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![Eric Biggers](/assets/img/avatar_default.png)
Add sysfs files that expose the inline encryption capabilities of request queues: /sys/block/$disk/queue/crypto/max_dun_bits /sys/block/$disk/queue/crypto/modes/$mode /sys/block/$disk/queue/crypto/num_keyslots Userspace can use these new files to decide what encryption settings to use, or whether to use inline encryption at all. This also brings the crypto capabilities in line with the other queue properties, which are already discoverable via the queue directory in sysfs. Design notes: - Place the new files in a new subdirectory "crypto" to group them together and to avoid complicating the main "queue" directory. This also makes it possible to replace "crypto" with a symlink later if we ever make the blk_crypto_profiles into real kobjects (see below). - It was necessary to define a new kobject that corresponds to the crypto subdirectory. For now, this kobject just contains a pointer to the blk_crypto_profile. Note that multiple queues (and hence multiple such kobjects) may refer to the same blk_crypto_profile. An alternative design would more closely match the current kernel data structures: the blk_crypto_profile could be a kobject itself, located directly under the host controller device's kobject, while /sys/block/$disk/queue/crypto would be a symlink to it. I decided not to do that for now because it would require a lot more changes, such as no longer embedding blk_crypto_profile in other structures, and also because I'm not sure we can rule out moving the crypto capabilities into 'struct queue_limits' in the future. (Even if multiple queues share the same crypto engine, maybe the supported data unit sizes could differ due to other queue properties.) It would also still be possible to switch to that design later without breaking userspace, by replacing the directory with a symlink. - Use "max_dun_bits" instead of "max_dun_bytes". Currently, the kernel internally stores this value in bytes, but that's an implementation detail. It probably makes more sense to talk about this value in bits, and choosing bits is more future-proof. - "modes" is a sub-subdirectory, since there may be multiple supported crypto modes, sysfs is supposed to have one value per file, and it makes sense to group all the mode files together. - Each mode had to be named. The crypto API names like "xts(aes)" are not appropriate because they don't specify the key size. Therefore, I assigned new names. The exact names chosen are arbitrary, but they happen to match the names used in log messages in fs/crypto/. - The "num_keyslots" file is a bit different from the others in that it is only useful to know for performance reasons. However, it's included as it can still be useful. For example, a user might not want to use inline encryption if there aren't very many keyslots. Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220124215938.2769-4-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
415 lines
12 KiB
C
415 lines
12 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
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*/
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/*
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* Refer to Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst for detailed explanation.
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*/
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) "blk-crypto: " fmt
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#include <linux/bio.h>
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#include <linux/blkdev.h>
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#include <linux/blk-crypto-profile.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include "blk-crypto-internal.h"
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const struct blk_crypto_mode blk_crypto_modes[] = {
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[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS] = {
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.name = "AES-256-XTS",
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.cipher_str = "xts(aes)",
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.keysize = 64,
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.ivsize = 16,
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},
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[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC_ESSIV] = {
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.name = "AES-128-CBC-ESSIV",
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.cipher_str = "essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)",
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.keysize = 16,
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.ivsize = 16,
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},
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[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_ADIANTUM] = {
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.name = "Adiantum",
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.cipher_str = "adiantum(xchacha12,aes)",
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.keysize = 32,
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.ivsize = 32,
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},
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};
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/*
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* This number needs to be at least (the number of threads doing IO
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* concurrently) * (maximum recursive depth of a bio), so that we don't
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* deadlock on crypt_ctx allocations. The default is chosen to be the same
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* as the default number of post read contexts in both EXT4 and F2FS.
