mirror of
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
synced 2024-11-01 08:58:07 +00:00
f9a705ad1c
- New page table code for both hypervisor and guest stage-2 - Introduction of a new EL2-private host context - Allow EL2 to have its own private per-CPU variables - Support of PMU event filtering - Complete rework of the Spectre mitigation PPC: - Fix for running nested guests with in-kernel IRQ chip - Fix race condition causing occasional host hard lockup - Minor cleanups and bugfixes x86: - allow trapping unknown MSRs to userspace - allow userspace to force #GP on specific MSRs - INVPCID support on AMD - nested AMD cleanup, on demand allocation of nested SVM state - hide PV MSRs and hypercalls for features not enabled in CPUID - new test for MSR_IA32_TSC writes from host and guest - cleanups: MMU, CPUID, shared MSRs - LAPIC latency optimizations ad bugfixes For x86, also included in this pull request is a new alternative and (in the future) more scalable implementation of extended page tables that does not need a reverse map from guest physical addresses to host physical addresses. For now it is disabled by default because it is still lacking a few of the existing MMU's bells and whistles. However it is a very solid piece of work and it is already available for people to hammer on it. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQFIBAABCAAyFiEE8TM4V0tmI4mGbHaCv/vSX3jHroMFAl+S8dsUHHBib256aW5p QHJlZGhhdC5jb20ACgkQv/vSX3jHroM40Af+M46NJmuS5rcwFfybvK/c42KT6svX Co1NrZDwzSQ2mMy3WQzH9qeLvb+nbY4sT3n5BPNPNsT+aIDPOTDt//qJ2/Ip9UUs tRNea0MAR96JWLE7MSeeRxnTaQIrw/AAZC0RXFzZvxcgytXwdqBExugw4im+b+dn Dcz8QxX1EkwT+4lTm5HC0hKZAuo4apnK1QkqCq4SdD2QVJ1YE6+z7pgj4wX7xitr STKD6q/Yt/0ndwqS0GSGbyg0jy6mE620SN6isFRkJYwqfwLJci6KnqvEK67EcNMu qeE017K+d93yIVC46/6TfVHzLR/D1FpQ8LZ16Yl6S13OuGIfAWBkQZtPRg== =AD6a -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini: "For x86, there is a new alternative and (in the future) more scalable implementation of extended page tables that does not need a reverse map from guest physical addresses to host physical addresses. For now it is disabled by default because it is still lacking a few of the existing MMU's bells and whistles. However it is a very solid piece of work and it is already available for people to hammer on it. Other updates: ARM: - New page table code for both hypervisor and guest stage-2 - Introduction of a new EL2-private host context - Allow EL2 to have its own private per-CPU variables - Support of PMU event filtering - Complete rework of the Spectre mitigation PPC: - Fix for running nested guests with in-kernel IRQ chip - Fix race condition causing occasional host hard lockup - Minor cleanups and bugfixes x86: - allow trapping unknown MSRs to userspace - allow userspace to force #GP on specific MSRs - INVPCID support on AMD - nested AMD cleanup, on demand allocation of nested SVM state - hide PV MSRs and hypercalls for features not enabled in CPUID - new test for MSR_IA32_TSC writes from host and guest - cleanups: MMU, CPUID, shared MSRs - LAPIC latency optimizations ad bugfixes" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (232 commits) kvm: x86/mmu: NX largepage recovery for TDP MMU kvm: x86/mmu: Don't clear write flooding count for direct roots kvm: x86/mmu: Support MMIO in the TDP MMU kvm: x86/mmu: Support write protection for nesting in tdp MMU kvm: x86/mmu: Support disabling dirty logging for the tdp MMU kvm: x86/mmu: Support dirty logging for the TDP MMU kvm: x86/mmu: Support changed pte notifier in tdp MMU kvm: x86/mmu: Add access tracking for tdp_mmu kvm: x86/mmu: Support invalidate range MMU notifier for TDP MMU kvm: x86/mmu: Allocate struct kvm_mmu_pages for all pages in TDP MMU kvm: x86/mmu: Add TDP MMU PF handler kvm: x86/mmu: Remove disallowed_hugepage_adjust shadow_walk_iterator arg kvm: x86/mmu: Support zapping SPTEs in the TDP MMU KVM: Cache as_id in kvm_memory_slot kvm: x86/mmu: Add functions to handle changed TDP SPTEs kvm: x86/mmu: Allocate and free TDP MMU roots kvm: x86/mmu: Init / Uninit the TDP MMU kvm: x86/mmu: Introduce tdp_iter KVM: mmu: extract spte.h and spte.c KVM: mmu: Separate updating a PTE from kvm_set_pte_rmapp ...
