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handle inode locking in the read/write paths, and improving the performance of Direct I/O overwrites. We also now record the error code which caused the first and most recent ext4_error() report in the superblock, to make it easier to root cause problems in production systems. There are also many of the usual cleanups and miscellaneous bug fixes. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEzBAABCAAdFiEEK2m5VNv+CHkogTfJ8vlZVpUNgaMFAl4yBf0ACgkQ8vlZVpUN gaOK8Af9EsY1vyR/IvEosfXJoKIqnTXN1SLt94iAOUh6dNeVNcyv1SIzRGFrpmsg uHY02EkcTl68b/AjV7ieDpOnOSmlP7NzynuVoar2hrjKX0MzpEu03Vv1a3dUQKuU zcdchi83EwRjEvegsNK/VF3FFadk3TtC7x+7o6p840V6OAyp5CXhjm1akJqIJwvd A4gTpruTSRIFg6Jj36HEDNRgSAeILed3wC7Ywtxt51tLK7Lp/qB1EuvYodMQRvGz d0fRhbNHKepVYfxwpDUDMFnrqDPZ/SZGF73XBxP2zHd6SXy9dBLzGsRL+oj9tTUg YQJtt4Yxjjg8Q1UrMyMRzQpi4S8dAQ== =pVeR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'ext4_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4 Pull ext4 updates from Ted Ts'o: "This merge window, we've added some performance improvements in how we handle inode locking in the read/write paths, and improving the performance of Direct I/O overwrites. We also now record the error code which caused the first and most recent ext4_error() report in the superblock, to make it easier to root cause problems in production systems. There are also many of the usual cleanups and miscellaneous bug fixes" * tag 'ext4_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4: (49 commits) jbd2: clean __jbd2_journal_abort_hard() and __journal_abort_soft() jbd2: make sure ESHUTDOWN to be recorded in the journal superblock ext4, jbd2: ensure panic when aborting with zero errno jbd2: switch to use jbd2_journal_abort() when failed to submit the commit record jbd2_seq_info_next should increase position index jbd2: remove pointless assertion in __journal_remove_journal_head ext4,jbd2: fix comment and code style jbd2: delete the duplicated words in the comments ext4: fix extent_status trace points ext4: fix symbolic enum printing in trace output ext4: choose hardlimit when softlimit is larger than hardlimit in ext4_statfs_project() ext4: fix race conditions in ->d_compare() and ->d_hash() ext4: make dioread_nolock the default ext4: fix extent_status fragmentation for plain files jbd2: clear JBD2_ABORT flag before journal_reset to update log tail info when load journal ext4: drop ext4_kvmalloc() ext4: Add EXT4_IOC_FSGETXATTR/EXT4_IOC_FSSETXATTR to compat_ioctl ext4: remove unused macro MPAGE_DA_EXTENT_TAIL ext4: add missing braces in ext4_ext_drop_refs() ext4: fix some nonstandard indentation in extents.c ...
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=====================================
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Filesystem-level encryption (fscrypt)
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=====================================
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Introduction
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============
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fscrypt is a library which filesystems can hook into to support
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transparent encryption of files and directories.
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Note: "fscrypt" in this document refers to the kernel-level portion,
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implemented in ``fs/crypto/``, as opposed to the userspace tool
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`fscrypt <https://github.com/google/fscrypt>`_. This document only
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covers the kernel-level portion. For command-line examples of how to
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use encryption, see the documentation for the userspace tool `fscrypt
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<https://github.com/google/fscrypt>`_. Also, it is recommended to use
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the fscrypt userspace tool, or other existing userspace tools such as
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`fscryptctl <https://github.com/google/fscryptctl>`_ or `Android's key
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management system
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<https://source.android.com/security/encryption/file-based>`_, over
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using the kernel's API directly. Using existing tools reduces the
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chance of introducing your own security bugs. (Nevertheless, for
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completeness this documentation covers the kernel's API anyway.)
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Unlike dm-crypt, fscrypt operates at the filesystem level rather than
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at the block device level. This allows it to encrypt different files
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with different keys and to have unencrypted files on the same
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filesystem. This is useful for multi-user systems where each user's
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data-at-rest needs to be cryptographically isolated from the others.
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However, except for filenames, fscrypt does not encrypt filesystem
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metadata.
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Unlike eCryptfs, which is a stacked filesystem, fscrypt is integrated
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directly into supported filesystems --- currently ext4, F2FS, and
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UBIFS. This allows encrypted files to be read and written without
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caching both the decrypted and encrypted pages in the pagecache,
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thereby nearly halving the memory used and bringing it in line with
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unencrypted files. Similarly, half as many dentries and inodes are
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needed. eCryptfs also limits encrypted filenames to 143 bytes,
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causing application compatibility issues; fscrypt allows the full 255
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bytes (NAME_MAX). Finally, unlike eCryptfs, the fscrypt API can be
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used by unprivileged users, with no need to mount anything.
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fscrypt does not support encrypting files in-place. Instead, it
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supports marking an empty directory as encrypted. Then, after
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userspace provides the key, all regular files, directories, and
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symbolic links created in that directory tree are transparently
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encrypted.
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Threat model
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============
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Offline attacks
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---------------
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Provided that userspace chooses a strong encryption key, fscrypt
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protects the confidentiality of file contents and filenames in the
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event of a single point-in-time permanent offline compromise of the
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block device content. fscrypt does not protect the confidentiality of
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non-filename metadata, e.g. file sizes, file permissions, file
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timestamps, and extended attributes. Also, the existence and location
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of holes (unallocated blocks which logically contain all zeroes) in
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files is not protected.
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fscrypt is not guaranteed to protect confidentiality or authenticity
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if an attacker is able to manipulate the filesystem offline prior to
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an authorized user later accessing the filesystem.
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Online attacks
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--------------
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fscrypt (and storage encryption in general) can only provide limited
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protection, if any at all, against online attacks. In detail:
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Side-channel attacks
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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fscrypt is only resistant to side-channel attacks, such as timing or
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electromagnetic attacks, to the extent that the underlying Linux
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Cryptographic API algorithms are. If a vulnerable algorithm is used,
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such as a table-based implementation of AES, it may be possible for an
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attacker to mount a side channel attack against the online system.
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Side channel attacks may also be mounted against applications
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consuming decrypted data.
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Unauthorized file access
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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After an encryption key has been added, fscrypt does not hide the
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plaintext file contents or filenames from other users on the same
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system. Instead, existing access control mechanisms such as file mode
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bits, POSIX ACLs, LSMs, or namespaces should be used for this purpose.
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(For the reasoning behind this, understand that while the key is
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added, the confidentiality of the data, from the perspective of the
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system itself, is *not* protected by the mathematical properties of
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encryption but rather only by the correctness of the kernel.
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Therefore, any encryption-specific access control checks would merely
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be enforced by kernel *code* and therefore would be largely redundant
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with the wide variety of access control mechanisms already available.)
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Kernel memory compromise
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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An attacker who compromises the system enough to read from arbitrary
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memory, e.g. by mounting a physical attack or by exploiting a kernel
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security vulnerability, can compromise all encryption keys that are
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currently in use.
