linux-stable/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
David Howells 78b7280cce KEYS: Improve /proc/keys
Improve /proc/keys by:

 (1) Don't attempt to summarise the payload of a negated key.  It won't have
     one.  To this end, a helper function - key_is_instantiated() has been
     added that allows the caller to find out whether the key is positively
     instantiated (as opposed to being uninstantiated or negatively
     instantiated).

 (2) Do show keys that are negative, expired or revoked rather than hiding
     them.  This requires an override flag (no_state_check) to be passed to
     search_my_process_keyrings() and keyring_search_aux() to suppress this
     check.

     Without this, keys that are possessed by the caller, but only grant
     permissions to the caller if possessed are skipped as the possession check
     fails.

     Keys that are visible due to user, group or other checks are visible with
     or without this patch.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-03-17 11:59:32 +11:00

265 lines
6.5 KiB
C

/* Request key authorisation token key definition.
*
* Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* See Documentation/keys-request-key.txt
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include "internal.h"
static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *, const void *, size_t);
static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *);
static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *);
static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *);
static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t);
/*
* The request-key authorisation key type definition.
*/
struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = {
.name = ".request_key_auth",
.def_datalen = sizeof(struct request_key_auth),
.instantiate = request_key_auth_instantiate,
.describe = request_key_auth_describe,
.revoke = request_key_auth_revoke,
.destroy = request_key_auth_destroy,
.read = request_key_auth_read,
};
/*
* Instantiate a request-key authorisation key.
*/
static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key,
const void *data,
size_t datalen)
{
key->payload.data = (struct request_key_auth *) data;
return 0;
}
/*
* Describe an authorisation token.
*/
static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key,
struct seq_file *m)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data;
seq_puts(m, "key:");
seq_puts(m, key->description);
if (key_is_instantiated(key))
seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len);
}
/*
* Read the callout_info data (retrieves the callout information).
* - the key's semaphore is read-locked
*/
static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key,
char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data;
size_t datalen;
long ret;
datalen = rka->callout_len;
ret = datalen;
/* we can return the data as is */
if (buffer && buflen > 0) {
if (buflen > datalen)
buflen = datalen;
if (copy_to_user(buffer, rka->callout_info, buflen) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Handle revocation of an authorisation token key.
*
* Called with the key sem write-locked.
*/
static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data;
kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
if (rka->cred) {
put_cred(rka->cred);
rka->cred = NULL;
}
}
/*
* Destroy an instantiation authorisation token key.
*/
static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data;
kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
if (rka->cred) {
put_cred(rka->cred);
rka->cred = NULL;
}
key_put(rka->target_key);
key_put(rka->dest_keyring);
kfree(rka->callout_info);
kfree(rka);
}
/*
* Create an authorisation token for /sbin/request-key or whoever to gain
* access to the caller's security data.
*/
struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
size_t callout_len, struct key *dest_keyring)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka, *irka;
const struct cred *cred = current->cred;
struct key *authkey = NULL;
char desc[20];
int ret;
kenter("%d,", target->serial);
/* allocate a auth record */
rka = kmalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rka) {
kleave(" = -ENOMEM");
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
rka->callout_info = kmalloc(callout_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rka->callout_info) {
kleave(" = -ENOMEM");
kfree(rka);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
/* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of
* another process */
if (cred->request_key_auth) {
/* it is - use that instantiation context here too */
down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
/* if the auth key has been revoked, then the key we're
* servicing is already instantiated */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &cred->request_key_auth->flags))
goto auth_key_revoked;
irka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
rka->cred = get_cred(irka->cred);
rka->pid = irka->pid;
up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
}
else {
/* it isn't - use this process as the context */
rka->cred = get_cred(cred);
rka->pid = current->pid;
}
rka->target_key = key_get(target);
rka->dest_keyring = key_get(dest_keyring);
memcpy(rka->callout_info, callout_info, callout_len);
rka->callout_len = callout_len;
/* allocate the auth key */
sprintf(desc, "%x", target->serial);
authkey = key_alloc(&key_type_request_key_auth, desc,
cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH |
KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(authkey);
goto error_alloc;
}
/* construct the auth key */
ret = key_instantiate_and_link(authkey, rka, 0, NULL, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_inst;
kleave(" = {%d,%d}", authkey->serial, atomic_read(&authkey->usage));
return authkey;
auth_key_revoked:
up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
kfree(rka->callout_info);
kfree(rka);
kleave("= -EKEYREVOKED");
return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
error_inst:
key_revoke(authkey);
key_put(authkey);
error_alloc:
key_put(rka->target_key);
key_put(rka->dest_keyring);
kfree(rka->callout_info);
kfree(rka);
kleave("= %d", ret);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
/*
* See if an authorisation key is associated with a particular key.
*/
static int key_get_instantiation_authkey_match(const struct key *key,
const void *_id)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data;
key_serial_t id = (key_serial_t)(unsigned long) _id;
return rka->target_key->serial == id;
}
/*
* Search the current process's keyrings for the authorisation key for
* instantiation of a key.
*/
struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key *authkey;
key_ref_t authkey_ref;
authkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(
&key_type_request_key_auth,
(void *) (unsigned long) target_id,
key_get_instantiation_authkey_match,
cred);
if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {
authkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);
goto error;
}
authkey = key_ref_to_ptr(authkey_ref);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags)) {
key_put(authkey);
authkey = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
}
error:
return authkey;
}