linux-stable/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
Linus Torvalds 8cb1ae19bf x86/fpu updates:
- Cleanup of extable fixup handling to be more robust, which in turn
    allows to make the FPU exception fixups more robust as well.
 
  - Change the return code for signal frame related failures from explicit
    error codes to a boolean fail/success as that's all what the calling
    code evaluates.
 
  - A large refactoring of the FPU code to prepare for adding AMX support:
 
    - Distangle the public header maze and remove especially the misnomed
      kitchen sink internal.h which is despite it's name included all over
      the place.
 
    - Add a proper abstraction for the register buffer storage (struct
      fpstate) which allows to dynamically size the buffer at runtime by
      flipping the pointer to the buffer container from the default
      container which is embedded in task_struct::tread::fpu to a
      dynamically allocated container with a larger register buffer.
 
    - Convert the code over to the new fpstate mechanism.
 
    - Consolidate the KVM FPU handling by moving the FPU related code into
      the FPU core which removes the number of exports and avoids adding
      even more export when AMX has to be supported in KVM. This also
      removes duplicated code which was of course unnecessary different and
      incomplete in the KVM copy.
 
    - Simplify the KVM FPU buffer handling by utilizing the new fpstate
      container and just switching the buffer pointer from the user space
      buffer to the KVM guest buffer when entering vcpu_run() and flipping
      it back when leaving the function. This cuts the memory requirements
      of a vCPU for FPU buffers in half and avoids pointless memory copy
      operations.
 
      This also solves the so far unresolved problem of adding AMX support
      because the current FPU buffer handling of KVM inflicted a circular
      dependency between adding AMX support to the core and to KVM.  With
      the new scheme of switching fpstate AMX support can be added to the
      core code without affecting KVM.
 
    - Replace various variables with proper data structures so the extra
      information required for adding dynamically enabled FPU features (AMX)
      can be added in one place
 
  - Add AMX (Advanved Matrix eXtensions) support (finally):
 
     AMX is a large XSTATE component which is going to be available with
     Saphire Rapids XEON CPUs. The feature comes with an extra MSR (MSR_XFD)
     which allows to trap the (first) use of an AMX related instruction,
     which has two benefits:
 
     1) It allows the kernel to control access to the feature
 
     2) It allows the kernel to dynamically allocate the large register
        state buffer instead of burdening every task with the the extra 8K
        or larger state storage.
 
     It would have been great to gain this kind of control already with
     AVX512.
 
     The support comes with the following infrastructure components:
 
     1) arch_prctl() to
        - read the supported features (equivalent to XGETBV(0))
        - read the permitted features for a task
        - request permission for a dynamically enabled feature
 
        Permission is granted per process, inherited on fork() and cleared
        on exec(). The permission policy of the kernel is restricted to
        sigaltstack size validation, but the syscall obviously allows
        further restrictions via seccomp etc.
 
     2) A stronger sigaltstack size validation for sys_sigaltstack(2) which
        takes granted permissions and the potentially resulting larger
        signal frame into account. This mechanism can also be used to
        enforce factual sigaltstack validation independent of dynamic
        features to help with finding potential victims of the 2K
        sigaltstack size constant which is broken since AVX512 support was
        added.
 
     3) Exception handling for #NM traps to catch first use of a extended
        feature via a new cause MSR. If the exception was caused by the use
        of such a feature, the handler checks permission for that
        feature. If permission has not been granted, the handler sends a
        SIGILL like the #UD handler would do if the feature would have been
        disabled in XCR0. If permission has been granted, then a new fpstate
        which fits the larger buffer requirement is allocated.
 
        In the unlikely case that this allocation fails, the handler sends
        SIGSEGV to the task. That's not elegant, but unavoidable as the
        other discussed options of preallocation or full per task
        permissions come with their own set of horrors for kernel and/or
        userspace. So this is the lesser of the evils and SIGSEGV caused by
        unexpected memory allocation failures is not a fundamentally new
        concept either.
 
        When allocation succeeds, the fpstate properties are filled in to
        reflect the extended feature set and the resulting sizes, the
        fpu::fpstate pointer is updated accordingly and the trap is disarmed
        for this task permanently.
 
     4) Enumeration and size calculations
 
     5) Trap switching via MSR_XFD
 
        The XFD (eXtended Feature Disable) MSR is context switched with the
        same life time rules as the FPU register state itself. The mechanism
        is keyed off with a static key which is default disabled so !AMX
        equipped CPUs have zero overhead. On AMX enabled CPUs the overhead
        is limited by comparing the tasks XFD value with a per CPU shadow
        variable to avoid redundant MSR writes. In case of switching from a
        AMX using task to a non AMX using task or vice versa, the extra MSR
        write is obviously inevitable.
 
        All other places which need to be aware of the variable feature sets
        and resulting variable sizes are not affected at all because they
        retrieve the information (feature set, sizes) unconditonally from
        the fpstate properties.
 
     6) Enable the new AMX states
 
   Note, this is relatively new code despite the fact that AMX support is in
   the works for more than a year now.
 
   The big refactoring of the FPU code, which allowed to do a proper
   integration has been started exactly 3 weeks ago. Refactoring of the
   existing FPU code and of the original AMX patches took a week and has
   been subject to extensive review and testing. The only fallout which has
   not been caught in review and testing right away was restricted to AMX
   enabled systems, which is completely irrelevant for anyone outside Intel
   and their early access program. There might be dragons lurking as usual,
   but so far the fine grained refactoring has held up and eventual yet
   undetected fallout is bisectable and should be easily addressable before
   the 5.16 release. Famous last words...
 
   Many thanks to Chang Bae and Dave Hansen for working hard on this and
   also to the various test teams at Intel who reserved extra capacity to
   follow the rapid development of this closely which provides the
   confidence level required to offer this rather large update for inclusion
   into 5.16-rc1.
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Merge tag 'x86-fpu-2021-11-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 fpu updates from Thomas Gleixner:

 - Cleanup of extable fixup handling to be more robust, which in turn
   allows to make the FPU exception fixups more robust as well.

 - Change the return code for signal frame related failures from
   explicit error codes to a boolean fail/success as that's all what the
   calling code evaluates.

 - A large refactoring of the FPU code to prepare for adding AMX
   support:

      - Distangle the public header maze and remove especially the
        misnomed kitchen sink internal.h which is despite it's name
        included all over the place.

      - Add a proper abstraction for the register buffer storage (struct
        fpstate) which allows to dynamically size the buffer at runtime
        by flipping the pointer to the buffer container from the default
        container which is embedded in task_struct::tread::fpu to a
        dynamically allocated container with a larger register buffer.

      - Convert the code over to the new fpstate mechanism.

      - Consolidate the KVM FPU handling by moving the FPU related code
        into the FPU core which removes the number of exports and avoids
        adding even more export when AMX has to be supported in KVM.
        This also removes duplicated code which was of course
        unnecessary different and incomplete in the KVM copy.

      - Simplify the KVM FPU buffer handling by utilizing the new
        fpstate container and just switching the buffer pointer from the
        user space buffer to the KVM guest buffer when entering
        vcpu_run() and flipping it back when leaving the function. This
        cuts the memory requirements of a vCPU for FPU buffers in half
        and avoids pointless memory copy operations.

        This also solves the so far unresolved problem of adding AMX
        support because the current FPU buffer handling of KVM inflicted
        a circular dependency between adding AMX support to the core and
        to KVM. With the new scheme of switching fpstate AMX support can
        be added to the core code without affecting KVM.