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However, fscrypt allows encryption keys to be removed from the kernel,
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which may protect them from later compromise.
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In more detail, the FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl (or the
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FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS ioctl) can wipe a master
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encryption key from kernel memory. If it does so, it will also try to
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evict all cached inodes which had been "unlocked" using the key,
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thereby wiping their per-file keys and making them once again appear
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"locked", i.e. in ciphertext or encrypted form.
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However, these ioctls have some limitations:
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- Per-file keys for in-use files will *not* be removed or wiped.
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Therefore, for maximum effect, userspace should close the relevant
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encrypted files and directories before removing a master key, as
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well as kill any processes whose working directory is in an affected
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encrypted directory.
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- The kernel cannot magically wipe copies of the master key(s) that
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userspace might have as well. Therefore, userspace must wipe all
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copies of the master key(s) it makes as well; normally this should
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be done immediately after FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, without waiting
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for FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. Naturally, the same also applies
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to all higher levels in the key hierarchy. Userspace should also
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follow other security precautions such as mlock()ing memory
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containing keys to prevent it from being swapped out.
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- In general, decrypted contents and filenames in the kernel VFS
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caches are freed but not wiped. Therefore, portions thereof may be
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recoverable from freed memory, even after the corresponding key(s)
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were wiped. To partially solve this, you can set
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CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y in your kernel config and add page_poison=1
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to your kernel command line. However, this has a performance cost.
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- Secret keys might still exist in CPU registers, in crypto
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accelerator hardware (if used by the crypto API to implement any of
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the algorithms), or in other places not explicitly considered here.
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Limitations of v1 policies
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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v1 encryption policies have some weaknesses with respect to online
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attacks:
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- There is no verification that the provided master key is correct.
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Therefore, a malicious user can temporarily associate the wrong key
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with another user's encrypted files to which they have read-only
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access. Because of filesystem caching, the wrong key will then be
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used by the other user's accesses to those files, even if the other
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user has the correct key in their own keyring. This violates the
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meaning of "read-only access".
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- A compromise of a per-file key also compromises the master key from
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which it was derived.
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- Non-root users cannot securely remove encryption keys.
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All the above problems are fixed with v2 encryption policies. For
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this reason among others, it is recommended to use v2 encryption
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policies on all new encrypted directories.
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Key hierarchy
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=============
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Master Keys
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-----------
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Each encrypted directory tree is protected by a *master key*. Master
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keys can be up to 64 bytes long, and must be at least as long as the
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greater of the key length needed by the contents and filenames
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encryption modes being used. For example, if AES-256-XTS is used for
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contents encryption, the master key must be 64 bytes (512 bits). Note
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that the XTS mode is defined to require a key twice as long as that
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required by the underlying block cipher.
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To "unlock" an encrypted directory tree, userspace must provide the
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appropriate master key. There can be any number of master keys, each
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of which protects any number of directory trees on any number of
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filesystems.
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Master keys must be real cryptographic keys, i.e. indistinguishable
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from random bytestrings of the same length. This implies that users
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**must not** directly use a password as a master key, zero-pad a
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shorter key, or repeat a shorter key. Security cannot be guaranteed
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if userspace makes any such error, as the cryptographic proofs and
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analysis would no longer apply.
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Instead, users should generate master keys either using a
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cryptographically secure random number generator, or by using a KDF
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(Key Derivation Function). The kernel does not do any key stretching;
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therefore, if userspace derives the key from a low-entropy secret such
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as a passphrase, it is critical that a KDF designed for this purpose
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be used, such as scrypt, PBKDF2, or Argon2.
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Key derivation function
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-----------------------
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With one exception, fscrypt never uses the master key(s) for
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encryption directly. Instead, they are only used as input to a KDF
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(Key Derivation Function) to derive the actual keys.
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The KDF used for a particular master key differs depending on whether
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the key is used for v1 encryption policies or for v2 encryption
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policies. Users **must not** use the same key for both v1 and v2
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encryption policies. (No real-world attack is currently known on this
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specific case of key reuse, but its security cannot be guaranteed
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since the cryptographic proofs and analysis would no longer apply.)
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For v1 encryption policies, the KDF only supports deriving per-file
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encryption keys. It works by encrypting the master key with
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AES-128-ECB, using the file's 16-byte nonce as the AES key. The
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resulting ciphertext is used as the derived key. If the ciphertext is
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longer than needed, then it is truncated to the needed length.
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For v2 encryption policies, the KDF is HKDF-SHA512. The master key is
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passed as the "input keying material", no salt is used, and a distinct
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"application-specific information string" is used for each distinct
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key to be derived. For example, when a per-file encryption key is
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derived, the application-specific information string is the file's
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nonce prefixed with "fscrypt\\0" and a context byte. Different
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context bytes are used for other types of derived keys.
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HKDF-SHA512 is preferred to the original AES-128-ECB based KDF because
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HKDF is more flexible, is nonreversible, and evenly distributes
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entropy from the master key. HKDF is also standardized and widely
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used by other software, whereas the AES-128-ECB based KDF is ad-hoc.
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Per-file encryption keys
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------------------------
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Since each master key can protect many files, it is necessary to
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"tweak" the encryption of each file so that the same plaintext in two
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files doesn't map to the same ciphertext, or vice versa. In most
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cases, fscrypt does this by deriving per-file keys. When a new
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encrypted inode (regular file, directory, or symlink) is created,
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fscrypt randomly generates a 16-byte nonce and stores it in the
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inode's encryption xattr. Then, it uses a KDF (as described in `Key
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derivation function`_) to derive the file's key from the master key
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and nonce.
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Key derivation was chosen over key wrapping because wrapped keys would
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require larger xattrs which would be less likely to fit in-line in the
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filesystem's inode table, and there didn't appear to be any
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significant advantages to key wrapping. In particular, currently
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there is no requirement to support unlocking a file with multiple
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alternative master keys or to support rotating master keys. Instead,
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the master keys may be wrapped in userspace, e.g. as is done by the
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`fscrypt <https://github.com/google/fscrypt>`_ tool.
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DIRECT_KEY policies
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-------------------
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The Adiantum encryption mode (see `Encryption modes and usage`_) is
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suitable for both contents and filenames encryption, and it accepts
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long IVs --- long enough to hold both an 8-byte logical block number
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and a 16-byte per-file nonce. Also, the overhead of each Adiantum key
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is greater than that of an AES-256-XTS key.
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Therefore, to improve performance and save memory, for Adiantum a
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"direct key" configuration is supported. When the user has enabled
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this by setting FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY in the fscrypt policy,
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per-file encryption keys are not used. Instead, whenever any data
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(contents or filenames) is encrypted, the file's 16-byte nonce is
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included in the IV. Moreover:
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- For v1 encryption policies, the encryption is done directly with the
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master key. Because of this, users **must not** use the same master
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key for any other purpose, even for other v1 policies.
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- For v2 encryption policies, the encryption is done with a per-mode
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key derived using the KDF. Users may use the same master key for
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other v2 encryption policies.
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IV_INO_LBLK_64 policies
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-----------------------
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When FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64 is set in the fscrypt policy,
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the encryption keys are derived from the master key, encryption mode
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number, and filesystem UUID. This normally results in all files
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protected by the same master key sharing a single contents encryption
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key and a single filenames encryption key. To still encrypt different
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files' data differently, inode numbers are included in the IVs.
