linux-stable/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
Mark Rutland 4e00f1d9b7 arm64: Avoid cpus_have_const_cap() for ARM64_HAS_EPAN
We use cpus_have_const_cap() to check for ARM64_HAS_EPAN but this is not
necessary and alternative_has_cap() or cpus_have_cap() would be
preferable.

For historical reasons, cpus_have_const_cap() is more complicated than
it needs to be. Before cpucaps are finalized, it will perform a bitmap
test of the system_cpucaps bitmap, and once cpucaps are finalized it
will use an alternative branch. This used to be necessary to handle some
race conditions in the window between cpucap detection and the
subsequent patching of alternatives and static branches, where different
branches could be out-of-sync with one another (or w.r.t. alternative
sequences). Now that we use alternative branches instead of static
branches, these are all patched atomically w.r.t. one another, and there
are only a handful of cases that need special care in the window between
cpucap detection and alternative patching.

Due to the above, it would be nice to remove cpus_have_const_cap(), and
migrate callers over to alternative_has_cap_*(), cpus_have_final_cap(),
or cpus_have_cap() depending on when their requirements. This will
remove redundant instructions and improve code generation, and will make
it easier to determine how each callsite will behave before, during, and
after alternative patching.

The ARM64_HAS_EPAN cpucap is used to affect two things:

1) The permision bits used for userspace executable mappings, which are
   chosen by adjust_protection_map(), which is an arch_initcall. This is
   called after the ARM64_HAS_EPAN cpucap has been detected and
   alternatives have been patched, and before any userspace translation
   tables exist.

2) The handling of faults taken from (user or kernel) accesses to
   userspace executable mappings in do_page_fault(). Userspace
   translation tables are created after adjust_protection_map() is
   called, and hence after the ARM64_HAS_EPAN cpucap has been detected
   and alternatives have been patched.

Neither of these run until after ARM64_HAS_EPAN cpucap has been detected
and alternatives have been patched, and hence there's no need to use
cpus_have_const_cap(). Since adjust_protection_map() is only executed
once at boot time it would be best for it to use cpus_have_cap(), and
since do_page_fault() is executed frequently it would be best for it to
use alternatives_have_cap_unlikely().

This patch replaces the uses of cpus_have_const_cap() with
cpus_have_cap() and alternative_has_cap_unlikely(), which will avoid
generating redundant code, and should be better for all subsequent calls
at runtime. The ARM64_HAS_EPAN cpucap is added to cpucap_is_possible()
so that code can be elided entirely when this is not possible.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com>
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2023-10-16 14:17:04 +01:00

962 lines
27 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Based on arch/arm/mm/fault.c
*
* Copyright (C) 1995 Linus Torvalds
* Copyright (C) 1995-2004 Russell King
* Copyright (C) 2012 ARM Ltd.
*/
#include <linux/acpi.h>
#include <linux/bitfield.h>
#include <linux/extable.h>
#include <linux/kfence.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/hardirq.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kasan.h>
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/page-flags.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/sched/debug.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
#include <linux/preempt.h>
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <asm/acpi.h>
#include <asm/bug.h>
#include <asm/cmpxchg.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/efi.h>
#include <asm/exception.h>
#include <asm/daifflags.h>
#include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
#include <asm/esr.h>
#include <asm/kprobes.h>
#include <asm/mte.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/sysreg.h>
#include <asm/system_misc.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
