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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAmOXmxkUHHBhdWxAcGF1 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXMPXg//cxfYC8lRtVpuGNCZWDietSiHzpzu +qFntaTplvybJMQX0HfgNee5cTBZM+W5mp1BHRcZInvV5LRhyrVtgsxDBifutE4x LyUJAw5SkiPdRC+XLDIRLKiZCobFBLVs2zO+qibIqsyR60pFjU6WXBLbJfidXBFR yWudDbLU0YhQJCHdNHNqnHCgqrEculxn6q3QPvm/DX0xzBwkFHSSYBkGNvHW2ZTA lKNreEOwEk5DTLIKjP4bJ72ixp0xbshw5CXuxtwB/12/4h8QbWbJVQLlIeZrTLmp zQXQLJ3pCqKJ2OUCgMDK+wmkvLezd80BV3Due7KX0pT0YRDygoh5QEpZ5/8k8eG7 prxToh2gJWk2htfJF6kgMpAh9Jqewcke4BysbYVM/427OPZYwQqLDZDGOzbtT6pl FYF+adN9wwkAErnHnPlzYipUEpBWurbjtsV8KFWNERoZ4YmzfSPEisRqGIHDGRws bTyq/7qs5FXkb1zULELj8V+S2ULsmxPqsxJ63p9di54Uo9lHK0I+0IUtajGDdfze psAasa9DD/oH2PAbSmpQ5Xo9XyfHRXsVuz1twEmEA14ML0m4wHbNWVHaK0aaXVdG kJKSDSjMsiV+GiwNo7ISJ4pVdUpnMI/iZSghFfV28cJslNhJDeaREHaE/Wtn1/xF /bCVmEfS16UoJsQ= =klFk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20221212' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore: - Improve the error handling in the device cgroup such that memory allocation failures when updating the access policy do not potentially alter the policy. - Some minor fixes to reiserfs to ensure that it properly releases LSM-related xattr values. - Update the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook to take sockptr_t values. Previously the net/BPF folks updated the getsockopt code in the network stack to leverage the sockptr_t type to make it easier to pass both kernel and __user pointers, but unfortunately when they did so they didn't convert the LSM hook. While there was/is no immediate risk by not converting the LSM hook, it seems like this is a mistake waiting to happen so this patch proactively does the LSM hook conversion. - Convert vfs_getxattr_alloc() to return an int instead of a ssize_t and cleanup the callers. Internally the function was never going to return anything larger than an int and the callers were doing some very odd things casting the return value; this patch fixes all that and helps bring a bit of sanity to vfs_getxattr_alloc() and its callers. - More verbose, and helpful, LSM debug output when the system is booted with "lsm.debug" on the command line. There are examples in the commit description, but the quick summary is that this patch provides better information about which LSMs are enabled and the ordering in which they are processed. - General comment and kernel-doc fixes and cleanups. * tag 'lsm-pr-20221212' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: lsm: Fix description of fs_context_parse_param lsm: Add/fix return values in lsm_hooks.h and fix formatting lsm: Clarify documentation of vm_enough_memory hook reiserfs: Add missing calls to reiserfs_security_free() lsm,fs: fix vfs_getxattr_alloc() return type and caller error paths device_cgroup: Roll back to original exceptions after copy failure LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot lsm: make security_socket_getpeersec_stream() sockptr_t safe audit: Fix some kernel-doc warnings lsm: remove obsoleted comments for security hooks fs: edit a comment made in bad taste
2749 lines
69 KiB
C
2749 lines
69 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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/*
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* Security plug functions
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com>
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* Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
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* Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com>
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* Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
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*/
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) "LSM: " fmt
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#include <linux/bpf.h>
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <linux/dcache.h>
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
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#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
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#include <linux/integrity.h>
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#include <linux/ima.h>
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#include <linux/evm.h>
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#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
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#include <linux/mman.h>
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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#include <linux/personality.h>
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#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
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#include <linux/string.h>
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#include <linux/msg.h>
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#include <net/flow.h>
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#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
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/* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */
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#define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info)
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/*
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* These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
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* security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows
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* all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing
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* purposes.
