linux-stable/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
Walter Wu 8cceeff48f kasan: detect negative size in memory operation function
Patch series "fix the missing underflow in memory operation function", v4.

The patchset helps to produce a KASAN report when size is negative in
memory operation functions.  It is helpful for programmer to solve an
undefined behavior issue.  Patch 1 based on Dmitry's review and
suggestion, patch 2 is a test in order to verify the patch 1.

[1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341
[2]https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20190927034338.15813-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com/

This patch (of 2):

KASAN missed detecting size is a negative number in memset(), memcpy(),
and memmove(), it will cause out-of-bounds bug.  So needs to be detected
by KASAN.

If size is a negative number, then it has a reason to be defined as
out-of-bounds bug type.  Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed
turn up as a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.

KASAN report is shown below:

 BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0
 Read of size 18446744073709551608 at addr ffffff8069660904 by task cat/72

 CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004ajb-00001-gdb8af2f372b2-dirty #1
 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
 Call trace:
  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x288
  show_stack+0x14/0x20
  dump_stack+0x10c/0x164
  print_address_description.isra.9+0x68/0x378
  __kasan_report+0x164/0x1a0
  kasan_report+0xc/0x18
  check_memory_region+0x174/0x1d0
  memmove+0x34/0x88
  kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0

[1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341

[cai@lca.pw: fix -Wdeclaration-after-statement warn]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1583509030-27939-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw
[peterz@infradead.org: fix objtool warning]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200305095436.GV2596@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191112065302.7015-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-04-02 09:35:30 -07:00

164 lines
4.5 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* This file contains generic KASAN specific error reporting code.
*
* Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
* Author: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
*
* Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by
* Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
*/
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/ftrace.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/stackdepot.h>
#include <linux/stacktrace.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/kasan.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include "kasan.h"
#include "../slab.h"
void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size)
{
void *p = addr;
while (p < addr + size && !(*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(p)))
p += KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
return p;
}
static const char *get_shadow_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
{
const char *bug_type = "unknown-crash";
u8 *shadow_addr;
shadow_addr = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr);
/*
* If shadow byte value is in [0, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) we can look
* at the next shadow byte to determine the type of the bad access.
*/
if (*shadow_addr > 0 && *shadow_addr <= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
shadow_addr++;
switch (*shadow_addr) {
case 0 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1:
/*
* In theory it's still possible to see these shadow values
* due to a data race in the kernel code.
*/
bug_type = "out-of-bounds";
break;
case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
case KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE:
bug_type = "slab-out-of-bounds";
break;
case KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE:
bug_type = "global-out-of-bounds";
break;
case KASAN_STACK_LEFT:
case KASAN_STACK_MID:
case KASAN_STACK_RIGHT:
case KASAN_STACK_PARTIAL:
bug_type = "stack-out-of-bounds";
break;
case KASAN_FREE_PAGE:
case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE:
bug_type = "use-after-free";
break;
case KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT:
case KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT:
bug_type = "alloca-out-of-bounds";
break;
case KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID:
bug_type = "vmalloc-out-of-bounds";
break;
}
return bug_type;
}
static const char *get_wild_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
{
const char *bug_type = "unknown-crash";
if ((unsigned long)info->access_addr < PAGE_SIZE)
bug_type = "null-ptr-deref";
else if ((unsigned long)info->access_addr < TASK_SIZE)
bug_type = "user-memory-access";
else
bug_type = "wild-memory-access";
return bug_type;
}
const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
{
/*
* If access_size is a negative number, then it has reason to be
* defined as out-of-bounds bug type.
*
* Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as
* a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
* so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
*/
if (info->access_addr + info->access_size < info->access_addr)
return "out-of-bounds";
if (addr_has_shadow(info->access_addr))
return get_shadow_bug_type(info);
return get_wild_bug_type(info);
}
#define DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_LOAD(size) \
void __asan_report_load##size##_noabort(unsigned long addr) \
{ \
kasan_report(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_); \
} \
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_report_load##size##_noabort)
#define DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_STORE(size) \
void __asan_report_store##size##_noabort(unsigned long addr) \
{ \
kasan_report(addr, size, true, _RET_IP_); \
} \
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_report_store##size##_noabort)
DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_LOAD(1);
DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_LOAD(2);
DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_LOAD(4);
DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_LOAD(8);
DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_LOAD(16);
DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_STORE(1);
DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_STORE(2);
DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_STORE(4);
DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_STORE(8);
DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_STORE(16);
void __asan_report_load_n_noabort(unsigned long addr, size_t size)
{
kasan_report(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_report_load_n_noabort);
void __asan_report_store_n_noabort(unsigned long addr, size_t size)
{
kasan_report(addr, size, true, _RET_IP_);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_report_store_n_noabort);