struct fault_info {
int (*fn)(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
struct pt_regs *regs);
int sig;
int code;
const char *name;
};
static const struct fault_info fault_info[];
static struct fault_info debug_fault_info[];
static inline const struct fault_info *esr_to_fault_info(unsigned long esr)
{
return fault_info + (esr & ESR_ELx_FSC);
}
static inline const struct fault_info *esr_to_debug_fault_info(unsigned long esr)
{
return debug_fault_info + DBG_ESR_EVT(esr);
}
static void data_abort_decode(unsigned long esr)
{
unsigned long iss2 = ESR_ELx_ISS2(esr);
pr_alert("Data abort info:\n");
if (esr & ESR_ELx_ISV) {
pr_alert(" Access size = %u byte(s)\n",
1U << ((esr & ESR_ELx_SAS) >> ESR_ELx_SAS_SHIFT));
pr_alert(" SSE = %lu, SRT = %lu\n",
(esr & ESR_ELx_SSE) >> ESR_ELx_SSE_SHIFT,
(esr & ESR_ELx_SRT_MASK) >> ESR_ELx_SRT_SHIFT);
pr_alert(" SF = %lu, AR = %lu\n",
(esr & ESR_ELx_SF) >> ESR_ELx_SF_SHIFT,
(esr & ESR_ELx_AR) >> ESR_ELx_AR_SHIFT);
} else {
pr_alert(" ISV = 0, ISS = 0x%08lx, ISS2 = 0x%08lx\n",
esr & ESR_ELx_ISS_MASK, iss2);
}
pr_alert(" CM = %lu, WnR = %lu, TnD = %lu, TagAccess = %lu\n",
(esr & ESR_ELx_CM) >> ESR_ELx_CM_SHIFT,
(esr & ESR_ELx_WNR) >> ESR_ELx_WNR_SHIFT,
(iss2 & ESR_ELx_TnD) >> ESR_ELx_TnD_SHIFT,
(iss2 & ESR_ELx_TagAccess) >> ESR_ELx_TagAccess_SHIFT);
pr_alert(" GCS = %ld, Overlay = %lu, DirtyBit = %lu, Xs = %llu\n",
(iss2 & ESR_ELx_GCS) >> ESR_ELx_GCS_SHIFT,
(iss2 & ESR_ELx_Overlay) >> ESR_ELx_Overlay_SHIFT,
(iss2 & ESR_ELx_DirtyBit) >> ESR_ELx_DirtyBit_SHIFT,
(iss2 & ESR_ELx_Xs_MASK) >> ESR_ELx_Xs_SHIFT);
}
static void mem_abort_decode(unsigned long esr)
{
pr_alert("Mem abort info:\n");
pr_alert(" ESR = 0x%016lx\n", esr);
pr_alert(" EC = 0x%02lx: %s, IL = %u bits\n",
ESR_ELx_EC(esr), esr_get_class_string(esr),
(esr & ESR_ELx_IL) ? 32 : 16);
pr_alert(" SET = %lu, FnV = %lu\n",
(esr & ESR_ELx_SET_MASK) >> ESR_ELx_SET_SHIFT,
(esr & ESR_ELx_FnV) >> ESR_ELx_FnV_SHIFT);
pr_alert(" EA = %lu, S1PTW = %lu\n",
(esr & ESR_ELx_EA) >> ESR_ELx_EA_SHIFT,
(esr & ESR_ELx_S1PTW) >> ESR_ELx_S1PTW_SHIFT);
pr_alert(" FSC = 0x%02lx: %s\n", (esr & ESR_ELx_FSC),
esr_to_fault_info(esr)->name);
if (esr_is_data_abort(esr))
data_abort_decode(esr);
}
static inline unsigned long mm_to_pgd_phys(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
/* Either init_pg_dir or swapper_pg_dir */
if (mm == &init_mm)
return __pa_symbol(mm->pgd);
return (unsigned long)virt_to_phys(mm->pgd);
}
/*
* Dump out the page tables associated with 'addr' in the currently active mm.
*/
static void show_pte(unsigned long addr)
{
struct mm_struct *mm;
pgd_t *pgdp;
pgd_t pgd;
if (is_ttbr0_addr(addr)) {
/* TTBR0 */
mm = current->active_mm;
if (mm == &init_mm) {
pr_alert("[%016lx] user address but active_mm is swapper\n",
addr);
return;
}
} else if (is_ttbr1_addr(addr)) {
/* TTBR1 */
mm = &init_mm;
} else {
pr_alert("[%016lx] address between user and kernel address ranges\n",
addr);
return;
}
pr_alert("%s pgtable: %luk pages, %llu-bit VAs, pgdp=%016lx\n",
mm == &init_mm ? "swapper" : "user", PAGE_SIZE / SZ_1K,
vabits_actual, mm_to_pgd_phys(mm));
pgdp = pgd_offset(mm, addr);
pgd = READ_ONCE(*pgdp);
pr_alert("[%016lx] pgd=%016llx", addr, pgd_val(pgd));
do {
p4d_t *p4dp, p4d;
pud_t *pudp, pud;
pmd_t *pmdp, pmd;
pte_t *ptep, pte;
if (pgd_none(pgd) || pgd_bad(pgd))
break;
p4dp = p4d_offset(pgdp, addr);
p4d = READ_ONCE(*p4dp);
pr_cont(", p4d=%016llx", p4d_val(p4d));
if (p4d_none(p4d) || p4d_bad(p4d))
break;
pudp = pud_offset(p4dp, addr);
pud = READ_ONCE(*pudp);
pr_cont(", pud=%016llx", pud_val(pud));
if (pud_none(pud) || pud_bad(pud))
break;
pmdp = pmd_offset(pudp, addr);
pmd = READ_ONCE(*pmdp);
pr_cont(", pmd=%016llx", pmd_val(pmd));
if (pmd_none(pmd) || pmd_bad(pmd))
break;
ptep = pte_offset_map(pmdp, addr);
if (!ptep)
break;
pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
pr_cont(", pte=%016llx", pte_val(pte));
pte_unmap(ptep);
} while(0);
pr_cont("\n");
}
/*
* This function sets the access flags (dirty, accessed), as well as write
* permission, and only to a more permissive setting.