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Consequently, shrinking the filesystem may not be allowed.
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This format is optimized for use with inline encryption hardware
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compliant with the UFS or eMMC standards, which support only 64 IV
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bits per I/O request and may have only a small number of keyslots.
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Key identifiers
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---------------
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For master keys used for v2 encryption policies, a unique 16-byte "key
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identifier" is also derived using the KDF. This value is stored in
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the clear, since it is needed to reliably identify the key itself.
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Dirhash keys
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------------
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For directories that are indexed using a secret-keyed dirhash over the
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plaintext filenames, the KDF is also used to derive a 128-bit
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SipHash-2-4 key per directory in order to hash filenames. This works
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just like deriving a per-file encryption key, except that a different
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KDF context is used. Currently, only casefolded ("case-insensitive")
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encrypted directories use this style of hashing.
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Encryption modes and usage
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==========================
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fscrypt allows one encryption mode to be specified for file contents
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and one encryption mode to be specified for filenames. Different
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directory trees are permitted to use different encryption modes.
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Currently, the following pairs of encryption modes are supported:
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- AES-256-XTS for contents and AES-256-CTS-CBC for filenames
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- AES-128-CBC for contents and AES-128-CTS-CBC for filenames
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- Adiantum for both contents and filenames
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If unsure, you should use the (AES-256-XTS, AES-256-CTS-CBC) pair.
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AES-128-CBC was added only for low-powered embedded devices with
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crypto accelerators such as CAAM or CESA that do not support XTS. To
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use AES-128-CBC, CONFIG_CRYPTO_ESSIV and CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256 (or
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another SHA-256 implementation) must be enabled so that ESSIV can be
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used.
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Adiantum is a (primarily) stream cipher-based mode that is fast even
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on CPUs without dedicated crypto instructions. It's also a true
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wide-block mode, unlike XTS. It can also eliminate the need to derive
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per-file encryption keys. However, it depends on the security of two
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primitives, XChaCha12 and AES-256, rather than just one. See the
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paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level
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processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details.
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To use Adiantum, CONFIG_CRYPTO_ADIANTUM must be enabled. Also, fast
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implementations of ChaCha and NHPoly1305 should be enabled, e.g.
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CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON and CONFIG_CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_NEON for ARM.
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New encryption modes can be added relatively easily, without changes
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to individual filesystems. However, authenticated encryption (AE)
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modes are not currently supported because of the difficulty of dealing
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with ciphertext expansion.
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Contents encryption
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-------------------
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For file contents, each filesystem block is encrypted independently.
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Starting from Linux kernel 5.5, encryption of filesystems with block
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size less than system's page size is supported.
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Each block's IV is set to the logical block number within the file as
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a little endian number, except that:
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- With CBC mode encryption, ESSIV is also used. Specifically, each IV
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is encrypted with AES-256 where the AES-256 key is the SHA-256 hash
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of the file's data encryption key.
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- With `DIRECT_KEY policies`_, the file's nonce is appended to the IV.
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Currently this is only allowed with the Adiantum encryption mode.
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- With `IV_INO_LBLK_64 policies`_, the logical block number is limited
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to 32 bits and is placed in bits 0-31 of the IV. The inode number
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(which is also limited to 32 bits) is placed in bits 32-63.
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Note that because file logical block numbers are included in the IVs,
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filesystems must enforce that blocks are never shifted around within
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encrypted files, e.g. via "collapse range" or "insert range".
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|
Filenames encryption
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--------------------
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For filenames, each full filename is encrypted at once. Because of
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the requirements to retain support for efficient directory lookups and
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filenames of up to 255 bytes, the same IV is used for every filename
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in a directory.
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However, each encrypted directory still uses a unique key, or
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alternatively has the file's nonce (for `DIRECT_KEY policies`_) or
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inode number (for `IV_INO_LBLK_64 policies`_) included in the IVs.
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Thus, IV reuse is limited to within a single directory.
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With CTS-CBC, the IV reuse means that when the plaintext filenames
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share a common prefix at least as long as the cipher block size (16
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bytes for AES), the corresponding encrypted filenames will also share
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a common prefix. This is undesirable. Adiantum does not have this
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weakness, as it is a wide-block encryption mode.
|
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All supported filenames encryption modes accept any plaintext length
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>= 16 bytes; cipher block alignment is not required. However,
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filenames shorter than 16 bytes are NUL-padded to 16 bytes before
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being encrypted. In addition, to reduce leakage of filename lengths
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via their ciphertexts, all filenames are NUL-padded to the next 4, 8,
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16, or 32-byte boundary (configurable). 32 is recommended since this
|
|
provides the best confidentiality, at the cost of making directory
|
|
entries consume slightly more space. Note that since NUL (``\0``) is
|
|
not otherwise a valid character in filenames, the padding will never
|
|
produce duplicate plaintexts.
|
|
|
|
Symbolic link targets are considered a type of filename and are
|
|
encrypted in the same way as filenames in directory entries, except
|
|
that IV reuse is not a problem as each symlink has its own inode.
|
|
|
|
User API
|
|
========
|
|
|
|
Setting an encryption policy
|
|
----------------------------
|
|
|
|
FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
|
|
The FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl sets an encryption policy on an
|
|
empty directory or verifies that a directory or regular file already
|
|
has the specified encryption policy. It takes in a pointer to a
|
|
:c:type:`struct fscrypt_policy_v1` or a :c:type:`struct
|
|
fscrypt_policy_v2`, defined as follows::
|
|
|
|
#define FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1 0
|
|
#define FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE 8
|
|
struct fscrypt_policy_v1 {
|
|
__u8 version;
|
|
__u8 contents_encryption_mode;
|
|
__u8 filenames_encryption_mode;
|
|
__u8 flags;
|
|
__u8 master_key_descriptor[FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
|
|
};
|
|
#define fscrypt_policy fscrypt_policy_v1
|
|
|
|
#define FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2 2
|
|
#define FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE 16
|
|
struct fscrypt_policy_v2 {
|
|
__u8 version;
|
|
__u8 contents_encryption_mode;
|
|
__u8 filenames_encryption_mode;
|
|
__u8 flags;
|
|
__u8 __reserved[4];
|
|
__u8 master_key_identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE];
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
This structure must be initialized as follows:
|
|
|
|
- ``version`` must be FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1 (0) if the struct is
|
|
:c:type:`fscrypt_policy_v1` or FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2 (2) if the struct
|
|
is :c:type:`fscrypt_policy_v2`. (Note: we refer to the original
|
|
policy version as "v1", though its version code is really 0.) For
|
|
new encrypted directories, use v2 policies.
|
|
|
|
- ``contents_encryption_mode`` and ``filenames_encryption_mode`` must
|
|
be set to constants from ``<linux/fscrypt.h>`` which identify the
|
|
encryption modes to use. If unsure, use FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS
|
|
(1) for ``contents_encryption_mode`` and FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_CTS
|
|
(4) for ``filenames_encryption_mode``.