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*/
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const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
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[LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none",
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[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",
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[LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
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[LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access",
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[LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images",
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[LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation",
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[LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",
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[LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access",
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[LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access",
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[LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables",
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[LOCKDOWN_DEVICE_TREE] = "modifying device tree contents",
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[LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage",
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[LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO",
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[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters",
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[LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio",
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[LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access",
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[LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access",
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[LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM",
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[LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM",
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[LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION] = "RTAS error injection",
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[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
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[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
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[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
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[LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
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[LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM",
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[LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
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[LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
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[LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",
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[LOCKDOWN_XFRM_SECRET] = "xfrm SA secret",
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[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
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};
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struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
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static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain);
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static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
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static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
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char *lsm_names;
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static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
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/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
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static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
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static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm;
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static __initconst const char * const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM;
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/* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */
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static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms;
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static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive;
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static __initdata bool debug;
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#define init_debug(...) \
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do { \
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if (debug) \
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pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \
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} while (0)
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static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm)
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{
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if (!lsm->enabled)
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return false;
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return *lsm->enabled;
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}
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/* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */
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static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1;
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static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0;
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static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled)
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{
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/*
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* When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use
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* a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state.
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*/
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if (!lsm->enabled) {
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if (enabled)
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lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
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else
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lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
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} else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) {
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if (!enabled)
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lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
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} else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) {
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if (enabled)
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lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
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} else {
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*lsm->enabled = enabled;
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}
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}
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/* Is an LSM already listed in the ordered LSMs list? */
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static bool __init exists_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
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{
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struct lsm_info **check;
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for (check = ordered_lsms; *check; check++)
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if (*check == lsm)
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return true;
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return false;
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}
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/* Append an LSM to the list of ordered LSMs to initialize. */
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static int last_lsm __initdata;
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static void __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *from)
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{
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/* Ignore duplicate selections. */
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if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
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return;
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if (WARN(last_lsm == LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM slots!?\n", from))
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return;
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/* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */
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if (!lsm->enabled)
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lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
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ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm;
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init_debug("%s ordered: %s (%s)\n", from, lsm->name,
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is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled");
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}
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/* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */
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static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm)
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{
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/* Skip if the LSM is disabled. */
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if (!is_enabled(lsm))
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return false;
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/* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */
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if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) {
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init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name);
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs)
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{
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int offset;
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if (*need <= 0)
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return;
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offset = ALIGN(*lbs, sizeof(void *));
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*lbs = offset + *need;
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*need = offset;
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}
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static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
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{
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if (!needed)
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return;
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lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
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lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
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/*
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* The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to
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* what the modules might need.
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*/
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if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0)
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blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
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lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
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lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
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lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
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lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
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lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
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}
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/* Prepare LSM for initialization. */
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static void __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
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{
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int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm);
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/* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */
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set_enabled(lsm, enabled);
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/* If enabled, do pre-initialization work. */
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if (enabled) {
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if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) {
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exclusive = lsm;
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init_debug("exclusive chosen: %s\n", lsm->name);
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}
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lsm_set_blob_sizes(lsm->blobs);
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}
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}
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/* Initialize a given LSM, if it is enabled. */
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static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
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{
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if (is_enabled(lsm)) {
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int ret;
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init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name);
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ret = lsm->init();
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WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret);
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}
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}
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/* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */
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static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
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{
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struct lsm_info *lsm;
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char *sep, *name, *next;
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/* LSM_ORDER_FIRST is always first. */
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for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
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if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST)
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append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " first");
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}
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/* Process "security=", if given. */
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if (chosen_major_lsm) {
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struct lsm_info *major;
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/*
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* To match the original "security=" behavior, this
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* explicitly does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major
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* if the selected one was separately disabled: disable
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* all non-matching Legacy Major LSMs.