1205 lines
27 KiB
C
1205 lines
27 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/*
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* Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
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*
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* AMD SVM-SEV support
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*
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* Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
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*/
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#include <linux/kvm_types.h>
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#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/highmem.h>
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#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
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#include <linux/pagemap.h>
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#include <linux/swap.h>
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#include "x86.h"
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#include "svm.h"
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static int sev_flush_asids(void);
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static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock);
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static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_bitmap_lock);
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unsigned int max_sev_asid;
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static unsigned int min_sev_asid;
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static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
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static unsigned long *sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap;
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#define __sme_page_pa(x) __sme_set(page_to_pfn(x) << PAGE_SHIFT)
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struct enc_region {
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struct list_head list;
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unsigned long npages;
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struct page **pages;
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unsigned long uaddr;
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unsigned long size;
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};
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static int sev_flush_asids(void)
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{
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int ret, error = 0;
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/*
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* DEACTIVATE will clear the WBINVD indicator causing DF_FLUSH to fail,
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* so it must be guarded.
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*/
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down_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
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wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
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ret = sev_guest_df_flush(&error);
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up_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
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if (ret)
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pr_err("SEV: DF_FLUSH failed, ret=%d, error=%#x\n", ret, error);
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return ret;
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}
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/* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */
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static bool __sev_recycle_asids(void)
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{
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int pos;
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/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */
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pos = find_next_bit(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap,
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max_sev_asid, min_sev_asid - 1);
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if (pos >= max_sev_asid)
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return false;
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if (sev_flush_asids())
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return false;
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bitmap_xor(sev_asid_bitmap, sev_asid_bitmap, sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap,
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max_sev_asid);
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bitmap_zero(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid);
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return true;
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}
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static int sev_asid_new(void)
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{
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bool retry = true;
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int pos;
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mutex_lock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
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/*
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* SEV-enabled guest must use asid from min_sev_asid to max_sev_asid.
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*/
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again:
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pos = find_next_zero_bit(sev_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_sev_asid - 1);
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if (pos >= max_sev_asid) {
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if (retry && __sev_recycle_asids()) {
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retry = false;
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goto again;
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}
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mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
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return -EBUSY;
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}
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__set_bit(pos, sev_asid_bitmap);
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mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
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return pos + 1;
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}
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static int sev_get_asid(struct kvm *kvm)
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{
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struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
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return sev->asid;
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}
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static void sev_asid_free(int asid)
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{
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struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
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int cpu, pos;
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mutex_lock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
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pos = asid - 1;
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__set_bit(pos, sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap);
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for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
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sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
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sd->sev_vmcbs[pos] = NULL;
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}
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mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
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}
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static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle)
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{
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struct sev_data_decommission *decommission;
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struct sev_data_deactivate *data;
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if (!handle)
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return;
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data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!data)