*
* It needs to cope with hardware update of the accessed/dirty state by other
* agents in the system and can safely skip the __sync_icache_dcache() call as,
* like set_pte_at(), the PTE is never changed from no-exec to exec here.
*
* Returns whether or not the PTE actually changed.
*/
int ptep_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep,
pte_t entry, int dirty)
{
pteval_t old_pteval, pteval;
pte_t pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
if (pte_same(pte, entry))
return 0;
/* only preserve the access flags and write permission */
pte_val(entry) &= PTE_RDONLY | PTE_AF | PTE_WRITE | PTE_DIRTY;
/*
* Setting the flags must be done atomically to avoid racing with the
* hardware update of the access/dirty state. The PTE_RDONLY bit must
* be set to the most permissive (lowest value) of *ptep and entry
* (calculated as: a & b == ~(~a | ~b)).
*/
pte_val(entry) ^= PTE_RDONLY;
pteval = pte_val(pte);
do {
old_pteval = pteval;
pteval ^= PTE_RDONLY;
pteval |= pte_val(entry);
pteval ^= PTE_RDONLY;
pteval = cmpxchg_relaxed(&pte_val(*ptep), old_pteval, pteval);
} while (pteval != old_pteval);
/* Invalidate a stale read-only entry */
if (dirty)
flush_tlb_page(vma, address);
return 1;
}
static bool is_el1_instruction_abort(unsigned long esr)
{
return ESR_ELx_EC(esr) == ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_CUR;
}
static bool is_el1_data_abort(unsigned long esr)
{
return ESR_ELx_EC(esr) == ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_CUR;
}
static inline bool is_el1_permission_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned long esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long fsc_type = esr & ESR_ELx_FSC_TYPE;
if (!is_el1_data_abort(esr) && !is_el1_instruction_abort(esr))
return false;
if (fsc_type == ESR_ELx_FSC_PERM)
return true;
if (is_ttbr0_addr(addr) && system_uses_ttbr0_pan())
return fsc_type == ESR_ELx_FSC_FAULT &&
(regs->pstate & PSR_PAN_BIT);
return false;
}
static bool __kprobes is_spurious_el1_translation_fault(unsigned long addr,
unsigned long esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long flags;
u64 par, dfsc;
if (!is_el1_data_abort(esr) ||
(esr & ESR_ELx_FSC_TYPE) != ESR_ELx_FSC_FAULT)
return false;
local_irq_save(flags);
asm volatile("at s1e1r, %0" :: "r" (addr));
isb();
par = read_sysreg_par();
local_irq_restore(flags);
/*
* If we now have a valid translation, treat the translation fault as
* spurious.
*/
if (!(par & SYS_PAR_EL1_F))
return true;
/*
* If we got a different type of fault from the AT instruction,
* treat the translation fault as spurious.
*/
dfsc = FIELD_GET(SYS_PAR_EL1_FST, par);
return (dfsc & ESR_ELx_FSC_TYPE) != ESR_ELx_FSC_FAULT;
}
static void die_kernel_fault(const char *msg, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
bust_spinlocks(1);
pr_alert("Unable to handle kernel %s at virtual address %016lx\n", msg,
addr);
kasan_non_canonical_hook(addr);
mem_abort_decode(esr);
show_pte(addr);
die("Oops", regs, esr);
bust_spinlocks(0);
make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
static void report_tag_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned long esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
/*
* SAS bits aren't set for all faults reported in EL1, so we can't
* find out access size.