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*/
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for (major = __start_lsm_info; major < __end_lsm_info;
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major++) {
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if ((major->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) &&
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strcmp(major->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0) {
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set_enabled(major, false);
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init_debug("security=%s disabled: %s (only one legacy major LSM)\n",
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chosen_major_lsm, major->name);
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}
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}
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}
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sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL);
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next = sep;
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/* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */
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while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) {
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bool found = false;
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for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
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if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE &&
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strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
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append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
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found = true;
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}
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}
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if (!found)
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init_debug("%s ignored: %s (not built into kernel)\n",
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origin, name);
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}
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/* Process "security=", if given. */
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if (chosen_major_lsm) {
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for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
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if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
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continue;
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if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) == 0)
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append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "security=");
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}
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}
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/* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */
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for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
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if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
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continue;
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set_enabled(lsm, false);
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init_debug("%s skipped: %s (not in requested order)\n",
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origin, lsm->name);
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}
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kfree(sep);
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}
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static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred);
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static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task);
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static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result);
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static void __init report_lsm_order(void)
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{
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struct lsm_info **lsm, *early;
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int first = 0;
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pr_info("initializing lsm=");
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/* Report each enabled LSM name, comma separated. */
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for (early = __start_early_lsm_info; early < __end_early_lsm_info; early++)
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if (is_enabled(early))
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pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", early->name);
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for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
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if (is_enabled(*lsm))
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pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", (*lsm)->name);
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pr_cont("\n");
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}
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static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
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{
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struct lsm_info **lsm;
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ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms),
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GFP_KERNEL);
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if (chosen_lsm_order) {
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if (chosen_major_lsm) {
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pr_warn("security=%s is ignored because it is superseded by lsm=%s\n",
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chosen_major_lsm, chosen_lsm_order);
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chosen_major_lsm = NULL;
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}
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ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline");
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} else
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ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin");
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for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
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prepare_lsm(*lsm);
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report_lsm_order();
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init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
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init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
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init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
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init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
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init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
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init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
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init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
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/*
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* Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
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*/
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if (blob_sizes.lbs_file)
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lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache",
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blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0,
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SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
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if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode)
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lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache",
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blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0,
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SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
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lsm_early_cred((struct cred *) current->cred);
