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![Eric Biggers](/assets/img/avatar_default.png)
Currently <crypto/sha.h> contains declarations for both SHA-1 and SHA-2, and <crypto/sha3.h> contains declarations for SHA-3. This organization is inconsistent, but more importantly SHA-1 is no longer considered to be cryptographically secure. So to the extent possible, SHA-1 shouldn't be grouped together with any of the other SHA versions, and usage of it should be phased out. Therefore, split <crypto/sha.h> into two headers <crypto/sha1.h> and <crypto/sha2.h>, and make everyone explicitly specify whether they want the declarations for SHA-1, SHA-2, or both. This avoids making the SHA-1 declarations visible to files that don't want anything to do with SHA-1. It also prepares for potentially moving sha1.h into a new insecure/ or dangerous/ directory. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2438 lines
65 KiB
C
2438 lines
65 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* K3 SA2UL crypto accelerator driver
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Texas Instruments Incorporated - http://www.ti.com
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*
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* Authors: Keerthy
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* Vitaly Andrianov
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* Tero Kristo
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*/
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#include <linux/clk.h>
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#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
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#include <linux/dmaengine.h>
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#include <linux/dmapool.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/of_device.h>
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#include <linux/platform_device.h>
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#include <linux/pm_runtime.h>
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#include <crypto/aes.h>
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#include <crypto/authenc.h>
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#include <crypto/des.h>
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#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
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#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
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#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
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#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
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#include <crypto/sha1.h>
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#include <crypto/sha2.h>
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#include "sa2ul.h"
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/* Byte offset for key in encryption security context */
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#define SC_ENC_KEY_OFFSET (1 + 27 + 4)
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/* Byte offset for Aux-1 in encryption security context */
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#define SC_ENC_AUX1_OFFSET (1 + 27 + 4 + 32)
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#define SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC 0x0001
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#define SA_CMDL_UPD_AUTH 0x0002
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#define SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC_IV 0x0004
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#define SA_CMDL_UPD_AUTH_IV 0x0008
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#define SA_CMDL_UPD_AUX_KEY 0x0010
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#define SA_AUTH_SUBKEY_LEN 16
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#define SA_CMDL_PAYLOAD_LENGTH_MASK 0xFFFF
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#define SA_CMDL_SOP_BYPASS_LEN_MASK 0xFF000000
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#define MODE_CONTROL_BYTES 27
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#define SA_HASH_PROCESSING 0
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#define SA_CRYPTO_PROCESSING 0
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#define SA_UPLOAD_HASH_TO_TLR BIT(6)
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#define SA_SW0_FLAGS_MASK 0xF0000
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#define SA_SW0_CMDL_INFO_MASK 0x1F00000
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#define SA_SW0_CMDL_PRESENT BIT(4)
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#define SA_SW0_ENG_ID_MASK 0x3E000000
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#define SA_SW0_DEST_INFO_PRESENT BIT(30)
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#define SA_SW2_EGRESS_LENGTH 0xFF000000
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#define SA_BASIC_HASH 0x10
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#define SHA256_DIGEST_WORDS 8
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/* Make 32-bit word from 4 bytes */
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#define SA_MK_U32(b0, b1, b2, b3) (((b0) << 24) | ((b1) << 16) | \
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((b2) << 8) | (b3))
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/* size of SCCTL structure in bytes */
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#define SA_SCCTL_SZ 16
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/* Max Authentication tag size */
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#define SA_MAX_AUTH_TAG_SZ 64
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#define PRIV_ID 0x1
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#define PRIV 0x1
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static struct device *sa_k3_dev;
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/**
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* struct sa_cmdl_cfg - Command label configuration descriptor
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* @aalg: authentication algorithm ID
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* @enc_eng_id: Encryption Engine ID supported by the SA hardware
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* @auth_eng_id: Authentication Engine ID
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* @iv_size: Initialization Vector size
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* @akey: Authentication key
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* @akey_len: Authentication key length
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* @enc: True, if this is an encode request
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*/
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struct sa_cmdl_cfg {
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int aalg;
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u8 enc_eng_id;
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u8 auth_eng_id;
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u8 iv_size;
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const u8 *akey;
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u16 akey_len;
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bool enc;
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};
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/**
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* struct algo_data - Crypto algorithm specific data
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* @enc_eng: Encryption engine info structure
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* @auth_eng: Authentication engine info structure
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* @auth_ctrl: Authentication control word
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* @hash_size: Size of digest
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* @iv_idx: iv index in psdata
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* @iv_out_size: iv out size
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* @ealg_id: Encryption Algorithm ID
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* @aalg_id: Authentication algorithm ID
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* @mci_enc: Mode Control Instruction for Encryption algorithm
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* @mci_dec: Mode Control Instruction for Decryption
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* @inv_key: Whether the encryption algorithm demands key inversion
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* @ctx: Pointer to the algorithm context
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* @keyed_mac: Whether the authentication algorithm has key
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* @prep_iopad: Function pointer to generate intermediate ipad/opad
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*/
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struct algo_data {
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struct sa_eng_info enc_eng;
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struct sa_eng_info auth_eng;
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u8 auth_ctrl;
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u8 hash_size;
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u8 iv_idx;
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u8 iv_out_size;
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u8 ealg_id;
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u8 aalg_id;
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u8 *mci_enc;
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u8 *mci_dec;
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bool inv_key;
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struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx;
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bool keyed_mac;
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void (*prep_iopad)(struct algo_data *algo, const u8 *key,
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u16 key_sz, __be32 *ipad, __be32 *opad);
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};
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/**
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* struct sa_alg_tmpl: A generic template encompassing crypto/aead algorithms
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* @type: Type of the crypto algorithm.
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* @alg: Union of crypto algorithm definitions.
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* @registered: Flag indicating if the crypto algorithm is already registered
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*/
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struct sa_alg_tmpl {
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u32 type; /* CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE from <linux/crypto.h> */
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union {
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struct skcipher_alg skcipher;
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struct ahash_alg ahash;
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struct aead_alg aead;
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} alg;
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bool registered;
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};
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/**
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* struct sa_mapped_sg: scatterlist information for tx and rx
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* @mapped: Set to true if the @sgt is mapped
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* @dir: mapping direction used for @sgt
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* @split_sg: Set if the sg is split and needs to be freed up
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* @static_sg: Static scatterlist entry for overriding data
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* @sgt: scatterlist table for DMA API use
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*/
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struct sa_mapped_sg {
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bool mapped;
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enum dma_data_direction dir;
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struct scatterlist static_sg;
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struct scatterlist *split_sg;