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return;
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/* deactivate handle */
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data->handle = handle;
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/* Guard DEACTIVATE against WBINVD/DF_FLUSH used in ASID recycling */
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down_read(&sev_deactivate_lock);
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sev_guest_deactivate(data, NULL);
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up_read(&sev_deactivate_lock);
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kfree(data);
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decommission = kzalloc(sizeof(*decommission), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!decommission)
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return;
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/* decommission handle */
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decommission->handle = handle;
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sev_guest_decommission(decommission, NULL);
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kfree(decommission);
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}
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static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
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{
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struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
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int asid, ret;
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ret = -EBUSY;
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if (unlikely(sev->active))
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return ret;
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asid = sev_asid_new();
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if (asid < 0)
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return ret;
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ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
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if (ret)
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goto e_free;
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sev->active = true;
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sev->asid = asid;
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INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->regions_list);
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return 0;
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e_free:
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sev_asid_free(asid);
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return ret;
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}
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static int sev_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle, int *error)
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{
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struct sev_data_activate *data;
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int asid = sev_get_asid(kvm);
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int ret;
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data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
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if (!data)
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return -ENOMEM;
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/* activate ASID on the given handle */
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data->handle = handle;
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data->asid = asid;
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ret = sev_guest_activate(data, error);
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kfree(data);
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return ret;
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}
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static int __sev_issue_cmd(int fd, int id, void *data, int *error)
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{
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struct fd f;
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int ret;
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f = fdget(fd);
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if (!f.file)
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return -EBADF;
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ret = sev_issue_cmd_external_user(f.file, id, data, error);
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fdput(f);
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return ret;
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}
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static int sev_issue_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, int id, void *data, int *error)
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{
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struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
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return __sev_issue_cmd(sev->fd, id, data, error);
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}
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static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
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{
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struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
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struct sev_data_launch_start *start;
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struct kvm_sev_launch_start params;
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void *dh_blob, *session_blob;
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int *error = &argp->error;
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int ret;
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if (!sev_guest(kvm))
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return -ENOTTY;
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if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
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return -EFAULT;
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start = kzalloc(sizeof(*start), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
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if (!start)
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return -ENOMEM;
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dh_blob = NULL;
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if (params.dh_uaddr) {
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dh_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.dh_uaddr, params.dh_len);
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if (IS_ERR(dh_blob)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(dh_blob);
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goto e_free;
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}
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start->dh_cert_address = __sme_set(__pa(dh_blob));
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start->dh_cert_len = params.dh_len;
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}
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session_blob = NULL;
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if (params.session_uaddr) {
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session_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr, params.session_len);
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if (IS_ERR(session_blob)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(session_blob);
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goto e_free_dh;
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}
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start->session_address = __sme_set(__pa(session_blob));
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start->session_len = params.session_len;
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}
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start->handle = params.handle;
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start->policy = params.policy;
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/* create memory encryption context */
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ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START, start, error);
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if (ret)
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goto e_free_session;
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/* Bind ASID to this guest */
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ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start->handle, error);
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if (ret)
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goto e_free_session;
