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295cf15623
Al reminds us that the usercopy API must only return complete failure if absolutely nothing could be copied. Currently, if userspace does something silly like giving us an unaligned pointer to Device memory, or a size which overruns MTE tag bounds, we may fail to honour that requirement when faulting on a multi-byte access even though a smaller access could have succeeded. Add a mitigation to the fixup routines to fall back to a single-byte copy if we faulted on a larger access before anything has been written to the destination, to guarantee making *some* forward progress. We needn't be too concerned about the overall performance since this should only occur when callers are doing something a bit dodgy in the first place. Particularly broken userspace might still be able to trick generic_perform_write() into an infinite loop by targeting write() at an mmap() of some read-only device register where the fault-in load succeeds but any store synchronously aborts such that copy_to_user() is genuinely unable to make progress, but, well, don't do that... CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Chen Huang <chenhuang5@huawei.com> Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/dc03d5c675731a1f24a62417dba5429ad744234e.1626098433.git.robin.murphy@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> |
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clear_page.S | ||
clear_user.S | ||
copy_from_user.S | ||
copy_in_user.S | ||
copy_page.S | ||
copy_template.S | ||
copy_to_user.S | ||
crc32.S | ||
csum.c | ||
delay.c | ||
error-inject.c | ||
insn.c | ||
kasan_sw_tags.S | ||
Makefile | ||
memchr.S | ||
memcmp.S | ||
memcpy.S | ||
memset.S | ||
mte.S | ||
strchr.S | ||
strcmp.S | ||
strlen.S | ||
strncmp.S | ||
strnlen.S | ||
strrchr.S | ||
tishift.S | ||
uaccess_flushcache.c | ||
xor-neon.c |