uuid = NULL;
new->cd = item->cd;
export_stats_reset(&new->ex_stats);
}
static void export_update(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *citem)
{
struct svc_export *new = container_of(cnew, struct svc_export, h);
struct svc_export *item = container_of(citem, struct svc_export, h);
int i;
new->ex_flags = item->ex_flags;
new->ex_anon_uid = item->ex_anon_uid;
new->ex_anon_gid = item->ex_anon_gid;
new->ex_fsid = item->ex_fsid;
new->ex_devid_map = item->ex_devid_map;
item->ex_devid_map = NULL;
new->ex_uuid = item->ex_uuid;
item->ex_uuid = NULL;
new->ex_fslocs.locations = item->ex_fslocs.locations;
item->ex_fslocs.locations = NULL;
new->ex_fslocs.locations_count = item->ex_fslocs.locations_count;
item->ex_fslocs.locations_count = 0;
new->ex_fslocs.migrated = item->ex_fslocs.migrated;
item->ex_fslocs.migrated = 0;
new->ex_layout_types = item->ex_layout_types;
new->ex_nflavors = item->ex_nflavors;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_SECINFO_LIST; i++) {
new->ex_flavors[i] = item->ex_flavors[i];
}
}
static struct cache_head *svc_export_alloc(void)
{
struct svc_export *i = kmalloc(sizeof(*i), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!i)
return NULL;
if (export_stats_init(&i->ex_stats)) {
kfree(i);
return NULL;
}
return &i->h;
}
static const struct cache_detail svc_export_cache_template = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.hash_size = EXPORT_HASHMAX,
.name = "nfsd.export",
.cache_put = svc_export_put,
.cache_upcall = svc_export_upcall,
.cache_request = svc_export_request,
.cache_parse = svc_export_parse,
.cache_show = svc_export_show,
.match = svc_export_match,
.init = svc_export_init,
.update = export_update,
.alloc = svc_export_alloc,
};
static int
svc_export_hash(struct svc_export *exp)
{
int hash;
hash = hash_ptr(exp->ex_client, EXPORT_HASHBITS);
hash ^= hash_ptr(exp->ex_path.dentry, EXPORT_HASHBITS);
hash ^= hash_ptr(exp->ex_path.mnt, EXPORT_HASHBITS);
return hash;
}
static struct svc_export *
svc_export_lookup(struct svc_export *exp)
{
struct cache_head *ch;
int hash = svc_export_hash(exp);
ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup_rcu(exp->cd, &exp->h, hash);
if (ch)
return container_of(ch, struct svc_export, h);
else
return NULL;
}
static struct svc_export *
svc_export_update(struct svc_export *new, struct svc_export *old)
{
struct cache_head *ch;
int hash = svc_export_hash(old);
ch = sunrpc_cache_update(old->cd, &new->h, &old->h, hash);
if (ch)
return container_of(ch, struct svc_export, h);
else
return NULL;
}
static struct svc_expkey *
exp_find_key(struct cache_detail *cd, struct auth_domain *clp, int fsid_type,
u32 *fsidv, struct cache_req *reqp)
{
struct svc_expkey key, *ek;
int err;
if (!clp)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
key.ek_client = clp;
key.ek_fsidtype = fsid_type;
memcpy(key.ek_fsid, fsidv, key_len(fsid_type));
ek = svc_expkey_lookup(cd, &key);
if (ek == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
err = cache_check(cd, &ek->h, reqp);
if (err) {
trace_nfsd_exp_find_key(&key, err);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
return ek;
}
static struct svc_export *
exp_get_by_name(struct cache_detail *cd, struct auth_domain *clp,
const struct path *path, struct cache_req *reqp)
{
struct svc_export *exp, key;
int err;
if (!clp)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
key.ex_client = clp;
key.ex_path = *path;
key.cd = cd;
exp = svc_export_lookup(&key);
if (exp == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
err = cache_check(cd, &exp->h, reqp);
if (err) {
trace_nfsd_exp_get_by_name(&key, err);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
return exp;
}
/*
* Find the export entry for a given dentry.
*/
static struct svc_export *
exp_parent(struct cache_detail *cd, struct auth_domain *clp, struct path *path)
{
struct dentry *saved = dget(path->dentry);
struct svc_export *exp = exp_get_by_name(cd, clp, path, NULL);
while (PTR_ERR(exp) == -ENOENT && !IS_ROOT(path->dentry)) {
struct dentry *parent = dget_parent(path->dentry);
dput(path->dentry);
path->dentry = parent;
exp = exp_get_by_name(cd, clp, path, NULL);
}
dput(path->dentry);
path->dentry = saved;
return exp;
}
/*
* Obtain the root fh on behalf of a client.