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/* return handle to userspace */
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params.handle = start->handle;
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if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params))) {
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sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start->handle);
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ret = -EFAULT;
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goto e_free_session;
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}
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sev->handle = start->handle;
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sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
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e_free_session:
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kfree(session_blob);
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e_free_dh:
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kfree(dh_blob);
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e_free:
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kfree(start);
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return ret;
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}
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static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr,
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unsigned long ulen, unsigned long *n,
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int write)
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{
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struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
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unsigned long npages, size;
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int npinned;
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unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
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struct page **pages;
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unsigned long first, last;
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int ret;
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if (ulen == 0 || uaddr + ulen < uaddr)
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return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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/* Calculate number of pages. */
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first = (uaddr & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
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last = ((uaddr + ulen - 1) & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
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npages = (last - first + 1);
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locked = sev->pages_locked + npages;
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lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
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if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
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pr_err("SEV: %lu locked pages exceed the lock limit of %lu.\n", locked, lock_limit);
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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}
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(npages > INT_MAX))
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return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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/* Avoid using vmalloc for smaller buffers. */
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size = npages * sizeof(struct page *);
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if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
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pages = __vmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
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else
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pages = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
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if (!pages)
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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/* Pin the user virtual address. */
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npinned = pin_user_pages_fast(uaddr, npages, write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, pages);
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if (npinned != npages) {
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pr_err("SEV: Failure locking %lu pages.\n", npages);
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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goto err;
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}
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*n = npages;
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sev->pages_locked = locked;
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|
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return pages;
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err:
|
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if (npinned > 0)
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unpin_user_pages(pages, npinned);
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kvfree(pages);
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return ERR_PTR(ret);
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}
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|
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static void sev_unpin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, struct page **pages,
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unsigned long npages)
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{
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struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
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unpin_user_pages(pages, npages);
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kvfree(pages);
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sev->pages_locked -= npages;
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}
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static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages)
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{
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uint8_t *page_virtual;
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unsigned long i;
|
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|
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if (this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT) || npages == 0 ||
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pages == NULL)
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return;
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for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
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page_virtual = kmap_atomic(pages[i]);
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clflush_cache_range(page_virtual, PAGE_SIZE);
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kunmap_atomic(page_virtual);
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}
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}
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static unsigned long get_num_contig_pages(unsigned long idx,
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struct page **inpages, unsigned long npages)
|
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{
|
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unsigned long paddr, next_paddr;
|
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unsigned long i = idx + 1, pages = 1;
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|
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/* find the number of contiguous pages starting from idx */
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paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[idx]);
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while (i < npages) {
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next_paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i++]);
|
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if ((paddr + PAGE_SIZE) == next_paddr) {
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pages++;
|
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paddr = next_paddr;
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continue;
|
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}
|
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break;
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}
|
|
|
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return pages;
|
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}
|
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|
|