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lsm_early_task(current);
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for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
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initialize_lsm(*lsm);
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kfree(ordered_lsms);
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}
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int __init early_security_init(void)
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{
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struct lsm_info *lsm;
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#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
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INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&security_hook_heads.NAME);
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#include "linux/lsm_hook_defs.h"
|
|
#undef LSM_HOOK
|
|
|
|
for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) {
|
|
if (!lsm->enabled)
|
|
lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
|
|
prepare_lsm(lsm);
|
|
initialize_lsm(lsm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* security_init - initializes the security framework
|
|
*
|
|
* This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence.
|
|
*/
|
|
int __init security_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
struct lsm_info *lsm;
|
|
|
|
init_debug("legacy security=%s\n", chosen_major_lsm ?: " *unspecified*");
|
|
init_debug(" CONFIG_LSM=%s\n", builtin_lsm_order);
|
|
init_debug("boot arg lsm=%s\n", chosen_lsm_order ?: " *unspecified*");
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Append the names of the early LSM modules now that kmalloc() is
|
|
* available
|
|
*/
|
|
for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) {
|
|
init_debug(" early started: %s (%s)\n", lsm->name,
|
|
is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled");
|
|
if (lsm->enabled)
|
|
lsm_append(lsm->name, &lsm_names);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Load LSMs in specified order. */
|
|
ordered_lsm_init();
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Save user chosen LSM */
|
|
static int __init choose_major_lsm(char *str)
|
|
{
|
|
chosen_major_lsm = str;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
__setup("security=", choose_major_lsm);
|
|
|
|
/* Explicitly choose LSM initialization order. */
|
|
static int __init choose_lsm_order(char *str)
|
|
{
|
|
chosen_lsm_order = str;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
__setup("lsm=", choose_lsm_order);
|
|
|
|
/* Enable LSM order debugging. */
|
|
static int __init enable_debug(char *str)
|
|
{
|
|
debug = true;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
__setup("lsm.debug", enable_debug);
|
|
|
|
static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *last;
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(!list || !lsm))
|
|
return false;
|
|
last = strrchr(list, ',');
|
|
if (last)
|
|
/* Pass the comma, strcmp() will check for '\0' */
|
|
last++;
|
|
else
|
|
last = list;
|
|
return !strcmp(last, lsm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
|
|
{
|
|
char *cp;
|
|
|
|
if (*result == NULL) {
|
|
*result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (*result == NULL)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Check if it is the last registered name */
|
|
if (match_last_lsm(*result, new))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *result, new);
|
|
if (cp == NULL)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
kfree(*result);
|
|
*result = cp;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
|
|
* @hooks: the hooks to add
|
|
* @count: the number of hooks to add
|
|
* @lsm: the name of the security module
|
|
*
|
|
* Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
|
|
*/
|
|
void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
|
|
const char *lsm)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
|
|
hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
|
|
hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Don't try to append during early_security_init(), we'll come back
|
|
* and fix this up afterwards.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (slab_is_available()) {
|
|
if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
|
|
panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
return blocking_notifier_call_chain(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain,
|
|
event, data);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_blocking_lsm_notifier);
|
|
|
|
int register_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
|
|
{
|
|
return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain,
|
|
nb);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_blocking_lsm_notifier);
|
|
|
|
int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
|
|
{
|
|
return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain,
|
|
nb);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob
|
|
* @cred: the cred that needs a blob
|
|
* @gfp: allocation type
|
|
*
|
|
* Allocate the cred blob for all the modules
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (blob_sizes.lbs_cred == 0) {
|
|
cred->security = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cred->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp);
|
|
if (cred->security == NULL)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob
|
|
* @cred: the cred that needs a blob
|
|
*
|
|
* Allocate the cred blob for all the modules
|
|
*/
|
|
static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob
|
|
* @file: the file that needs a blob
|
|
*
|
|
* Allocate the file blob for all the modules
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!lsm_file_cache) {
|
|
file->f_security = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (file->f_security == NULL)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob
|
|
* @inode: the inode that needs a blob
|
|
*
|
|
* Allocate the inode blob for all the modules
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
|
|
*/
|
|
int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!lsm_inode_cache) {
|
|
inode->i_security = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
|
|
if (inode->i_security == NULL)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* lsm_task_alloc - allocate a composite task blob
|
|
* @task: the task that needs a blob
|
|
*
|
|
* Allocate the task blob for all the modules
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
|
|
{
|
|
if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
|
|
task->security = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (task->security == NULL)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* lsm_ipc_alloc - allocate a composite ipc blob
|
|
* @kip: the ipc that needs a blob
|
|
*
|
|
* Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip)
|
|
{
|
|
if (blob_sizes.lbs_ipc == 0) {
|
|
kip->security = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kip->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_ipc, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (kip->security == NULL)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob
|
|
* @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob
|
|
*
|
|
* Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg == 0) {
|
|
mp->security = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mp->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (mp->security == NULL)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob
|
|
* @task: the task that needs a blob
|
|
*
|
|
* Allocate the task blob for all the modules
|
|
*/
|
|
static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob
|
|
* @sb: the superblock that needs a blob
|
|
*
|
|
* Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
|
|
{
|
|
if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock == 0) {
|
|
sb->s_security = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sb->s_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_superblock, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (sb->s_security == NULL)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and
|
|
* can be accessed with:
|
|
*
|
|
* LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>)
|
|
*
|
|
* The macros below define static constants for the default value of each
|
|
* LSM hook.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default)
|
|
#define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_void(DEFAULT, NAME)
|
|
#define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int(DEFAULT, NAME) \
|
|
static const int __maybe_unused LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT);
|
|
#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
|
|
DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME)
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
|
|
#undef LSM_HOOK
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Hook list operation macros.