      - Replace various variables with proper data structures so the
        extra information required for adding dynamically enabled FPU
        features (AMX) can be added in one place

 - Add AMX (Advanced Matrix eXtensions) support (finally):

   AMX is a large XSTATE component which is going to be available with
   Saphire Rapids XEON CPUs. The feature comes with an extra MSR
   (MSR_XFD) which allows to trap the (first) use of an AMX related
   instruction, which has two benefits:

    1) It allows the kernel to control access to the feature

    2) It allows the kernel to dynamically allocate the large register
       state buffer instead of burdening every task with the the extra
       8K or larger state storage.

   It would have been great to gain this kind of control already with
   AVX512.

   The support comes with the following infrastructure components:

    1) arch_prctl() to
        - read the supported features (equivalent to XGETBV(0))
        - read the permitted features for a task
        - request permission for a dynamically enabled feature

       Permission is granted per process, inherited on fork() and
       cleared on exec(). The permission policy of the kernel is
       restricted to sigaltstack size validation, but the syscall
       obviously allows further restrictions via seccomp etc.

    2) A stronger sigaltstack size validation for sys_sigaltstack(2)
       which takes granted permissions and the potentially resulting
       larger signal frame into account. This mechanism can also be used
       to enforce factual sigaltstack validation independent of dynamic
       features to help with finding potential victims of the 2K
       sigaltstack size constant which is broken since AVX512 support
       was added.

    3) Exception handling for #NM traps to catch first use of a extended
       feature via a new cause MSR. If the exception was caused by the
       use of such a feature, the handler checks permission for that
       feature. If permission has not been granted, the handler sends a
       SIGILL like the #UD handler would do if the feature would have
       been disabled in XCR0. If permission has been granted, then a new
       fpstate which fits the larger buffer requirement is allocated.

       In the unlikely case that this allocation fails, the handler
       sends SIGSEGV to the task. That's not elegant, but unavoidable as
       the other discussed options of preallocation or full per task
       permissions come with their own set of horrors for kernel and/or
       userspace. So this is the lesser of the evils and SIGSEGV caused
       by unexpected memory allocation failures is not a fundamentally
       new concept either.

       When allocation succeeds, the fpstate properties are filled in to
       reflect the extended feature set and the resulting sizes, the
       fpu::fpstate pointer is updated accordingly and the trap is
       disarmed for this task permanently.

    4) Enumeration and size calculations

    5) Trap switching via MSR_XFD

       The XFD (eXtended Feature Disable) MSR is context switched with
       the same life time rules as the FPU register state itself. The
       mechanism is keyed off with a static key which is default
       disabled so !AMX equipped CPUs have zero overhead. On AMX enabled
       CPUs the overhead is limited by comparing the tasks XFD value
       with a per CPU shadow variable to avoid redundant MSR writes. In
       case of switching from a AMX using task to a non AMX using task
       or vice versa, the extra MSR write is obviously inevitable.

       All other places which need to be aware of the variable feature
       sets and resulting variable sizes are not affected at all because
       they retrieve the information (feature set, sizes) unconditonally
       from the fpstate properties.

    6) Enable the new AMX states

   Note, this is relatively new code despite the fact that AMX support
   is in the works for more than a year now.

   The big refactoring of the FPU code, which allowed to do a proper
   integration has been started exactly 3 weeks ago. Refactoring of the
   existing FPU code and of the original AMX patches took a week and has
   been subject to extensive review and testing. The only fallout which
   has not been caught in review and testing right away was restricted
   to AMX enabled systems, which is completely irrelevant for anyone
   outside Intel and their early access program. There might be dragons
   lurking as usual, but so far the fine grained refactoring has held up
   and eventual yet undetected fallout is bisectable and should be
   easily addressable before the 5.16 release. Famous last words...

   Many thanks to Chang Bae and Dave Hansen for working hard on this and
   also to the various test teams at Intel who reserved extra capacity
   to follow the rapid development of this closely which provides the
   confidence level required to offer this rather large update for
   inclusion into 5.16-rc1

* tag 'x86-fpu-2021-11-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (110 commits)
  Documentation/x86: Add documentation for using dynamic XSTATE features
  x86/fpu: Include vmalloc.h for vzalloc()
  selftests/x86/amx: Add context switch test
  selftests/x86/amx: Add test cases for AMX state management
  x86/fpu/amx: Enable the AMX feature in 64-bit mode
  x86/fpu: Add XFD handling for dynamic states
  x86/fpu: Calculate the default sizes independently
  x86/fpu/amx: Define AMX state components and have it used for boot-time checks
  x86/fpu/xstate: Prepare XSAVE feature table for gaps in state component numbers
  x86/fpu/xstate: Add fpstate_realloc()/free()
  x86/fpu/xstate: Add XFD #NM handler
  x86/fpu: Update XFD state where required
  x86/fpu: Add sanity checks for XFD
  x86/fpu: Add XFD state to fpstate
  x86/msr-index: Add MSRs for XFD
  x86/cpufeatures: Add eXtended Feature Disabling (XFD) feature bit
  x86/fpu: Reset permission and fpstate on exec()
  x86/fpu: Prepare fpu_clone() for dynamically enabled features
  x86/fpu/signal: Prepare for variable sigframe length
  x86/signal: Use fpu::__state_user_size for sigalt stack validation
  ...
2021-11-01 14:03:56 -07:00