*/
bool is_write = !!(esr & ESR_ELx_WNR);
kasan_report((void *)addr, 0, is_write, regs->pc);
}
#else
/* Tag faults aren't enabled without CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS. */
static inline void report_tag_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned long esr,
struct pt_regs *regs) { }
#endif
static void do_tag_recovery(unsigned long addr, unsigned long esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
report_tag_fault(addr, esr, regs);
/*
* Disable MTE Tag Checking on the local CPU for the current EL.
* It will be done lazily on the other CPUs when they will hit a
* tag fault.
*/
sysreg_clear_set(sctlr_el1, SCTLR_EL1_TCF_MASK,
SYS_FIELD_PREP_ENUM(SCTLR_EL1, TCF, NONE));
isb();
}
static bool is_el1_mte_sync_tag_check_fault(unsigned long esr)
{
unsigned long fsc = esr & ESR_ELx_FSC;
if (!is_el1_data_abort(esr))
return false;
if (fsc == ESR_ELx_FSC_MTE)
return true;
return false;
}
static bool is_translation_fault(unsigned long esr)
{
return (esr & ESR_ELx_FSC_TYPE) == ESR_ELx_FSC_FAULT;
}
static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned long esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
const char *msg;
/*
* Are we prepared to handle this kernel fault?
* We are almost certainly not prepared to handle instruction faults.
*/
if (!is_el1_instruction_abort(esr) && fixup_exception(regs))
return;
if (WARN_RATELIMIT(is_spurious_el1_translation_fault(addr, esr, regs),
"Ignoring spurious kernel translation fault at virtual address %016lx\n", addr))
return;
if (is_el1_mte_sync_tag_check_fault(esr)) {
do_tag_recovery(addr, esr, regs);
return;
}
if (is_el1_permission_fault(addr, esr, regs)) {
if (esr & ESR_ELx_WNR)
msg = "write to read-only memory";
else if (is_el1_instruction_abort(esr))
msg = "execute from non-executable memory";
else
msg = "read from unreadable memory";
} else if (addr < PAGE_SIZE) {
msg = "NULL pointer dereference";
} else {
if (is_translation_fault(esr) &&
kfence_handle_page_fault(addr, esr & ESR_ELx_WNR, regs))
return;
msg = "paging request";
}
if (efi_runtime_fixup_exception(regs, msg))
return;
die_kernel_fault(msg, addr, esr, regs);
}
static void set_thread_esr(unsigned long address, unsigned long esr)
{
current->thread.fault_address = address;
/*
* If the faulting address is in the kernel, we must sanitize the ESR.
* From userspace's point of view, kernel-only mappings don't exist
* at all, so we report them as level 0 translation faults.
* (This is not quite the way that "no mapping there at all" behaves:
* an alignment fault not caused by the memory type would take
* precedence over translation fault for a real access to empty
* space. Unfortunately we can't easily distinguish "alignment fault
* not caused by memory type" from "alignment fault caused by memory
* type", so we ignore this wrinkle and just return the translation
* fault.)
*/
if (!is_ttbr0_addr(current->thread.fault_address)) {
switch (ESR_ELx_EC(esr)) {
case ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_LOW:
/*
* These bits provide only information about the
* faulting instruction, which userspace knows already.
* We explicitly clear bits which are architecturally
* RES0 in case they are given meanings in future.
* We always report the ESR as if the fault was taken
* to EL1 and so ISV and the bits in ISS[23:14] are
* clear. (In fact it always will be a fault to EL1.)
*/
esr &= ESR_ELx_EC_MASK | ESR_ELx_IL |
ESR_ELx_CM | ESR_ELx_WNR;
esr |= ESR_ELx_FSC_FAULT;
break;
case ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW:
/*
* Claim a level 0 translation fault.
* All other bits are architecturally RES0 for faults
* reported with that DFSC value, so we clear them.
*/
esr &= ESR_ELx_EC_MASK | ESR_ELx_IL;
esr |= ESR_ELx_FSC_FAULT;
break;
default:
/*
* This should never happen (entry.S only brings us
* into this code for insn and data aborts from a lower
* exception level). Fail safe by not providing an ESR
* context record at all.
*/
WARN(1, "ESR 0x%lx is not DABT or IABT from EL0\n", esr);
esr = 0;
break;
}
}
current->thread.fault_code = esr;
}
static void do_bad_area(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(far);
/*
* If we are in kernel mode at this point, we have no context to
* handle this fault with.
