linux-stable/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_rtas.c
Nicholas Piggin f62f3c2064 KVM: PPC: Book3S: Fix H_RTAS rets buffer overflow
The kvmppc_rtas_hcall() sets the host rtas_args.rets pointer based on
the rtas_args.nargs that was provided by the guest. That guest nargs
value is not range checked, so the guest can cause the host rets pointer
to be pointed outside the args array. The individual rtas function
handlers check the nargs and nrets values to ensure they are correct,
but if they are not, the handlers store a -3 (0xfffffffd) failure
indication in rets[0] which corrupts host memory.

Fix this by testing up front whether the guest supplied nargs and nret
would exceed the array size, and fail the hcall directly without storing
a failure indication to rets[0].

Also expand on a comment about why we kill the guest and try not to
return errors directly if we have a valid rets[0] pointer.

Fixes: 8e591cb720 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add infrastructure to implement kernel-side RTAS calls")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.10+
Reported-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2021-07-23 16:14:31 +10:00

307 lines
6.9 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright 2012 Michael Ellerman, IBM Corporation.
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/kvm_book3s.h>
#include <asm/kvm_ppc.h>
#include <asm/hvcall.h>
#include <asm/rtas.h>
#include <asm/xive.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XICS
static void kvm_rtas_set_xive(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct rtas_args *args)
{
u32 irq, server, priority;
int rc;
if (be32_to_cpu(args->nargs) != 3 || be32_to_cpu(args->nret) != 1) {
rc = -3;
goto out;
}
irq = be32_to_cpu(args->args[0]);
server = be32_to_cpu(args->args[1]);
priority = be32_to_cpu(args->args[2]);
if (xics_on_xive())
rc = kvmppc_xive_set_xive(vcpu->kvm, irq, server, priority);
else
rc = kvmppc_xics_set_xive(vcpu->kvm, irq, server, priority);
if (rc)
rc = -3;
out:
args->rets[0] = cpu_to_be32(rc);
}
static void kvm_rtas_get_xive(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct rtas_args *args)
{
u32 irq, server, priority;
int rc;
if (be32_to_cpu(args->nargs) != 1 || be32_to_cpu(args->nret) != 3) {
rc = -3;
goto out;
}
irq = be32_to_cpu(args->args[0]);
server = priority = 0;
if (xics_on_xive())
rc = kvmppc_xive_get_xive(vcpu->kvm, irq, &server, &priority);
else
rc = kvmppc_xics_get_xive(vcpu->kvm, irq, &server, &priority);
if (rc) {
rc = -3;
goto out;
}
args->rets[1] = cpu_to_be32(server);
args->rets[2] = cpu_to_be32(priority);
out:
args->rets[0] = cpu_to_be32(rc);
}
static void kvm_rtas_int_off(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct rtas_args *args)
{
u32 irq;
int rc;
if (be32_to_cpu(args->nargs) != 1 || be32_to_cpu(args->nret) != 1) {
rc = -3;
goto out;
}
irq = be32_to_cpu(args->args[0]);
if (xics_on_xive())
rc = kvmppc_xive_int_off(vcpu->kvm, irq);
else
rc = kvmppc_xics_int_off(vcpu->kvm, irq);
if (rc)
rc = -3;
out:
args->rets[0] = cpu_to_be32(rc);
}
static void kvm_rtas_int_on(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct rtas_args *args)
{
u32 irq;
int rc;
if (be32_to_cpu(args->nargs) != 1 || be32_to_cpu(args->nret) != 1) {
rc = -3;
goto out;
}
irq = be32_to_cpu(args->args[0]);
if (xics_on_xive())
rc = kvmppc_xive_int_on(vcpu->kvm, irq);
else
rc = kvmppc_xics_int_on(vcpu->kvm, irq);
if (rc)
rc = -3;
out:
args->rets[0] = cpu_to_be32(rc);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_XICS */
struct rtas_handler {
void (*handler)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct rtas_args *args);
char *name;
};
static struct rtas_handler rtas_handlers[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XICS
{ .name = "ibm,set-xive", .handler = kvm_rtas_set_xive },
{ .name = "ibm,get-xive", .handler = kvm_rtas_get_xive },
{ .name = "ibm,int-off", .handler = kvm_rtas_int_off },
{ .name = "ibm,int-on", .handler = kvm_rtas_int_on },
#endif
};
struct rtas_token_definition {
struct list_head list;
struct rtas_handler *handler;
u64 token;
};
static int rtas_name_matches(char *s1, char *s2)
{
struct kvm_rtas_token_args args;
return !strncmp(s1, s2, sizeof(args.name));
}