2074 lines
54 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/* cpu_feature_enabled() cannot be used this early */
#define USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <linux/sched/clock.h>
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
#include <linux/sched/smt.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
#include <linux/kgdb.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
#include <asm/stackprotector.h>
#include <asm/perf_event.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/doublefault.h>
#include <asm/archrandom.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include <asm/vsyscall.h>
#include <linux/topology.h>
#include <linux/cpumask.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <asm/proto.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
#include <asm/mtrr.h>
#include <asm/hwcap2.h>
#include <linux/numa.h>
#include <asm/numa.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/mce.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/memtype.h>
#include <asm/microcode.h>
#include <asm/microcode_intel.h>
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
#include <asm/uv/uv.h>
#include <asm/sigframe.h>
#include "cpu.h"
u32 elf_hwcap2 __read_mostly;
/* all of these masks are initialized in setup_cpu_local_masks() */
cpumask_var_t cpu_initialized_mask;
cpumask_var_t cpu_callout_mask;
cpumask_var_t cpu_callin_mask;
/* representing cpus for which sibling maps can be computed */
cpumask_var_t cpu_sibling_setup_mask;
/* Number of siblings per CPU package */
int smp_num_siblings = 1;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(smp_num_siblings);
/* Last level cache ID of each logical CPU */
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u16, cpu_llc_id) = BAD_APICID;
u16 get_llc_id(unsigned int cpu)
{
return per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_llc_id);
/* L2 cache ID of each logical CPU */
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u16, cpu_l2c_id) = BAD_APICID;
/* correctly size the local cpu masks */
void __init setup_cpu_local_masks(void)
{
alloc_bootmem_cpumask_var(&cpu_initialized_mask);
alloc_bootmem_cpumask_var(&cpu_callin_mask);
alloc_bootmem_cpumask_var(&cpu_callout_mask);
alloc_bootmem_cpumask_var(&cpu_sibling_setup_mask);
}
static void default_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
cpu_detect_cache_sizes(c);
#else
/* Not much we can do here... */
/* Check if at least it has cpuid */
if (c->cpuid_level == -1) {
/* No cpuid. It must be an ancient CPU */
if (c->x86 == 4)
strcpy(c->x86_model_id, "486");
else if (c->x86 == 3)
strcpy(c->x86_model_id, "386");
}
#endif
}
static const struct cpu_dev default_cpu = {
.c_init = default_init,
.c_vendor = "Unknown",
.c_x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_UNKNOWN,
};
static const struct cpu_dev *this_cpu = &default_cpu;
DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct gdt_page, gdt_page) = { .gdt = {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* We need valid kernel segments for data and code in long mode too
* IRET will check the segment types kkeil 2000/10/28
* Also sysret mandates a special GDT layout
*
* TLS descriptors are currently at a different place compared to i386.
* Hopefully nobody expects them at a fixed place (Wine?)
*/
[GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL32_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc09b, 0, 0xfffff),
[GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xa09b, 0, 0xfffff),
[GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc093, 0, 0xfffff),
[GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER32_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc0fb, 0, 0xfffff),
[GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc0f3, 0, 0xfffff),
[GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xa0fb, 0, 0xfffff),
#else
[GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc09a, 0, 0xfffff),
[GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc092, 0, 0xfffff),
[GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc0fa, 0, 0xfffff),
[GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc0f2, 0, 0xfffff),
/*
* Segments used for calling PnP BIOS have byte granularity.
* They code segments and data segments have fixed 64k limits,
* the transfer segment sizes are set at run time.
*/
/* 32-bit code */
[GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_CS32] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x409a, 0, 0xffff),
/* 16-bit code */
[GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_CS16] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x009a, 0, 0xffff),
/* 16-bit data */
[GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x0092, 0, 0xffff),
/* 16-bit data */
[GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_TS1] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x0092, 0, 0),
/* 16-bit data */
[GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_TS2] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x0092, 0, 0),
/*
* The APM segments have byte granularity and their bases
* are set at run time. All have 64k limits.
*/
/* 32-bit code */
[GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x409a, 0, 0xffff),
/* 16-bit code */
[GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE+1] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x009a, 0, 0xffff),
/* data */
[GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE+2] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x4092, 0, 0xffff),
[GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc092, 0, 0xfffff),
[GDT_ENTRY_PERCPU] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc092, 0, 0xfffff),
#endif
} };
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(gdt_page);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
static int __init x86_nopcid_setup(char *s)
{
/* nopcid doesn't accept parameters */
if (s)
return -EINVAL;
/* do not emit a message if the feature is not present */
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID))
return 0;
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID);
pr_info("nopcid: PCID feature disabled\n");
return 0;
}
early_param("nopcid", x86_nopcid_setup);
#endif
static int __init x86_noinvpcid_setup(char *s)
{
/* noinvpcid doesn't accept parameters */
if (s)
return -EINVAL;
/* do not emit a message if the feature is not present */
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID))
return 0;
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID);
pr_info("noinvpcid: INVPCID feature disabled\n");
return 0;
}
early_param("noinvpcid", x86_noinvpcid_setup);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
static int cachesize_override = -1;
static int disable_x86_serial_nr = 1;
static int __init cachesize_setup(char *str)
{
get_option(&str, &cachesize_override);
return 1;
}
__setup("cachesize=", cachesize_setup);
static int __init x86_sep_setup(char *s)
{
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEP);
return 1;
}
__setup("nosep", x86_sep_setup);
/* Standard macro to see if a specific flag is changeable */
static inline int flag_is_changeable_p(u32 flag)
{
u32 f1, f2;
/*
* Cyrix and IDT cpus allow disabling of CPUID
* so the code below may return different results
* when it is executed before and after enabling
* the CPUID. Add "volatile" to not allow gcc to
* optimize the subsequent calls to this function.
*/
asm volatile ("pushfl \n\t"
"pushfl \n\t"
"popl %0 \n\t"
"movl %0, %1 \n\t"
"xorl %2, %0 \n\t"
"pushl %0 \n\t"
"popfl \n\t"
"pushfl \n\t"
"popl %0 \n\t"
"popfl \n\t"
: "=&r" (f1), "=&r" (f2)
: "ir" (flag));
return ((f1^f2) & flag) != 0;
}
/* Probe for the CPUID instruction */
int have_cpuid_p(void)
{
return flag_is_changeable_p(X86_EFLAGS_ID);
}
static void squash_the_stupid_serial_number(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
unsigned long lo, hi;
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PN) || !disable_x86_serial_nr)
return;
/* Disable processor serial number: */
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL, lo, hi);
lo |= 0x200000;
wrmsr(MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL, lo, hi);
pr_notice("CPU serial number disabled.\n");
clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_PN);
/* Disabling the serial number may affect the cpuid level */
c->cpuid_level = cpuid_eax(0);
}
static int __init x86_serial_nr_setup(char *s)
{
disable_x86_serial_nr = 0;
return 1;
}
__setup("serialnumber", x86_serial_nr_setup);
#else
static inline int flag_is_changeable_p(u32 flag)
{
return 1;
}
static inline void squash_the_stupid_serial_number(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
}
#endif
static __init int setup_disable_smep(char *arg)
{
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SMEP);
return 1;
}
__setup("nosmep", setup_disable_smep);
static __always_inline void setup_smep(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SMEP))
cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_SMEP);
}
static __init int setup_disable_smap(char *arg)
{
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
return 1;
}
__setup("nosmap", setup_disable_smap);
static __always_inline void setup_smap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
unsigned long eflags = native_save_fl();
/* This should have been cleared long ago */
