linux-stable/kernel/pid.c
Linus Torvalds 74858abbb1 cap-checkpoint-restore-v5.9
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Merge tag 'cap-checkpoint-restore-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux

Pull checkpoint-restore updates from Christian Brauner:
 "This enables unprivileged checkpoint/restore of processes.

  Given that this work has been going on for quite some time the first
  sentence in this summary is hopefully more exciting than the actual
  final code changes required. Unprivileged checkpoint/restore has seen
  a frequent increase in interest over the last two years and has thus
  been one of the main topics for the combined containers &
  checkpoint/restore microconference since at least 2018 (cf. [1]).

  Here are just the three most frequent use-cases that were brought forward:

   - The JVM developers are integrating checkpoint/restore into a Java
     VM to significantly decrease the startup time.

   - In high-performance computing environment a resource manager will
     typically be distributing jobs where users are always running as
     non-root. Long-running and "large" processes with significant
     startup times are supposed to be checkpointed and restored with
     CRIU.

   - Container migration as a non-root user.

  In all of these scenarios it is either desirable or required to run
  without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. The userspace implementation of
  checkpoint/restore CRIU already has the pull request for supporting
  unprivileged checkpoint/restore up (cf. [2]).

  To enable unprivileged checkpoint/restore a new dedicated capability
  CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is introduced. This solution has last been
  discussed in 2019 in a talk by Google at Linux Plumbers (cf. [1]
  "Update on Task Migration at Google Using CRIU") with Adrian and
  Nicolas providing the implementation now over the last months. In
  essence, this allows the CRIU binary to be installed with the
  CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE vfs capability set thereby enabling
  unprivileged users to restore processes.

  To make this possible the following permissions are altered:

   - Selecting a specific PID via clone3() set_tid relaxed from userns
     CAP_SYS_ADMIN to CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.

   - Selecting a specific PID via /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid relaxed
     from userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN to CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.

   - Accessing /proc/pid/map_files relaxed from init userns
     CAP_SYS_ADMIN to init userns CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.

   - Changing /proc/self/exe from userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN to userns
     CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.

  Of these four changes the /proc/self/exe change deserves a few words
  because the reasoning behind even restricting /proc/self/exe changes
  in the first place is just full of historical quirks and tracking this
  down was a questionable version of fun that I'd like to spare others.

  In short, it is trivial to change /proc/self/exe as an unprivileged
  user, i.e. without userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN right now. Either via ptrace()
  or by simply intercepting the elf loader in userspace during exec.
  Nicolas was nice enough to even provide a POC for the latter (cf. [3])
  to illustrate this fact.

  The original patchset which introduced PR_SET_MM_MAP had no
  permissions around changing the exe link. They too argued that it is
  trivial to spoof the exe link already which is true. The argument
  brought up against this was that the Tomoyo LSM uses the exe link in
  tomoyo_manager() to detect whether the calling process is a policy
  manager. This caused changing the exe links to be guarded by userns
  CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

  All in all this rather seems like a "better guard it with something
  rather than nothing" argument which imho doesn't qualify as a great
  security policy. Again, because spoofing the exe link is possible for
  the calling process so even if this were security relevant it was
  broken back then and would be broken today. So technically, dropping
  all permissions around changing the exe link would probably be
  possible and would send a clearer message to any userspace that relies
  on /proc/self/exe for security reasons that they should stop doing
  this but for now we're only relaxing the exe link permissions from
  userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN to userns CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.

  There's a final uapi change in here. Changing the exe link used to
  accidently return EINVAL when the caller lacked the necessary
  permissions instead of the more correct EPERM. This pr contains a
  commit fixing this. I assume that userspace won't notice or care and
  if they do I will revert this commit. But since we are changing the
  permissions anyway it seems like a good opportunity to try this fix.