|
|
*
|
|
* call_void_hook:
|
|
* This is a hook that does not return a value.
|
|
*
|
|
* call_int_hook:
|
|
* This is a hook that returns a value.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \
|
|
do { \
|
|
struct security_hook_list *P; \
|
|
\
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \
|
|
P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
|
|
} while (0)
|
|
|
|
#define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \
|
|
int RC = IRC; \
|
|
do { \
|
|
struct security_hook_list *P; \
|
|
\
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \
|
|
RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
|
|
if (RC != 0) \
|
|
break; \
|
|
} \
|
|
} while (0); \
|
|
RC; \
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
/* Security operations */
|
|
|
|
int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
|
|
const struct cred *to)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
|
|
const struct cred *to)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
|
|
const struct cred *to, struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, 0, child, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
|
|
kernel_cap_t *effective,
|
|
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
|
|
kernel_cap_t *permitted)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(capget, 0, target,
|
|
effective, inheritable, permitted);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
|
|
const kernel_cap_t *effective,
|
|
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
|
|
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(capset, 0, new, old,
|
|
effective, inheritable, permitted);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
|
|
struct user_namespace *ns,
|
|
int cap,
|
|
unsigned int opts)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(quota_on, 0, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_syslog(int type)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(syslog, 0, type);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(settime, 0, ts, tz);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
int cap_sys_admin = 1;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The module will respond with a positive value if
|
|
* it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() call should be
|
|
* made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules
|
|
* agree that it should be set it will. If any module
|
|
* thinks it should not be set it won't.
|
|
*/
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) {
|
|
rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
|
|
if (rc <= 0) {
|
|
cap_sys_admin = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, 0, bprm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, 0, fc, src_fc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
|
|
struct fs_parameter *param)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
int trc;
|
|
int rc = -ENOPARAM;
|
|
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.fs_context_parse_param,
|
|
list) {
|
|
trc = hp->hook.fs_context_parse_param(fc, param);
|
|
if (trc == 0)
|
|
rc = 0;
|
|
else if (trc != -ENOPARAM)
|
|
return trc;
|
|
}
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
security_sb_free(sb);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_sb_delete(struct super_block *sb)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sb_delete, sb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb);
|
|
kfree(sb->s_security);
|
|
sb->s_security = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!*mnt_opts)
|
|
return;
|
|
call_void_hook(sb_free_mnt_opts, *mnt_opts);
|
|
*mnt_opts = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_free_mnt_opts);
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, 0, options, mnt_opts);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts);
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb,
|
|
void *mnt_opts)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_mnt_opts_compat, 0, sb, mnt_opts);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_mnt_opts_compat);
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb,
|
|
void *mnt_opts)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, mnt_opts);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount);
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, 0, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
|
|
const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_umount, 0, mnt, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, const struct path *new_path)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, 0, old_path, new_path);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
|
|
void *mnt_opts,
|
|
unsigned long kern_flags,
|
|
unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts,
|
|
mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb,
|
|
mnt_opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts);
|
|
|
|
int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
|
|
struct super_block *newsb,
|
|
unsigned long kern_flags,
|
|
unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb,
|
|
kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
|
|
|
|
int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
|
|
unsigned int obj_type)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_notify, 0, path, mask, obj_type);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode);
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
security_inode_free(inode);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob
|
|
*/
|
|
kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
integrity_inode_free(inode);
|
|
call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode);
|
|
/*
|
|
* The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
|
|
* a call to security_inode_permission() can be made
|
|
* after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
|
|
* wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
|
|
* job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
|
|
* leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
|
|
* The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (inode->i_security)
|
|
call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security,
|
|
inode_free_by_rcu);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
|
|
const struct qstr *name,
|
|
const char **xattr_name, void **ctx,
|
|
u32 *ctxlen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Only one module will provide a security context.