|
|
|
|
- ``flags`` contains optional flags from ``<linux/fscrypt.h>``:
|
|
|
|
- FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_*: The amount of NUL padding to use when
|
|
encrypting filenames. If unsure, use FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32
|
|
(0x3).
|
|
- FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY: See `DIRECT_KEY policies`_.
|
|
- FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64: See `IV_INO_LBLK_64
|
|
policies`_. This is mutually exclusive with DIRECT_KEY and is not
|
|
supported on v1 policies.
|
|
|
|
- For v2 encryption policies, ``__reserved`` must be zeroed.
|
|
|
|
- For v1 encryption policies, ``master_key_descriptor`` specifies how
|
|
to find the master key in a keyring; see `Adding keys`_. It is up
|
|
to userspace to choose a unique ``master_key_descriptor`` for each
|
|
master key. The e4crypt and fscrypt tools use the first 8 bytes of
|
|
``SHA-512(SHA-512(master_key))``, but this particular scheme is not
|
|
required. Also, the master key need not be in the keyring yet when
|
|
FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY is executed. However, it must be added
|
|
before any files can be created in the encrypted directory.
|
|
|
|
For v2 encryption policies, ``master_key_descriptor`` has been
|
|
replaced with ``master_key_identifier``, which is longer and cannot
|
|
be arbitrarily chosen. Instead, the key must first be added using
|
|
`FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY`_. Then, the ``key_spec.u.identifier``
|
|
the kernel returned in the :c:type:`struct fscrypt_add_key_arg` must
|
|
be used as the ``master_key_identifier`` in the :c:type:`struct
|
|
fscrypt_policy_v2`.
|
|
|
|
If the file is not yet encrypted, then FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY
|
|
verifies that the file is an empty directory. If so, the specified
|
|
encryption policy is assigned to the directory, turning it into an
|
|
encrypted directory. After that, and after providing the
|
|
corresponding master key as described in `Adding keys`_, all regular
|
|
files, directories (recursively), and symlinks created in the
|
|
directory will be encrypted, inheriting the same encryption policy.
|
|
The filenames in the directory's entries will be encrypted as well.
|
|
|
|
Alternatively, if the file is already encrypted, then
|
|
FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY validates that the specified encryption
|
|
policy exactly matches the actual one. If they match, then the ioctl
|
|
returns 0. Otherwise, it fails with EEXIST. This works on both
|
|
regular files and directories, including nonempty directories.
|
|
|
|
When a v2 encryption policy is assigned to a directory, it is also
|
|
required that either the specified key has been added by the current
|
|
user or that the caller has CAP_FOWNER in the initial user namespace.
|
|
(This is needed to prevent a user from encrypting their data with
|
|
another user's key.) The key must remain added while
|
|
FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY is executing. However, if the new
|
|
encrypted directory does not need to be accessed immediately, then the
|
|
key can be removed right away afterwards.
|
|
|
|
Note that the ext4 filesystem does not allow the root directory to be
|
|
encrypted, even if it is empty. Users who want to encrypt an entire
|
|
filesystem with one key should consider using dm-crypt instead.
|
|
|
|
FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can fail with the following errors:
|
|
|
|
- ``EACCES``: the file is not owned by the process's uid, nor does the
|
|
process have the CAP_FOWNER capability in a namespace with the file
|
|
owner's uid mapped
|
|
- ``EEXIST``: the file is already encrypted with an encryption policy
|
|
different from the one specified
|
|
- ``EINVAL``: an invalid encryption policy was specified (invalid
|
|
version, mode(s), or flags; or reserved bits were set); or a v1
|
|
encryption policy was specified but the directory has the casefold
|
|
flag enabled (casefolding is incompatible with v1 policies).
|
|
- ``ENOKEY``: a v2 encryption policy was specified, but the key with
|
|
the specified ``master_key_identifier`` has not been added, nor does
|
|
the process have the CAP_FOWNER capability in the initial user
|
|
namespace
|
|
- ``ENOTDIR``: the file is unencrypted and is a regular file, not a
|
|
directory
|
|
- ``ENOTEMPTY``: the file is unencrypted and is a nonempty directory
|
|
- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement encryption
|
|
- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with encryption
|
|
support for filesystems, or the filesystem superblock has not
|
|
had encryption enabled on it. (For example, to use encryption on an
|
|
ext4 filesystem, CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION must be enabled in the
|
|
kernel config, and the superblock must have had the "encrypt"
|
|
feature flag enabled using ``tune2fs -O encrypt`` or ``mkfs.ext4 -O
|
|
encrypt``.)
|
|
- ``EPERM``: this directory may not be encrypted, e.g. because it is
|
|
the root directory of an ext4 filesystem
|
|
- ``EROFS``: the filesystem is readonly
|
|
|
|
Getting an encryption policy
|
|
----------------------------
|
|
|
|
Two ioctls are available to get a file's encryption policy:
|
|
|
|
- `FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX`_
|
|
- `FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY`_
|
|
|
|
The extended (_EX) version of the ioctl is more general and is
|
|
recommended to use when possible. However, on older kernels only the
|
|
original ioctl is available. Applications should try the extended
|
|
version, and if it fails with ENOTTY fall back to the original
|
|
version.
|
|
|
|
FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
|
|
The FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX ioctl retrieves the encryption
|
|
policy, if any, for a directory or regular file. No additional
|
|
permissions are required beyond the ability to open the file. It
|
|
takes in a pointer to a :c:type:`struct fscrypt_get_policy_ex_arg`,
|
|
defined as follows::
|
|
|
|
struct fscrypt_get_policy_ex_arg {
|
|
__u64 policy_size; /* input/output */
|
|
union {
|
|
__u8 version;
|
|
struct fscrypt_policy_v1 v1;
|
|
struct fscrypt_policy_v2 v2;
|
|
} policy; /* output */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
The caller must initialize ``policy_size`` to the size available for
|
|
the policy struct, i.e. ``sizeof(arg.policy)``.
|
|
|
|
On success, the policy struct is returned in ``policy``, and its
|
|
actual size is returned in ``policy_size``. ``policy.version`` should
|
|
be checked to determine the version of policy returned. Note that the
|
|
version code for the "v1" policy is actually 0 (FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1).
|
|
|
|
FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX can fail with the following errors:
|
|
|
|
- ``EINVAL``: the file is encrypted, but it uses an unrecognized
|
|
encryption policy version
|
|
- ``ENODATA``: the file is not encrypted
|
|
- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement encryption,
|
|
or this kernel is too old to support FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX
|
|
(try FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY instead)
|
|
- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with encryption
|
|
support for this filesystem, or the filesystem superblock has not
|
|
had encryption enabled on it
|
|
- ``EOVERFLOW``: the file is encrypted and uses a recognized
|
|
encryption policy version, but the policy struct does not fit into
|
|
the provided buffer
|
|
|
|
Note: if you only need to know whether a file is encrypted or not, on
|
|
most filesystems it is also possible to use the FS_IOC_GETFLAGS ioctl
|
|
and check for FS_ENCRYPT_FL, or to use the statx() system call and
|
|
check for STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED in stx_attributes.