  With these changes merged unprivileged checkpoint/restore will be
  possible and has already been tested by various users"

[1] LPC 2018
     1. "Task Migration at Google Using CRIU"
        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yI_1cuhoDgA&t=12095
     2. "Securely Migrating Untrusted Workloads with CRIU"
        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yI_1cuhoDgA&t=14400
     LPC 2019
     1. "CRIU and the PID dance"
         https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LN2CUgp8deo&list=PLVsQ_xZBEyN30ZA3Pc9MZMFzdjwyz26dO&index=9&t=2m48s
     2. "Update on Task Migration at Google Using CRIU"
        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LN2CUgp8deo&list=PLVsQ_xZBEyN30ZA3Pc9MZMFzdjwyz26dO&index=9&t=1h2m8s

[2] https://github.com/checkpoint-restore/criu/pull/1155

[3] https://github.com/nviennot/run_as_exe

* tag 'cap-checkpoint-restore-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
  selftests: add clone3() CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE test
  prctl: exe link permission error changed from -EINVAL to -EPERM
  prctl: Allow local CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to change /proc/self/exe
  proc: allow access in init userns for map_files with CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
  pid_namespace: use checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() for ns_last_pid
  pid: use checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() for set_tid
  capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
2020-08-04 15:02:07 -07:00