*/
if (user_mode(regs)) {
const struct fault_info *inf = esr_to_fault_info(esr);
set_thread_esr(addr, esr);
arm64_force_sig_fault(inf->sig, inf->code, far, inf->name);
} else {
__do_kernel_fault(addr, esr, regs);
}
}
#define VM_FAULT_BADMAP ((__force vm_fault_t)0x010000)
#define VM_FAULT_BADACCESS ((__force vm_fault_t)0x020000)
static vm_fault_t __do_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
unsigned int mm_flags, unsigned long vm_flags,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so we can handle
* it.
* Check that the permissions on the VMA allow for the fault which
* occurred.
*/
if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags))
return VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
return handle_mm_fault(vma, addr, mm_flags, regs);
}
static bool is_el0_instruction_abort(unsigned long esr)
{
return ESR_ELx_EC(esr) == ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW;
}
/*
* Note: not valid for EL1 DC IVAC, but we never use that such that it
* should fault. EL0 cannot issue DC IVAC (undef).
*/
static bool is_write_abort(unsigned long esr)
{
return (esr & ESR_ELx_WNR) && !(esr & ESR_ELx_CM);
}
static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
const struct fault_info *inf;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
vm_fault_t fault;
unsigned long vm_flags;
unsigned int mm_flags = FAULT_FLAG_DEFAULT;
unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(far);
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
if (kprobe_page_fault(regs, esr))
return 0;
/*
* If we're in an interrupt or have no user context, we must not take
* the fault.
*/
if (faulthandler_disabled() || !mm)
goto no_context;
if (user_mode(regs))
mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_USER;
/*
* vm_flags tells us what bits we must have in vma->vm_flags
* for the fault to be benign, __do_page_fault() would check
* vma->vm_flags & vm_flags and returns an error if the
* intersection is empty
*/
if (is_el0_instruction_abort(esr)) {
/* It was exec fault */
vm_flags = VM_EXEC;
mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION;
} else if (is_write_abort(esr)) {
/* It was write fault */
vm_flags = VM_WRITE;
mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
} else {
/* It was read fault */
vm_flags = VM_READ;
/* Write implies read */
vm_flags |= VM_WRITE;
/* If EPAN is absent then exec implies read */
if (!alternative_has_cap_unlikely(ARM64_HAS_EPAN))
vm_flags |= VM_EXEC;
}
if (is_ttbr0_addr(addr) && is_el1_permission_fault(addr, esr, regs)) {
if (is_el1_instruction_abort(esr))
die_kernel_fault("execution of user memory",
addr, esr, regs);
if (!search_exception_tables(regs->pc))
die_kernel_fault("access to user memory outside uaccess routines",
addr, esr, regs);
}
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, addr);
if (!(mm_flags & FAULT_FLAG_USER))
goto lock_mmap;
vma = lock_vma_under_rcu(mm, addr);
if (!vma)
goto lock_mmap;
if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags)) {
vma_end_read(vma);
goto lock_mmap;
}
fault = handle_mm_fault(vma, addr, mm_flags | FAULT_FLAG_VMA_LOCK, regs);
if (!(fault & (VM_FAULT_RETRY | VM_FAULT_COMPLETED)))
vma_end_read(vma);
if (!(fault & VM_FAULT_RETRY)) {
count_vm_vma_lock_event(VMA_LOCK_SUCCESS);
goto done;
}
count_vm_vma_lock_event(VMA_LOCK_RETRY);
/* Quick path to respond to signals */
if (fault_signal_pending(fault, regs)) {
if (!user_mode(regs))
goto no_context;
return 0;
}
lock_mmap:
retry:
vma = lock_mm_and_find_vma(mm, addr, regs);
if (unlikely(!vma)) {
fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
goto done;
}
fault = __do_page_fault(mm, vma, addr, mm_flags, vm_flags, regs);
/* Quick path to respond to signals */
if (fault_signal_pending(fault, regs)) {
if (!user_mode(regs))
goto no_context;
return 0;
}
/* The fault is fully completed (including releasing mmap lock) */
if (fault & VM_FAULT_COMPLETED)
return 0;
if (fault & VM_FAULT_RETRY) {
mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_TRIED;
goto retry;
}
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
done:
/*
* Handle the "normal" (no error) case first.
*/
if (likely(!(fault & (VM_FAULT_ERROR | VM_FAULT_BADMAP |
VM_FAULT_BADACCESS))))
return 0;
/*
* If we are in kernel mode at this point, we have no context to
* handle this fault with.