BUG_ON(eflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC);
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SMAP)) {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SMAP
cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_SMAP);
#else
clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_SMAP);
#endif
}
}
static __always_inline void setup_umip(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
/* Check the boot processor, plus build option for UMIP. */
if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_UMIP))
goto out;
/* Check the current processor's cpuid bits. */
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_UMIP))
goto out;
cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP);
pr_info_once("x86/cpu: User Mode Instruction Prevention (UMIP) activated\n");
return;
out:
/*
* Make sure UMIP is disabled in case it was enabled in a
* previous boot (e.g., via kexec).
*/
cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP);
}
/* These bits should not change their value after CPU init is finished. */
static const unsigned long cr4_pinned_mask =
X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_UMIP | X86_CR4_FSGSBASE;
static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(cr_pinning);
static unsigned long cr4_pinned_bits __ro_after_init;
void native_write_cr0(unsigned long val)
{
unsigned long bits_missing = 0;
set_register:
asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr0": "+r" (val) : : "memory");
if (static_branch_likely(&cr_pinning)) {
if (unlikely((val & X86_CR0_WP) != X86_CR0_WP)) {
bits_missing = X86_CR0_WP;
val |= bits_missing;
goto set_register;
}
/* Warn after we've set the missing bits. */
WARN_ONCE(bits_missing, "CR0 WP bit went missing!?\n");
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(native_write_cr0);
void native_write_cr4(unsigned long val)
{
unsigned long bits_changed = 0;
set_register:
asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr4": "+r" (val) : : "memory");
if (static_branch_likely(&cr_pinning)) {
if (unlikely((val & cr4_pinned_mask) != cr4_pinned_bits)) {
bits_changed = (val & cr4_pinned_mask) ^ cr4_pinned_bits;
val = (val & ~cr4_pinned_mask) | cr4_pinned_bits;
goto set_register;
}
/* Warn after we've corrected the changed bits. */
WARN_ONCE(bits_changed, "pinned CR4 bits changed: 0x%lx!?\n",
bits_changed);
}
}
#if IS_MODULE(CONFIG_LKDTM)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(native_write_cr4);
#endif
void cr4_update_irqsoff(unsigned long set, unsigned long clear)
{
unsigned long newval, cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
newval = (cr4 & ~clear) | set;
if (newval != cr4) {
this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.cr4, newval);
__write_cr4(newval);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cr4_update_irqsoff);
/* Read the CR4 shadow. */
unsigned long cr4_read_shadow(void)
{
return this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cr4_read_shadow);
void cr4_init(void)
{
unsigned long cr4 = __read_cr4();
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID))
cr4 |= X86_CR4_PCIDE;
if (static_branch_likely(&cr_pinning))
cr4 = (cr4 & ~cr4_pinned_mask) | cr4_pinned_bits;
__write_cr4(cr4);
/* Initialize cr4 shadow for this CPU. */
this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.cr4, cr4);
}
/*
* Once CPU feature detection is finished (and boot params have been
* parsed), record any of the sensitive CR bits that are set, and
* enable CR pinning.
*/
static void __init setup_cr_pinning(void)
{
cr4_pinned_bits = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4) & cr4_pinned_mask;
static_key_enable(&cr_pinning.key);
}
static __init int x86_nofsgsbase_setup(char *arg)
{
/* Require an exact match without trailing characters. */
if (strlen(arg))
return 0;
/* Do not emit a message if the feature is not present. */
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE))
return 1;
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE);
pr_info("FSGSBASE disabled via kernel command line\n");
return 1;
}
__setup("nofsgsbase", x86_nofsgsbase_setup);
/*
* Protection Keys are not available in 32-bit mode.
*/
static bool pku_disabled;
static __always_inline void setup_pku(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
if (c == &boot_cpu_data) {
if (pku_disabled || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PKU))
return;
/*
* Setting CR4.PKE will cause the X86_FEATURE_OSPKE cpuid
* bit to be set. Enforce it.
*/
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE);
} else if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) {
return;
}
cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_PKE);
/* Load the default PKRU value */
pkru_write_default();
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg)
{
/*
* Do not clear the X86_FEATURE_PKU bit. All of the
* runtime checks are against OSPKE so clearing the
* bit does nothing.
*
* This way, we will see "pku" in cpuinfo, but not
* "ospke", which is exactly what we want. It shows
* that the CPU has PKU, but the OS has not enabled it.
* This happens to be exactly how a system would look
* if we disabled the config option.
*/
pr_info("x86: 'nopku' specified, disabling Memory Protection Keys\n");
pku_disabled = true;
return 1;
}
__setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku);
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
/*
* Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always
* be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization
* software. Add those features to this table to auto-disable them.
*/
struct cpuid_dependent_feature {
u32 feature;
u32 level;
};
static const struct cpuid_dependent_feature
cpuid_dependent_features[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_MWAIT, 0x00000005 },
{ X86_FEATURE_DCA, 0x00000009 },
{ X86_FEATURE_XSAVE, 0x0000000d },
{ 0, 0 }
};
static void filter_cpuid_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, bool warn)
{
const struct cpuid_dependent_feature *df;
for (df = cpuid_dependent_features; df->feature; df++) {
if (!cpu_has(c, df->feature))
continue;
/*
* Note: cpuid_level is set to -1 if unavailable, but
* extended_extended_level is set to 0 if unavailable
* and the legitimate extended levels are all negative
* when signed; hence the weird messing around with
* signs here...
*/
if (!((s32)df->level < 0 ?
(u32)df->level > (u32)c->extended_cpuid_level :
(s32)df->level > (s32)c->cpuid_level))
continue;
clear_cpu_cap(c, df->feature);
if (!warn)
continue;
pr_warn("CPU: CPU feature " X86_CAP_FMT " disabled, no CPUID level 0x%x\n",
x86_cap_flag(df->feature), df->level);
}
}
/*
* Naming convention should be: <Name> [(<Codename>)]
* This table only is used unless init_<vendor>() below doesn't set it;
* in particular, if CPUID levels 0x80000002..4 are supported, this
* isn't used
*/
/* Look up CPU names by table lookup. */
static const char *table_lookup_model(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
const struct legacy_cpu_model_info *info;
if (c->x86_model >= 16)
return NULL; /* Range check */
if (!this_cpu)
return NULL;
info = this_cpu->legacy_models;
while (info->family) {
if (info->family == c->x86)
return info->model_names[c->x86_model];
info++;
}
#endif
return NULL; /* Not found */
}
/* Aligned to unsigned long to avoid split lock in atomic bitmap ops */
__u32 cpu_caps_cleared[NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS] __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long));
__u32 cpu_caps_set[NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS] __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long));
void load_percpu_segment(int cpu)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
loadsegment(fs, __KERNEL_PERCPU);
#else
__loadsegment_simple(gs, 0);
wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, cpu_kernelmode_gs_base(cpu));
#endif
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/* The 32-bit entry code needs to find cpu_entry_area. */
DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct cpu_entry_area *, cpu_entry_area);
#endif
/* Load the original GDT from the per-cpu structure */
void load_direct_gdt(int cpu)
{
struct desc_ptr gdt_descr;
gdt_descr.address = (long)get_cpu_gdt_rw(cpu);
gdt_descr.size = GDT_SIZE - 1;
load_gdt(&gdt_descr);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(load_direct_gdt);
/* Load a fixmap remapping of the per-cpu GDT */
void load_fixmap_gdt(int cpu)
{
struct desc_ptr gdt_descr;
gdt_descr.address = (long)get_cpu_gdt_ro(cpu);
gdt_descr.size = GDT_SIZE - 1;
load_gdt(&gdt_descr);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(load_fixmap_gdt);
/*
* Current gdt points %fs at the "master" per-cpu area: after this,
* it's on the real one.
*/
void switch_to_new_gdt(int cpu)
{
/* Load the original GDT */
load_direct_gdt(cpu);
/* Reload the per-cpu base */
load_percpu_segment(cpu);
}
static const struct cpu_dev *cpu_devs[X86_VENDOR_NUM] = {};
static void get_model_name(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
unsigned int *v;
char *p, *q, *s;
if (c->extended_cpuid_level < 0x80000004)
return;
v = (unsigned int *)c->x86_model_id;
cpuid(0x80000002, &v[0], &v[1], &v[2], &v[3]);
cpuid(0x80000003, &v[4], &v[5], &v[6], &v[7]);
cpuid(0x80000004, &v[8], &v[9], &v[10], &v[11]);