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*/
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static int num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs = 128;
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module_param(num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs, int, 0444);
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MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs,
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"Number of bio crypto contexts to preallocate");
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static struct kmem_cache *bio_crypt_ctx_cache;
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static mempool_t *bio_crypt_ctx_pool;
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static int __init bio_crypt_ctx_init(void)
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{
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size_t i;
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bio_crypt_ctx_cache = KMEM_CACHE(bio_crypt_ctx, 0);
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if (!bio_crypt_ctx_cache)
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goto out_no_mem;
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bio_crypt_ctx_pool = mempool_create_slab_pool(num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs,
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bio_crypt_ctx_cache);
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if (!bio_crypt_ctx_pool)
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goto out_no_mem;
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/* This is assumed in various places. */
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BUILD_BUG_ON(BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID != 0);
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/* Sanity check that no algorithm exceeds the defined limits. */
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for (i = 0; i < BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX; i++) {
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BUG_ON(blk_crypto_modes[i].keysize > BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_KEY_SIZE);
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BUG_ON(blk_crypto_modes[i].ivsize > BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE);
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}
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return 0;
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out_no_mem:
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panic("Failed to allocate mem for bio crypt ctxs\n");
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}
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subsys_initcall(bio_crypt_ctx_init);
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void bio_crypt_set_ctx(struct bio *bio, const struct blk_crypto_key *key,
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const u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE], gfp_t gfp_mask)
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{
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struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc;
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/*
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* The caller must use a gfp_mask that contains __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM so
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* that the mempool_alloc() can't fail.
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*/
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WARN_ON_ONCE(!(gfp_mask & __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM));
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bc = mempool_alloc(bio_crypt_ctx_pool, gfp_mask);
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bc->bc_key = key;
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memcpy(bc->bc_dun, dun, sizeof(bc->bc_dun));
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bio->bi_crypt_context = bc;
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}
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void __bio_crypt_free_ctx(struct bio *bio)
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{
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mempool_free(bio->bi_crypt_context, bio_crypt_ctx_pool);
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bio->bi_crypt_context = NULL;
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}
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int __bio_crypt_clone(struct bio *dst, struct bio *src, gfp_t gfp_mask)
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{
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dst->bi_crypt_context = mempool_alloc(bio_crypt_ctx_pool, gfp_mask);
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if (!dst->bi_crypt_context)
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return -ENOMEM;
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*dst->bi_crypt_context = *src->bi_crypt_context;
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return 0;
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}
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/* Increments @dun by @inc, treating @dun as a multi-limb integer. */
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void bio_crypt_dun_increment(u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE],
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unsigned int inc)
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{
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int i;
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for (i = 0; inc && i < BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE; i++) {
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dun[i] += inc;
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/*
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* If the addition in this limb overflowed, then we need to
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* carry 1 into the next limb. Else the carry is 0.
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*/
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if (dun[i] < inc)
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inc = 1;
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else
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inc = 0;
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}
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}
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void __bio_crypt_advance(struct bio *bio, unsigned int bytes)
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{
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struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = bio->bi_crypt_context;
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bio_crypt_dun_increment(bc->bc_dun,
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bytes >> bc->bc_key->data_unit_size_bits);
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}
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/*
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* Returns true if @bc->bc_dun plus @bytes converted to data units is equal to
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* @next_dun, treating the DUNs as multi-limb integers.
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*/
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bool bio_crypt_dun_is_contiguous(const struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc,
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unsigned int bytes,
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const u64 next_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE])
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{
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int i;
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unsigned int carry = bytes >> bc->bc_key->data_unit_size_bits;
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for (i = 0; i < BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE; i++) {
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if (bc->bc_dun[i] + carry != next_dun[i])
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return false;
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/*
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* If the addition in this limb overflowed, then we need to
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* carry 1 into the next limb. Else the carry is 0.
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*/
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if ((bc->bc_dun[i] + carry) < carry)
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carry = 1;
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else
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carry = 0;
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}
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/* If the DUN wrapped through 0, don't treat it as contiguous. */
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return carry == 0;
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}
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/*
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* Checks that two bio crypt contexts are compatible - i.e. that
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* they are mergeable except for data_unit_num continuity.
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*/
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static bool bio_crypt_ctx_compatible(struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc1,
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struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc2)
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{
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if (!bc1)
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return !bc2;
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return bc2 && bc1->bc_key == bc2->bc_key;
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}
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bool bio_crypt_rq_ctx_compatible(struct request *rq, struct bio *bio)
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{
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return bio_crypt_ctx_compatible(rq->crypt_ctx, bio->bi_crypt_context);
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}
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/*
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* Checks that two bio crypt contexts are compatible, and also
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* that their data_unit_nums are continuous (and can hence be merged)
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* in the order @bc1 followed by @bc2.