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struct sg_table sgt;
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};
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/**
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* struct sa_rx_data: RX Packet miscellaneous data place holder
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* @req: crypto request data pointer
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* @ddev: pointer to the DMA device
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* @tx_in: dma_async_tx_descriptor pointer for rx channel
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* @mapped_sg: Information on tx (0) and rx (1) scatterlist DMA mapping
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* @enc: Flag indicating either encryption or decryption
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* @enc_iv_size: Initialisation vector size
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* @iv_idx: Initialisation vector index
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*/
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struct sa_rx_data {
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void *req;
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struct device *ddev;
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struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx_in;
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struct sa_mapped_sg mapped_sg[2];
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u8 enc;
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u8 enc_iv_size;
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u8 iv_idx;
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};
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/**
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* struct sa_req: SA request definition
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* @dev: device for the request
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* @size: total data to the xmitted via DMA
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* @enc_offset: offset of cipher data
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* @enc_size: data to be passed to cipher engine
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* @enc_iv: cipher IV
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* @auth_offset: offset of the authentication data
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* @auth_size: size of the authentication data
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* @auth_iv: authentication IV
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* @type: algorithm type for the request
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* @cmdl: command label pointer
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* @base: pointer to the base request
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* @ctx: pointer to the algorithm context data
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* @enc: true if this is an encode request
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* @src: source data
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* @dst: destination data
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* @callback: DMA callback for the request
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* @mdata_size: metadata size passed to DMA
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*/
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struct sa_req {
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struct device *dev;
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u16 size;
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u8 enc_offset;
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u16 enc_size;
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u8 *enc_iv;
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u8 auth_offset;
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u16 auth_size;
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u8 *auth_iv;
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u32 type;
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u32 *cmdl;
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struct crypto_async_request *base;
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struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx;
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bool enc;
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struct scatterlist *src;
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struct scatterlist *dst;
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dma_async_tx_callback callback;
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u16 mdata_size;
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};
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/*
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* Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256
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* For CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode for encryption
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*/
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static u8 mci_cbc_enc_array[3][MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = {
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{ 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x0a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x4a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x8a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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};
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/*
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* Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256
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* For CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode for decryption
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*/
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static u8 mci_cbc_dec_array[3][MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = {
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{ 0x71, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x71, 0x00, 0x00, 0x84, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x71, 0x00, 0x00, 0x88, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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};
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/*
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* Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256
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* For CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode for encryption
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*/
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static u8 mci_cbc_enc_no_iv_array[3][MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = {
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{ 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x0a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x4a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x8a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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};
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/*
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* Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256
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* For CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode for decryption
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*/
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static u8 mci_cbc_dec_no_iv_array[3][MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = {
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{ 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x84, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x88, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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};
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/*
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* Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256
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* For ECB (Electronic Code Book) mode for encryption
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*/
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static u8 mci_ecb_enc_array[3][27] = {
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{ 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x84, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x88, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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};
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/*
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* Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256
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* For ECB (Electronic Code Book) mode for decryption
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*/
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static u8 mci_ecb_dec_array[3][27] = {
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{ 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x84, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x88, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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};
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/*
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* Mode Control Instructions for DES algorithm
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* For CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode and ECB mode
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* encryption and for decryption respectively
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*/
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static u8 mci_cbc_3des_enc_array[MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = {
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0x60, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x52, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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};
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static u8 mci_cbc_3des_dec_array[MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = {
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0x70, 0x00, 0x00, 0x85, 0x0a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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};
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static u8 mci_ecb_3des_enc_array[MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = {
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0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x85, 0x0a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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};
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static u8 mci_ecb_3des_dec_array[MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = {
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0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x85, 0x0a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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};
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/*
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* Perform 16 byte or 128 bit swizzling
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* The SA2UL Expects the security context to
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* be in little Endian and the bus width is 128 bits or 16 bytes
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* Hence swap 16 bytes at a time from higher to lower address
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*/
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static void sa_swiz_128(u8 *in, u16 len)
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{
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u8 data[16];
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int i, j;
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for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) {
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memcpy(data, &in[i], 16);
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for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
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in[i + j] = data[15 - j];
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}
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}
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/* Prepare the ipad and opad from key as per SHA algorithm step 1*/
|
|