c->x86_model_id[48] = 0;
/* Trim whitespace */
p = q = s = &c->x86_model_id[0];
while (*p == ' ')
p++;
while (*p) {
/* Note the last non-whitespace index */
if (!isspace(*p))
s = q;
*q++ = *p++;
}
*(s + 1) = '\0';
}
void detect_num_cpu_cores(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
c->x86_max_cores = 1;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) || c->cpuid_level < 4)
return;
cpuid_count(4, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
if (eax & 0x1f)
c->x86_max_cores = (eax >> 26) + 1;
}
void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
unsigned int n, dummy, ebx, ecx, edx, l2size;
n = c->extended_cpuid_level;
if (n >= 0x80000005) {
cpuid(0x80000005, &dummy, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
c->x86_cache_size = (ecx>>24) + (edx>>24);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/* On K8 L1 TLB is inclusive, so don't count it */
c->x86_tlbsize = 0;
#endif
}
if (n < 0x80000006) /* Some chips just has a large L1. */
return;
cpuid(0x80000006, &dummy, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
l2size = ecx >> 16;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
c->x86_tlbsize += ((ebx >> 16) & 0xfff) + (ebx & 0xfff);
#else
/* do processor-specific cache resizing */
if (this_cpu->legacy_cache_size)
l2size = this_cpu->legacy_cache_size(c, l2size);
/* Allow user to override all this if necessary. */
if (cachesize_override != -1)
l2size = cachesize_override;
if (l2size == 0)
return; /* Again, no L2 cache is possible */
#endif
c->x86_cache_size = l2size;
}
u16 __read_mostly tlb_lli_4k[NR_INFO];
u16 __read_mostly tlb_lli_2m[NR_INFO];
u16 __read_mostly tlb_lli_4m[NR_INFO];
u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_4k[NR_INFO];
u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_2m[NR_INFO];
u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_4m[NR_INFO];
u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_1g[NR_INFO];
static void cpu_detect_tlb(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
if (this_cpu->c_detect_tlb)
this_cpu->c_detect_tlb(c);
pr_info("Last level iTLB entries: 4KB %d, 2MB %d, 4MB %d\n",
tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES], tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES],
tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES]);
pr_info("Last level dTLB entries: 4KB %d, 2MB %d, 4MB %d, 1GB %d\n",
tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES], tlb_lld_2m[ENTRIES],
tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES], tlb_lld_1g[ENTRIES]);
}
int detect_ht_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HT))
return -1;
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CMP_LEGACY))
return -1;
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XTOPOLOGY))
return -1;
cpuid(1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
smp_num_siblings = (ebx & 0xff0000) >> 16;
if (smp_num_siblings == 1)
pr_info_once("CPU0: Hyper-Threading is disabled\n");
#endif
return 0;
}
void detect_ht(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
int index_msb, core_bits;
if (detect_ht_early(c) < 0)
return;
index_msb = get_count_order(smp_num_siblings);
c->phys_proc_id = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, index_msb);
smp_num_siblings = smp_num_siblings / c->x86_max_cores;
index_msb = get_count_order(smp_num_siblings);
core_bits = get_count_order(c->x86_max_cores);
c->cpu_core_id = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, index_msb) &
((1 << core_bits) - 1);
#endif
}
static void get_cpu_vendor(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
char *v = c->x86_vendor_id;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < X86_VENDOR_NUM; i++) {
if (!cpu_devs[i])
break;
if (!strcmp(v, cpu_devs[i]->c_ident[0]) ||
(cpu_devs[i]->c_ident[1] &&
!strcmp(v, cpu_devs[i]->c_ident[1]))) {
this_cpu = cpu_devs[i];
c->x86_vendor = this_cpu->c_x86_vendor;
return;
}
}
pr_err_once("CPU: vendor_id '%s' unknown, using generic init.\n" \
"CPU: Your system may be unstable.\n", v);
c->x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_UNKNOWN;
this_cpu = &default_cpu;
}
void cpu_detect(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
/* Get vendor name */
cpuid(0x00000000, (unsigned int *)&c->cpuid_level,
(unsigned int *)&c->x86_vendor_id[0],
(unsigned int *)&c->x86_vendor_id[8],
(unsigned int *)&c->x86_vendor_id[4]);
c->x86 = 4;
/* Intel-defined flags: level 0x00000001 */
if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000001) {
u32 junk, tfms, cap0, misc;
cpuid(0x00000001, &tfms, &misc, &junk, &cap0);
c->x86 = x86_family(tfms);
c->x86_model = x86_model(tfms);
c->x86_stepping = x86_stepping(tfms);
if (cap0 & (1<<19)) {
c->x86_clflush_size = ((misc >> 8) & 0xff) * 8;
c->x86_cache_alignment = c->x86_clflush_size;
}
}
}
static void apply_forced_caps(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS; i++) {
c->x86_capability[i] &= ~cpu_caps_cleared[i];
c->x86_capability[i] |= cpu_caps_set[i];
}
}
static void init_speculation_control(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
/*
* The Intel SPEC_CTRL CPUID bit implies IBRS and IBPB support,
* and they also have a different bit for STIBP support. Also,
* a hypervisor might have set the individual AMD bits even on
* Intel CPUs, for finer-grained selection of what's available.
*/
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) {
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
}
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP))
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS)) {
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
}
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB))
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) {
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
}
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD);
}
}
void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
/* Intel-defined flags: level 0x00000001 */
if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000001) {
cpuid(0x00000001, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
c->x86_capability[CPUID_1_ECX] = ecx;
c->x86_capability[CPUID_1_EDX] = edx;
}
/* Thermal and Power Management Leaf: level 0x00000006 (eax) */
if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000006)
c->x86_capability[CPUID_6_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x00000006);
/* Additional Intel-defined flags: level 0x00000007 */
if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000007) {
cpuid_count(0x00000007, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_0_EBX] = ebx;
c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_ECX] = ecx;
c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_EDX] = edx;
/* Check valid sub-leaf index before accessing it */
if (eax >= 1) {
cpuid_count(0x00000007, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_1_EAX] = eax;
}
}
/* Extended state features: level 0x0000000d */
if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x0000000d) {
cpuid_count(0x0000000d, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
c->x86_capability[CPUID_D_1_EAX] = eax;
}
/* AMD-defined flags: level 0x80000001 */
eax = cpuid_eax(0x80000000);
c->extended_cpuid_level = eax;
if ((eax & 0xffff0000) == 0x80000000) {
if (eax >= 0x80000001) {
cpuid(0x80000001, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0001_ECX] = ecx;
c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0001_EDX] = edx;
}
}
if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000007) {
cpuid(0x80000007, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = ebx;
c->x86_power = edx;
}
if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008) {
cpuid(0x80000008, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0008_EBX] = ebx;
}
if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000000a)
c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = cpuid_edx(0x8000000a);
if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000001f)
c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x8000001f);
init_scattered_cpuid_features(c);
init_speculation_control(c);
/*
* Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, after probe.
* This needs to happen each time we re-probe, which may happen
* several times during CPU initialization.
*/
apply_forced_caps(c);
}
void get_cpu_address_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008) {
cpuid(0x80000008, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
c->x86_virt_bits = (eax >> 8) & 0xff;
c->x86_phys_bits = eax & 0xff;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
else if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PAE) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PSE36))
c->x86_phys_bits = 36;
#endif
c->x86_cache_bits = c->x86_phys_bits;
}
static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
int i;
/*
* First of all, decide if this is a 486 or higher
* It's a 486 if we can modify the AC flag
*/
if (flag_is_changeable_p(X86_EFLAGS_AC))
c->x86 = 4;
else
c->x86 = 3;
for (i = 0; i < X86_VENDOR_NUM; i++)
if (cpu_devs[i] && cpu_devs[i]->c_identify) {
c->x86_vendor_id[0] = 0;
cpu_devs[i]->c_identify(c);
if (c->x86_vendor_id[0]) {
get_cpu_vendor(c);
break;
}
}
#endif
}
#define NO_SPECULATION BIT(0)
#define NO_MELTDOWN BIT(1)
#define NO_SSB BIT(2)
#define NO_L1TF BIT(3)