static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
|
|
{
|
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unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr, npages, pages, size, i;
|
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struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
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struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data params;
|
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struct sev_data_launch_update_data *data;
|
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struct page **inpages;
|
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int ret;
|
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|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
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return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
|
|
if (!data)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
vaddr = params.uaddr;
|
|
size = params.len;
|
|
vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
|
|
|
|
/* Lock the user memory. */
|
|
inpages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr, size, &npages, 1);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(inpages)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(inpages);
|
|
goto e_free;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before LAUNCH_UPDATE encrypts pages in
|
|
* place; the cache may contain the data that was written unencrypted.
|
|
*/
|
|
sev_clflush_pages(inpages, npages);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr, i += pages) {
|
|
int offset, len;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the user buffer is not page-aligned, calculate the offset
|
|
* within the page.
|
|
*/
|
|
offset = vaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
|
|
|
|
/* Calculate the number of pages that can be encrypted in one go. */
|
|
pages = get_num_contig_pages(i, inpages, npages);
|
|
|
|
len = min_t(size_t, ((pages * PAGE_SIZE) - offset), size);
|
|
|
|
data->handle = sev->handle;
|
|
data->len = len;
|
|
data->address = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i]) + offset;
|
|
ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, data, &argp->error);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto e_unpin;
|
|
|
|
size -= len;
|
|
next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
e_unpin:
|
|
/* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
|
|
set_page_dirty_lock(inpages[i]);
|
|
mark_page_accessed(inpages[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
/* unlock the user pages */
|
|
sev_unpin_memory(kvm, inpages, npages);
|
|
e_free:
|
|
kfree(data);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
void __user *measure = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct sev_data_launch_measure *data;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_launch_measure params;
|
|
void __user *p = NULL;
|
|
void *blob = NULL;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, measure, sizeof(params)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
|
|
if (!data)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
/* User wants to query the blob length */
|
|
if (!params.len)
|
|
goto cmd;
|
|
|
|
p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr;
|
|
if (p) {
|
|
if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) {
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
goto e_free;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!blob)
|
|
goto e_free;
|
|
|
|
data->address = __psp_pa(blob);
|
|
data->len = params.len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cmd:
|
|
data->handle = sev->handle;
|
|
ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE, data, &argp->error);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!params.len)
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto e_free_blob;
|
|
|
|
if (blob) {
|
|
if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len))
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
params.len = data->len;
|
|
if (copy_to_user(measure, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
e_free_blob:
|
|
kfree(blob);
|
|
e_free:
|
|
kfree(data);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_launch_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct sev_data_launch_finish *data;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
|
|
if (!data)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
data->handle = sev->handle;
|
|
ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_FINISH, data, &argp->error);
|
|
|
|
kfree(data);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_guest_status(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_guest_status params;
|
|
struct sev_data_guest_status *data;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
|
|
if (!data)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
data->handle = sev->handle;
|
|
ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS, data, &argp->error);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto e_free;
|
|
|
|
params.policy = data->policy;
|
|
params.state = data->state;
|
|
params.handle = data->handle;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
e_free:
|
|
kfree(data);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src,
|
|
unsigned long dst, int size,
|
|
int *error, bool enc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct sev_data_dbg *data;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
|
|
if (!data)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
data->handle = sev->handle;
|
|
data->dst_addr = dst;
|
|
data->src_addr = src;
|
|
data->len = size;
|
|
|
|
ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm,
|
|
enc ? SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT : SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT,
|
|
data, error);
|
|
kfree(data);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int __sev_dbg_decrypt(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src_paddr,
|
|
unsigned long dst_paddr, int sz, int *err)
|
|
{
|
|
int offset;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Its safe to read more than we are asked, caller should ensure that
|
|
* destination has enough space.
|
|
*/
|
|
src_paddr = round_down(src_paddr, 16);
|
|
offset = src_paddr & 15;
|
|
sz = round_up(sz + offset, 16);
|
|
|
|
return __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, src_paddr, dst_paddr, sz, err, false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
|
|
unsigned long __user dst_uaddr,
|
|
unsigned long dst_paddr,
|
|
int size, int *err)
|
|
{
|
|
struct page *tpage = NULL;
|
|
int ret, offset;
|
|
|
|
/* if inputs are not 16-byte then use intermediate buffer */
|
|
if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_paddr, 16) ||
|
|
!IS_ALIGNED(paddr, 16) ||
|
|
!IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
|
|
tpage = (void *)alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!tpage)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
dst_paddr = __sme_page_pa(tpage);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, size, err);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto e_free;
|
|
|
|
if (tpage) {
|
|
offset = paddr & 15;
|
|
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)dst_uaddr,
|
|
page_address(tpage) + offset, size))
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
e_free:
|
|
if (tpage)
|
|
__free_page(tpage);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
|
|
unsigned long __user vaddr,
|
|
unsigned long dst_paddr,
|
|
unsigned long __user dst_vaddr,
|
|
int size, int *error)
|
|
{
|
|
struct page *src_tpage = NULL;
|
|
struct page *dst_tpage = NULL;
|
|
int ret, len = size;
|
|
|
|
/* If source buffer is not aligned then use an intermediate buffer */
|
|
if (!IS_ALIGNED(vaddr, 16)) {
|
|
src_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!src_tpage)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(page_address(src_tpage),
|
|
(void __user *)(uintptr_t)vaddr, size)) {
|
|
__free_page(src_tpage);
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
paddr = __sme_page_pa(src_tpage);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If destination buffer or length is not aligned then do read-modify-write:
|
|
* - decrypt destination in an intermediate buffer
|
|
* - copy the source buffer in an intermediate buffer
|
|
* - use the intermediate buffer as source buffer
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_vaddr, 16) || !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
|
|
int dst_offset;
|
|
|
|
dst_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!dst_tpage) {
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
goto e_free;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, dst_paddr,
|
|
__sme_page_pa(dst_tpage), size, error);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto e_free;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If source is kernel buffer then use memcpy() otherwise
|
|
* copy_from_user().