static void prepare_kipad(u8 *k_ipad, const u8 *key, u16 key_sz)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < key_sz; i++)
|
|
k_ipad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x36;
|
|
|
|
/* Instead of XOR with 0 */
|
|
for (; i < SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE; i++)
|
|
k_ipad[i] = 0x36;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void prepare_kopad(u8 *k_opad, const u8 *key, u16 key_sz)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < key_sz; i++)
|
|
k_opad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x5c;
|
|
|
|
/* Instead of XOR with 0 */
|
|
for (; i < SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE; i++)
|
|
k_opad[i] = 0x5c;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_export_shash(void *state, struct shash_desc *hash,
|
|
int digest_size, __be32 *out)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sha1_state *sha1;
|
|
struct sha256_state *sha256;
|
|
u32 *result;
|
|
|
|
switch (digest_size) {
|
|
case SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE:
|
|
sha1 = state;
|
|
result = sha1->state;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE:
|
|
sha256 = state;
|
|
result = sha256->state;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "%s: bad digest_size=%d\n", __func__,
|
|
digest_size);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crypto_shash_export(hash, state);
|
|
|
|
cpu_to_be32_array(out, result, digest_size / 4);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_prepare_iopads(struct algo_data *data, const u8 *key,
|
|
u16 key_sz, __be32 *ipad, __be32 *opad)
|
|
{
|
|
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, data->ctx->shash);
|
|
int block_size = crypto_shash_blocksize(data->ctx->shash);
|
|
int digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(data->ctx->shash);
|
|
union {
|
|
struct sha1_state sha1;
|
|
struct sha256_state sha256;
|
|
u8 k_pad[SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE];
|
|
} sha;
|
|
|
|
shash->tfm = data->ctx->shash;
|
|
|
|
prepare_kipad(sha.k_pad, key, key_sz);
|
|
|
|
crypto_shash_init(shash);
|
|
crypto_shash_update(shash, sha.k_pad, block_size);
|
|
sa_export_shash(&sha, shash, digest_size, ipad);
|
|
|
|
prepare_kopad(sha.k_pad, key, key_sz);
|
|
|
|
crypto_shash_init(shash);
|
|
crypto_shash_update(shash, sha.k_pad, block_size);
|
|
|
|
sa_export_shash(&sha, shash, digest_size, opad);
|
|
|
|
memzero_explicit(&sha, sizeof(sha));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Derive the inverse key used in AES-CBC decryption operation */
|
|
static inline int sa_aes_inv_key(u8 *inv_key, const u8 *key, u16 key_sz)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx;
|
|
int key_pos;
|
|
|
|
if (aes_expandkey(&ctx, key, key_sz)) {
|
|
dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "%s: bad key len(%d)\n", __func__, key_sz);
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* work around to get the right inverse for AES_KEYSIZE_192 size keys */
|
|
if (key_sz == AES_KEYSIZE_192) {
|
|
ctx.key_enc[52] = ctx.key_enc[51] ^ ctx.key_enc[46];
|
|
ctx.key_enc[53] = ctx.key_enc[52] ^ ctx.key_enc[47];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Based crypto_aes_expand_key logic */
|
|
switch (key_sz) {
|
|
case AES_KEYSIZE_128:
|
|
case AES_KEYSIZE_192:
|
|
key_pos = key_sz + 24;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AES_KEYSIZE_256:
|
|
key_pos = key_sz + 24 - 4;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "%s: bad key len(%d)\n", __func__, key_sz);
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(inv_key, &ctx.key_enc[key_pos], key_sz);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set Security context for the encryption engine */
|
|
static int sa_set_sc_enc(struct algo_data *ad, const u8 *key, u16 key_sz,
|
|
u8 enc, u8 *sc_buf)
|
|
{
|
|
const u8 *mci = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Set Encryption mode selector to crypto processing */
|
|
sc_buf[0] = SA_CRYPTO_PROCESSING;
|
|
|
|
if (enc)
|
|
mci = ad->mci_enc;
|
|
else
|
|
mci = ad->mci_dec;
|
|
/* Set the mode control instructions in security context */
|
|
if (mci)
|
|
memcpy(&sc_buf[1], mci, MODE_CONTROL_BYTES);
|
|
|
|
/* For AES-CBC decryption get the inverse key */
|
|
if (ad->inv_key && !enc) {
|
|
if (sa_aes_inv_key(&sc_buf[SC_ENC_KEY_OFFSET], key, key_sz))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
/* For all other cases: key is used */
|
|
} else {
|
|
memcpy(&sc_buf[SC_ENC_KEY_OFFSET], key, key_sz);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set Security context for the authentication engine */
|
|
static void sa_set_sc_auth(struct algo_data *ad, const u8 *key, u16 key_sz,
|
|
u8 *sc_buf)
|
|
{
|
|
__be32 *ipad = (void *)(sc_buf + 32);
|
|
__be32 *opad = (void *)(sc_buf + 64);
|
|
|
|
/* Set Authentication mode selector to hash processing */
|
|
sc_buf[0] = SA_HASH_PROCESSING;
|
|
/* Auth SW ctrl word: bit[6]=1 (upload computed hash to TLR section) */
|
|
sc_buf[1] = SA_UPLOAD_HASH_TO_TLR;
|
|
sc_buf[1] |= ad->auth_ctrl;
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the keys or ipad/opad */
|
|
if (ad->keyed_mac)
|
|
ad->prep_iopad(ad, key, key_sz, ipad, opad);
|
|
else {
|
|
/* basic hash */
|
|
sc_buf[1] |= SA_BASIC_HASH;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline void sa_copy_iv(__be32 *out, const u8 *iv, bool size16)
|
|
{
|
|
int j;
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < ((size16) ? 4 : 2); j++) {
|
|
*out = cpu_to_be32(*((u32 *)iv));
|
|
iv += 4;
|
|
out++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Format general command label */
|
|
static int sa_format_cmdl_gen(struct sa_cmdl_cfg *cfg, u8 *cmdl,
|
|
struct sa_cmdl_upd_info *upd_info)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 enc_offset = 0, auth_offset = 0, total = 0;
|
|
u8 enc_next_eng = SA_ENG_ID_OUTPORT2;
|
|
u8 auth_next_eng = SA_ENG_ID_OUTPORT2;
|
|
u32 *word_ptr = (u32 *)cmdl;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
/* Clear the command label */
|
|
memzero_explicit(cmdl, (SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32)));
|
|
|
|
/* Iniialize the command update structure */
|
|
memzero_explicit(upd_info, sizeof(*upd_info));
|
|
|
|
if (cfg->enc_eng_id && cfg->auth_eng_id) {
|
|
if (cfg->enc) {
|
|
auth_offset = SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES;
|
|
enc_next_eng = cfg->auth_eng_id;
|
|
|
|
if (cfg->iv_size)
|
|
auth_offset += cfg->iv_size;
|
|
} else {
|
|
enc_offset = SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES;
|
|
auth_next_eng = cfg->enc_eng_id;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cfg->enc_eng_id) {
|
|
upd_info->flags |= SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC;
|
|
upd_info->enc_size.index = enc_offset >> 2;
|
|
upd_info->enc_offset.index = upd_info->enc_size.index + 1;
|
|
/* Encryption command label */
|
|
cmdl[enc_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_NESC] = enc_next_eng;
|
|
|
|
/* Encryption modes requiring IV */
|
|
if (cfg->iv_size) {
|
|
upd_info->flags |= SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC_IV;
|
|
upd_info->enc_iv.index =
|
|
(enc_offset + SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES) >> 2;
|
|
upd_info->enc_iv.size = cfg->iv_size;
|
|
|
|
cmdl[enc_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_LABEL_LEN] =
|
|
SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES + cfg->iv_size;
|
|
|
|
cmdl[enc_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_OPTION_CTRL1] =
|
|
(SA_CTX_ENC_AUX2_OFFSET | (cfg->iv_size >> 3));
|
|
total += SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES + cfg->iv_size;
|
|
} else {
|
|
cmdl[enc_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_LABEL_LEN] =
|
|
SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES;
|
|
total += SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cfg->auth_eng_id) {
|
|
upd_info->flags |= SA_CMDL_UPD_AUTH;
|
|
upd_info->auth_size.index = auth_offset >> 2;
|
|
upd_info->auth_offset.index = upd_info->auth_size.index + 1;
|
|
cmdl[auth_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_NESC] = auth_next_eng;
|
|
cmdl[auth_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_LABEL_LEN] =
|
|
SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES;
|
|
total += SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
total = roundup(total, 8);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < total / 4; i++)
|
|
word_ptr[i] = swab32(word_ptr[i]);
|
|
|
|
return total;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Update Command label */
|
|
static inline void sa_update_cmdl(struct sa_req *req, u32 *cmdl,
|
|
struct sa_cmdl_upd_info *upd_info)
|
|
{
|
|
int i = 0, j;
|
|
|
|
if (likely(upd_info->flags & SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC)) {
|
|
cmdl[upd_info->enc_size.index] &= ~SA_CMDL_PAYLOAD_LENGTH_MASK;
|
|
cmdl[upd_info->enc_size.index] |= req->enc_size;
|
|
cmdl[upd_info->enc_offset.index] &=
|
|
~SA_CMDL_SOP_BYPASS_LEN_MASK;
|
|
cmdl[upd_info->enc_offset.index] |=
|
|
((u32)req->enc_offset <<
|
|
__ffs(SA_CMDL_SOP_BYPASS_LEN_MASK));
|
|
|
|
if (likely(upd_info->flags & SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC_IV)) {
|
|
__be32 *data = (__be32 *)&cmdl[upd_info->enc_iv.index];
|
|
u32 *enc_iv = (u32 *)req->enc_iv;
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; i < upd_info->enc_iv.size; i += 4, j++) {
|
|
data[j] = cpu_to_be32(*enc_iv);
|
|
enc_iv++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (likely(upd_info->flags & SA_CMDL_UPD_AUTH)) {
|
|
cmdl[upd_info->auth_size.index] &= ~SA_CMDL_PAYLOAD_LENGTH_MASK;
|
|
cmdl[upd_info->auth_size.index] |= req->auth_size;
|
|
cmdl[upd_info->auth_offset.index] &=
|
|
~SA_CMDL_SOP_BYPASS_LEN_MASK;
|
|
cmdl[upd_info->auth_offset.index] |=
|
|
((u32)req->auth_offset <<
|
|
__ffs(SA_CMDL_SOP_BYPASS_LEN_MASK));
|
|
if (upd_info->flags & SA_CMDL_UPD_AUTH_IV) {
|
|
sa_copy_iv((void *)&cmdl[upd_info->auth_iv.index],
|
|
req->auth_iv,
|
|
(upd_info->auth_iv.size > 8));
|
|
}
|
|
if (upd_info->flags & SA_CMDL_UPD_AUX_KEY) {
|
|
int offset = (req->auth_size & 0xF) ? 4 : 0;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&cmdl[upd_info->aux_key_info.index],
|
|
&upd_info->aux_key[offset], 16);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Format SWINFO words to be sent to SA */
|
|
static
|
|
void sa_set_swinfo(u8 eng_id, u16 sc_id, dma_addr_t sc_phys,
|
|
u8 cmdl_present, u8 cmdl_offset, u8 flags,
|
|
u8 hash_size, u32 *swinfo)
|
|
{
|
|
swinfo[0] = sc_id;
|
|
swinfo[0] |= (flags << __ffs(SA_SW0_FLAGS_MASK));
|
|
if (likely(cmdl_present))
|
|
swinfo[0] |= ((cmdl_offset | SA_SW0_CMDL_PRESENT) <<
|
|
__ffs(SA_SW0_CMDL_INFO_MASK));
|
|
swinfo[0] |= (eng_id << __ffs(SA_SW0_ENG_ID_MASK));
|
|
|
|
swinfo[0] |= SA_SW0_DEST_INFO_PRESENT;
|
|
swinfo[1] = (u32)(sc_phys & 0xFFFFFFFFULL);
|
|
swinfo[2] = (u32)((sc_phys & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000ULL) >> 32);
|
|
swinfo[2] |= (hash_size << __ffs(SA_SW2_EGRESS_LENGTH));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Dump the security context */
|
|
static void sa_dump_sc(u8 *buf, dma_addr_t dma_addr)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
dev_info(sa_k3_dev, "Security context dump:: 0x%pad\n", &dma_addr);
|
|
print_hex_dump(KERN_CONT, "", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET,
|
|
16, 1, buf, SA_CTX_MAX_SZ, false);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static
|
|
int sa_init_sc(struct sa_ctx_info *ctx, const u8 *enc_key,
|
|
u16 enc_key_sz, const u8 *auth_key, u16 auth_key_sz,
|
|
struct algo_data *ad, u8 enc, u32 *swinfo)
|
|
{
|
|
int enc_sc_offset = 0;
|
|
int auth_sc_offset = 0;
|
|
u8 *sc_buf = ctx->sc;
|
|
u16 sc_id = ctx->sc_id;
|
|
u8 first_engine = 0;
|
|
|
|
memzero_explicit(sc_buf, SA_CTX_MAX_SZ);
|
|
|
|
if (ad->auth_eng.eng_id) {
|
|
if (enc)
|
|
first_engine = ad->enc_eng.eng_id;
|
|
else
|
|
first_engine = ad->auth_eng.eng_id;
|
|
|
|
enc_sc_offset = SA_CTX_PHP_PE_CTX_SZ;
|
|
auth_sc_offset = enc_sc_offset + ad->enc_eng.sc_size;
|
|
sc_buf[1] = SA_SCCTL_FE_AUTH_ENC;
|
|
if (!ad->hash_size)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
ad->hash_size = roundup(ad->hash_size, 8);
|
|
|
|
} else if (ad->enc_eng.eng_id && !ad->auth_eng.eng_id) {
|
|
enc_sc_offset = SA_CTX_PHP_PE_CTX_SZ;
|
|
first_engine = ad->enc_eng.eng_id;
|
|
sc_buf[1] = SA_SCCTL_FE_ENC;
|
|
ad->hash_size = ad->iv_out_size;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SCCTL Owner info: 0=host, 1=CP_ACE */
|
|
sc_buf[SA_CTX_SCCTL_OWNER_OFFSET] = 0;
|
|
memcpy(&sc_buf[2], &sc_id, 2);
|
|
sc_buf[4] = 0x0;
|
|
sc_buf[5] = PRIV_ID;
|
|
sc_buf[6] = PRIV;
|
|
sc_buf[7] = 0x0;
|
|
|
|
/* Prepare context for encryption engine */
|
|
if (ad->enc_eng.sc_size) {
|
|
if (sa_set_sc_enc(ad, enc_key, enc_key_sz, enc,
|
|