|
|
|
|
FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
|
|
The FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl can also retrieve the
|
|
encryption policy, if any, for a directory or regular file. However,
|
|
unlike `FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX`_,
|
|
FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY only supports the original policy
|
|
version. It takes in a pointer directly to a :c:type:`struct
|
|
fscrypt_policy_v1` rather than a :c:type:`struct
|
|
fscrypt_get_policy_ex_arg`.
|
|
|
|
The error codes for FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY are the same as those
|
|
for FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX, except that
|
|
FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY also returns ``EINVAL`` if the file is
|
|
encrypted using a newer encryption policy version.
|
|
|
|
Getting the per-filesystem salt
|
|
-------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Some filesystems, such as ext4 and F2FS, also support the deprecated
|
|
ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_PWSALT. This ioctl retrieves a randomly
|
|
generated 16-byte value stored in the filesystem superblock. This
|
|
value is intended to used as a salt when deriving an encryption key
|
|
from a passphrase or other low-entropy user credential.
|
|
|
|
FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_PWSALT is deprecated. Instead, prefer to
|
|
generate and manage any needed salt(s) in userspace.
|
|
|
|
Adding keys
|
|
-----------
|
|
|
|
FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
|
|
The FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl adds a master encryption key to
|
|
the filesystem, making all files on the filesystem which were
|
|
encrypted using that key appear "unlocked", i.e. in plaintext form.
|
|
It can be executed on any file or directory on the target filesystem,
|
|
but using the filesystem's root directory is recommended. It takes in
|
|
a pointer to a :c:type:`struct fscrypt_add_key_arg`, defined as
|
|
follows::
|
|
|
|
struct fscrypt_add_key_arg {
|
|
struct fscrypt_key_specifier key_spec;
|
|
__u32 raw_size;
|
|
__u32 key_id;
|
|
__u32 __reserved[8];
|
|
__u8 raw[];
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#define FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR 1
|
|
#define FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER 2
|
|
|
|
struct fscrypt_key_specifier {
|
|
__u32 type; /* one of FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_* */
|
|
__u32 __reserved;
|
|
union {
|
|
__u8 __reserved[32]; /* reserve some extra space */
|
|
__u8 descriptor[FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
|
|
__u8 identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE];
|
|
} u;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
struct fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload {
|
|
__u32 type;
|
|
__u32 __reserved;
|
|
__u8 raw[];
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
:c:type:`struct fscrypt_add_key_arg` must be zeroed, then initialized
|
|
as follows:
|
|
|
|
- If the key is being added for use by v1 encryption policies, then
|
|
``key_spec.type`` must contain FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR, and
|
|
``key_spec.u.descriptor`` must contain the descriptor of the key
|
|
being added, corresponding to the value in the
|
|
``master_key_descriptor`` field of :c:type:`struct
|
|
fscrypt_policy_v1`. To add this type of key, the calling process
|
|
must have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the initial user
|
|
namespace.
|
|
|
|
Alternatively, if the key is being added for use by v2 encryption
|
|
policies, then ``key_spec.type`` must contain
|
|
FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER, and ``key_spec.u.identifier`` is
|
|
an *output* field which the kernel fills in with a cryptographic
|
|
hash of the key. To add this type of key, the calling process does
|
|
not need any privileges. However, the number of keys that can be
|
|
added is limited by the user's quota for the keyrings service (see
|
|
``Documentation/security/keys/core.rst``).
|
|
|
|
- ``raw_size`` must be the size of the ``raw`` key provided, in bytes.
|
|
Alternatively, if ``key_id`` is nonzero, this field must be 0, since
|
|
in that case the size is implied by the specified Linux keyring key.
|
|
|
|
- ``key_id`` is 0 if the raw key is given directly in the ``raw``
|
|
field. Otherwise ``key_id`` is the ID of a Linux keyring key of
|
|
type "fscrypt-provisioning" whose payload is a :c:type:`struct
|
|
fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload` whose ``raw`` field contains the
|
|
raw key and whose ``type`` field matches ``key_spec.type``. Since
|
|
``raw`` is variable-length, the total size of this key's payload
|
|
must be ``sizeof(struct fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload)`` plus the
|
|
raw key size. The process must have Search permission on this key.
|
|
|
|
Most users should leave this 0 and specify the raw key directly.
|
|
The support for specifying a Linux keyring key is intended mainly to
|
|
allow re-adding keys after a filesystem is unmounted and re-mounted,
|
|
without having to store the raw keys in userspace memory.
|
|
|
|
- ``raw`` is a variable-length field which must contain the actual
|
|
key, ``raw_size`` bytes long. Alternatively, if ``key_id`` is
|
|
nonzero, then this field is unused.
|
|
|
|
For v2 policy keys, the kernel keeps track of which user (identified
|
|
by effective user ID) added the key, and only allows the key to be
|
|
removed by that user --- or by "root", if they use
|
|
`FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS`_.
|
|
|
|
However, if another user has added the key, it may be desirable to
|
|
prevent that other user from unexpectedly removing it. Therefore,
|
|
FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY may also be used to add a v2 policy key
|
|
*again*, even if it's already added by other user(s). In this case,
|
|
FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY will just install a claim to the key for the
|
|
current user, rather than actually add the key again (but the raw key
|
|
must still be provided, as a proof of knowledge).
|
|
|
|
FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY returns 0 if either the key or a claim to
|
|
the key was either added or already exists.
|
|
|
|
FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY can fail with the following errors:
|
|
|
|
- ``EACCES``: FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR was specified, but the
|
|
caller does not have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the initial
|
|
user namespace; or the raw key was specified by Linux key ID but the
|
|
process lacks Search permission on the key.
|
|
- ``EDQUOT``: the key quota for this user would be exceeded by adding
|
|
the key
|
|
- ``EINVAL``: invalid key size or key specifier type, or reserved bits
|
|
were set
|
|
- ``EKEYREJECTED``: the raw key was specified by Linux key ID, but the
|
|
key has the wrong type
|
|
- ``ENOKEY``: the raw key was specified by Linux key ID, but no key
|
|
exists with that ID
|
|
- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement encryption
|
|
- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with encryption
|
|
support for this filesystem, or the filesystem superblock has not
|
|
had encryption enabled on it
|
|
|
|
Legacy method
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
|
|
For v1 encryption policies, a master encryption key can also be
|
|
provided by adding it to a process-subscribed keyring, e.g. to a
|
|
session keyring, or to a user keyring if the user keyring is linked
|
|
into the session keyring.
|
|
|
|
This method is deprecated (and not supported for v2 encryption
|
|
policies) for several reasons. First, it cannot be used in
|
|
combination with FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY (see `Removing keys`_),
|
|
so for removing a key a workaround such as keyctl_unlink() in
|
|
combination with ``sync; echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches`` would
|
|
have to be used. Second, it doesn't match the fact that the
|
|
locked/unlocked status of encrypted files (i.e. whether they appear to
|
|
be in plaintext form or in ciphertext form) is global. This mismatch
|
|
has caused much confusion as well as real problems when processes
|
|
running under different UIDs, such as a ``sudo`` command, need to
|
|
access encrypted files.