|
|
*/
|
|
dst_offset = dst_paddr & 15;
|
|
|
|
if (src_tpage)
|
|
memcpy(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
|
|
page_address(src_tpage), size);
|
|
else {
|
|
if (copy_from_user(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
|
|
(void __user *)(uintptr_t)vaddr, size)) {
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
goto e_free;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
paddr = __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage);
|
|
dst_paddr = round_down(dst_paddr, 16);
|
|
len = round_up(size, 16);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, len, error, true);
|
|
|
|
e_free:
|
|
if (src_tpage)
|
|
__free_page(src_tpage);
|
|
if (dst_tpage)
|
|
__free_page(dst_tpage);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, bool dec)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr;
|
|
unsigned long dst_vaddr;
|
|
struct page **src_p, **dst_p;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_dbg debug;
|
|
unsigned long n;
|
|
unsigned int size;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&debug, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(debug)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
if (!debug.len || debug.src_uaddr + debug.len < debug.src_uaddr)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (!debug.dst_uaddr)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
vaddr = debug.src_uaddr;
|
|
size = debug.len;
|
|
vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
|
|
dst_vaddr = debug.dst_uaddr;
|
|
|
|
for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr) {
|
|
int len, s_off, d_off;
|
|
|
|
/* lock userspace source and destination page */
|
|
src_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(src_p))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(src_p);
|
|
|
|
dst_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, dst_vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 1);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(dst_p)) {
|
|
sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
|
|
return PTR_ERR(dst_p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before DBG_{DE,EN}CRYPT read or modify
|
|
* the pages; flush the destination too so that future accesses do not
|
|
* see stale data.
|
|
*/
|
|
sev_clflush_pages(src_p, 1);
|
|
sev_clflush_pages(dst_p, 1);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Since user buffer may not be page aligned, calculate the
|
|
* offset within the page.
|
|
*/
|
|
s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
|
|
d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
|
|
len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size);
|
|
|
|
if (dec)
|
|
ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(kvm,
|
|
__sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
|
|
dst_vaddr,
|
|
__sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
|
|
len, &argp->error);
|
|
else
|
|
ret = __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(kvm,
|
|
__sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
|
|
vaddr,
|
|
__sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
|
|
dst_vaddr,
|
|
len, &argp->error);
|
|
|
|
sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
|
|
sev_unpin_memory(kvm, dst_p, n);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
|
|
dst_vaddr = dst_vaddr + len;
|
|
size -= len;
|
|
}
|
|
err:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct sev_data_launch_secret *data;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_launch_secret params;
|
|
struct page **pages;
|
|
void *blob, *hdr;
|
|
unsigned long n, i;
|
|
int ret, offset;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr, params.guest_len, &n, 1);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(pages))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(pages);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before LAUNCH_SECRET encrypts pages in
|
|
* place; the cache may contain the data that was written unencrypted.
|
|
*/
|
|
sev_clflush_pages(pages, n);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The secret must be copied into contiguous memory region, lets verify
|
|
* that userspace memory pages are contiguous before we issue command.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (get_num_contig_pages(0, pages, n) != n) {
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
goto e_unpin_memory;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
|
|
if (!data)
|
|
goto e_unpin_memory;
|
|
|
|
offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
|
|
data->guest_address = __sme_page_pa(pages[0]) + offset;
|
|
data->guest_len = params.guest_len;
|
|
|
|
blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(blob)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(blob);
|
|
goto e_free;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data->trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);
|
|
data->trans_len = params.trans_len;
|
|
|
|
hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(hdr)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(hdr);
|
|
goto e_free_blob;
|
|
}
|
|
data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
|
|
data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
|
|
|
|
data->handle = sev->handle;
|
|
ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, data, &argp->error);
|
|
|
|
kfree(hdr);
|
|
|
|
e_free_blob:
|
|
kfree(blob);
|
|
e_free:
|
|
kfree(data);
|
|
e_unpin_memory:
|
|
/* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
|
|
set_page_dirty_lock(pages[i]);
|
|
mark_page_accessed(pages[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
sev_unpin_memory(kvm, pages, n);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
if (!svm_sev_enabled())
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
if (!argp)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&sev_cmd, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
|
|
switch (sev_cmd.id) {
|
|
case KVM_SEV_INIT:
|
|
r = sev_guest_init(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START:
|
|
r = sev_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA:
|
|
r = sev_launch_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE:
|
|
r = sev_launch_measure(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH:
|
|
r = sev_launch_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS:
|
|
r = sev_guest_status(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT:
|
|
r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, true);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT:
|
|
r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, false);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET:
|
|
r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
r = -EINVAL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(argp, &sev_cmd, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
|
|
r = -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
|
|
struct kvm_enc_region *range)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct enc_region *region;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
if (range->addr > ULONG_MAX || range->size > ULONG_MAX)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
region = kzalloc(sizeof(*region), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
|
|
if (!region)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
region->pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, range->addr, range->size, ®ion->npages, 1);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(region->pages)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(region->pages);
|
|
goto e_free;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1
|
|
* or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are
|
|
* flushed to ensure that guest data gets written into memory with
|
|
* correct C-bit.