&sc_buf[enc_sc_offset]))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Prepare context for authentication engine */
|
|
if (ad->auth_eng.sc_size)
|
|
sa_set_sc_auth(ad, auth_key, auth_key_sz,
|
|
&sc_buf[auth_sc_offset]);
|
|
|
|
/* Set the ownership of context to CP_ACE */
|
|
sc_buf[SA_CTX_SCCTL_OWNER_OFFSET] = 0x80;
|
|
|
|
/* swizzle the security context */
|
|
sa_swiz_128(sc_buf, SA_CTX_MAX_SZ);
|
|
|
|
sa_set_swinfo(first_engine, ctx->sc_id, ctx->sc_phys, 1, 0,
|
|
SA_SW_INFO_FLAG_EVICT, ad->hash_size, swinfo);
|
|
|
|
sa_dump_sc(sc_buf, ctx->sc_phys);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Free the per direction context memory */
|
|
static void sa_free_ctx_info(struct sa_ctx_info *ctx,
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *data)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long bn;
|
|
|
|
bn = ctx->sc_id - data->sc_id_start;
|
|
spin_lock(&data->scid_lock);
|
|
__clear_bit(bn, data->ctx_bm);
|
|
data->sc_id--;
|
|
spin_unlock(&data->scid_lock);
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->sc) {
|
|
dma_pool_free(data->sc_pool, ctx->sc, ctx->sc_phys);
|
|
ctx->sc = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_init_ctx_info(struct sa_ctx_info *ctx,
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *data)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long bn;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&data->scid_lock);
|
|
bn = find_first_zero_bit(data->ctx_bm, SA_MAX_NUM_CTX);
|
|
__set_bit(bn, data->ctx_bm);
|
|
data->sc_id++;
|
|
spin_unlock(&data->scid_lock);
|
|
|
|
ctx->sc_id = (u16)(data->sc_id_start + bn);
|
|
|
|
ctx->sc = dma_pool_alloc(data->sc_pool, GFP_KERNEL, &ctx->sc_phys);
|
|
if (!ctx->sc) {
|
|
dev_err(&data->pdev->dev, "Failed to allocate SC memory\n");
|
|
err = -ENOMEM;
|
|
goto scid_rollback;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
scid_rollback:
|
|
spin_lock(&data->scid_lock);
|
|
__clear_bit(bn, data->ctx_bm);
|
|
data->sc_id--;
|
|
spin_unlock(&data->scid_lock);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_cipher_cra_exit(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev);
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(sa_k3_dev, "%s(0x%p) sc-ids(0x%x(0x%pad), 0x%x(0x%pad))\n",
|
|
__func__, tfm, ctx->enc.sc_id, &ctx->enc.sc_phys,
|
|
ctx->dec.sc_id, &ctx->dec.sc_phys);
|
|
|
|
sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data);
|
|
sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->dec, data);
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_skcipher(ctx->fallback.skcipher);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_cipher_cra_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev);
|
|
const char *name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(&tfm->base);
|
|
struct crypto_skcipher *child;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
memzero_explicit(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
|
|
ctx->dev_data = data;
|
|
|
|
ret = sa_init_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
ret = sa_init_ctx_info(&ctx->dec, data);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
child = crypto_alloc_skcipher(name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(child)) {
|
|
dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "Error allocating fallback algo %s\n", name);
|
|
return PTR_ERR(child);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx->fallback.skcipher = child;
|
|
crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, crypto_skcipher_reqsize(child) +
|
|
sizeof(struct skcipher_request));
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(sa_k3_dev, "%s(0x%p) sc-ids(0x%x(0x%pad), 0x%x(0x%pad))\n",
|
|
__func__, tfm, ctx->enc.sc_id, &ctx->enc.sc_phys,
|
|
ctx->dec.sc_id, &ctx->dec.sc_phys);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_cipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
|
|
unsigned int keylen, struct algo_data *ad)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
|
|
struct crypto_skcipher *child = ctx->fallback.skcipher;
|
|
int cmdl_len;
|
|
struct sa_cmdl_cfg cfg;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
|
|
keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_256)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
ad->enc_eng.eng_id = SA_ENG_ID_EM1;
|
|
ad->enc_eng.sc_size = SA_CTX_ENC_TYPE1_SZ;
|
|
|
|
memzero_explicit(&cfg, sizeof(cfg));
|
|
cfg.enc_eng_id = ad->enc_eng.eng_id;
|
|
cfg.iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm);
|
|
|
|
crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(child, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
|
|
crypto_skcipher_set_flags(child, tfm->base.crt_flags &
|
|
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
|
|
ret = crypto_skcipher_setkey(child, key, keylen);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
/* Setup Encryption Security Context & Command label template */
|
|
if (sa_init_sc(&ctx->enc, key, keylen, NULL, 0, ad, 1,
|
|
&ctx->enc.epib[1]))
|
|
goto badkey;
|
|
|
|
cmdl_len = sa_format_cmdl_gen(&cfg,
|
|
(u8 *)ctx->enc.cmdl,
|
|
&ctx->enc.cmdl_upd_info);
|
|
if (cmdl_len <= 0 || (cmdl_len > SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32)))
|
|
goto badkey;
|
|
|
|
ctx->enc.cmdl_size = cmdl_len;
|
|
|
|
/* Setup Decryption Security Context & Command label template */
|
|
if (sa_init_sc(&ctx->dec, key, keylen, NULL, 0, ad, 0,
|
|
&ctx->dec.epib[1]))
|
|
goto badkey;
|
|
|
|
cfg.enc_eng_id = ad->enc_eng.eng_id;
|
|
cmdl_len = sa_format_cmdl_gen(&cfg, (u8 *)ctx->dec.cmdl,
|
|
&ctx->dec.cmdl_upd_info);
|
|
|
|
if (cmdl_len <= 0 || (cmdl_len > SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32)))
|
|
goto badkey;
|
|
|
|
ctx->dec.cmdl_size = cmdl_len;
|
|
ctx->iv_idx = ad->iv_idx;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
badkey:
|
|
dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "%s: badkey\n", __func__);
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_aes_cbc_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
|
|
unsigned int keylen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct algo_data ad = { 0 };
|
|
/* Convert the key size (16/24/32) to the key size index (0/1/2) */
|
|
int key_idx = (keylen >> 3) - 2;
|
|
|
|
if (key_idx >= 3)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
ad.mci_enc = mci_cbc_enc_array[key_idx];
|
|
ad.mci_dec = mci_cbc_dec_array[key_idx];
|
|
ad.inv_key = true;
|
|
ad.ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_AES_CBC;
|
|
ad.iv_idx = 4;
|
|
ad.iv_out_size = 16;
|
|
|
|
return sa_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, &ad);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_aes_ecb_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
|
|
unsigned int keylen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct algo_data ad = { 0 };
|
|
/* Convert the key size (16/24/32) to the key size index (0/1/2) */
|
|
int key_idx = (keylen >> 3) - 2;
|
|
|
|
if (key_idx >= 3)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
ad.mci_enc = mci_ecb_enc_array[key_idx];
|
|
ad.mci_dec = mci_ecb_dec_array[key_idx];
|
|
ad.inv_key = true;
|
|
ad.ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_AES_ECB;
|
|
|
|
return sa_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, &ad);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_3des_cbc_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
|
|
unsigned int keylen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct algo_data ad = { 0 };
|
|
|
|
ad.mci_enc = mci_cbc_3des_enc_array;
|
|
ad.mci_dec = mci_cbc_3des_dec_array;
|
|
ad.ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_3DES_CBC;
|
|
ad.iv_idx = 6;
|
|
ad.iv_out_size = 8;
|
|
|
|
return sa_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, &ad);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_3des_ecb_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
|
|
unsigned int keylen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct algo_data ad = { 0 };
|
|
|
|
ad.mci_enc = mci_ecb_3des_enc_array;
|
|
ad.mci_dec = mci_ecb_3des_dec_array;
|
|
|
|
return sa_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, &ad);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_sync_from_device(struct sa_rx_data *rxd)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sg_table *sgt;
|
|
|
|
if (rxd->mapped_sg[0].dir == DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL)
|
|
sgt = &rxd->mapped_sg[0].sgt;
|
|
else
|
|
sgt = &rxd->mapped_sg[1].sgt;
|
|
|
|
dma_sync_sgtable_for_cpu(rxd->ddev, sgt, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_free_sa_rx_data(struct sa_rx_data *rxd)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(rxd->mapped_sg); i++) {
|
|
struct sa_mapped_sg *mapped_sg = &rxd->mapped_sg[i];
|
|
|
|
if (mapped_sg->mapped) {
|
|
dma_unmap_sgtable(rxd->ddev, &mapped_sg->sgt,
|
|
mapped_sg->dir, 0);
|
|
kfree(mapped_sg->split_sg);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kfree(rxd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_aes_dma_in_callback(void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_rx_data *rxd = (struct sa_rx_data *)data;
|
|
struct skcipher_request *req;
|
|
u32 *result;
|
|
__be32 *mdptr;
|
|
size_t ml, pl;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
sa_sync_from_device(rxd);
|
|
req = container_of(rxd->req, struct skcipher_request, base);
|
|
|
|
if (req->iv) {
|
|
mdptr = (__be32 *)dmaengine_desc_get_metadata_ptr(rxd->tx_in, &pl,
|
|
&ml);
|
|
result = (u32 *)req->iv;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < (rxd->enc_iv_size / 4); i++)
|
|
result[i] = be32_to_cpu(mdptr[i + rxd->iv_idx]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sa_free_sa_rx_data(rxd);
|
|
|
|
skcipher_request_complete(req, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sa_prepare_tx_desc(u32 *mdptr, u32 pslen, u32 *psdata, u32 epiblen, u32 *epib)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 *out, *in;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (out = mdptr, in = epib, i = 0; i < epiblen / sizeof(u32); i++)
|
|
*out++ = *in++;
|
|
|
|
mdptr[4] = (0xFFFF << 16);
|
|
for (out = &mdptr[5], in = psdata, i = 0;
|
|
i < pslen / sizeof(u32); i++)
|
|
*out++ = *in++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_run(struct sa_req *req)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_rx_data *rxd;
|
|
gfp_t gfp_flags;
|
|
u32 cmdl[SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS];
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *pdata = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev);
|
|
struct device *ddev;
|
|
struct dma_chan *dma_rx;
|
|
int sg_nents, src_nents, dst_nents;
|
|
struct scatterlist *src, *dst;
|
|
size_t pl, ml, split_size;
|
|
struct sa_ctx_info *sa_ctx = req->enc ? &req->ctx->enc : &req->ctx->dec;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx_out;
|
|
u32 *mdptr;
|
|
bool diff_dst;
|
|
enum dma_data_direction dir_src;
|
|
struct sa_mapped_sg *mapped_sg;
|
|
|
|
gfp_flags = req->base->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP ?
|
|
GFP_KERNEL : GFP_ATOMIC;
|
|
|
|
rxd = kzalloc(sizeof(*rxd), gfp_flags);
|
|
if (!rxd)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
if (req->src != req->dst) {
|
|
diff_dst = true;
|
|
dir_src = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
diff_dst = false;
|
|
dir_src = DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* SA2UL has an interesting feature where the receive DMA channel
|
|
* is selected based on the data passed to the engine. Within the
|
|
* transition range, there is also a space where it is impossible
|
|
* to determine where the data will end up, and this should be
|
|
* avoided. This will be handled by the SW fallback mechanism by
|
|
* the individual algorithm implementations.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (req->size >= 256)
|
|
dma_rx = pdata->dma_rx2;
|
|
else
|
|
dma_rx = pdata->dma_rx1;
|
|
|
|
ddev = dma_rx->device->dev;
|
|
rxd->ddev = ddev;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(cmdl, sa_ctx->cmdl, sa_ctx->cmdl_size);
|
|
|
|
sa_update_cmdl(req, cmdl, &sa_ctx->cmdl_upd_info);
|
|
|
|
if (req->type != CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH) {
|
|
if (req->enc)
|
|
req->type |=
|
|
(SA_REQ_SUBTYPE_ENC << SA_REQ_SUBTYPE_SHIFT);
|
|
else
|
|
req->type |=
|
|
(SA_REQ_SUBTYPE_DEC << SA_REQ_SUBTYPE_SHIFT);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cmdl[sa_ctx->cmdl_size / sizeof(u32)] = req->type;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Map the packets, first we check if the data fits into a single
|
|
* sg entry and use that if possible. If it does not fit, we check
|
|
* if we need to do sg_split to align the scatterlist data on the
|
|
* actual data size being processed by the crypto engine.
