linux-stable/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
Linus Torvalds 95faf6ba65 Driver core changes for 5.16-rc1
Here is the big set of driver core changes for 5.16-rc1.
 
 All of these have been in linux-next for a while now with no reported
 problems.
 
 Included in here are:
 	- big update and cleanup of the sysfs abi documentation files
 	  and scripts from Mauro.  We are almost at the place where we
 	  can properly check that the running kernel's sysfs abi is
 	  documented fully.
 	- firmware loader updates
 	- dyndbg updates
 	- kernfs cleanups and fixes from Christoph
 	- device property updates
 	- component fix
 	- other minor driver core cleanups and fixes
 
 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'driver-core-5.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core

Pull driver core updates from Greg KH:
 "Here is the big set of driver core changes for 5.16-rc1.

  All of these have been in linux-next for a while now with no reported
  problems.

  Included in here are:

   - big update and cleanup of the sysfs abi documentation files and
     scripts from Mauro. We are almost at the place where we can
     properly check that the running kernel's sysfs abi is documented
     fully.

   - firmware loader updates

   - dyndbg updates

   - kernfs cleanups and fixes from Christoph

   - device property updates

   - component fix

   - other minor driver core cleanups and fixes"

* tag 'driver-core-5.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core: (122 commits)
  device property: Drop redundant NULL checks
  x86/build: Tuck away built-in firmware under FW_LOADER
  vmlinux.lds.h: wrap built-in firmware support under FW_LOADER
  firmware_loader: move struct builtin_fw to the only place used
  x86/microcode: Use the firmware_loader built-in API
  firmware_loader: remove old DECLARE_BUILTIN_FIRMWARE()
  firmware_loader: formalize built-in firmware API
  component: do not leave master devres group open after bind
  dyndbg: refine verbosity 1-4 summary-detail
  gpiolib: acpi: Replace custom code with device_match_acpi_handle()
  i2c: acpi: Replace custom function with device_match_acpi_handle()
  driver core: Provide device_match_acpi_handle() helper
  dyndbg: fix spurious vNpr_info change
  dyndbg: no vpr-info on empty queries
  dyndbg: vpr-info on remove-module complete, not starting
  device property: Add missed header in fwnode.h
  Documentation: dyndbg: Improve cli param examples
  dyndbg: Remove support for ddebug_query param
  dyndbg: make dyndbg a known cli param
  dyndbg: show module in vpr-info in dd-exec-queries
  ...
2021-11-04 08:32:38 -07:00

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What: /sys/kernel/security/*/ima/policy
Date: May 2008
Contact: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Description:
The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
values of executables and other sensitive system files
loaded into the run-time of this system. At runtime,
the policy can be constrained based on LSM specific data.
Policies are loaded into the securityfs file ima/policy
by opening the file, writing the rules one at a time and
then closing the file. The new policy takes effect after
the file ima/policy is closed.
IMA appraisal, if configured, uses these file measurements
for local measurement appraisal.
::
rule format: action [condition ...]
action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise |
audit | hash | dont_hash
condition:= base | lsm [option]
base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [fsname=]
[uid=] [euid=] [gid=] [egid=]
[fowner=] [fgroup=]]
lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
[obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
option: [[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
[appraise_flag=] [appraise_algos=] [keyrings=]
base:
func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
[FIRMWARE_CHECK]
[KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK]
[KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] [CRITICAL_DATA]
[SETXATTR_CHECK]
mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
[[^]MAY_EXEC]
fsmagic:= hex value
fsuuid:= file system UUID (e.g 8bcbe394-4f13-4144-be8e-5aa9ea2ce2f6)
uid:= decimal value
euid:= decimal value
gid:= decimal value
egid:= decimal value
fowner:= decimal value
fgroup:= decimal value
lsm: are LSM specific
option:
appraise_type:= [imasig] [imasig|modsig]
appraise_flag:= [check_blacklist]
Currently, blacklist check is only for files signed with appended
signature.
keyrings:= list of keyrings
(eg, .builtin_trusted_keys|.ima). Only valid
when action is "measure" and func is KEY_CHECK.
template:= name of a defined IMA template type
(eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure".
pcr:= decimal value
label:= [selinux]|[kernel_info]|[data_label]
data_label:= a unique string used for grouping and limiting critical data.
For example, "selinux" to measure critical data for SELinux.
appraise_algos:= comma-separated list of hash algorithms
For example, "sha256,sha512" to only accept to appraise
files where the security.ima xattr was hashed with one
of these two algorithms.
default policy:
# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0
# SYSFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572
# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
dont_appraise fsmagic=0x64626720
# TMPFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994
# RAMFS_MAGIC
dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6
# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
dont_appraise fsmagic=0x1cd1
# BINFMTFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
dont_appraise fsmagic=0x42494e4d
# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673
# SELINUX_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
# CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
dont_appraise fsmagic=0x27e0eb
# NSFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
dont_appraise fsmagic=0x6e736673
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
measure func=MODULE_CHECK
measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK
appraise fowner=0
The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check,
all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files
open for read by root in do_filp_open. The default appraisal
policy appraises all files owned by root.
Examples of LSM specific definitions:
SELinux::
dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
dont_appraise obj_type=var_log_t
dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t
dont_appraise obj_type=auditd_log_t
measure subj_user=system_u func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
measure subj_role=system_r func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
Smack::
measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs::
measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK pcr=5
Example of appraise rule allowing modsig appended signatures:
appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig
Example of measure rule using KEY_CHECK to measure all keys:
measure func=KEY_CHECK
Example of measure rule using KEY_CHECK to only measure
keys added to .builtin_trusted_keys or .ima keyring:
measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima
Example of the special SETXATTR_CHECK appraise rule, that
restricts the hash algorithms allowed when writing to the
security.ima xattr of a file:
appraise func=SETXATTR_CHECK appraise_algos=sha256,sha384,sha512