* This could be done in user space, but I feel that it adds some safety
* since its harder to fool a kernel module than a user space program.
*/
int
exp_rootfh(struct net *net, struct auth_domain *clp, char *name,
struct knfsd_fh *f, int maxsize)
{
struct svc_export *exp;
struct path path;
struct inode *inode;
struct svc_fh fh;
int err;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
struct cache_detail *cd = nn->svc_export_cache;
err = -EPERM;
/* NB: we probably ought to check that it's NUL-terminated */
if (kern_path(name, 0, &path)) {
printk("nfsd: exp_rootfh path not found %s", name);
return err;
}
inode = d_inode(path.dentry);
dprintk("nfsd: exp_rootfh(%s [%p] %s:%s/%ld)\n",
name, path.dentry, clp->name,
inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
exp = exp_parent(cd, clp, &path);
if (IS_ERR(exp)) {
err = PTR_ERR(exp);
goto out;
}
/*
* fh must be initialized before calling fh_compose
*/
fh_init(&fh, maxsize);
if (fh_compose(&fh, exp, path.dentry, NULL))
err = -EINVAL;
else
err = 0;
memcpy(f, &fh.fh_handle, sizeof(struct knfsd_fh));
fh_put(&fh);
exp_put(exp);
out:
path_put(&path);
return err;
}
static struct svc_export *exp_find(struct cache_detail *cd,
struct auth_domain *clp, int fsid_type,
u32 *fsidv, struct cache_req *reqp)
{
struct svc_export *exp;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(cd->net, nfsd_net_id);
struct svc_expkey *ek = exp_find_key(nn->svc_expkey_cache, clp, fsid_type, fsidv, reqp);
if (IS_ERR(ek))
return ERR_CAST(ek);
exp = exp_get_by_name(cd, clp, &ek->ek_path, reqp);
cache_put(&ek->h, nn->svc_expkey_cache);
if (IS_ERR(exp))
return ERR_CAST(exp);
return exp;
}
__be32 check_nfsd_access(struct svc_export *exp, struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
struct exp_flavor_info *f;
struct exp_flavor_info *end = exp->ex_flavors + exp->ex_nflavors;
/* legacy gss-only clients are always OK: */
if (exp->ex_client == rqstp->rq_gssclient)
return 0;
/* ip-address based client; check sec= export option: */
for (f = exp->ex_flavors; f < end; f++) {
if (f->pseudoflavor == rqstp->rq_cred.cr_flavor)
return 0;
}
/* defaults in absence of sec= options: */
if (exp->ex_nflavors == 0) {
if (rqstp->rq_cred.cr_flavor == RPC_AUTH_NULL ||
rqstp->rq_cred.cr_flavor == RPC_AUTH_UNIX)
return 0;
}
/* If the compound op contains a spo_must_allowed op,
* it will be sent with integrity/protection which
* will have to be expressly allowed on mounts that
* don't support it
*/
if (nfsd4_spo_must_allow(rqstp))
return 0;
return rqstp->rq_vers < 4 ? nfserr_acces : nfserr_wrongsec;
}
/*
* Uses rq_client and rq_gssclient to find an export; uses rq_client (an
* auth_unix client) if it's available and has secinfo information;
* otherwise, will try to use rq_gssclient.
*
* Called from functions that handle requests; functions that do work on
* behalf of mountd are passed a single client name to use, and should
* use exp_get_by_name() or exp_find().