684 lines
17 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Generic pidhash and scalable, time-bounded PID allocator
*
* (C) 2002-2003 Nadia Yvette Chambers, IBM
* (C) 2004 Nadia Yvette Chambers, Oracle
* (C) 2002-2004 Ingo Molnar, Red Hat
*
* pid-structures are backing objects for tasks sharing a given ID to chain
* against. There is very little to them aside from hashing them and
* parking tasks using given ID's on a list.
*
* The hash is always changed with the tasklist_lock write-acquired,
* and the hash is only accessed with the tasklist_lock at least
* read-acquired, so there's no additional SMP locking needed here.
*
* We have a list of bitmap pages, which bitmaps represent the PID space.
* Allocating and freeing PIDs is completely lockless. The worst-case
* allocation scenario when all but one out of 1 million PIDs possible are
* allocated already: the scanning of 32 list entries and at most PAGE_SIZE
* bytes. The typical fastpath is a single successful setbit. Freeing is O(1).
*
* Pid namespaces:
* (C) 2007 Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>, OpenVZ, SWsoft Inc.
* (C) 2007 Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>, IBM
* Many thanks to Oleg Nesterov for comments and help
*
*/
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <linux/init_task.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
#include <linux/refcount.h>
#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
#include <linux/idr.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
struct pid init_struct_pid = {
.count = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
.tasks = {
{ .first = NULL },
{ .first = NULL },
{ .first = NULL },
},
.level = 0,
.numbers = { {
.nr = 0,
.ns = &init_pid_ns,
}, }
};
int pid_max = PID_MAX_DEFAULT;
#define RESERVED_PIDS 300
int pid_max_min = RESERVED_PIDS + 1;
int pid_max_max = PID_MAX_LIMIT;
/*
* PID-map pages start out as NULL, they get allocated upon
* first use and are never deallocated. This way a low pid_max
* value does not cause lots of bitmaps to be allocated, but
* the scheme scales to up to 4 million PIDs, runtime.
*/
struct pid_namespace init_pid_ns = {
.kref = KREF_INIT(2),
.idr = IDR_INIT(init_pid_ns.idr),
.pid_allocated = PIDNS_ADDING,
.level = 0,
.child_reaper = &init_task,
.user_ns = &init_user_ns,
.ns.inum = PROC_PID_INIT_INO,
#ifdef CONFIG_PID_NS
.ns.ops = &pidns_operations,
#endif
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_pid_ns);
/*
* Note: disable interrupts while the pidmap_lock is held as an
* interrupt might come in and do read_lock(&tasklist_lock).
*
* If we don't disable interrupts there is a nasty deadlock between
* detach_pid()->free_pid() and another cpu that does
* spin_lock(&pidmap_lock) followed by an interrupt routine that does
* read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
*
* After we clean up the tasklist_lock and know there are no
* irq handlers that take it we can leave the interrupts enabled.
* For now it is easier to be safe than to prove it can't happen.
*/
static __cacheline_aligned_in_smp DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pidmap_lock);
void put_pid(struct pid *pid)
{
struct pid_namespace *ns;
if (!pid)
return;
ns = pid->numbers[pid->level].ns;
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&pid->count)) {
kmem_cache_free(ns->pid_cachep, pid);
put_pid_ns(ns);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(put_pid);
static void delayed_put_pid(struct rcu_head *rhp)
{
struct pid *pid = container_of(rhp, struct pid, rcu);
put_pid(pid);
}
void free_pid(struct pid *pid)
{
/* We can be called with write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock) held */
int i;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&pidmap_lock, flags);
for (i = 0; i <= pid->level; i++) {
struct upid *upid = pid->numbers + i;
struct pid_namespace *ns = upid->ns;
switch (--ns->pid_allocated) {
case 2:
case 1:
/* When all that is left in the pid namespace
* is the reaper wake up the reaper. The reaper
* may be sleeping in zap_pid_ns_processes().
*/
wake_up_process(ns->child_reaper);
break;
case PIDNS_ADDING:
/* Handle a fork failure of the first process */
WARN_ON(ns->child_reaper);
ns->pid_allocated = 0;
break;
}
idr_remove(&ns->idr, upid->nr);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pidmap_lock, flags);