|
|
|
|
Nevertheless, to add a key to one of the process-subscribed keyrings,
|
|
the add_key() system call can be used (see:
|
|
``Documentation/security/keys/core.rst``). The key type must be
|
|
"logon"; keys of this type are kept in kernel memory and cannot be
|
|
read back by userspace. The key description must be "fscrypt:"
|
|
followed by the 16-character lower case hex representation of the
|
|
``master_key_descriptor`` that was set in the encryption policy. The
|
|
key payload must conform to the following structure::
|
|
|
|
#define FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE 64
|
|
|
|
struct fscrypt_key {
|
|
__u32 mode;
|
|
__u8 raw[FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
|
|
__u32 size;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
``mode`` is ignored; just set it to 0. The actual key is provided in
|
|
``raw`` with ``size`` indicating its size in bytes. That is, the
|
|
bytes ``raw[0..size-1]`` (inclusive) are the actual key.
|
|
|
|
The key description prefix "fscrypt:" may alternatively be replaced
|
|
with a filesystem-specific prefix such as "ext4:". However, the
|
|
filesystem-specific prefixes are deprecated and should not be used in
|
|
new programs.
|
|
|
|
Removing keys
|
|
-------------
|
|
|
|
Two ioctls are available for removing a key that was added by
|
|
`FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY`_:
|
|
|
|
- `FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY`_
|
|
- `FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS`_
|
|
|
|
These two ioctls differ only in cases where v2 policy keys are added
|
|
or removed by non-root users.
|
|
|
|
These ioctls don't work on keys that were added via the legacy
|
|
process-subscribed keyrings mechanism.
|
|
|
|
Before using these ioctls, read the `Kernel memory compromise`_
|
|
section for a discussion of the security goals and limitations of
|
|
these ioctls.
|
|
|
|
FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
|
|
The FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl removes a claim to a master
|
|
encryption key from the filesystem, and possibly removes the key
|
|
itself. It can be executed on any file or directory on the target
|
|
filesystem, but using the filesystem's root directory is recommended.
|
|
It takes in a pointer to a :c:type:`struct fscrypt_remove_key_arg`,
|
|
defined as follows::
|
|
|
|
struct fscrypt_remove_key_arg {
|
|
struct fscrypt_key_specifier key_spec;
|
|
#define FSCRYPT_KEY_REMOVAL_STATUS_FLAG_FILES_BUSY 0x00000001
|
|
#define FSCRYPT_KEY_REMOVAL_STATUS_FLAG_OTHER_USERS 0x00000002
|
|
__u32 removal_status_flags; /* output */
|
|
__u32 __reserved[5];
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
This structure must be zeroed, then initialized as follows:
|
|
|
|
- The key to remove is specified by ``key_spec``:
|
|
|
|
- To remove a key used by v1 encryption policies, set
|
|
``key_spec.type`` to FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR and fill
|
|
in ``key_spec.u.descriptor``. To remove this type of key, the
|
|
calling process must have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
|
|
initial user namespace.
|
|
|
|
- To remove a key used by v2 encryption policies, set
|
|
``key_spec.type`` to FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER and fill
|
|
in ``key_spec.u.identifier``.
|
|
|
|
For v2 policy keys, this ioctl is usable by non-root users. However,
|
|
to make this possible, it actually just removes the current user's
|
|
claim to the key, undoing a single call to FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY.
|
|
Only after all claims are removed is the key really removed.
|
|
|
|
For example, if FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY was called with uid 1000,
|
|
then the key will be "claimed" by uid 1000, and
|
|
FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY will only succeed as uid 1000. Or, if
|
|
both uids 1000 and 2000 added the key, then for each uid
|
|
FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY will only remove their own claim. Only
|
|
once *both* are removed is the key really removed. (Think of it like
|
|
unlinking a file that may have hard links.)
|
|
|
|
If FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY really removes the key, it will also
|
|
try to "lock" all files that had been unlocked with the key. It won't
|
|
lock files that are still in-use, so this ioctl is expected to be used
|
|
in cooperation with userspace ensuring that none of the files are
|
|
still open. However, if necessary, this ioctl can be executed again
|
|
later to retry locking any remaining files.
|
|
|
|
FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY returns 0 if either the key was removed
|
|
(but may still have files remaining to be locked), the user's claim to
|
|
the key was removed, or the key was already removed but had files
|
|
remaining to be the locked so the ioctl retried locking them. In any
|
|
of these cases, ``removal_status_flags`` is filled in with the
|
|
following informational status flags:
|
|
|
|
- ``FSCRYPT_KEY_REMOVAL_STATUS_FLAG_FILES_BUSY``: set if some file(s)
|
|
are still in-use. Not guaranteed to be set in the case where only
|
|
the user's claim to the key was removed.
|
|
- ``FSCRYPT_KEY_REMOVAL_STATUS_FLAG_OTHER_USERS``: set if only the
|
|
user's claim to the key was removed, not the key itself
|
|
|
|
FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY can fail with the following errors:
|
|
|
|
- ``EACCES``: The FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR key specifier type
|
|
was specified, but the caller does not have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN
|
|
capability in the initial user namespace
|
|
- ``EINVAL``: invalid key specifier type, or reserved bits were set
|
|
- ``ENOKEY``: the key object was not found at all, i.e. it was never
|
|
added in the first place or was already fully removed including all
|
|
files locked; or, the user does not have a claim to the key (but
|
|
someone else does).
|
|
- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement encryption
|
|
- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with encryption
|
|
support for this filesystem, or the filesystem superblock has not
|
|
had encryption enabled on it
|
|
|
|
FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
|
|
FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS is exactly the same as
|
|
`FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY`_, except that for v2 policy keys, the
|
|
ALL_USERS version of the ioctl will remove all users' claims to the
|
|
key, not just the current user's. I.e., the key itself will always be
|
|
removed, no matter how many users have added it. This difference is
|
|
only meaningful if non-root users are adding and removing keys.
|
|
|
|
Because of this, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS also requires
|
|
"root", namely the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the initial user
|
|
namespace. Otherwise it will fail with EACCES.
|
|
|
|
Getting key status
|
|
------------------
|
|
|
|
FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
|
|
The FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS ioctl retrieves the status of a
|
|
master encryption key. It can be executed on any file or directory on
|
|
the target filesystem, but using the filesystem's root directory is
|
|
recommended. It takes in a pointer to a :c:type:`struct
|
|
fscrypt_get_key_status_arg`, defined as follows::
|
|
|
|
struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg {
|
|
/* input */
|
|
struct fscrypt_key_specifier key_spec;
|
|
__u32 __reserved[6];
|
|
|
|
/* output */
|
|
#define FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_ABSENT 1
|
|
#define FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_PRESENT 2
|
|
#define FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_INCOMPLETELY_REMOVED 3
|
|
__u32 status;
|
|
#define FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_FLAG_ADDED_BY_SELF 0x00000001
|
|
__u32 status_flags;
|
|
__u32 user_count;
|
|
__u32 __out_reserved[13];
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
The caller must zero all input fields, then fill in ``key_spec``:
|
|
|
|
- To get the status of a key for v1 encryption policies, set
|
|
``key_spec.type`` to FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR and fill
|
|
in ``key_spec.u.descriptor``.