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*/
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bool bio_crypt_ctx_mergeable(struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc1, unsigned int bc1_bytes,
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struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc2)
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{
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if (!bio_crypt_ctx_compatible(bc1, bc2))
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return false;
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return !bc1 || bio_crypt_dun_is_contiguous(bc1, bc1_bytes, bc2->bc_dun);
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}
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/* Check that all I/O segments are data unit aligned. */
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static bool bio_crypt_check_alignment(struct bio *bio)
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{
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const unsigned int data_unit_size =
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bio->bi_crypt_context->bc_key->crypto_cfg.data_unit_size;
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struct bvec_iter iter;
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struct bio_vec bv;
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bio_for_each_segment(bv, bio, iter) {
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if (!IS_ALIGNED(bv.bv_len | bv.bv_offset, data_unit_size))
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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blk_status_t __blk_crypto_init_request(struct request *rq)
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{
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return blk_crypto_get_keyslot(rq->q->crypto_profile,
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rq->crypt_ctx->bc_key,
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&rq->crypt_keyslot);
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}
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/**
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* __blk_crypto_free_request - Uninitialize the crypto fields of a request.
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*
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* @rq: The request whose crypto fields to uninitialize.
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*
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* Completely uninitializes the crypto fields of a request. If a keyslot has
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* been programmed into some inline encryption hardware, that keyslot is
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* released. The rq->crypt_ctx is also freed.
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*/
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void __blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq)
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{
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blk_crypto_put_keyslot(rq->crypt_keyslot);
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mempool_free(rq->crypt_ctx, bio_crypt_ctx_pool);
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blk_crypto_rq_set_defaults(rq);
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}
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/**
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* __blk_crypto_bio_prep - Prepare bio for inline encryption
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*
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* @bio_ptr: pointer to original bio pointer
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*
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* If the bio crypt context provided for the bio is supported by the underlying
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* device's inline encryption hardware, do nothing.
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*
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* Otherwise, try to perform en/decryption for this bio by falling back to the
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* kernel crypto API. When the crypto API fallback is used for encryption,
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* blk-crypto may choose to split the bio into 2 - the first one that will
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* continue to be processed and the second one that will be resubmitted via
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* submit_bio_noacct. A bounce bio will be allocated to encrypt the contents
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* of the aforementioned "first one", and *bio_ptr will be updated to this
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* bounce bio.
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*
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* Caller must ensure bio has bio_crypt_ctx.
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*
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* Return: true on success; false on error (and bio->bi_status will be set
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* appropriately, and bio_endio() will have been called so bio
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* submission should abort).
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*/
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bool __blk_crypto_bio_prep(struct bio **bio_ptr)
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{
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struct bio *bio = *bio_ptr;
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const struct blk_crypto_key *bc_key = bio->bi_crypt_context->bc_key;
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struct blk_crypto_profile *profile;
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/* Error if bio has no data. */
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!bio_has_data(bio))) {
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bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
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goto fail;
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}
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if (!bio_crypt_check_alignment(bio)) {
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bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
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goto fail;
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}
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/*
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* Success if device supports the encryption context, or if we succeeded
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* in falling back to the crypto API.
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*/
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profile = bdev_get_queue(bio->bi_bdev)->crypto_profile;
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if (__blk_crypto_cfg_supported(profile, &bc_key->crypto_cfg))
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return true;
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if (blk_crypto_fallback_bio_prep(bio_ptr))
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return true;
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fail:
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bio_endio(*bio_ptr);
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return false;
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}
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int __blk_crypto_rq_bio_prep(struct request *rq, struct bio *bio,
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gfp_t gfp_mask)
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{
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if (!rq->crypt_ctx) {
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rq->crypt_ctx = mempool_alloc(bio_crypt_ctx_pool, gfp_mask);
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if (!rq->crypt_ctx)
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return -ENOMEM;
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}
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*rq->crypt_ctx = *bio->bi_crypt_context;
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* blk_crypto_init_key() - Prepare a key for use with blk-crypto
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* @blk_key: Pointer to the blk_crypto_key to initialize.