|
|
*/
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security, list) {
|
|
rc = hp->hook.dentry_init_security(dentry, mode, name,
|
|
xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen);
|
|
if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
|
|
|
|
int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
|
|
struct qstr *name,
|
|
const struct cred *old, struct cred *new)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, 0, dentry, mode,
|
|
name, old, new);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
|
|
const struct qstr *qstr,
|
|
const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1];
|
|
struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!initxattrs)
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode,
|
|
dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs));
|
|
lsm_xattr = new_xattrs;
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr,
|
|
&lsm_xattr->name,
|
|
&lsm_xattr->value,
|
|
&lsm_xattr->value_len);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1;
|
|
ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
|
|
out:
|
|
for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++)
|
|
kfree(xattr->value);
|
|
return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
|
|
const struct qstr *name,
|
|
const struct inode *context_inode)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, 0, inode, name,
|
|
context_inode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
|
|
const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
|
|
void **value, size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir,
|
|
qstr, name, value, len);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
|
|
int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
|
|
unsigned int dev)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
|
|
|
|
int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir);
|
|
|
|
int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_unlink, 0, dir, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink);
|
|
|
|
int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
|
|
const char *old_name)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
|
|
struct dentry *new_dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
|
|
const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
|
|
unsigned int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) ||
|
|
(d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
|
|
new_dentry, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename);
|
|
|
|
int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_chroot, 0, path);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_create, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
|
|
struct dentry *new_dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_link, 0, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, 0, dir, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
|
|
const char *old_name)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
|
|
struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
|
|
unsigned int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) ||
|
|
(d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
|
|
int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry,
|
|
old_dir, old_dentry);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry,
|
|
new_dir, new_dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
|
|
bool rcu)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
|
struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return evm_inode_setattr(mnt_userns, dentry, attr);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
|
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
|
|
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/*
|
|
* SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
|
|
* so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, mnt_userns, dentry, name, value,
|
|
size, flags);
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 1)
|
|
ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return evm_inode_setxattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name, value, size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
|
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
|
|
struct posix_acl *kacl)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name,
|
|
kacl);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
ret = ima_inode_set_acl(mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return evm_inode_set_acl(mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_get_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
|
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, 0, mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_remove_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
|
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
ret = ima_inode_remove_acl(mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return evm_inode_remove_acl(mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
|
|
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return;
|
|
call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
|
|
evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, 0, dentry, name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
|
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/*
|
|
* SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
|
|
* so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, mnt_userns, dentry, name);
|
|
if (ret == 1)
|
|
ret = cap_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return evm_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_killpriv(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
|
struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, mnt_userns, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
|
|
struct inode *inode, const char *name,
|
|
void **buffer, bool alloc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name.
|
|
*/
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) {
|
|
rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(mnt_userns, inode, name, buffer, alloc);
|
|
if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name.
|
|
*/
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) {
|
|
rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size,
|
|
flags);
|
|
if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, 0, inode, buffer, buffer_size);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
|
|
|
|
void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, 0, src, new);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The implementation can return 0 (accept the xattr), 1 (discard the
|
|
* xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or
|
|
* any other error code incase of an error.
|
|
*/
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(hp,
|
|
&security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr, list) {
|
|
rc = hp->hook.inode_copy_up_xattr(name);
|
|
if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
|
|
|
|
int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
|
|
struct kernfs_node *kn)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, kn_dir, kn);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
return fsnotify_perm(file, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file);
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
security_file_free(file);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_file_free(struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
void *blob;
|
|
|
|
call_void_hook(file_free_security, file);
|
|
|
|
blob = file->f_security;
|
|
if (blob) {
|
|
file->f_security = NULL;
|
|
kmem_cache_free(lsm_file_cache, blob);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, 0, file, cmd, arg);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl);
|
|
|
|
static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect
|
|
* it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about...
