linux-stable/kernel/module_signing.c
David Howells caabe24057 MODSIGN: Move the magic string to the end of a module and eliminate the search
Emit the magic string that indicates a module has a signature after the
signature data instead of before it.  This allows module_sig_check() to
be made simpler and faster by the elimination of the search for the
magic string.  Instead we just need to do a single memcmp().

This works because at the end of the signature data there is the
fixed-length signature information block.  This block then falls
immediately prior to the magic number.

From the contents of the information block, it is trivial to calculate
the size of the signature data and thus the size of the actual module
data.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-10-19 17:30:40 -07:00

249 lines
5.9 KiB
C

/* Module signature checker
*
* Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include "module-internal.h"
/*
* Module signature information block.
*
* The constituents of the signature section are, in order:
*
* - Signer's name
* - Key identifier
* - Signature data
* - Information block
*/
struct module_signature {
enum pkey_algo algo : 8; /* Public-key crypto algorithm */
enum pkey_hash_algo hash : 8; /* Digest algorithm */
enum pkey_id_type id_type : 8; /* Key identifier type */
u8 signer_len; /* Length of signer's name */
u8 key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier */
u8 __pad[3];
__be32 sig_len; /* Length of signature data */
};
/*
* Digest the module contents.
*/
static struct public_key_signature *mod_make_digest(enum pkey_hash_algo hash,
const void *mod,
unsigned long modlen)
{
struct public_key_signature *pks;
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
struct shash_desc *desc;
size_t digest_size, desc_size;
int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
* big the hash operational data will be.
*/
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo[hash], 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG) : ERR_CAST(tfm);
desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
/* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of our
* context data and the digest output buffer on the end of that.
*/
ret = -ENOMEM;
pks = kzalloc(digest_size + sizeof(*pks) + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pks)
goto error_no_pks;
pks->pkey_hash_algo = hash;
pks->digest = (u8 *)pks + sizeof(*pks) + desc_size;
pks->digest_size = digest_size;
desc = (void *)pks + sizeof(*pks);
desc->tfm = tfm;
desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, mod, modlen, pks->digest);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
pr_devel("<==%s() = ok\n", __func__);
return pks;
error:
kfree(pks);
error_no_pks:
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
/*
* Extract an MPI array from the signature data. This represents the actual
* signature. Each raw MPI is prefaced by a BE 2-byte value indicating the
* size of the MPI in bytes.
*
* RSA signatures only have one MPI, so currently we only read one.
*/
static int mod_extract_mpi_array(struct public_key_signature *pks,
const void *data, size_t len)
{
size_t nbytes;
MPI mpi;
if (len < 3)
return -EBADMSG;
nbytes = ((const u8 *)data)[0] << 8 | ((const u8 *)data)[1];
data += 2;
len -= 2;
if (len != nbytes)
return -EBADMSG;
mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(data, nbytes);
if (!mpi)
return -ENOMEM;
pks->mpi[0] = mpi;
pks->nr_mpi = 1;
return 0;
}
/*
* Request an asymmetric key.
*/
static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
const u8 *key_id, size_t key_id_len)
{
key_ref_t key;
size_t i;
char *id, *q;
pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu,,%zu)\n", __func__, signer_len, key_id_len);
/* Construct an identifier. */
id = kmalloc(signer_len + 2 + key_id_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!id)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
memcpy(id, signer, signer_len);
q = id + signer_len;
*q++ = ':';
*q++ = ' ';
for (i = 0; i < key_id_len; i++) {
*q++ = hex_asc[*key_id >> 4];
*q++ = hex_asc[*key_id++ & 0x0f];
}
*q = 0;
pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1),
&key_type_asymmetric, id);
if (IS_ERR(key))
pr_warn("Request for unknown module key '%s' err %ld\n",
id, PTR_ERR(key));
kfree(id);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
/* Hide some search errors */
case -EACCES:
case -ENOTDIR:
case -EAGAIN:
return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
default:
return ERR_CAST(key);
}
}
pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key)));
return key_ref_to_ptr(key);
}
/*
* Verify the signature on a module.
*/
int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen)
{
struct public_key_signature *pks;
struct module_signature ms;
struct key *key;
const void *sig;
size_t modlen = *_modlen, sig_len;
int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s(,%lu)\n", __func__, modlen);
if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
return -EBADMSG;
memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
modlen -= sizeof(ms);
sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
if (sig_len >= modlen)
return -EBADMSG;
modlen -= sig_len;
if ((size_t)ms.signer_len + ms.key_id_len >= modlen)
return -EBADMSG;
modlen -= (size_t)ms.signer_len + ms.key_id_len;
*_modlen = modlen;
sig = mod + modlen;
/* For the moment, only support RSA and X.509 identifiers */
if (ms.algo != PKEY_ALGO_RSA ||
ms.id_type != PKEY_ID_X509)
return -ENOPKG;
if (ms.hash >= PKEY_HASH__LAST ||
!pkey_hash_algo[ms.hash])
return -ENOPKG;
key = request_asymmetric_key(sig, ms.signer_len,
sig + ms.signer_len, ms.key_id_len);
if (IS_ERR(key))
return PTR_ERR(key);
pks = mod_make_digest(ms.hash, mod, modlen);
if (IS_ERR(pks)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(pks);
goto error_put_key;
}
ret = mod_extract_mpi_array(pks, sig + ms.signer_len + ms.key_id_len,
sig_len);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_free_pks;
ret = verify_signature(key, pks);
pr_devel("verify_signature() = %d\n", ret);
error_free_pks:
mpi_free(pks->rsa.s);
kfree(pks);
error_put_key:
key_put(key);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}