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* @raw_key: Pointer to the raw key. Must be the correct length for the chosen
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* @crypto_mode; see blk_crypto_modes[].
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* @crypto_mode: identifier for the encryption algorithm to use
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* @dun_bytes: number of bytes that will be used to specify the DUN when this
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* key is used
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* @data_unit_size: the data unit size to use for en/decryption
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*
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* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure. The caller is responsible for
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* zeroizing both blk_key and raw_key when done with them.
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*/
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int blk_crypto_init_key(struct blk_crypto_key *blk_key, const u8 *raw_key,
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enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode,
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unsigned int dun_bytes,
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unsigned int data_unit_size)
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{
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const struct blk_crypto_mode *mode;
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memset(blk_key, 0, sizeof(*blk_key));
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if (crypto_mode >= ARRAY_SIZE(blk_crypto_modes))
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return -EINVAL;
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mode = &blk_crypto_modes[crypto_mode];
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if (mode->keysize == 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (dun_bytes == 0 || dun_bytes > mode->ivsize)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (!is_power_of_2(data_unit_size))
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return -EINVAL;
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blk_key->crypto_cfg.crypto_mode = crypto_mode;
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blk_key->crypto_cfg.dun_bytes = dun_bytes;
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blk_key->crypto_cfg.data_unit_size = data_unit_size;
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blk_key->data_unit_size_bits = ilog2(data_unit_size);
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blk_key->size = mode->keysize;
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memcpy(blk_key->raw, raw_key, mode->keysize);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Check if bios with @cfg can be en/decrypted by blk-crypto (i.e. either the
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* request queue it's submitted to supports inline crypto, or the
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* blk-crypto-fallback is enabled and supports the cfg).
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*/
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bool blk_crypto_config_supported(struct request_queue *q,
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const struct blk_crypto_config *cfg)
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{
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return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION_FALLBACK) ||
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__blk_crypto_cfg_supported(q->crypto_profile, cfg);
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}
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/**
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* blk_crypto_start_using_key() - Start using a blk_crypto_key on a device
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* @key: A key to use on the device
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* @q: the request queue for the device
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*
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* Upper layers must call this function to ensure that either the hardware
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* supports the key's crypto settings, or the crypto API fallback has transforms
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* for the needed mode allocated and ready to go. This function may allocate
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* an skcipher, and *should not* be called from the data path, since that might
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* cause a deadlock
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*
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* Return: 0 on success; -ENOPKG if the hardware doesn't support the key and
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* blk-crypto-fallback is either disabled or the needed algorithm
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* is disabled in the crypto API; or another -errno code.
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*/
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int blk_crypto_start_using_key(const struct blk_crypto_key *key,
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struct request_queue *q)
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{
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if (__blk_crypto_cfg_supported(q->crypto_profile, &key->crypto_cfg))
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return 0;
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return blk_crypto_fallback_start_using_mode(key->crypto_cfg.crypto_mode);
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}
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/**
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* blk_crypto_evict_key() - Evict a key from any inline encryption hardware
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* it may have been programmed into
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* @q: The request queue who's associated inline encryption hardware this key
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* might have been programmed into
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* @key: The key to evict
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*
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* Upper layers (filesystems) must call this function to ensure that a key is
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* evicted from any hardware that it might have been programmed into. The key
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* must not be in use by any in-flight IO when this function is called.
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*
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* Return: 0 on success or if the key wasn't in any keyslot; -errno on error.
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*/
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int blk_crypto_evict_key(struct request_queue *q,
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const struct blk_crypto_key *key)
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{
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if (__blk_crypto_cfg_supported(q->crypto_profile, &key->crypto_cfg))
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return __blk_crypto_evict_key(q->crypto_profile, key);
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/*
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* If the request_queue didn't support the key, then blk-crypto-fallback
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* may have been used, so try to evict the key from blk-crypto-fallback.
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*/
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return blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key(key);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_crypto_evict_key);
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