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ)
|
|
return prot;
|
|
if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
|
|
return prot;
|
|
/*
|
|
* if that's an anonymous mapping, let it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!file)
|
|
return prot | PROT_EXEC;
|
|
/*
|
|
* ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need
|
|
* NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!path_noexec(&file->f_path)) {
|
|
#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
|
|
if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) {
|
|
unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file);
|
|
if (!(caps & NOMMU_MAP_EXEC))
|
|
return prot;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
return prot | PROT_EXEC;
|
|
}
|
|
/* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */
|
|
return prot;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
|
|
unsigned long flags)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot,
|
|
mmap_prot(file, prot), flags);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return ima_file_mmap(file, prot);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, 0, addr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
|
|
unsigned long prot)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, 0, file, cmd, arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
|
|
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, 0, tsk, fown, sig);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_open(struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_truncate(struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(file_truncate, 0, file);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
security_task_free(task);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(task_free, task);
|
|
|
|
kfree(task->security);
|
|
task->security = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp);
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
security_cred_free(cred);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* There is a failure case in prepare_creds() that
|
|
* may result in a call here with ->security being NULL.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (unlikely(cred->security == NULL))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
call_void_hook(cred_free, cred);
|
|
|
|
kfree(cred->security);
|
|
cred->security = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
security_cred_free(new);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
*secid = 0;
|
|
call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
|
|
|
|
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
|
|
bool contents)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return ima_read_file(file, id, contents);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
|
|
|
|
int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
|
|
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
|
|
|
|
int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return ima_load_data(id, contents);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data);
|
|
|
|
int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
|
|
enum kernel_load_data_id id,
|
|
char *description)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
|
|
description);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data);
|
|
|
|
int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
|
|
int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
|
|
int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, 0, new, old, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgroups, 0, new, old);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, 0, p, pgid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, 0, p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
*secid = 0;
|
|
call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj);
|
|
|
|
void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
*secid = 0;
|
|
call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
|
|
|
|
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_setnice, 0, p, nice);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, 0, p, ioprio);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, 0, p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
|
|
unsigned int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, 0, cred, tcred, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
|
|
struct rlimit *new_rlim)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, 0, p, resource, new_rlim);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, 0, p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, 0, p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
|
|
int sig, const struct cred *cred)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
|
|
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
|
|
{
|
|
int thisrc;
|
|
int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl);
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) {
|
|
thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
|
if (thisrc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl)) {
|
|
rc = thisrc;
|
|
if (thisrc != 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(userns_create, 0, cred);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
*secid = 0;
|
|
call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_msg_msg_alloc(msg);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg);
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
security_msg_msg_free(msg);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg);
|
|
kfree(msg->security);
|
|
msg->security = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(msq);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq);
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
security_msg_queue_free(msq);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq);
|
|
kfree(msq->security);
|
|
msq->security = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, 0, msq, msqflg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, 0, msq, cmd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq,
|
|
struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, 0, msq, msg, msqflg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
|
|
struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, 0, msq, msg, target, type, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(shp);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp);
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
security_shm_free(shp);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp);
|
|
kfree(shp->security);
|
|
shp->security = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(shm_associate, 0, shp, shmflg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, 0, shp, cmd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, 0, shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(sma);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma);
|
|
if (unlikely(rc))
|
|
security_sem_free(sma);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma);
|
|
kfree(sma->security);
|
|
sma->security = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sem_associate, 0, sma, semflg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, 0, sma, cmd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
|
|
unsigned nsops, int alter)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sem_semop, 0, sma, sops, nsops, alter);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return;
|
|
call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate);
|
|
|
|
int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm,
|
|
const char *name, char **value)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
|
|
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
|
|
continue;
|
|
return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
|
|
}
|
|
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
|
|
size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
|
|
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
|
|
continue;
|
|
return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
|
|
}
|
|
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(netlink_send, 0, sk, skb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, 0, name);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
|
|
|
|
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this
|
|
* LSM hook is not "stackable").