call_rcu(&pid->rcu, delayed_put_pid);
}
struct pid *alloc_pid(struct pid_namespace *ns, pid_t *set_tid,
size_t set_tid_size)
{
struct pid *pid;
enum pid_type type;
int i, nr;
struct pid_namespace *tmp;
struct upid *upid;
int retval = -ENOMEM;
/*
* set_tid_size contains the size of the set_tid array. Starting at
* the most nested currently active PID namespace it tells alloc_pid()
* which PID to set for a process in that most nested PID namespace
* up to set_tid_size PID namespaces. It does not have to set the PID
* for a process in all nested PID namespaces but set_tid_size must
* never be greater than the current ns->level + 1.
*/
if (set_tid_size > ns->level + 1)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
pid = kmem_cache_alloc(ns->pid_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pid)
return ERR_PTR(retval);
tmp = ns;
pid->level = ns->level;
for (i = ns->level; i >= 0; i--) {
int tid = 0;
if (set_tid_size) {
tid = set_tid[ns->level - i];
retval = -EINVAL;
if (tid < 1 || tid >= pid_max)
goto out_free;
/*
* Also fail if a PID != 1 is requested and
* no PID 1 exists.
*/
if (tid != 1 && !tmp->child_reaper)
goto out_free;
retval = -EPERM;
if (!checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(tmp->user_ns))
goto out_free;
set_tid_size--;
}
idr_preload(GFP_KERNEL);
spin_lock_irq(&pidmap_lock);
if (tid) {
nr = idr_alloc(&tmp->idr, NULL, tid,
tid + 1, GFP_ATOMIC);
/*
* If ENOSPC is returned it means that the PID is
* alreay in use. Return EEXIST in that case.
*/
if (nr == -ENOSPC)
nr = -EEXIST;
} else {
int pid_min = 1;
/*
* init really needs pid 1, but after reaching the
* maximum wrap back to RESERVED_PIDS
*/
if (idr_get_cursor(&tmp->idr) > RESERVED_PIDS)
pid_min = RESERVED_PIDS;
/*
* Store a null pointer so find_pid_ns does not find
* a partially initialized PID (see below).
*/
nr = idr_alloc_cyclic(&tmp->idr, NULL, pid_min,
pid_max, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&pidmap_lock);
idr_preload_end();
if (nr < 0) {
retval = (nr == -ENOSPC) ? -EAGAIN : nr;
goto out_free;
}
pid->numbers[i].nr = nr;
pid->numbers[i].ns = tmp;
tmp = tmp->parent;
}
/*
* ENOMEM is not the most obvious choice especially for the case
* where the child subreaper has already exited and the pid
* namespace denies the creation of any new processes. But ENOMEM
* is what we have exposed to userspace for a long time and it is
* documented behavior for pid namespaces. So we can't easily
* change it even if there were an error code better suited.
*/
retval = -ENOMEM;
get_pid_ns(ns);
refcount_set(&pid->count, 1);
spin_lock_init(&pid->lock);
for (type = 0; type < PIDTYPE_MAX; ++type)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&pid->tasks[type]);
init_waitqueue_head(&pid->wait_pidfd);
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&pid->inodes);
upid = pid->numbers + ns->level;
spin_lock_irq(&pidmap_lock);
if (!(ns->pid_allocated & PIDNS_ADDING))
goto out_unlock;
for ( ; upid >= pid->numbers; --upid) {
/* Make the PID visible to find_pid_ns. */
idr_replace(&upid->ns->idr, pid, upid->nr);
upid->ns->pid_allocated++;
}
spin_unlock_irq(&pidmap_lock);
return pid;
out_unlock:
spin_unlock_irq(&pidmap_lock);
put_pid_ns(ns);
out_free:
spin_lock_irq(&pidmap_lock);
while (++i <= ns->level) {
upid = pid->numbers + i;
idr_remove(&upid->ns->idr, upid->nr);
}
/* On failure to allocate the first pid, reset the state */
if (ns->pid_allocated == PIDNS_ADDING)
idr_set_cursor(&ns->idr, 0);
spin_unlock_irq(&pidmap_lock);
kmem_cache_free(ns->pid_cachep, pid);
return ERR_PTR(retval);
}
void disable_pid_allocation(struct pid_namespace *ns)
{
spin_lock_irq(&pidmap_lock);
ns->pid_allocated &= ~PIDNS_ADDING;
spin_unlock_irq(&pidmap_lock);
}
struct pid *find_pid_ns(int nr, struct pid_namespace *ns)
{
return idr_find(&ns->idr, nr);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(find_pid_ns);
struct pid *find_vpid(int nr)
{
return find_pid_ns(nr, task_active_pid_ns(current));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(find_vpid);
static struct pid **task_pid_ptr(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type)
{
return (type == PIDTYPE_PID) ?
&task->thread_pid :
&task->signal->pids[type];
}
/*
* attach_pid() must be called with the tasklist_lock write-held.
*/
void attach_pid(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type)