*/
struct svc_export *
rqst_exp_get_by_name(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct path *path)
{
struct svc_export *gssexp, *exp = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), nfsd_net_id);
struct cache_detail *cd = nn->svc_export_cache;
if (rqstp->rq_client == NULL)
goto gss;
/* First try the auth_unix client: */
exp = exp_get_by_name(cd, rqstp->rq_client, path, &rqstp->rq_chandle);
if (PTR_ERR(exp) == -ENOENT)
goto gss;
if (IS_ERR(exp))
return exp;
/* If it has secinfo, assume there are no gss/... clients */
if (exp->ex_nflavors > 0)
return exp;
gss:
/* Otherwise, try falling back on gss client */
if (rqstp->rq_gssclient == NULL)
return exp;
gssexp = exp_get_by_name(cd, rqstp->rq_gssclient, path, &rqstp->rq_chandle);
if (PTR_ERR(gssexp) == -ENOENT)
return exp;
if (!IS_ERR(exp))
exp_put(exp);
return gssexp;
}
struct svc_export *
rqst_exp_find(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, int fsid_type, u32 *fsidv)
{
struct svc_export *gssexp, *exp = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), nfsd_net_id);
struct cache_detail *cd = nn->svc_export_cache;
if (rqstp->rq_client == NULL)
goto gss;
/* First try the auth_unix client: */
exp = exp_find(cd, rqstp->rq_client, fsid_type,
fsidv, &rqstp->rq_chandle);
if (PTR_ERR(exp) == -ENOENT)
goto gss;
if (IS_ERR(exp))
return exp;
/* If it has secinfo, assume there are no gss/... clients */
if (exp->ex_nflavors > 0)
return exp;
gss:
/* Otherwise, try falling back on gss client */
if (rqstp->rq_gssclient == NULL)
return exp;
gssexp = exp_find(cd, rqstp->rq_gssclient, fsid_type, fsidv,
&rqstp->rq_chandle);
if (PTR_ERR(gssexp) == -ENOENT)
return exp;
if (!IS_ERR(exp))
exp_put(exp);
return gssexp;
}
struct svc_export *
rqst_exp_parent(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct path *path)
{
struct dentry *saved = dget(path->dentry);
struct svc_export *exp = rqst_exp_get_by_name(rqstp, path);
while (PTR_ERR(exp) == -ENOENT && !IS_ROOT(path->dentry)) {
struct dentry *parent = dget_parent(path->dentry);
dput(path->dentry);
path->dentry = parent;
exp = rqst_exp_get_by_name(rqstp, path);
}
dput(path->dentry);
path->dentry = saved;
return exp;
}
struct svc_export *rqst_find_fsidzero_export(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
u32 fsidv[2];
mk_fsid(FSID_NUM, fsidv, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
return rqst_exp_find(rqstp, FSID_NUM, fsidv);
}
/*
* Called when we need the filehandle for the root of the pseudofs,
* for a given NFSv4 client. The root is defined to be the
* export point with fsid==0
*/
__be32
exp_pseudoroot(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp)
{
struct svc_export *exp;
__be32 rv;
exp = rqst_find_fsidzero_export(rqstp);
if (IS_ERR(exp))
return nfserrno(PTR_ERR(exp));
rv = fh_compose(fhp, exp, exp->ex_path.dentry, NULL);
exp_put(exp);
return rv;
}
static struct flags {
int flag;
char *name[2];
} expflags[] = {
{ NFSEXP_READONLY, {"ro", "rw"}},
{ NFSEXP_INSECURE_PORT, {"insecure", ""}},
{ NFSEXP_ROOTSQUASH, {"root_squash", "no_root_squash"}},
{ NFSEXP_ALLSQUASH, {"all_squash", ""}},
{ NFSEXP_ASYNC, {"async", "sync"}},
{ NFSEXP_GATHERED_WRITES, {"wdelay", "no_wdelay"}},
{ NFSEXP_NOREADDIRPLUS, {"nordirplus", ""}},
{ NFSEXP_NOHIDE, {"nohide", ""}},
{ NFSEXP_CROSSMOUNT, {"crossmnt", ""}},
{ NFSEXP_NOSUBTREECHECK, {"no_subtree_check", ""}},
{ NFSEXP_NOAUTHNLM, {"insecure_locks", ""}},
{ NFSEXP_V4ROOT, {"v4root", ""}},
{ NFSEXP_PNFS, {"pnfs", ""}},
{ NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL, {"security_label", ""}},
{ 0, {"", ""}}
};
static void show_expflags(struct seq_file *m, int flags, int mask)
{
struct flags *flg;
int state, first = 0;
for (flg = expflags; flg->flag; flg++) {
if (flg->flag & ~mask)
continue;
state = (flg->flag & flags) ? 0 : 1;
if (*flg->name[state])
seq_printf(m, "%s%s", first++?",":"", flg->name[state]);
}
}
static void show_secinfo_flags(struct seq_file *m, int flags)
{
seq_printf(m, ",");
show_expflags(m, flags, NFSEXP_SECINFO_FLAGS);
}
static bool secinfo_flags_equal(int f, int g)
{
f &= NFSEXP_SECINFO_FLAGS;
g &= NFSEXP_SECINFO_FLAGS;
return f == g;
}
static int show_secinfo_run(struct seq_file *m, struct exp_flavor_info **fp, struct exp_flavor_info *end)