#define NO_MDS BIT(4)
#define MSBDS_ONLY BIT(5)
#define NO_SWAPGS BIT(6)
#define NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT BIT(7)
#define NO_SPECTRE_V2 BIT(8)
#define VULNWL(vendor, family, model, whitelist) \
X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, whitelist)
#define VULNWL_INTEL(model, whitelist) \
VULNWL(INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_##model, whitelist)
#define VULNWL_AMD(family, whitelist) \
VULNWL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, whitelist)
#define VULNWL_HYGON(family, whitelist) \
VULNWL(HYGON, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, whitelist)
static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
VULNWL(ANY, 4, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION),
VULNWL(CENTAUR, 5, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION),
VULNWL(INTEL, 5, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION),
VULNWL(NSC, 5, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION),
/* Intel Family 6 */
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_D, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH, NO_SSB),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_NP, NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
/*
* Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously
* being documented as such in the APM). But according to AMD, %gs is
* updated non-speculatively, and the issuing of %gs-relative memory
* operands will be blocked until the %gs update completes, which is
* good enough for our purposes.
*/
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
/* Zhaoxin Family 7 */
VULNWL(CENTAUR, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS),
VULNWL(ZHAOXIN, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS),
{}
};
#define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues) \
X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, \
INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \
X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
#define SRBDS BIT(0)
static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xC), SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xD), SRBDS),
{}
};
static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which)
{
const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
}
u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void)
{
u64 ia32_cap = 0;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
return ia32_cap;
}
static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) &&
!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION))
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECTRE_V2))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) &&
!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
}
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SWAPGS))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
/*
* When the CPU is not mitigated for TAA (TAA_NO=0) set TAA bug when:
* - TSX is supported or
* - TSX_CTRL is present
*
* TSX_CTRL check is needed for cases when TSX could be disabled before
* the kernel boot e.g. kexec.
* TSX_CTRL check alone is not sufficient for cases when the microcode
* update is not present or running as guest that don't get TSX_CTRL.
*/
if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) &&
(cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RTM) ||
(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
/*
* SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed
* in the vulnerability blacklist.
*/
if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ||
cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) &&
cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS);
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO)
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_L1TF))
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
}
/*
* The NOPL instruction is supposed to exist on all CPUs of family >= 6;
* unfortunately, that's not true in practice because of early VIA
* chips and (more importantly) broken virtualizers that are not easy
* to detect. In the latter case it doesn't even *fail* reliably, so
* probing for it doesn't even work. Disable it completely on 32-bit
* unless we can find a reliable way to detect all the broken cases.
* Enable it explicitly on 64-bit for non-constant inputs of cpu_has().
*/
static void detect_nopl(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_NOPL);
#else
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_NOPL);
#endif
}
/*
* We parse cpu parameters early because fpu__init_system() is executed
* before parse_early_param().
*/
static void __init cpu_parse_early_param(void)
{
char arg[128];
char *argptr = arg;
int arglen, res, bit;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "no387"))
#ifdef CONFIG_MATH_EMULATION
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FPU);
#else
pr_err("Option 'no387' required CONFIG_MATH_EMULATION enabled.\n");
#endif
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nofxsr"))
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FXSR);
#endif
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "noxsave"))
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE);
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "noxsaveopt"))
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVEOPT);
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "noxsaves"))
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
arglen = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "clearcpuid", arg, sizeof(arg));
if (arglen <= 0)
return;
pr_info("Clearing CPUID bits:");
do {
res = get_option(&argptr, &bit);
if (res == 0 || res == 3)
break;
/* If the argument was too long, the last bit may be cut off */
if (res == 1 && arglen >= sizeof(arg))
break;
if (bit >= 0 && bit < NCAPINTS * 32) {
pr_cont(" " X86_CAP_FMT, x86_cap_flag(bit));
setup_clear_cpu_cap(bit);
}
} while (res == 2);
pr_cont("\n");
}
/*
* Do minimum CPU detection early.
* Fields really needed: vendor, cpuid_level, family, model, mask,
* cache alignment.
* The others are not touched to avoid unwanted side effects.
*
* WARNING: this function is only called on the boot CPU. Don't add code
* here that is supposed to run on all CPUs.
*/
static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
c->x86_clflush_size = 64;
c->x86_phys_bits = 36;
c->x86_virt_bits = 48;
#else
c->x86_clflush_size = 32;
c->x86_phys_bits = 32;
c->x86_virt_bits = 32;
#endif
c->x86_cache_alignment = c->x86_clflush_size;
memset(&c->x86_capability, 0, sizeof(c->x86_capability));
c->extended_cpuid_level = 0;
if (!have_cpuid_p())
identify_cpu_without_cpuid(c);
/* cyrix could have cpuid enabled via c_identify()*/
if (have_cpuid_p()) {
cpu_detect(c);
get_cpu_vendor(c);
get_cpu_cap(c);
get_cpu_address_sizes(c);
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CPUID);
cpu_parse_early_param();
if (this_cpu->c_early_init)
this_cpu->c_early_init(c);
c->cpu_index = 0;
filter_cpuid_features(c, false);
if (this_cpu->c_bsp_init)
this_cpu->c_bsp_init(c);
} else {
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CPUID);
}
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
cpu_set_bug_bits(c);
sld_setup(c);
fpu__init_system(c);
init_sigframe_size();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Regardless of whether PCID is enumerated, the SDM says
* that it can't be enabled in 32-bit mode.
*/
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID);
#endif
/*
* Later in the boot process pgtable_l5_enabled() relies on
* cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LA57). If 5-level paging is not
* enabled by this point we need to clear the feature bit to avoid
* false-positives at the later stage.
*
* pgtable_l5_enabled() can be false here for several reasons:
* - 5-level paging is disabled compile-time;
* - it's 32-bit kernel;
* - machine doesn't support 5-level paging;
* - user specified 'no5lvl' in kernel command line.
*/
if (!pgtable_l5_enabled())
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_LA57);
detect_nopl();
}
void __init early_cpu_init(void)
{
const struct cpu_dev *const *cdev;
int count = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_PROCESSOR_SELECT
pr_info("KERNEL supported cpus:\n");
#endif
for (cdev = __x86_cpu_dev_start; cdev < __x86_cpu_dev_end; cdev++) {
const struct cpu_dev *cpudev = *cdev;
if (count >= X86_VENDOR_NUM)
break;
cpu_devs[count] = cpudev;
count++;
#ifdef CONFIG_PROCESSOR_SELECT
{
unsigned int j;
for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
if (!cpudev->c_ident[j])
continue;
pr_info(" %s %s\n", cpudev->c_vendor,
cpudev->c_ident[j]);
}
}
#endif
}
early_identify_cpu(&boot_cpu_data);
}
static void detect_null_seg_behavior(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* Empirically, writing zero to a segment selector on AMD does
* not clear the base, whereas writing zero to a segment
* selector on Intel does clear the base. Intel's behavior
* allows slightly faster context switches in the common case
* where GS is unused by the prev and next threads.
*
* Since neither vendor documents this anywhere that I can see,
* detect it directly instead of hard-coding the choice by
* vendor.
*
* I've designated AMD's behavior as the "bug" because it's
* counterintuitive and less friendly.