{
struct pid *pid = *task_pid_ptr(task, type);
hlist_add_head_rcu(&task->pid_links[type], &pid->tasks[type]);
}
static void __change_pid(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type,
struct pid *new)
{
struct pid **pid_ptr = task_pid_ptr(task, type);
struct pid *pid;
int tmp;
pid = *pid_ptr;
hlist_del_rcu(&task->pid_links[type]);
*pid_ptr = new;
for (tmp = PIDTYPE_MAX; --tmp >= 0; )
if (pid_has_task(pid, tmp))
return;
free_pid(pid);
}
void detach_pid(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type)
{
__change_pid(task, type, NULL);
}
void change_pid(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type,
struct pid *pid)
{
__change_pid(task, type, pid);
attach_pid(task, type);
}
void exchange_tids(struct task_struct *left, struct task_struct *right)
{
struct pid *pid1 = left->thread_pid;
struct pid *pid2 = right->thread_pid;
struct hlist_head *head1 = &pid1->tasks[PIDTYPE_PID];
struct hlist_head *head2 = &pid2->tasks[PIDTYPE_PID];
/* Swap the single entry tid lists */
hlists_swap_heads_rcu(head1, head2);
/* Swap the per task_struct pid */
rcu_assign_pointer(left->thread_pid, pid2);
rcu_assign_pointer(right->thread_pid, pid1);
/* Swap the cached value */
WRITE_ONCE(left->pid, pid_nr(pid2));
WRITE_ONCE(right->pid, pid_nr(pid1));
}
/* transfer_pid is an optimization of attach_pid(new), detach_pid(old) */
void transfer_pid(struct task_struct *old, struct task_struct *new,
enum pid_type type)
{
if (type == PIDTYPE_PID)
new->thread_pid = old->thread_pid;
hlist_replace_rcu(&old->pid_links[type], &new->pid_links[type]);
}
struct task_struct *pid_task(struct pid *pid, enum pid_type type)
{
struct task_struct *result = NULL;
if (pid) {
struct hlist_node *first;
first = rcu_dereference_check(hlist_first_rcu(&pid->tasks[type]),
lockdep_tasklist_lock_is_held());
if (first)
result = hlist_entry(first, struct task_struct, pid_links[(type)]);
}
return result;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(pid_task);
/*
* Must be called under rcu_read_lock().
*/
struct task_struct *find_task_by_pid_ns(pid_t nr, struct pid_namespace *ns)
{
RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_read_lock_held(),
"find_task_by_pid_ns() needs rcu_read_lock() protection");
return pid_task(find_pid_ns(nr, ns), PIDTYPE_PID);
}
struct task_struct *find_task_by_vpid(pid_t vnr)
{
return find_task_by_pid_ns(vnr, task_active_pid_ns(current));
}
struct task_struct *find_get_task_by_vpid(pid_t nr)
{
struct task_struct *task;
rcu_read_lock();
task = find_task_by_vpid(nr);
if (task)
get_task_struct(task);
rcu_read_unlock();
return task;
}
struct pid *get_task_pid(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type)
{
struct pid *pid;
rcu_read_lock();
pid = get_pid(rcu_dereference(*task_pid_ptr(task, type)));
rcu_read_unlock();
return pid;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_task_pid);
struct task_struct *get_pid_task(struct pid *pid, enum pid_type type)
{
struct task_struct *result;
rcu_read_lock();
result = pid_task(pid, type);
if (result)
get_task_struct(result);
rcu_read_unlock();
return result;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_pid_task);
struct pid *find_get_pid(pid_t nr)
{
struct pid *pid;
rcu_read_lock();
pid = get_pid(find_vpid(nr));
rcu_read_unlock();
return pid;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(find_get_pid);
pid_t pid_nr_ns(struct pid *pid, struct pid_namespace *ns)
{
struct upid *upid;
pid_t nr = 0;
if (pid && ns->level <= pid->level) {
upid = &pid->numbers[ns->level];
if (upid->ns == ns)
nr = upid->nr;
}
return nr;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pid_nr_ns);
pid_t pid_vnr(struct pid *pid)
{
return pid_nr_ns(pid, task_active_pid_ns(current));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pid_vnr);
pid_t __task_pid_nr_ns(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type,
struct pid_namespace *ns)
{
pid_t nr = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
if (!ns)
ns = task_active_pid_ns(current);
nr = pid_nr_ns(rcu_dereference(*task_pid_ptr(task, type)), ns);
rcu_read_unlock();
return nr;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__task_pid_nr_ns);
struct pid_namespace *task_active_pid_ns(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