|
|
*/
|
|
src = req->src;
|
|
sg_nents = sg_nents_for_len(src, req->size);
|
|
|
|
split_size = req->size;
|
|
|
|
mapped_sg = &rxd->mapped_sg[0];
|
|
if (sg_nents == 1 && split_size <= req->src->length) {
|
|
src = &mapped_sg->static_sg;
|
|
src_nents = 1;
|
|
sg_init_table(src, 1);
|
|
sg_set_page(src, sg_page(req->src), split_size,
|
|
req->src->offset);
|
|
|
|
mapped_sg->sgt.sgl = src;
|
|
mapped_sg->sgt.orig_nents = src_nents;
|
|
ret = dma_map_sgtable(ddev, &mapped_sg->sgt, dir_src, 0);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
mapped_sg->dir = dir_src;
|
|
mapped_sg->mapped = true;
|
|
} else {
|
|
mapped_sg->sgt.sgl = req->src;
|
|
mapped_sg->sgt.orig_nents = sg_nents;
|
|
ret = dma_map_sgtable(ddev, &mapped_sg->sgt, dir_src, 0);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
mapped_sg->dir = dir_src;
|
|
mapped_sg->mapped = true;
|
|
|
|
ret = sg_split(mapped_sg->sgt.sgl, mapped_sg->sgt.nents, 0, 1,
|
|
&split_size, &src, &src_nents, gfp_flags);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
src_nents = mapped_sg->sgt.nents;
|
|
src = mapped_sg->sgt.sgl;
|
|
} else {
|
|
mapped_sg->split_sg = src;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dma_sync_sgtable_for_device(ddev, &mapped_sg->sgt, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
|
|
|
|
if (!diff_dst) {
|
|
dst_nents = src_nents;
|
|
dst = src;
|
|
} else {
|
|
dst_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, req->size);
|
|
mapped_sg = &rxd->mapped_sg[1];
|
|
|
|
if (dst_nents == 1 && split_size <= req->dst->length) {
|
|
dst = &mapped_sg->static_sg;
|
|
dst_nents = 1;
|
|
sg_init_table(dst, 1);
|
|
sg_set_page(dst, sg_page(req->dst), split_size,
|
|
req->dst->offset);
|
|
|
|
mapped_sg->sgt.sgl = dst;
|
|
mapped_sg->sgt.orig_nents = dst_nents;
|
|
ret = dma_map_sgtable(ddev, &mapped_sg->sgt,
|
|
DMA_FROM_DEVICE, 0);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto err_cleanup;
|
|
|
|
mapped_sg->dir = DMA_FROM_DEVICE;
|
|
mapped_sg->mapped = true;
|
|
} else {
|
|
mapped_sg->sgt.sgl = req->dst;
|
|
mapped_sg->sgt.orig_nents = dst_nents;
|
|
ret = dma_map_sgtable(ddev, &mapped_sg->sgt,
|
|
DMA_FROM_DEVICE, 0);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto err_cleanup;
|
|
|
|
mapped_sg->dir = DMA_FROM_DEVICE;
|
|
mapped_sg->mapped = true;
|
|
|
|
ret = sg_split(mapped_sg->sgt.sgl, mapped_sg->sgt.nents,
|
|
0, 1, &split_size, &dst, &dst_nents,
|
|
gfp_flags);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
dst_nents = mapped_sg->sgt.nents;
|
|
dst = mapped_sg->sgt.sgl;
|
|
} else {
|
|
mapped_sg->split_sg = dst;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rxd->tx_in = dmaengine_prep_slave_sg(dma_rx, dst, dst_nents,
|
|
DMA_DEV_TO_MEM,
|
|
DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT | DMA_CTRL_ACK);
|
|
if (!rxd->tx_in) {
|
|
dev_err(pdata->dev, "IN prep_slave_sg() failed\n");
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
goto err_cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rxd->req = (void *)req->base;
|
|
rxd->enc = req->enc;
|
|
rxd->iv_idx = req->ctx->iv_idx;
|
|
rxd->enc_iv_size = sa_ctx->cmdl_upd_info.enc_iv.size;
|
|
rxd->tx_in->callback = req->callback;
|
|
rxd->tx_in->callback_param = rxd;
|
|
|
|
tx_out = dmaengine_prep_slave_sg(pdata->dma_tx, src,
|
|
src_nents, DMA_MEM_TO_DEV,
|
|
DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT | DMA_CTRL_ACK);
|
|
|
|
if (!tx_out) {
|
|
dev_err(pdata->dev, "OUT prep_slave_sg() failed\n");
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
goto err_cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Prepare metadata for DMA engine. This essentially describes the
|
|
* crypto algorithm to be used, data sizes, different keys etc.
|
|
*/
|
|
mdptr = (u32 *)dmaengine_desc_get_metadata_ptr(tx_out, &pl, &ml);
|
|
|
|
sa_prepare_tx_desc(mdptr, (sa_ctx->cmdl_size + (SA_PSDATA_CTX_WORDS *
|
|
sizeof(u32))), cmdl, sizeof(sa_ctx->epib),
|
|
sa_ctx->epib);
|
|
|
|
ml = sa_ctx->cmdl_size + (SA_PSDATA_CTX_WORDS * sizeof(u32));
|
|
dmaengine_desc_set_metadata_len(tx_out, req->mdata_size);
|
|
|
|
dmaengine_submit(tx_out);
|
|
dmaengine_submit(rxd->tx_in);
|
|
|
|
dma_async_issue_pending(dma_rx);
|
|
dma_async_issue_pending(pdata->dma_tx);
|
|
|
|
return -EINPROGRESS;
|
|
|
|
err_cleanup:
|
|
sa_free_sa_rx_data(rxd);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_cipher_run(struct skcipher_request *req, u8 *iv, int enc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx =
|
|
crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
|
|
struct crypto_alg *alg = req->base.tfm->__crt_alg;
|
|
struct sa_req sa_req = { 0 };
|
|
|
|
if (!req->cryptlen)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (req->cryptlen % alg->cra_blocksize)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
/* Use SW fallback if the data size is not supported */
|
|
if (req->cryptlen > SA_MAX_DATA_SZ ||
|
|
(req->cryptlen >= SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MIN &&
|
|
req->cryptlen <= SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MAX)) {
|
|
struct skcipher_request *subreq = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
skcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->fallback.skcipher);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags,
|
|
req->base.complete,
|
|
req->base.data);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->src, req->dst,
|
|
req->cryptlen, req->iv);
|
|
if (enc)
|
|
return crypto_skcipher_encrypt(subreq);
|
|
else
|
|
return crypto_skcipher_decrypt(subreq);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sa_req.size = req->cryptlen;
|
|
sa_req.enc_size = req->cryptlen;
|
|
sa_req.src = req->src;
|
|
sa_req.dst = req->dst;
|
|
sa_req.enc_iv = iv;
|
|
sa_req.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER;
|
|
sa_req.enc = enc;
|
|
sa_req.callback = sa_aes_dma_in_callback;
|
|
sa_req.mdata_size = 44;
|
|
sa_req.base = &req->base;
|
|
sa_req.ctx = ctx;
|
|
|
|
return sa_run(&sa_req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
return sa_cipher_run(req, req->iv, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
return sa_cipher_run(req, req->iv, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_sha_dma_in_callback(void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_rx_data *rxd = (struct sa_rx_data *)data;
|
|
struct ahash_request *req;
|
|
struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
|
|
unsigned int authsize;
|
|
int i;
|
|
size_t ml, pl;
|
|
u32 *result;
|
|
__be32 *mdptr;
|
|
|
|
sa_sync_from_device(rxd);
|
|
req = container_of(rxd->req, struct ahash_request, base);
|
|
tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
|
|
authsize = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
|
|
|
|
mdptr = (__be32 *)dmaengine_desc_get_metadata_ptr(rxd->tx_in, &pl, &ml);
|
|
result = (u32 *)req->result;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < (authsize / 4); i++)
|
|
result[i] = be32_to_cpu(mdptr[i + 4]);
|
|
|
|
sa_free_sa_rx_data(rxd);
|
|
|
|
ahash_request_complete(req, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int zero_message_process(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
|
|
int sa_digest_size = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
|
|
|
|
switch (sa_digest_size) {
|
|
case SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE:
|
|
memcpy(req->result, sha1_zero_message_hash, sa_digest_size);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE:
|
|
memcpy(req->result, sha256_zero_message_hash, sa_digest_size);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE:
|
|
memcpy(req->result, sha512_zero_message_hash, sa_digest_size);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha_run(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req));
|
|
struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
struct sa_req sa_req = { 0 };
|
|
size_t auth_len;
|
|
|
|
auth_len = req->nbytes;
|
|
|
|
if (!auth_len)
|
|
return zero_message_process(req);
|
|
|
|
if (auth_len > SA_MAX_DATA_SZ ||
|
|
(auth_len >= SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MIN &&
|
|
auth_len <= SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MAX)) {
|
|
struct ahash_request *subreq = &rctx->fallback_req;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
ahash_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->fallback.ahash);
|
|
subreq->base.flags = req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
|
|
|
|
crypto_ahash_init(subreq);
|
|
|
|
subreq->nbytes = auth_len;
|
|
subreq->src = req->src;
|
|
subreq->result = req->result;
|
|
|
|
ret |= crypto_ahash_update(subreq);
|
|
|
|
subreq->nbytes = 0;
|
|
|
|
ret |= crypto_ahash_final(subreq);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sa_req.size = auth_len;
|
|
sa_req.auth_size = auth_len;
|
|
sa_req.src = req->src;
|
|
sa_req.dst = req->src;
|
|
sa_req.enc = true;
|
|
sa_req.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH;
|
|
sa_req.callback = sa_sha_dma_in_callback;
|
|
sa_req.mdata_size = 28;
|
|
sa_req.ctx = ctx;
|
|
sa_req.base = &req->base;
|
|
|
|
return sa_run(&sa_req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha_setup(struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx, struct algo_data *ad)
|
|
{
|
|
int bs = crypto_shash_blocksize(ctx->shash);
|
|
int cmdl_len;
|
|
struct sa_cmdl_cfg cfg;
|
|
|
|
ad->enc_eng.sc_size = SA_CTX_ENC_TYPE1_SZ;
|
|
ad->auth_eng.eng_id = SA_ENG_ID_AM1;
|
|
ad->auth_eng.sc_size = SA_CTX_AUTH_TYPE2_SZ;
|
|
|
|
memset(ctx->authkey, 0, bs);
|
|
memset(&cfg, 0, sizeof(cfg));
|
|
cfg.aalg = ad->aalg_id;
|
|
cfg.enc_eng_id = ad->enc_eng.eng_id;
|
|
cfg.auth_eng_id = ad->auth_eng.eng_id;
|
|
cfg.iv_size = 0;
|
|
cfg.akey = NULL;
|
|
cfg.akey_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Setup Encryption Security Context & Command label template */
|
|
if (sa_init_sc(&ctx->enc, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, ad, 0,
|
|
&ctx->enc.epib[1]))
|
|
goto badkey;
|
|
|
|
cmdl_len = sa_format_cmdl_gen(&cfg,
|
|
(u8 *)ctx->enc.cmdl,
|
|
&ctx->enc.cmdl_upd_info);
|
|
if (cmdl_len <= 0 || (cmdl_len > SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32)))
|
|
goto badkey;
|
|
|
|
ctx->enc.cmdl_size = cmdl_len;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
badkey:
|
|
dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "%s: badkey\n", __func__);
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha_cra_init_alg(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const char *alg_base)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev);
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
|
|
ctx->dev_data = data;
|
|
ret = sa_init_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
if (alg_base) {
|
|
ctx->shash = crypto_alloc_shash(alg_base, 0,
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(ctx->shash)) {
|
|
dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "base driver %s couldn't be loaded\n",
|
|
alg_base);
|
|
return PTR_ERR(ctx->shash);
|
|
}
|
|
/* for fallback */
|
|
ctx->fallback.ahash =
|
|
crypto_alloc_ahash(alg_base, 0,
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(ctx->fallback.ahash)) {
|
|
dev_err(ctx->dev_data->dev,
|
|
"Could not load fallback driver\n");
|
|
return PTR_ERR(ctx->fallback.ahash);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(sa_k3_dev, "%s(0x%p) sc-ids(0x%x(0x%pad), 0x%x(0x%pad))\n",
|
|
__func__, tfm, ctx->enc.sc_id, &ctx->enc.sc_phys,
|
|
ctx->dec.sc_id, &ctx->dec.sc_phys);
|
|
|
|
crypto_ahash_set_reqsize(__crypto_ahash_cast(tfm),
|
|
sizeof(struct sa_sha_req_ctx) +
|
|
crypto_ahash_reqsize(ctx->fallback.ahash));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha_digest(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
return sa_sha_run(req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha_init(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
|
|
struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(sa_k3_dev, "init: digest size: %u, rctx=%p\n",
|
|
crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm), rctx);
|
|
|
|
ahash_request_set_tfm(&rctx->fallback_req, ctx->fallback.ahash);
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.base.flags =
|
|
req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
|
|
|
|
return crypto_ahash_init(&rctx->fallback_req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha_update(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
|
|
struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
ahash_request_set_tfm(&rctx->fallback_req, ctx->fallback.ahash);
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.base.flags =
|
|
req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.nbytes = req->nbytes;
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.src = req->src;
|
|
|
|
return crypto_ahash_update(&rctx->fallback_req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha_final(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
|
|
struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
ahash_request_set_tfm(&rctx->fallback_req, ctx->fallback.ahash);
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.base.flags =
|
|
req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.result = req->result;
|
|
|
|
return crypto_ahash_final(&rctx->fallback_req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha_finup(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
|
|
struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
ahash_request_set_tfm(&rctx->fallback_req, ctx->fallback.ahash);
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.base.flags =
|
|
req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
|
|
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.nbytes = req->nbytes;
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.src = req->src;
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.result = req->result;
|
|
|
|
return crypto_ahash_finup(&rctx->fallback_req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha_import(struct ahash_request *req, const void *in)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
ahash_request_set_tfm(&rctx->fallback_req, ctx->fallback.ahash);
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.base.flags = req->base.flags &
|
|
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
|
|
|
|
return crypto_ahash_import(&rctx->fallback_req, in);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha_export(struct ahash_request *req, void *out)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
|
|
struct ahash_request *subreq = &rctx->fallback_req;
|
|
|
|
ahash_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->fallback.ahash);
|
|
subreq->base.flags = req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
|
|
|
|
return crypto_ahash_export(subreq, out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha1_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct algo_data ad = { 0 };
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
sa_sha_cra_init_alg(tfm, "sha1");
|
|
|
|
ad.aalg_id = SA_AALG_ID_SHA1;
|
|
ad.hash_size = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
|
|
ad.auth_ctrl = SA_AUTH_SW_CTRL_SHA1;
|
|
|
|
sa_sha_setup(ctx, &ad);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha256_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct algo_data ad = { 0 };
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
sa_sha_cra_init_alg(tfm, "sha256");
|
|
|
|
ad.aalg_id = SA_AALG_ID_SHA2_256;
|
|
ad.hash_size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
|
|
ad.auth_ctrl = SA_AUTH_SW_CTRL_SHA256;
|
|
|
|
sa_sha_setup(ctx, &ad);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha512_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct algo_data ad = { 0 };
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
sa_sha_cra_init_alg(tfm, "sha512");
|
|
|
|
ad.aalg_id = SA_AALG_ID_SHA2_512;
|
|
ad.hash_size = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE;
|
|
ad.auth_ctrl = SA_AUTH_SW_CTRL_SHA512;
|
|
|
|
sa_sha_setup(ctx, &ad);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_sha_cra_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev);
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(sa_k3_dev, "%s(0x%p) sc-ids(0x%x(0x%pad), 0x%x(0x%pad))\n",
|
|
__func__, tfm, ctx->enc.sc_id, &ctx->enc.sc_phys,
|
|
ctx->dec.sc_id, &ctx->dec.sc_phys);
|
|
|
|
if (crypto_tfm_alg_type(tfm) == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH)
|
|
sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data);
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_shash(ctx->shash);
|
|
crypto_free_ahash(ctx->fallback.ahash);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_aead_dma_in_callback(void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_rx_data *rxd = (struct sa_rx_data *)data;
|
|
struct aead_request *req;
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm;
|
|
unsigned int start;
|
|
unsigned int authsize;
|
|
u8 auth_tag[SA_MAX_AUTH_TAG_SZ];
|
|
size_t pl, ml;
|
|
int i;
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
u16 auth_len;
|
|
u32 *mdptr;
|
|
|
|
sa_sync_from_device(rxd);
|
|
req = container_of(rxd->req, struct aead_request, base);
|
|
tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
start = req->assoclen + req->cryptlen;
|
|
authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
|
|
|
|
mdptr = (u32 *)dmaengine_desc_get_metadata_ptr(rxd->tx_in, &pl, &ml);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < (authsize / 4); i++)
|
|
mdptr[i + 4] = swab32(mdptr[i + 4]);
|
|
|
|
auth_len = req->assoclen + req->cryptlen;
|
|
|
|
if (rxd->enc) {
|
|
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(&mdptr[4], req->dst, start, authsize,
|
|
1);
|
|
} else {
|
|
auth_len -= authsize;
|
|
start -= authsize;
|
|
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(auth_tag, req->src, start, authsize,
|
|
0);
|
|
|
|
err = memcmp(&mdptr[4], auth_tag, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sa_free_sa_rx_data(rxd);
|
|
|
|
aead_request_complete(req, err);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_cra_init_aead(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const char *hash,
|
|
const char *fallback)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev);
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
memzero_explicit(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
|
|
|
|
ctx->shash = crypto_alloc_shash(hash, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(ctx->shash)) {
|
|
dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "base driver %s couldn't be loaded\n", hash);
|
|
return PTR_ERR(ctx->shash);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx->fallback.aead = crypto_alloc_aead(fallback, 0,
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(ctx->fallback.aead)) {
|
|
dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "fallback driver %s couldn't be loaded\n",
|
|
fallback);
|
|
return PTR_ERR(ctx->fallback.aead);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crypto_aead_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct aead_request) +
|
|
crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->fallback.aead));
|
|
|
|
ret = sa_init_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = sa_init_ctx_info(&ctx->dec, data);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(sa_k3_dev, "%s(0x%p) sc-ids(0x%x(0x%pad), 0x%x(0x%pad))\n",
|
|
__func__, tfm, ctx->enc.sc_id, &ctx->enc.sc_phys,
|
|
ctx->dec.sc_id, &ctx->dec.sc_phys);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_cra_init_aead_sha1(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
|
|
{
|
|
return sa_cra_init_aead(tfm, "sha1",
|
|
"authenc(hmac(sha1-ce),cbc(aes-ce))");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_cra_init_aead_sha256(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
|
|
{
|
|
return sa_cra_init_aead(tfm, "sha256",
|
|
"authenc(hmac(sha256-ce),cbc(aes-ce))");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_exit_tfm_aead(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev);
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_shash(ctx->shash);
|
|
crypto_free_aead(ctx->fallback.aead);
|
|
|
|
sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data);
|
|
sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->dec, data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* AEAD algorithm configuration interface function */
|
|
static int sa_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
|
|
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen,
|
|