static int rtas_token_undefine(struct kvm *kvm, char *name)
{
struct rtas_token_definition *d, *tmp;
lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->arch.rtas_token_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(d, tmp, &kvm->arch.rtas_tokens, list) {
if (rtas_name_matches(d->handler->name, name)) {
list_del(&d->list);
kfree(d);
return 0;
}
}
/* It's not an error to undefine an undefined token */
return 0;
}
static int rtas_token_define(struct kvm *kvm, char *name, u64 token)
{
struct rtas_token_definition *d;
struct rtas_handler *h = NULL;
bool found;
int i;
lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->arch.rtas_token_lock);
list_for_each_entry(d, &kvm->arch.rtas_tokens, list) {
if (d->token == token)
return -EEXIST;
}
found = false;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(rtas_handlers); i++) {
h = &rtas_handlers[i];
if (rtas_name_matches(h->name, name)) {
found = true;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
return -ENOENT;
d = kzalloc(sizeof(*d), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!d)
return -ENOMEM;
d->handler = h;
d->token = token;
list_add_tail(&d->list, &kvm->arch.rtas_tokens);
return 0;
}
int kvm_vm_ioctl_rtas_define_token(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
{
struct kvm_rtas_token_args args;
int rc;
if (copy_from_user(&args, argp, sizeof(args)))
return -EFAULT;
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.rtas_token_lock);
if (args.token)
rc = rtas_token_define(kvm, args.name, args.token);
else
rc = rtas_token_undefine(kvm, args.name);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.rtas_token_lock);
return rc;
}
int kvmppc_rtas_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct rtas_token_definition *d;
struct rtas_args args;
rtas_arg_t *orig_rets;
gpa_t args_phys;
int rc;
/*
* r4 contains the guest physical address of the RTAS args
* Mask off the top 4 bits since this is a guest real address
*/
args_phys = kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 4) & KVM_PAM;
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
rc = kvm_read_guest(vcpu->kvm, args_phys, &args, sizeof(args));
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
if (rc)
goto fail;
/*
* args->rets is a pointer into args->args. Now that we've
* copied args we need to fix it up to point into our copy,
* not the guest args. We also need to save the original
* value so we can restore it on the way out.
*/
orig_rets = args.rets;
if (be32_to_cpu(args.nargs) >= ARRAY_SIZE(args.args)) {
/*
* Don't overflow our args array: ensure there is room for
* at least rets[0] (even if the call specifies 0 nret).
*
* Each handler must then check for the correct nargs and nret
* values, but they may always return failure in rets[0].
*/
rc = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
args.rets = &args.args[be32_to_cpu(args.nargs)];
mutex_lock(&vcpu->kvm->arch.rtas_token_lock);
rc = -ENOENT;
list_for_each_entry(d, &vcpu->kvm->arch.rtas_tokens, list) {
if (d->token == be32_to_cpu(args.token)) {
d->handler->handler(vcpu, &args);
rc = 0;
break;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->arch.rtas_token_lock);
if (rc == 0) {
args.rets = orig_rets;
rc = kvm_write_guest(vcpu->kvm, args_phys, &args, sizeof(args));
if (rc)
goto fail;
}
return rc;
fail:
/*
* We only get here if the guest has called RTAS with a bogus
* args pointer or nargs/nret values that would overflow the
* array. That means we can't get to the args, and so we can't
* fail the RTAS call. So fail right out to userspace, which
* should kill the guest.
*
* SLOF should actually pass the hcall return value from the
* rtas handler call in r3, so enter_rtas could be modified to
* return a failure indication in r3 and we could return such
* errors to the guest rather than failing to host userspace.
* However old guests that don't test for failure could then
* continue silently after errors, so for now we won't do this.
*/
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvmppc_rtas_hcall);
void kvmppc_rtas_tokens_free(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct rtas_token_definition *d, *tmp;
list_for_each_entry_safe(d, tmp, &kvm->arch.rtas_tokens, list) {
list_del(&d->list);
kfree(d);
}
}