{
int flags;
flags = (*fp)->flags;
seq_printf(m, ",sec=%d", (*fp)->pseudoflavor);
(*fp)++;
while (*fp != end && secinfo_flags_equal(flags, (*fp)->flags)) {
seq_printf(m, ":%d", (*fp)->pseudoflavor);
(*fp)++;
}
return flags;
}
static void show_secinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct svc_export *exp)
{
struct exp_flavor_info *f;
struct exp_flavor_info *end = exp->ex_flavors + exp->ex_nflavors;
int flags;
if (exp->ex_nflavors == 0)
return;
f = exp->ex_flavors;
flags = show_secinfo_run(m, &f, end);
if (!secinfo_flags_equal(flags, exp->ex_flags))
show_secinfo_flags(m, flags);
while (f != end) {
flags = show_secinfo_run(m, &f, end);
show_secinfo_flags(m, flags);
}
}
static void exp_flags(struct seq_file *m, int flag, int fsid,
kuid_t anonu, kgid_t anong, struct nfsd4_fs_locations *fsloc)
{
struct user_namespace *userns = m->file->f_cred->user_ns;
show_expflags(m, flag, NFSEXP_ALLFLAGS);
if (flag & NFSEXP_FSID)
seq_printf(m, ",fsid=%d", fsid);
if (!uid_eq(anonu, make_kuid(userns, (uid_t)-2)) &&
!uid_eq(anonu, make_kuid(userns, 0x10000-2)))
seq_printf(m, ",anonuid=%u", from_kuid_munged(userns, anonu));
if (!gid_eq(anong, make_kgid(userns, (gid_t)-2)) &&
!gid_eq(anong, make_kgid(userns, 0x10000-2)))
seq_printf(m, ",anongid=%u", from_kgid_munged(userns, anong));
if (fsloc && fsloc->locations_count > 0) {
char *loctype = (fsloc->migrated) ? "refer" : "replicas";
int i;
seq_printf(m, ",%s=", loctype);
seq_escape(m, fsloc->locations[0].path, ",;@ \t\n\\");
seq_putc(m, '@');
seq_escape(m, fsloc->locations[0].hosts, ",;@ \t\n\\");
for (i = 1; i < fsloc->locations_count; i++) {
seq_putc(m, ';');
seq_escape(m, fsloc->locations[i].path, ",;@ \t\n\\");
seq_putc(m, '@');
seq_escape(m, fsloc->locations[i].hosts, ",;@ \t\n\\");
}
}
}
static int e_show(struct seq_file *m, void *p)
{
struct cache_head *cp = p;
struct svc_export *exp = container_of(cp, struct svc_export, h);
struct cache_detail *cd = m->private;
bool export_stats = is_export_stats_file(m);
if (p == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
seq_puts(m, "# Version 1.1\n");
if (export_stats)
seq_puts(m, "# Path Client Start-time\n#\tStats\n");
else
seq_puts(m, "# Path Client(Flags) # IPs\n");
return 0;
}
exp_get(exp);
if (cache_check(cd, &exp->h, NULL))
return 0;
exp_put(exp);
return svc_export_show(m, cd, cp);
}
const struct seq_operations nfs_exports_op = {
.start = cache_seq_start_rcu,
.next = cache_seq_next_rcu,
.stop = cache_seq_stop_rcu,
.show = e_show,
};
/*
* Initialize the exports module.
*/
int
nfsd_export_init(struct net *net)
{
int rv;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
dprintk("nfsd: initializing export module (net: %x).\n", net->ns.inum);
nn->svc_export_cache = cache_create_net(&svc_export_cache_template, net);
if (IS_ERR(nn->svc_export_cache))
return PTR_ERR(nn->svc_export_cache);
rv = cache_register_net(nn->svc_export_cache, net);
if (rv)
goto destroy_export_cache;
nn->svc_expkey_cache = cache_create_net(&svc_expkey_cache_template, net);
if (IS_ERR(nn->svc_expkey_cache)) {
rv = PTR_ERR(nn->svc_expkey_cache);
goto unregister_export_cache;
}
rv = cache_register_net(nn->svc_expkey_cache, net);
if (rv)
goto destroy_expkey_cache;
return 0;
destroy_expkey_cache:
cache_destroy_net(nn->svc_expkey_cache, net);
unregister_export_cache:
cache_unregister_net(nn->svc_export_cache, net);
destroy_export_cache:
cache_destroy_net(nn->svc_export_cache, net);
return rv;
}
/*
* Flush exports table - called when last nfsd thread is killed
*/
void
nfsd_export_flush(struct net *net)
{
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
cache_purge(nn->svc_expkey_cache);
cache_purge(nn->svc_export_cache);
}
/*
* Shutdown the exports module.
*/
void
nfsd_export_shutdown(struct net *net)
{
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
dprintk("nfsd: shutting down export module (net: %x).\n", net->ns.inum);
cache_unregister_net(nn->svc_expkey_cache, net);
cache_unregister_net(nn->svc_export_cache, net);
cache_destroy_net(nn->svc_expkey_cache, net);
cache_destroy_net(nn->svc_export_cache, net);
svcauth_unix_purge(net);
dprintk("nfsd: export shutdown complete (net: %x).\n", net->ns.inum);
}