struct algo_data *ad)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc);
|
|
struct crypto_authenc_keys keys;
|
|
int cmdl_len;
|
|
struct sa_cmdl_cfg cfg;
|
|
int key_idx;
|
|
|
|
if (crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen) != 0)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
/* Convert the key size (16/24/32) to the key size index (0/1/2) */
|
|
key_idx = (keys.enckeylen >> 3) - 2;
|
|
if (key_idx >= 3)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
ad->ctx = ctx;
|
|
ad->enc_eng.eng_id = SA_ENG_ID_EM1;
|
|
ad->enc_eng.sc_size = SA_CTX_ENC_TYPE1_SZ;
|
|
ad->auth_eng.eng_id = SA_ENG_ID_AM1;
|
|
ad->auth_eng.sc_size = SA_CTX_AUTH_TYPE2_SZ;
|
|
ad->mci_enc = mci_cbc_enc_no_iv_array[key_idx];
|
|
ad->mci_dec = mci_cbc_dec_no_iv_array[key_idx];
|
|
ad->inv_key = true;
|
|
ad->keyed_mac = true;
|
|
ad->ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_AES_CBC;
|
|
ad->prep_iopad = sa_prepare_iopads;
|
|
|
|
memset(&cfg, 0, sizeof(cfg));
|
|
cfg.enc = true;
|
|
cfg.aalg = ad->aalg_id;
|
|
cfg.enc_eng_id = ad->enc_eng.eng_id;
|
|
cfg.auth_eng_id = ad->auth_eng.eng_id;
|
|
cfg.iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(authenc);
|
|
cfg.akey = keys.authkey;
|
|
cfg.akey_len = keys.authkeylen;
|
|
|
|
/* Setup Encryption Security Context & Command label template */
|
|
if (sa_init_sc(&ctx->enc, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen,
|
|
keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen,
|
|
ad, 1, &ctx->enc.epib[1]))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
cmdl_len = sa_format_cmdl_gen(&cfg,
|
|
(u8 *)ctx->enc.cmdl,
|
|
&ctx->enc.cmdl_upd_info);
|
|
if (cmdl_len <= 0 || (cmdl_len > SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32)))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
ctx->enc.cmdl_size = cmdl_len;
|
|
|
|
/* Setup Decryption Security Context & Command label template */
|
|
if (sa_init_sc(&ctx->dec, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen,
|
|
keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen,
|
|
ad, 0, &ctx->dec.epib[1]))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
cfg.enc = false;
|
|
cmdl_len = sa_format_cmdl_gen(&cfg, (u8 *)ctx->dec.cmdl,
|
|
&ctx->dec.cmdl_upd_info);
|
|
|
|
if (cmdl_len <= 0 || (cmdl_len > SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32)))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
ctx->dec.cmdl_size = cmdl_len;
|
|
|
|
crypto_aead_clear_flags(ctx->fallback.aead, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
|
|
crypto_aead_set_flags(ctx->fallback.aead,
|
|
crypto_aead_get_flags(authenc) &
|
|
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
|
|
crypto_aead_setkey(ctx->fallback.aead, key, keylen);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_aead_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm, unsigned int authsize)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm));
|
|
|
|
return crypto_aead_setauthsize(ctx->fallback.aead, authsize);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_aead_cbc_sha1_setkey(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
|
|
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct algo_data ad = { 0 };
|
|
|
|
ad.ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_AES_CBC;
|
|
ad.aalg_id = SA_AALG_ID_HMAC_SHA1;
|
|
ad.hash_size = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
|
|
ad.auth_ctrl = SA_AUTH_SW_CTRL_SHA1;
|
|
|
|
return sa_aead_setkey(authenc, key, keylen, &ad);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_aead_cbc_sha256_setkey(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
|
|
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct algo_data ad = { 0 };
|
|
|
|
ad.ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_AES_CBC;
|
|
ad.aalg_id = SA_AALG_ID_HMAC_SHA2_256;
|
|
ad.hash_size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
|
|
ad.auth_ctrl = SA_AUTH_SW_CTRL_SHA256;
|
|
|
|
return sa_aead_setkey(authenc, key, keylen, &ad);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_aead_run(struct aead_request *req, u8 *iv, int enc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
struct sa_req sa_req = { 0 };
|
|
size_t auth_size, enc_size;
|
|
|
|
enc_size = req->cryptlen;
|
|
auth_size = req->assoclen + req->cryptlen;
|
|
|
|
if (!enc) {
|
|
enc_size -= crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
|
|
auth_size -= crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (auth_size > SA_MAX_DATA_SZ ||
|
|
(auth_size >= SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MIN &&
|
|
auth_size <= SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MAX)) {
|
|
struct aead_request *subreq = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->fallback.aead);
|
|
aead_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags,
|
|
req->base.complete, req->base.data);
|
|
aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->src, req->dst,
|
|
req->cryptlen, req->iv);
|
|
aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen);
|
|
|
|
ret = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(subreq) :
|
|
crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sa_req.enc_offset = req->assoclen;
|
|
sa_req.enc_size = enc_size;
|
|
sa_req.auth_size = auth_size;
|
|
sa_req.size = auth_size;
|
|
sa_req.enc_iv = iv;
|
|
sa_req.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD;
|
|
sa_req.enc = enc;
|
|
sa_req.callback = sa_aead_dma_in_callback;
|
|
sa_req.mdata_size = 52;
|
|
sa_req.base = &req->base;
|
|
sa_req.ctx = ctx;
|
|
sa_req.src = req->src;
|
|
sa_req.dst = req->dst;
|
|
|
|
return sa_run(&sa_req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* AEAD algorithm encrypt interface function */
|
|
static int sa_aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
return sa_aead_run(req, req->iv, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* AEAD algorithm decrypt interface function */
|
|
static int sa_aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
return sa_aead_run(req, req->iv, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct sa_alg_tmpl sa_algs[] = {
|
|
{
|
|
.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER,
|
|
.alg.skcipher = {
|
|
.base.cra_name = "cbc(aes)",
|
|
.base.cra_driver_name = "cbc-aes-sa2ul",
|
|
.base.cra_priority = 30000,
|
|
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
.base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx),
|
|
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.init = sa_cipher_cra_init,
|
|
.exit = sa_cipher_cra_exit,
|
|
.min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
.max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.setkey = sa_aes_cbc_setkey,
|
|
.encrypt = sa_encrypt,
|
|
.decrypt = sa_decrypt,
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER,
|
|
.alg.skcipher = {
|
|
.base.cra_name = "ecb(aes)",
|
|
.base.cra_driver_name = "ecb-aes-sa2ul",
|
|
.base.cra_priority = 30000,
|
|
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
.base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx),
|
|
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.init = sa_cipher_cra_init,
|
|
.exit = sa_cipher_cra_exit,
|
|
.min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
.max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
.setkey = sa_aes_ecb_setkey,
|
|
.encrypt = sa_encrypt,
|
|
.decrypt = sa_decrypt,
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER,
|
|
.alg.skcipher = {
|
|
.base.cra_name = "cbc(des3_ede)",
|
|
.base.cra_driver_name = "cbc-des3-sa2ul",
|
|
.base.cra_priority = 30000,
|
|
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
.base.cra_blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx),
|
|
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.init = sa_cipher_cra_init,
|
|
.exit = sa_cipher_cra_exit,
|
|
.min_keysize = 3 * DES_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
.max_keysize = 3 * DES_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
.ivsize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.setkey = sa_3des_cbc_setkey,
|
|
.encrypt = sa_encrypt,
|
|
.decrypt = sa_decrypt,
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER,
|
|
.alg.skcipher = {
|
|
.base.cra_name = "ecb(des3_ede)",
|
|
.base.cra_driver_name = "ecb-des3-sa2ul",
|
|
.base.cra_priority = 30000,
|
|
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
.base.cra_blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx),
|
|
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.init = sa_cipher_cra_init,
|
|
.exit = sa_cipher_cra_exit,
|
|
.min_keysize = 3 * DES_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
.max_keysize = 3 * DES_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
.setkey = sa_3des_ecb_setkey,
|
|
.encrypt = sa_encrypt,
|
|
.decrypt = sa_decrypt,
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH,
|
|
.alg.ahash = {
|
|
.halg.base = {
|
|
.cra_name = "sha1",
|
|
.cra_driver_name = "sha1-sa2ul",
|
|
.cra_priority = 400,
|
|
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
.cra_blocksize = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx),
|
|
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.cra_init = sa_sha1_cra_init,
|
|
.cra_exit = sa_sha_cra_exit,
|
|
},
|
|
.halg.digestsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
|
.halg.statesize = sizeof(struct sa_sha_req_ctx) +
|
|
sizeof(struct sha1_state),
|
|
.init = sa_sha_init,
|
|
.update = sa_sha_update,
|
|
.final = sa_sha_final,
|
|
.finup = sa_sha_finup,
|
|
.digest = sa_sha_digest,
|
|
.export = sa_sha_export,
|
|
.import = sa_sha_import,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH,
|
|
.alg.ahash = {
|
|
.halg.base = {
|
|
.cra_name = "sha256",
|
|
.cra_driver_name = "sha256-sa2ul",
|
|
.cra_priority = 400,
|
|
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
.cra_blocksize = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx),
|
|
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.cra_init = sa_sha256_cra_init,
|
|
.cra_exit = sa_sha_cra_exit,
|
|
},
|
|
.halg.digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
|
.halg.statesize = sizeof(struct sa_sha_req_ctx) +
|
|
sizeof(struct sha256_state),
|
|
.init = sa_sha_init,
|
|
.update = sa_sha_update,
|
|
.final = sa_sha_final,
|
|
.finup = sa_sha_finup,
|
|