|
|
*/
|
|
sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages);
|
|
|
|
region->uaddr = range->addr;
|
|
region->size = range->size;
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
list_add_tail(®ion->list, &sev->regions_list);
|
|
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
e_free:
|
|
kfree(region);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct enc_region *
|
|
find_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
|
|
struct enc_region *i;
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(i, head, list) {
|
|
if (i->uaddr == range->addr &&
|
|
i->size == range->size)
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void __unregister_enc_region_locked(struct kvm *kvm,
|
|
struct enc_region *region)
|
|
{
|
|
sev_unpin_memory(kvm, region->pages, region->npages);
|
|
list_del(®ion->list);
|
|
kfree(region);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
|
|
struct kvm_enc_region *range)
|
|
{
|
|
struct enc_region *region;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm)) {
|
|
ret = -ENOTTY;
|
|
goto failed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
region = find_enc_region(kvm, range);
|
|
if (!region) {
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
goto failed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before
|
|
* releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will
|
|
* not do this, so issue a WBINVD.
|
|
*/
|
|
wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
|
|
|
|
__unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm, region);
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
failed:
|
|
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
|
|
struct list_head *pos, *q;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before
|
|
* releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will
|
|
* not do this, so issue a WBINVD.
|
|
*/
|
|
wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* if userspace was terminated before unregistering the memory regions
|
|
* then lets unpin all the registered memory.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!list_empty(head)) {
|
|
list_for_each_safe(pos, q, head) {
|
|
__unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm,
|
|
list_entry(pos, struct enc_region, list));
|
|
cond_resched();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
|
|
sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
|
|
sev_asid_free(sev->asid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sev_user_data_status *status;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
/* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */
|
|
max_sev_asid = cpuid_ecx(0x8000001F);
|
|
|
|
if (!svm_sev_enabled())
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */
|
|
min_sev_asid = cpuid_edx(0x8000001F);
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize SEV ASID bitmaps */
|
|
sev_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(max_sev_asid, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!sev_asid_bitmap)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(max_sev_asid, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
status = kmalloc(sizeof(*status), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!status)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check SEV platform status.
|
|
*
|
|
* PLATFORM_STATUS can be called in any state, if we failed to query
|
|
* the PLATFORM status then either PSP firmware does not support SEV
|
|
* feature or SEV firmware is dead.
|
|
*/
|
|
rc = sev_platform_status(status, NULL);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
pr_info("SEV supported\n");
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
kfree(status);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!svm_sev_enabled())
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
|
|
bitmap_free(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap);
|
|
|
|
sev_flush_asids();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu)
|
|
{
|
|
struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
|
|
int asid = sev_get_asid(svm->vcpu.kvm);
|
|
|
|
/* Assign the asid allocated with this SEV guest */
|
|
svm->vmcb->control.asid = asid;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Flush guest TLB:
|
|
*
|
|
* 1) when different VMCB for the same ASID is to be run on the same host CPU.
|
|
* 2) or this VMCB was executed on different host CPU in previous VMRUNs.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] == svm->vmcb &&
|
|
svm->vcpu.arch.last_vmentry_cpu == cpu)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = svm->vmcb;
|
|
svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID;
|
|
vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);
|
|
}
|