*/
unsigned long old_base, tmp;
rdmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, old_base);
wrmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, 1);
loadsegment(fs, 0);
rdmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, tmp);
if (tmp != 0)
set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_NULL_SEG);
wrmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, old_base);
#endif
}
static void generic_identify(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
c->extended_cpuid_level = 0;
if (!have_cpuid_p())
identify_cpu_without_cpuid(c);
/* cyrix could have cpuid enabled via c_identify()*/
if (!have_cpuid_p())
return;
cpu_detect(c);
get_cpu_vendor(c);
get_cpu_cap(c);
get_cpu_address_sizes(c);
if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000001) {
c->initial_apicid = (cpuid_ebx(1) >> 24) & 0xFF;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
# ifdef CONFIG_SMP
c->apicid = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, 0);
# else
c->apicid = c->initial_apicid;
# endif
#endif
c->phys_proc_id = c->initial_apicid;
}
get_model_name(c); /* Default name */
detect_null_seg_behavior(c);
/*
* ESPFIX is a strange bug. All real CPUs have it. Paravirt
* systems that run Linux at CPL > 0 may or may not have the
* issue, but, even if they have the issue, there's absolutely
* nothing we can do about it because we can't use the real IRET
* instruction.
*
* NB: For the time being, only 32-bit kernels support
* X86_BUG_ESPFIX as such. 64-bit kernels directly choose
* whether to apply espfix using paravirt hooks. If any
* non-paravirt system ever shows up that does *not* have the
* ESPFIX issue, we can change this.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_ESPFIX);
#endif
}
/*
* Validate that ACPI/mptables have the same information about the
* effective APIC id and update the package map.
*/
static void validate_apic_and_package_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
unsigned int apicid, cpu = smp_processor_id();
apicid = apic->cpu_present_to_apicid(cpu);
if (apicid != c->apicid) {
pr_err(FW_BUG "CPU%u: APIC id mismatch. Firmware: %x APIC: %x\n",
cpu, apicid, c->initial_apicid);
}
BUG_ON(topology_update_package_map(c->phys_proc_id, cpu));
BUG_ON(topology_update_die_map(c->cpu_die_id, cpu));
#else
c->logical_proc_id = 0;
#endif
}
/*
* This does the hard work of actually picking apart the CPU stuff...
*/
static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
int i;
c->loops_per_jiffy = loops_per_jiffy;
c->x86_cache_size = 0;
c->x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_UNKNOWN;
c->x86_model = c->x86_stepping = 0; /* So far unknown... */
c->x86_vendor_id[0] = '\0'; /* Unset */
c->x86_model_id[0] = '\0'; /* Unset */
c->x86_max_cores = 1;
c->x86_coreid_bits = 0;
c->cu_id = 0xff;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
c->x86_clflush_size = 64;
c->x86_phys_bits = 36;
c->x86_virt_bits = 48;
#else
c->cpuid_level = -1; /* CPUID not detected */
c->x86_clflush_size = 32;
c->x86_phys_bits = 32;
c->x86_virt_bits = 32;
#endif
c->x86_cache_alignment = c->x86_clflush_size;
memset(&c->x86_capability, 0, sizeof(c->x86_capability));
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES
memset(&c->vmx_capability, 0, sizeof(c->vmx_capability));
#endif
generic_identify(c);
if (this_cpu->c_identify)
this_cpu->c_identify(c);
/* Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, after probe */
apply_forced_caps(c);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
c->apicid = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, 0);
#endif
/*
* Vendor-specific initialization. In this section we
* canonicalize the feature flags, meaning if there are
* features a certain CPU supports which CPUID doesn't
* tell us, CPUID claiming incorrect flags, or other bugs,
* we handle them here.
*
* At the end of this section, c->x86_capability better
* indicate the features this CPU genuinely supports!
*/
if (this_cpu->c_init)
this_cpu->c_init(c);
/* Disable the PN if appropriate */
squash_the_stupid_serial_number(c);
/* Set up SMEP/SMAP/UMIP */
setup_smep(c);
setup_smap(c);
setup_umip(c);
/* Enable FSGSBASE instructions if available. */
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)) {
cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE);
elf_hwcap2 |= HWCAP2_FSGSBASE;
}
/*
* The vendor-specific functions might have changed features.
* Now we do "generic changes."
*/
/* Filter out anything that depends on CPUID levels we don't have */
filter_cpuid_features(c, true);
/* If the model name is still unset, do table lookup. */
if (!c->x86_model_id[0]) {
const char *p;
p = table_lookup_model(c);
if (p)
strcpy(c->x86_model_id, p);
else
/* Last resort... */
sprintf(c->x86_model_id, "%02x/%02x",
c->x86, c->x86_model);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
detect_ht(c);
#endif
x86_init_rdrand(c);
setup_pku(c);
/*
* Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it
* before following smp all cpus cap AND.
*/
apply_forced_caps(c);
/*
* On SMP, boot_cpu_data holds the common feature set between
* all CPUs; so make sure that we indicate which features are
* common between the CPUs. The first time this routine gets
* executed, c == &boot_cpu_data.
*/
if (c != &boot_cpu_data) {
/* AND the already accumulated flags with these */
for (i = 0; i < NCAPINTS; i++)
boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[i] &= c->x86_capability[i];
/* OR, i.e. replicate the bug flags */
for (i = NCAPINTS; i < NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS; i++)
c->x86_capability[i] |= boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[i];
}
/* Init Machine Check Exception if available. */
mcheck_cpu_init(c);
select_idle_routine(c);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
numa_add_cpu(smp_processor_id());
#endif
}
/*
* Set up the CPU state needed to execute SYSENTER/SYSEXIT instructions
* on 32-bit kernels:
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
void enable_sep_cpu(void)
{
struct tss_struct *tss;
int cpu;
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEP))
return;
cpu = get_cpu();
tss = &per_cpu(cpu_tss_rw, cpu);
/*
* We cache MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS's value in the TSS's ss1 field --
* see the big comment in struct x86_hw_tss's definition.
*/
tss->x86_tss.ss1 = __KERNEL_CS;
wrmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, tss->x86_tss.ss1, 0);
wrmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, (unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(cpu) + 1), 0);
wrmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, (unsigned long)entry_SYSENTER_32, 0);
put_cpu();
}
#endif
void __init identify_boot_cpu(void)
{
identify_cpu(&boot_cpu_data);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
sysenter_setup();
enable_sep_cpu();
#endif
cpu_detect_tlb(&boot_cpu_data);
setup_cr_pinning();
tsx_init();
}
void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
BUG_ON(c == &boot_cpu_data);
identify_cpu(c);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
enable_sep_cpu();
#endif
mtrr_ap_init();
validate_apic_and_package_id(c);
x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap();
update_srbds_msr();
}
static __init int setup_noclflush(char *arg)
{
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSHOPT);
return 1;
}
__setup("noclflush", setup_noclflush);
void print_cpu_info(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
const char *vendor = NULL;
if (c->x86_vendor < X86_VENDOR_NUM) {
vendor = this_cpu->c_vendor;
} else {
if (c->cpuid_level >= 0)
vendor = c->x86_vendor_id;
}
if (vendor && !strstr(c->x86_model_id, vendor))
pr_cont("%s ", vendor);
if (c->x86_model_id[0])
pr_cont("%s", c->x86_model_id);
else
pr_cont("%d86", c->x86);
pr_cont(" (family: 0x%x, model: 0x%x", c->x86, c->x86_model);
if (c->x86_stepping || c->cpuid_level >= 0)
pr_cont(", stepping: 0x%x)\n", c->x86_stepping);
else
pr_cont(")\n");
}
/*
* clearcpuid= was already parsed in cpu_parse_early_param(). This dummy
* function prevents it from becoming an environment variable for init.
*/
static __init int setup_clearcpuid(char *arg)
{
return 1;
}
__setup("clearcpuid=", setup_clearcpuid);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
DEFINE_PER_CPU_FIRST(struct fixed_percpu_data,
fixed_percpu_data) __aligned(PAGE_SIZE) __visible;
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(fixed_percpu_data);
/*
* The following percpu variables are hot. Align current_task to
* cacheline size such that they fall in the same cacheline.
*/
DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct task_struct *, current_task) ____cacheline_aligned =
&init_task;
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(current_task);
DEFINE_PER_CPU(void *, hardirq_stack_ptr);
DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, hardirq_stack_inuse);
DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, __preempt_count) = INIT_PREEMPT_COUNT;
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(__preempt_count);
DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, cpu_current_top_of_stack) = TOP_OF_INIT_STACK;
/* May not be marked __init: used by software suspend */
void syscall_init(void)
{
wrmsr(MSR_STAR, 0, (__USER32_CS << 16) | __KERNEL_CS);