.digest = sa_sha_digest,
|
|
.export = sa_sha_export,
|
|
.import = sa_sha_import,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH,
|
|
.alg.ahash = {
|
|
.halg.base = {
|
|
.cra_name = "sha512",
|
|
.cra_driver_name = "sha512-sa2ul",
|
|
.cra_priority = 400,
|
|
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
.cra_blocksize = SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx),
|
|
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.cra_init = sa_sha512_cra_init,
|
|
.cra_exit = sa_sha_cra_exit,
|
|
},
|
|
.halg.digestsize = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
|
.halg.statesize = sizeof(struct sa_sha_req_ctx) +
|
|
sizeof(struct sha512_state),
|
|
.init = sa_sha_init,
|
|
.update = sa_sha_update,
|
|
.final = sa_sha_final,
|
|
.finup = sa_sha_finup,
|
|
.digest = sa_sha_digest,
|
|
.export = sa_sha_export,
|
|
.import = sa_sha_import,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
|
|
.alg.aead = {
|
|
.base = {
|
|
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))",
|
|
.cra_driver_name =
|
|
"authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))-sa2ul",
|
|
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx),
|
|
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.cra_priority = 3000,
|
|
},
|
|
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.maxauthsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.init = sa_cra_init_aead_sha1,
|
|
.exit = sa_exit_tfm_aead,
|
|
.setkey = sa_aead_cbc_sha1_setkey,
|
|
.setauthsize = sa_aead_setauthsize,
|
|
.encrypt = sa_aead_encrypt,
|
|
.decrypt = sa_aead_decrypt,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
|
|
.alg.aead = {
|
|
.base = {
|
|
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
|
|
.cra_driver_name =
|
|
"authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))-sa2ul",
|
|
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx),
|
|
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.cra_alignmask = 0,
|
|
.cra_priority = 3000,
|
|
},
|
|
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.maxauthsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.init = sa_cra_init_aead_sha256,
|
|
.exit = sa_exit_tfm_aead,
|
|
.setkey = sa_aead_cbc_sha256_setkey,
|
|
.setauthsize = sa_aead_setauthsize,
|
|
.encrypt = sa_aead_encrypt,
|
|
.decrypt = sa_aead_decrypt,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* Register the algorithms in crypto framework */
|
|
static void sa_register_algos(const struct device *dev)
|
|
{
|
|
char *alg_name;
|
|
u32 type;
|
|
int i, err;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sa_algs); i++) {
|
|
type = sa_algs[i].type;
|
|
if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER) {
|
|
alg_name = sa_algs[i].alg.skcipher.base.cra_name;
|
|
err = crypto_register_skcipher(&sa_algs[i].alg.skcipher);
|
|
} else if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH) {
|
|
alg_name = sa_algs[i].alg.ahash.halg.base.cra_name;
|
|
err = crypto_register_ahash(&sa_algs[i].alg.ahash);
|
|
} else if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD) {
|
|
alg_name = sa_algs[i].alg.aead.base.cra_name;
|
|
err = crypto_register_aead(&sa_algs[i].alg.aead);
|
|
} else {
|
|
dev_err(dev,
|
|
"un-supported crypto algorithm (%d)",
|
|
sa_algs[i].type);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
dev_err(dev, "Failed to register '%s'\n", alg_name);
|
|
else
|
|
sa_algs[i].registered = true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Unregister the algorithms in crypto framework */
|
|
static void sa_unregister_algos(const struct device *dev)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 type;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sa_algs); i++) {
|
|
type = sa_algs[i].type;
|
|
if (!sa_algs[i].registered)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER)
|
|
crypto_unregister_skcipher(&sa_algs[i].alg.skcipher);
|
|
else if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH)
|
|
crypto_unregister_ahash(&sa_algs[i].alg.ahash);
|
|
else if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD)
|
|
crypto_unregister_aead(&sa_algs[i].alg.aead);
|
|
|
|
sa_algs[i].registered = false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_init_mem(struct sa_crypto_data *dev_data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct device *dev = &dev_data->pdev->dev;
|
|
/* Setup dma pool for security context buffers */
|
|
dev_data->sc_pool = dma_pool_create("keystone-sc", dev,
|
|
SA_CTX_MAX_SZ, 64, 0);
|
|
if (!dev_data->sc_pool) {
|
|
dev_err(dev, "Failed to create dma pool");
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_dma_init(struct sa_crypto_data *dd)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
struct dma_slave_config cfg;
|
|
|
|
dd->dma_rx1 = NULL;
|
|
dd->dma_tx = NULL;
|
|
dd->dma_rx2 = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ret = dma_coerce_mask_and_coherent(dd->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(48));
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
dd->dma_rx1 = dma_request_chan(dd->dev, "rx1");
|
|
if (IS_ERR(dd->dma_rx1))
|
|
return dev_err_probe(dd->dev, PTR_ERR(dd->dma_rx1),
|
|
"Unable to request rx1 DMA channel\n");
|
|
|
|
dd->dma_rx2 = dma_request_chan(dd->dev, "rx2");
|
|
if (IS_ERR(dd->dma_rx2)) {
|
|
dma_release_channel(dd->dma_rx1);
|
|
return dev_err_probe(dd->dev, PTR_ERR(dd->dma_rx2),
|
|
"Unable to request rx2 DMA channel\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dd->dma_tx = dma_request_chan(dd->dev, "tx");
|
|
if (IS_ERR(dd->dma_tx)) {
|
|
ret = dev_err_probe(dd->dev, PTR_ERR(dd->dma_tx),
|
|
"Unable to request tx DMA channel\n");
|
|
goto err_dma_tx;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memzero_explicit(&cfg, sizeof(cfg));
|
|
|
|
cfg.src_addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_4_BYTES;
|
|
cfg.dst_addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_4_BYTES;
|
|
cfg.src_maxburst = 4;
|
|
cfg.dst_maxburst = 4;
|
|
|
|
ret = dmaengine_slave_config(dd->dma_rx1, &cfg);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
dev_err(dd->dev, "can't configure IN dmaengine slave: %d\n",
|
|
ret);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = dmaengine_slave_config(dd->dma_rx2, &cfg);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
dev_err(dd->dev, "can't configure IN dmaengine slave: %d\n",
|
|
ret);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = dmaengine_slave_config(dd->dma_tx, &cfg);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
dev_err(dd->dev, "can't configure OUT dmaengine slave: %d\n",
|
|
ret);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
err_dma_tx:
|
|
dma_release_channel(dd->dma_rx1);
|
|
dma_release_channel(dd->dma_rx2);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_link_child(struct device *dev, void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct device *parent = data;
|
|
|
|
device_link_add(dev, parent, DL_FLAG_AUTOPROBE_CONSUMER);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_ul_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
|
|
{
|
|
struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
|
|
struct device_node *node = dev->of_node;
|
|
struct resource *res;
|
|
static void __iomem *saul_base;
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *dev_data;
|
|
u32 val;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
dev_data = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*dev_data), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!dev_data)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
sa_k3_dev = dev;
|
|
dev_data->dev = dev;
|
|
dev_data->pdev = pdev;
|
|
platform_set_drvdata(pdev, dev_data);
|
|
dev_set_drvdata(sa_k3_dev, dev_data);
|
|
|
|
pm_runtime_enable(dev);
|
|
ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(dev);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "%s: failed to get sync: %d\n", __func__,
|
|
ret);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sa_init_mem(dev_data);
|
|
ret = sa_dma_init(dev_data);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto disable_pm_runtime;
|
|
|
|
spin_lock_init(&dev_data->scid_lock);
|
|
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
|
|
saul_base = devm_ioremap_resource(dev, res);
|
|
|
|
dev_data->base = saul_base;
|
|
val = SA_EEC_ENCSS_EN | SA_EEC_AUTHSS_EN | SA_EEC_CTXCACH_EN |
|
|
SA_EEC_CPPI_PORT_IN_EN | SA_EEC_CPPI_PORT_OUT_EN |
|
|
SA_EEC_TRNG_EN;
|
|
|
|
writel_relaxed(val, saul_base + SA_ENGINE_ENABLE_CONTROL);
|
|
|
|
sa_register_algos(dev);
|
|
|
|
ret = of_platform_populate(node, NULL, NULL, &pdev->dev);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto release_dma;
|
|
|
|
device_for_each_child(&pdev->dev, &pdev->dev, sa_link_child);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
release_dma:
|
|
sa_unregister_algos(&pdev->dev);
|
|
|
|
dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_rx2);
|
|
dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_rx1);
|
|
dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_tx);
|
|
|
|
dma_pool_destroy(dev_data->sc_pool);
|
|
|
|
disable_pm_runtime:
|
|
pm_runtime_put_sync(&pdev->dev);
|
|
pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_ul_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *dev_data = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
|
|
|
|
sa_unregister_algos(&pdev->dev);
|
|
|
|
dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_rx2);
|
|
dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_rx1);
|
|
dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_tx);
|
|
|
|
dma_pool_destroy(dev_data->sc_pool);
|
|
|
|
platform_set_drvdata(pdev, NULL);
|
|
|
|
pm_runtime_put_sync(&pdev->dev);
|
|
pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const struct of_device_id of_match[] = {
|
|
{.compatible = "ti,j721e-sa2ul",},
|
|
{.compatible = "ti,am654-sa2ul",},
|
|
{},
|
|
};
|
|
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, of_match);
|
|
|
|
static struct platform_driver sa_ul_driver = {
|
|
.probe = sa_ul_probe,
|
|
.remove = sa_ul_remove,
|
|
.driver = {
|
|
.name = "saul-crypto",
|
|
.of_match_table = of_match,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
module_platform_driver(sa_ul_driver);
|
|
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
|