|
|
|
|
- To get the status of a key for v2 encryption policies, set
|
|
``key_spec.type`` to FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER and fill
|
|
in ``key_spec.u.identifier``.
|
|
|
|
On success, 0 is returned and the kernel fills in the output fields:
|
|
|
|
- ``status`` indicates whether the key is absent, present, or
|
|
incompletely removed. Incompletely removed means that the master
|
|
secret has been removed, but some files are still in use; i.e.,
|
|
`FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY`_ returned 0 but set the informational
|
|
status flag FSCRYPT_KEY_REMOVAL_STATUS_FLAG_FILES_BUSY.
|
|
|
|
- ``status_flags`` can contain the following flags:
|
|
|
|
- ``FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_FLAG_ADDED_BY_SELF`` indicates that the key
|
|
has added by the current user. This is only set for keys
|
|
identified by ``identifier`` rather than by ``descriptor``.
|
|
|
|
- ``user_count`` specifies the number of users who have added the key.
|
|
This is only set for keys identified by ``identifier`` rather than
|
|
by ``descriptor``.
|
|
|
|
FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS can fail with the following errors:
|
|
|
|
- ``EINVAL``: invalid key specifier type, or reserved bits were set
|
|
- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement encryption
|
|
- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with encryption
|
|
support for this filesystem, or the filesystem superblock has not
|
|
had encryption enabled on it
|
|
|
|
Among other use cases, FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS can be useful
|
|
for determining whether the key for a given encrypted directory needs
|
|
to be added before prompting the user for the passphrase needed to
|
|
derive the key.
|
|
|
|
FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS can only get the status of keys in
|
|
the filesystem-level keyring, i.e. the keyring managed by
|
|
`FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY`_ and `FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY`_. It
|
|
cannot get the status of a key that has only been added for use by v1
|
|
encryption policies using the legacy mechanism involving
|
|
process-subscribed keyrings.
|
|
|
|
Access semantics
|
|
================
|
|
|
|
With the key
|
|
------------
|
|
|
|
With the encryption key, encrypted regular files, directories, and
|
|
symlinks behave very similarly to their unencrypted counterparts ---
|
|
after all, the encryption is intended to be transparent. However,
|
|
astute users may notice some differences in behavior:
|
|
|
|
- Unencrypted files, or files encrypted with a different encryption
|
|
policy (i.e. different key, modes, or flags), cannot be renamed or
|
|
linked into an encrypted directory; see `Encryption policy
|
|
enforcement`_. Attempts to do so will fail with EXDEV. However,
|
|
encrypted files can be renamed within an encrypted directory, or
|
|
into an unencrypted directory.
|
|
|
|
Note: "moving" an unencrypted file into an encrypted directory, e.g.
|
|
with the `mv` program, is implemented in userspace by a copy
|
|
followed by a delete. Be aware that the original unencrypted data
|
|
may remain recoverable from free space on the disk; prefer to keep
|
|
all files encrypted from the very beginning. The `shred` program
|
|
may be used to overwrite the source files but isn't guaranteed to be
|
|
effective on all filesystems and storage devices.
|
|
|
|
- Direct I/O is not supported on encrypted files. Attempts to use
|
|
direct I/O on such files will fall back to buffered I/O.
|
|
|
|
- The fallocate operations FALLOC_FL_COLLAPSE_RANGE and
|
|
FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE are not supported on encrypted files and will
|
|
fail with EOPNOTSUPP.
|
|
|
|
- Online defragmentation of encrypted files is not supported. The
|
|
EXT4_IOC_MOVE_EXT and F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE ioctls will fail with
|
|
EOPNOTSUPP.
|
|
|
|
- The ext4 filesystem does not support data journaling with encrypted
|
|
regular files. It will fall back to ordered data mode instead.
|
|
|
|
- DAX (Direct Access) is not supported on encrypted files.
|
|
|
|
- The st_size of an encrypted symlink will not necessarily give the
|
|
length of the symlink target as required by POSIX. It will actually
|
|
give the length of the ciphertext, which will be slightly longer
|
|
than the plaintext due to NUL-padding and an extra 2-byte overhead.
|
|
|
|
- The maximum length of an encrypted symlink is 2 bytes shorter than
|
|
the maximum length of an unencrypted symlink. For example, on an
|
|
EXT4 filesystem with a 4K block size, unencrypted symlinks can be up
|
|
to 4095 bytes long, while encrypted symlinks can only be up to 4093
|
|
bytes long (both lengths excluding the terminating null).
|
|
|
|
Note that mmap *is* supported. This is possible because the pagecache
|
|
for an encrypted file contains the plaintext, not the ciphertext.
|
|
|
|
Without the key
|
|
---------------
|
|
|
|
Some filesystem operations may be performed on encrypted regular
|
|
files, directories, and symlinks even before their encryption key has
|
|
been added, or after their encryption key has been removed:
|
|
|
|
- File metadata may be read, e.g. using stat().
|
|
|
|
- Directories may be listed, in which case the filenames will be
|
|
listed in an encoded form derived from their ciphertext. The
|
|
current encoding algorithm is described in `Filename hashing and
|
|
encoding`_. The algorithm is subject to change, but it is
|
|
guaranteed that the presented filenames will be no longer than
|
|
NAME_MAX bytes, will not contain the ``/`` or ``\0`` characters, and
|
|
will uniquely identify directory entries.
|
|
|
|
The ``.`` and ``..`` directory entries are special. They are always
|
|
present and are not encrypted or encoded.
|
|
|
|
- Files may be deleted. That is, nondirectory files may be deleted
|
|
with unlink() as usual, and empty directories may be deleted with
|
|
rmdir() as usual. Therefore, ``rm`` and ``rm -r`` will work as
|
|
expected.
|
|
|
|
- Symlink targets may be read and followed, but they will be presented
|
|
in encrypted form, similar to filenames in directories. Hence, they
|
|
are unlikely to point to anywhere useful.
|
|
|
|
Without the key, regular files cannot be opened or truncated.
|
|
Attempts to do so will fail with ENOKEY. This implies that any
|
|
regular file operations that require a file descriptor, such as
|
|
read(), write(), mmap(), fallocate(), and ioctl(), are also forbidden.
|
|
|
|
Also without the key, files of any type (including directories) cannot
|
|
be created or linked into an encrypted directory, nor can a name in an
|
|
encrypted directory be the source or target of a rename, nor can an
|
|
O_TMPFILE temporary file be created in an encrypted directory. All
|
|
such operations will fail with ENOKEY.
|
|
|
|
It is not currently possible to backup and restore encrypted files
|
|
without the encryption key. This would require special APIs which
|
|
have not yet been implemented.
|
|
|
|
Encryption policy enforcement
|
|
=============================
|
|
|
|
After an encryption policy has been set on a directory, all regular
|
|
files, directories, and symbolic links created in that directory
|
|
(recursively) will inherit that encryption policy. Special files ---
|
|
that is, named pipes, device nodes, and UNIX domain sockets --- will
|
|
not be encrypted.
