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a421027987
Add documentation about protected KVM guests and description of changes that are necessary to move a KVM VM into Protected Virtualization mode. Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> [borntraeger@de.ibm.com: fixing and conversion to rst] Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
84 lines
3.1 KiB
ReStructuredText
84 lines
3.1 KiB
ReStructuredText
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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======================================
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s390 (IBM Z) Boot/IPL of Protected VMs
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======================================
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Summary
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-------
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The memory of Protected Virtual Machines (PVMs) is not accessible to
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I/O or the hypervisor. In those cases where the hypervisor needs to
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access the memory of a PVM, that memory must be made accessible.
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Memory made accessible to the hypervisor will be encrypted. See
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:doc:`s390-pv` for details."
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On IPL (boot) a small plaintext bootloader is started, which provides
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information about the encrypted components and necessary metadata to
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KVM to decrypt the protected virtual machine.
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Based on this data, KVM will make the protected virtual machine known
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to the Ultravisor (UV) and instruct it to secure the memory of the
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PVM, decrypt the components and verify the data and address list
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hashes, to ensure integrity. Afterwards KVM can run the PVM via the
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SIE instruction which the UV will intercept and execute on KVM's
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behalf.
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As the guest image is just like an opaque kernel image that does the
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switch into PV mode itself, the user can load encrypted guest
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executables and data via every available method (network, dasd, scsi,
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direct kernel, ...) without the need to change the boot process.
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Diag308
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-------
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This diagnose instruction is the basic mechanism to handle IPL and
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related operations for virtual machines. The VM can set and retrieve
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IPL information blocks, that specify the IPL method/devices and
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request VM memory and subsystem resets, as well as IPLs.
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For PVMs this concept has been extended with new subcodes:
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Subcode 8: Set an IPL Information Block of type 5 (information block
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for PVMs)
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Subcode 9: Store the saved block in guest memory
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Subcode 10: Move into Protected Virtualization mode
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The new PV load-device-specific-parameters field specifies all data
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that is necessary to move into PV mode.
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* PV Header origin
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* PV Header length
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* List of Components composed of
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* AES-XTS Tweak prefix
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* Origin
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* Size
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The PV header contains the keys and hashes, which the UV will use to
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decrypt and verify the PV, as well as control flags and a start PSW.
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The components are for instance an encrypted kernel, kernel parameters
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and initrd. The components are decrypted by the UV.
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After the initial import of the encrypted data, all defined pages will
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contain the guest content. All non-specified pages will start out as
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zero pages on first access.
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When running in protected virtualization mode, some subcodes will result in
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exceptions or return error codes.
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Subcodes 4 and 7, which specify operations that do not clear the guest
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memory, will result in specification exceptions. This is because the
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UV will clear all memory when a secure VM is removed, and therefore
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non-clearing IPL subcodes are not allowed.
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Subcodes 8, 9, 10 will result in specification exceptions.
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Re-IPL into a protected mode is only possible via a detour into non
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protected mode.
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Keys
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----
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Every CEC will have a unique public key to enable tooling to build
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encrypted images.
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See `s390-tools <https://github.com/ibm-s390-tools/s390-tools/>`_
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for the tooling.
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