return ns_of_pid(task_pid(tsk));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(task_active_pid_ns);
/*
* Used by proc to find the first pid that is greater than or equal to nr.
*
* If there is a pid at nr this function is exactly the same as find_pid_ns.
*/
struct pid *find_ge_pid(int nr, struct pid_namespace *ns)
{
return idr_get_next(&ns->idr, &nr);
}
/**
* pidfd_create() - Create a new pid file descriptor.
*
* @pid: struct pid that the pidfd will reference
*
* This creates a new pid file descriptor with the O_CLOEXEC flag set.
*
* Note, that this function can only be called after the fd table has
* been unshared to avoid leaking the pidfd to the new process.
*
* Return: On success, a cloexec pidfd is returned.
* On error, a negative errno number will be returned.
*/
static int pidfd_create(struct pid *pid)
{
int fd;
fd = anon_inode_getfd("[pidfd]", &pidfd_fops, get_pid(pid),
O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd < 0)
put_pid(pid);
return fd;
}
/**
* pidfd_open() - Open new pid file descriptor.
*
* @pid: pid for which to retrieve a pidfd
* @flags: flags to pass
*
* This creates a new pid file descriptor with the O_CLOEXEC flag set for
* the process identified by @pid. Currently, the process identified by
* @pid must be a thread-group leader. This restriction currently exists
* for all aspects of pidfds including pidfd creation (CLONE_PIDFD cannot
* be used with CLONE_THREAD) and pidfd polling (only supports thread group
* leaders).
*
* Return: On success, a cloexec pidfd is returned.
* On error, a negative errno number will be returned.
*/
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pidfd_open, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, flags)
{
int fd;
struct pid *p;
if (flags)
return -EINVAL;
if (pid <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
p = find_get_pid(pid);
if (!p)
return -ESRCH;
if (pid_has_task(p, PIDTYPE_TGID))
fd = pidfd_create(p);
else
fd = -EINVAL;
put_pid(p);
return fd;
}
void __init pid_idr_init(void)
{
/* Verify no one has done anything silly: */
BUILD_BUG_ON(PID_MAX_LIMIT >= PIDNS_ADDING);
/* bump default and minimum pid_max based on number of cpus */
pid_max = min(pid_max_max, max_t(int, pid_max,
PIDS_PER_CPU_DEFAULT * num_possible_cpus()));
pid_max_min = max_t(int, pid_max_min,
PIDS_PER_CPU_MIN * num_possible_cpus());
pr_info("pid_max: default: %u minimum: %u\n", pid_max, pid_max_min);
idr_init(&init_pid_ns.idr);
init_pid_ns.pid_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(pid,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC | SLAB_ACCOUNT);
}
static struct file *__pidfd_fget(struct task_struct *task, int fd)
{
struct file *file;
int ret;
ret = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS))
file = fget_task(task, fd);
else
file = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
mutex_unlock(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex);
return file ?: ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
}
static int pidfd_getfd(struct pid *pid, int fd)
{
struct task_struct *task;
struct file *file;
int ret;
task = get_pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
if (!task)
return -ESRCH;
file = __pidfd_fget(task, fd);
put_task_struct(task);
if (IS_ERR(file))
return PTR_ERR(file);
ret = receive_fd(file, O_CLOEXEC);
fput(file);
return ret;
}
/**
* sys_pidfd_getfd() - Get a file descriptor from another process
*
* @pidfd: the pidfd file descriptor of the process
* @fd: the file descriptor number to get
* @flags: flags on how to get the fd (reserved)
*
* This syscall gets a copy of a file descriptor from another process
* based on the pidfd, and file descriptor number. It requires that
* the calling process has the ability to ptrace the process represented
* by the pidfd. The process which is having its file descriptor copied
* is otherwise unaffected.
*
* Return: On success, a cloexec file descriptor is returned.
* On error, a negative errno number will be returned.
*/
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(pidfd_getfd, int, pidfd, int, fd,
unsigned int, flags)
{
struct pid *pid;
struct fd f;
int ret;
/* flags is currently unused - make sure it's unset */
if (flags)
return -EINVAL;
f = fdget(pidfd);
if (!f.file)
return -EBADF;
pid = pidfd_pid(f.file);
if (IS_ERR(pid))
ret = PTR_ERR(pid);
else
ret = pidfd_getfd(pid, fd);
fdput(f);
return ret;
}