|
|
|
|
Except for those special files, it is forbidden to have unencrypted
|
|
files, or files encrypted with a different encryption policy, in an
|
|
encrypted directory tree. Attempts to link or rename such a file into
|
|
an encrypted directory will fail with EXDEV. This is also enforced
|
|
during ->lookup() to provide limited protection against offline
|
|
attacks that try to disable or downgrade encryption in known locations
|
|
where applications may later write sensitive data. It is recommended
|
|
that systems implementing a form of "verified boot" take advantage of
|
|
this by validating all top-level encryption policies prior to access.
|
|
|
|
Implementation details
|
|
======================
|
|
|
|
Encryption context
|
|
------------------
|
|
|
|
An encryption policy is represented on-disk by a :c:type:`struct
|
|
fscrypt_context_v1` or a :c:type:`struct fscrypt_context_v2`. It is
|
|
up to individual filesystems to decide where to store it, but normally
|
|
it would be stored in a hidden extended attribute. It should *not* be
|
|
exposed by the xattr-related system calls such as getxattr() and
|
|
setxattr() because of the special semantics of the encryption xattr.
|
|
(In particular, there would be much confusion if an encryption policy
|
|
were to be added to or removed from anything other than an empty
|
|
directory.) These structs are defined as follows::
|
|
|
|
#define FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE 16
|
|
|
|
#define FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE 8
|
|
struct fscrypt_context_v1 {
|
|
u8 version;
|
|
u8 contents_encryption_mode;
|
|
u8 filenames_encryption_mode;
|
|
u8 flags;
|
|
u8 master_key_descriptor[FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
|
|
u8 nonce[FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE];
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#define FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE 16
|
|
struct fscrypt_context_v2 {
|
|
u8 version;
|
|
u8 contents_encryption_mode;
|
|
u8 filenames_encryption_mode;
|
|
u8 flags;
|
|
u8 __reserved[4];
|
|
u8 master_key_identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE];
|
|
u8 nonce[FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE];
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
The context structs contain the same information as the corresponding
|
|
policy structs (see `Setting an encryption policy`_), except that the
|
|
context structs also contain a nonce. The nonce is randomly generated
|
|
by the kernel and is used as KDF input or as a tweak to cause
|
|
different files to be encrypted differently; see `Per-file encryption
|
|
keys`_ and `DIRECT_KEY policies`_.
|
|
|
|
Data path changes
|
|
-----------------
|
|
|
|
For the read path (->readpage()) of regular files, filesystems can
|
|
read the ciphertext into the page cache and decrypt it in-place. The
|
|
page lock must be held until decryption has finished, to prevent the
|
|
page from becoming visible to userspace prematurely.
|
|
|
|
For the write path (->writepage()) of regular files, filesystems
|
|
cannot encrypt data in-place in the page cache, since the cached
|
|
plaintext must be preserved. Instead, filesystems must encrypt into a
|
|
temporary buffer or "bounce page", then write out the temporary
|
|
buffer. Some filesystems, such as UBIFS, already use temporary
|
|
buffers regardless of encryption. Other filesystems, such as ext4 and
|
|
F2FS, have to allocate bounce pages specially for encryption.
|
|
|
|
Filename hashing and encoding
|
|
-----------------------------
|
|
|
|
Modern filesystems accelerate directory lookups by using indexed
|
|
directories. An indexed directory is organized as a tree keyed by
|
|
filename hashes. When a ->lookup() is requested, the filesystem
|
|
normally hashes the filename being looked up so that it can quickly
|
|
find the corresponding directory entry, if any.
|
|
|
|
With encryption, lookups must be supported and efficient both with and
|
|
without the encryption key. Clearly, it would not work to hash the
|
|
plaintext filenames, since the plaintext filenames are unavailable
|
|
without the key. (Hashing the plaintext filenames would also make it
|
|
impossible for the filesystem's fsck tool to optimize encrypted
|
|
directories.) Instead, filesystems hash the ciphertext filenames,
|
|
i.e. the bytes actually stored on-disk in the directory entries. When
|
|
asked to do a ->lookup() with the key, the filesystem just encrypts
|
|
the user-supplied name to get the ciphertext.
|
|
|
|
Lookups without the key are more complicated. The raw ciphertext may
|
|
contain the ``\0`` and ``/`` characters, which are illegal in
|
|
filenames. Therefore, readdir() must base64-encode the ciphertext for
|
|
presentation. For most filenames, this works fine; on ->lookup(), the
|
|
filesystem just base64-decodes the user-supplied name to get back to
|
|
the raw ciphertext.
|
|
|
|
However, for very long filenames, base64 encoding would cause the
|
|
filename length to exceed NAME_MAX. To prevent this, readdir()
|
|
actually presents long filenames in an abbreviated form which encodes
|
|
a strong "hash" of the ciphertext filename, along with the optional
|
|
filesystem-specific hash(es) needed for directory lookups. This
|
|
allows the filesystem to still, with a high degree of confidence, map
|
|
the filename given in ->lookup() back to a particular directory entry
|
|
that was previously listed by readdir(). See :c:type:`struct
|
|
fscrypt_nokey_name` in the source for more details.
|
|
|
|
Note that the precise way that filenames are presented to userspace
|
|
without the key is subject to change in the future. It is only meant
|
|
as a way to temporarily present valid filenames so that commands like
|
|
``rm -r`` work as expected on encrypted directories.
|
|
|
|
Tests
|
|
=====
|
|
|
|
To test fscrypt, use xfstests, which is Linux's de facto standard
|
|
filesystem test suite. First, run all the tests in the "encrypt"
|
|
group on the relevant filesystem(s). For example, to test ext4 and
|
|
f2fs encryption using `kvm-xfstests
|
|
<https://github.com/tytso/xfstests-bld/blob/master/Documentation/kvm-quickstart.md>`_::
|
|
|
|
kvm-xfstests -c ext4,f2fs -g encrypt
|
|
|
|
UBIFS encryption can also be tested this way, but it should be done in
|
|
a separate command, and it takes some time for kvm-xfstests to set up
|
|
emulated UBI volumes::
|
|
|
|
kvm-xfstests -c ubifs -g encrypt
|
|
|
|
No tests should fail. However, tests that use non-default encryption
|
|
modes (e.g. generic/549 and generic/550) will be skipped if the needed
|
|
algorithms were not built into the kernel's crypto API. Also, tests
|
|
that access the raw block device (e.g. generic/399, generic/548,
|
|
generic/549, generic/550) will be skipped on UBIFS.
|
|
|
|
Besides running the "encrypt" group tests, for ext4 and f2fs it's also
|
|
possible to run most xfstests with the "test_dummy_encryption" mount
|
|
option. This option causes all new files to be automatically
|
|
encrypted with a dummy key, without having to make any API calls.
|
|
This tests the encrypted I/O paths more thoroughly. To do this with
|
|
kvm-xfstests, use the "encrypt" filesystem configuration::
|
|
|
|
kvm-xfstests -c ext4/encrypt,f2fs/encrypt -g auto
|
|
|
|
Because this runs many more tests than "-g encrypt" does, it takes
|
|
much longer to run; so also consider using `gce-xfstests
|
|
<https://github.com/tytso/xfstests-bld/blob/master/Documentation/gce-xfstests.md>`_
|
|
instead of kvm-xfstests::
|
|
|
|
gce-xfstests -c ext4/encrypt,f2fs/encrypt -g auto
|