wrmsrl(MSR_LSTAR, (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_64);
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
wrmsrl(MSR_CSTAR, (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_compat);
/*
* This only works on Intel CPUs.
* On AMD CPUs these MSRs are 32-bit, CPU truncates MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP.
* This does not cause SYSENTER to jump to the wrong location, because
* AMD doesn't allow SYSENTER in long mode (either 32- or 64-bit).
*/
wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, (u64)__KERNEL_CS);
wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP,
(unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(smp_processor_id()) + 1));
wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, (u64)entry_SYSENTER_compat);
#else
wrmsrl(MSR_CSTAR, (unsigned long)ignore_sysret);
wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, (u64)GDT_ENTRY_INVALID_SEG);
wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, 0ULL);
wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, 0ULL);
#endif
/*
* Flags to clear on syscall; clear as much as possible
* to minimize user space-kernel interference.
*/
wrmsrl(MSR_SYSCALL_MASK,
X86_EFLAGS_CF|X86_EFLAGS_PF|X86_EFLAGS_AF|
X86_EFLAGS_ZF|X86_EFLAGS_SF|X86_EFLAGS_TF|
X86_EFLAGS_IF|X86_EFLAGS_DF|X86_EFLAGS_OF|
X86_EFLAGS_IOPL|X86_EFLAGS_NT|X86_EFLAGS_RF|
X86_EFLAGS_AC|X86_EFLAGS_ID);
}
#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct task_struct *, current_task) = &init_task;
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(current_task);
DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, __preempt_count) = INIT_PREEMPT_COUNT;
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(__preempt_count);
/*
* On x86_32, vm86 modifies tss.sp0, so sp0 isn't a reliable way to find
* the top of the kernel stack. Use an extra percpu variable to track the
* top of the kernel stack directly.
*/
DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, cpu_current_top_of_stack) =
(unsigned long)&init_thread_union + THREAD_SIZE;
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(cpu_current_top_of_stack);
#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, __stack_chk_guard);
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_guard);
#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
/*
* Clear all 6 debug registers:
*/
static void clear_all_debug_regs(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
/* Ignore db4, db5 */
if ((i == 4) || (i == 5))
continue;
set_debugreg(0, i);
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KGDB
/*
* Restore debug regs if using kgdbwait and you have a kernel debugger
* connection established.
*/
static void dbg_restore_debug_regs(void)
{
if (unlikely(kgdb_connected && arch_kgdb_ops.correct_hw_break))
arch_kgdb_ops.correct_hw_break();
}
#else /* ! CONFIG_KGDB */
#define dbg_restore_debug_regs()
#endif /* ! CONFIG_KGDB */
static void wait_for_master_cpu(int cpu)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
* wait for ACK from master CPU before continuing
* with AP initialization
*/
WARN_ON(cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(cpu, cpu_initialized_mask));
while (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, cpu_callout_mask))
cpu_relax();
#endif
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
static inline void setup_getcpu(int cpu)
{
unsigned long cpudata = vdso_encode_cpunode(cpu, early_cpu_to_node(cpu));
struct desc_struct d = { };
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDPID))
wrmsr(MSR_TSC_AUX, cpudata, 0);
/* Store CPU and node number in limit. */
d.limit0 = cpudata;
d.limit1 = cpudata >> 16;
d.type = 5; /* RO data, expand down, accessed */
d.dpl = 3; /* Visible to user code */
d.s = 1; /* Not a system segment */
d.p = 1; /* Present */
d.d = 1; /* 32-bit */
write_gdt_entry(get_cpu_gdt_rw(cpu), GDT_ENTRY_CPUNODE, &d, DESCTYPE_S);
}
static inline void ucode_cpu_init(int cpu)
{
if (cpu)
load_ucode_ap();
}
static inline void tss_setup_ist(struct tss_struct *tss)
{
/* Set up the per-CPU TSS IST stacks */
tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_DF] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(DF);
tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_NMI] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(NMI);
tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_DB] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(DB);
tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_MCE] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(MCE);
/* Only mapped when SEV-ES is active */
tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC);
}
#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
static inline void setup_getcpu(int cpu) { }
static inline void ucode_cpu_init(int cpu)
{
show_ucode_info_early();
}
static inline void tss_setup_ist(struct tss_struct *tss) { }
#endif /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
static inline void tss_setup_io_bitmap(struct tss_struct *tss)
{
tss->x86_tss.io_bitmap_base = IO_BITMAP_OFFSET_INVALID;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IOPL_IOPERM
tss->io_bitmap.prev_max = 0;
tss->io_bitmap.prev_sequence = 0;
memset(tss->io_bitmap.bitmap, 0xff, sizeof(tss->io_bitmap.bitmap));
/*
* Invalidate the extra array entry past the end of the all
* permission bitmap as required by the hardware.
*/
tss->io_bitmap.mapall[IO_BITMAP_LONGS] = ~0UL;
#endif
}
/*
* Setup everything needed to handle exceptions from the IDT, including the IST
* exceptions which use paranoid_entry().
*/
void cpu_init_exception_handling(void)
{
struct tss_struct *tss = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tss_rw);
int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
/* paranoid_entry() gets the CPU number from the GDT */
setup_getcpu(cpu);
/* IST vectors need TSS to be set up. */
tss_setup_ist(tss);
tss_setup_io_bitmap(tss);
set_tss_desc(cpu, &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->tss.x86_tss);
load_TR_desc();
/* Finally load the IDT */
load_current_idt();
}
/*
* cpu_init() initializes state that is per-CPU. Some data is already
* initialized (naturally) in the bootstrap process, such as the GDT. We
* reload it nevertheless, this function acts as a 'CPU state barrier',
* nothing should get across.
*/
void cpu_init(void)
{
struct task_struct *cur = current;
int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
wait_for_master_cpu(cpu);
ucode_cpu_init(cpu);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
if (this_cpu_read(numa_node) == 0 &&
early_cpu_to_node(cpu) != NUMA_NO_NODE)
set_numa_node(early_cpu_to_node(cpu));
#endif
pr_debug("Initializing CPU#%d\n", cpu);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) || cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_VME) ||
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DE))
cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_VME|X86_CR4_PVI|X86_CR4_TSD|X86_CR4_DE);
/*
* Initialize the per-CPU GDT with the boot GDT,
* and set up the GDT descriptor:
*/
switch_to_new_gdt(cpu);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) {
loadsegment(fs, 0);
memset(cur->thread.tls_array, 0, GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES * 8);
syscall_init();
wrmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, 0);
wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, 0);
barrier();
x2apic_setup();
}
mmgrab(&init_mm);
cur->active_mm = &init_mm;
BUG_ON(cur->mm);
initialize_tlbstate_and_flush();
enter_lazy_tlb(&init_mm, cur);
/*
* sp0 points to the entry trampoline stack regardless of what task
* is running.
*/
load_sp0((unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(cpu) + 1));
load_mm_ldt(&init_mm);
clear_all_debug_regs();
dbg_restore_debug_regs();
doublefault_init_cpu_tss();
fpu__init_cpu();
if (is_uv_system())
uv_cpu_init();
load_fixmap_gdt(cpu);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
void cpu_init_secondary(void)
{
/*
* Relies on the BP having set-up the IDT tables, which are loaded
* on this CPU in cpu_init_exception_handling().
*/
cpu_init_exception_handling();
cpu_init();
}
#endif
/*
* The microcode loader calls this upon late microcode load to recheck features,
* only when microcode has been updated. Caller holds microcode_mutex and CPU
* hotplug lock.
*/
void microcode_check(void)
{
struct cpuinfo_x86 info;
perf_check_microcode();
/* Reload CPUID max function as it might've changed. */
info.cpuid_level = cpuid_eax(0);
/*
* Copy all capability leafs to pick up the synthetic ones so that
* memcmp() below doesn't fail on that. The ones coming from CPUID will
* get overwritten in get_cpu_cap().
*/
memcpy(&info.x86_capability, &boot_cpu_data.x86_capability, sizeof(info.x86_capability));
get_cpu_cap(&info);
if (!memcmp(&info.x86_capability, &boot_cpu_data.x86_capability, sizeof(info.x86_capability)))
return;
pr_warn("x86/CPU: CPU features have changed after loading microcode, but might not take effect.\n");
pr_warn("x86/CPU: Please consider either early loading through initrd/built-in or a potential BIOS update.\n");
}
/*
* Invoked from core CPU hotplug code after hotplug operations
*/
void arch_smt_update(void)
{
/* Handle the speculative execution misfeatures */
cpu_bugs_smt_update();
/* Check whether IPI broadcasting can be enabled */
apic_smt_update();
}