|
|
*/
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
|
|
rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
|
|
if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx))
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
|
|
|
|
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
*secid = 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
|
|
|
|
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
|
|
|
|
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(inode_invalidate_secctx, inode);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
|
|
int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
|
|
const struct cred *cred,
|
|
struct watch_notification *n)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(post_notification, 0, w_cred, cred, n);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
|
|
int security_watch_key(struct key *key)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(watch_key, 0, key);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
|
|
|
|
int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, 0, sock, other, newsk);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect);
|
|
|
|
int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, 0, sock, other);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send);
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_create, 0, family, type, protocol, kern);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
|
|
int type, int protocol, int kern)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, 0, sock, family, type,
|
|
protocol, kern);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, 0, socka, sockb);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair);
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_connect, 0, sock, address, addrlen);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_listen, 0, sock, backlog);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_accept, 0, sock, newsock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, 0, sock, msg, size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
|
|
int size, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, 0, sock, msg, size, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, 0, sock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, 0, sock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, 0, sock, how);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, 0, sk, skb);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval,
|
|
sockptr_t optlen, unsigned int len)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
|
|
optval, optlen, len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
|
|
skb, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
|
|
|
|
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone);
|
|
|
|
void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi_common *flic)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &flic->flowic_secid);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow);
|
|
|
|
void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
|
|
struct flowi_common *flic)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, flic);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow);
|
|
|
|
void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft);
|
|
|
|
int security_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk,
|
|
struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, 0, sk, skb, req);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request);
|
|
|
|
void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
|
|
const struct request_sock *req)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
|
|
struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established);
|
|
|
|
int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
|
|
|
|
void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc);
|
|
|
|
void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec);
|
|
|
|
int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security);
|
|
|
|
void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(tun_dev_free_security, security);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security);
|
|
|
|
int security_tun_dev_create(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create);
|
|
|
|
int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, 0, security);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue);
|
|
|
|
int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, 0, sk, security);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
|
|
|
|
int security_tun_dev_open(void *security)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, 0, security);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open);
|
|
|
|
int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, 0, asoc, skb);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request);
|
|
|
|
int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
|
|
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, 0, sk, optname,
|
|
address, addrlen);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect);
|
|
|
|
void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk,
|
|
struct sock *newsk)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sctp_sk_clone, asoc, sk, newsk);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone);
|
|
|
|
int security_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
|
|
struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_established, 0, asoc, skb);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_established);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
|
|
|
|
int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, 0, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access);
|
|
|
|
int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, const char *dev_name, u8 port_num)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, 0, sec, dev_name, port_num);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet);
|
|
|
|
int security_ib_alloc_security(void **sec)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, 0, sec);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_alloc_security);
|
|
|
|
void security_ib_free_security(void *sec)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(ib_free_security, sec);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_free_security);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
|
|
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
|
|
gfp_t gfp)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, 0, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc);
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
|
|
struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, 0, old_ctx, new_ctxp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free);
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, 0, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
|
|
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, 0, x, sec_ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc);
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
|
|
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, 0, x);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete);
|
|
|
|
void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
|
|
struct xfrm_policy *xp,
|
|
const struct flowi_common *flic)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment
|
|
* becomes difficult if multiple LSMs supply this call. Fortunately,
|
|
* we can use the first LSM's judgment because currently only SELinux
|
|
* supplies this call.
|
|
*
|
|
* For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than
|
|
* using the macro
|
|
*/
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
|
|
list) {
|
|
rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, flic);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi_common *flic)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &flic->flowic_secid,
|
|
0);
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(rc);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
|
|
|
|
int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
|
|
unsigned long flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_key_free(struct key *key)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(key_free, key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
|
|
enum key_need_perm need_perm)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(key_permission, 0, key_ref, cred, need_perm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
|
|
{
|
|
*_buffer = NULL;
|
|
return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, _buffer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
|
|
|
|
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
|
|
int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size);
|
|
}
|
|
int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode);
|
|
}
|
|
int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog);
|
|
}
|
|
int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map);
|
|
}
|
|
int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux);
|
|
}
|
|
void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map);
|
|
}
|
|
void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
|
|
|
|
int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
|
|
int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, 0, attr, type);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, 0, event);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(perf_event_free, event);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, 0, event);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
|
|
int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(uring_override_creds, 0, new);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_uring_sqpoll(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
|