*/
if (!user_mode(regs))
goto no_context;
if (fault & VM_FAULT_OOM) {
/*
* We ran out of memory, call the OOM killer, and return to
* userspace (which will retry the fault, or kill us if we got
* oom-killed).
*/
pagefault_out_of_memory();
return 0;
}
inf = esr_to_fault_info(esr);
set_thread_esr(addr, esr);
if (fault & VM_FAULT_SIGBUS) {
/*
* We had some memory, but were unable to successfully fix up
* this page fault.
*/
arm64_force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR, far, inf->name);
} else if (fault & (VM_FAULT_HWPOISON_LARGE | VM_FAULT_HWPOISON)) {
unsigned int lsb;
lsb = PAGE_SHIFT;
if (fault & VM_FAULT_HWPOISON_LARGE)
lsb = hstate_index_to_shift(VM_FAULT_GET_HINDEX(fault));
arm64_force_sig_mceerr(BUS_MCEERR_AR, far, lsb, inf->name);
} else {
/*
* Something tried to access memory that isn't in our memory
* map.
*/
arm64_force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV,
fault == VM_FAULT_BADACCESS ? SEGV_ACCERR : SEGV_MAPERR,
far, inf->name);
}
return 0;
no_context:
__do_kernel_fault(addr, esr, regs);
return 0;
}
static int __kprobes do_translation_fault(unsigned long far,
unsigned long esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(far);
if (is_ttbr0_addr(addr))
return do_page_fault(far, esr, regs);
do_bad_area(far, esr, regs);
return 0;
}
static int do_alignment_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMPAT_ALIGNMENT_FIXUPS) &&
compat_user_mode(regs))
return do_compat_alignment_fixup(far, regs);
do_bad_area(far, esr, regs);
return 0;
}
static int do_bad(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return 1; /* "fault" */
}
static int do_sea(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
const struct fault_info *inf;
unsigned long siaddr;
inf = esr_to_fault_info(esr);
if (user_mode(regs) && apei_claim_sea(regs) == 0) {
/*
* APEI claimed this as a firmware-first notification.
* Some processing deferred to task_work before ret_to_user().
*/
return 0;
}
if (esr & ESR_ELx_FnV) {
siaddr = 0;
} else {
/*
* The architecture specifies that the tag bits of FAR_EL1 are
* UNKNOWN for synchronous external aborts. Mask them out now
* so that userspace doesn't see them.
*/
siaddr = untagged_addr(far);
}
arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, inf->sig, inf->code, siaddr, esr);
return 0;
}
static int do_tag_check_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
/*
* The architecture specifies that bits 63:60 of FAR_EL1 are UNKNOWN
* for tag check faults. Set them to corresponding bits in the untagged
* address.
*/
far = (__untagged_addr(far) & ~MTE_TAG_MASK) | (far & MTE_TAG_MASK);
do_bad_area(far, esr, regs);
return 0;
}
static const struct fault_info fault_info[] = {
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "ttbr address size fault" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 1 address size fault" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 2 address size fault" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 3 address size fault" },
{ do_translation_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR, "level 0 translation fault" },
{ do_translation_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR, "level 1 translation fault" },
{ do_translation_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR, "level 2 translation fault" },
{ do_translation_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR, "level 3 translation fault" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 8" },
{ do_page_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "level 1 access flag fault" },
{ do_page_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "level 2 access flag fault" },
{ do_page_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "level 3 access flag fault" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 12" },
{ do_page_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "level 1 permission fault" },
{ do_page_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "level 2 permission fault" },
{ do_page_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "level 3 permission fault" },
{ do_sea, SIGBUS, BUS_OBJERR, "synchronous external abort" },
{ do_tag_check_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_MTESERR, "synchronous tag check fault" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 18" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 19" },
{ do_sea, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 0 (translation table walk)" },
{ do_sea, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 1 (translation table walk)" },
{ do_sea, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 2 (translation table walk)" },
{ do_sea, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 3 (translation table walk)" },
{ do_sea, SIGBUS, BUS_OBJERR, "synchronous parity or ECC error" }, // Reserved when RAS is implemented
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 25" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 26" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 27" },
{ do_sea, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 0 synchronous parity error (translation table walk)" }, // Reserved when RAS is implemented
{ do_sea, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 1 synchronous parity error (translation table walk)" }, // Reserved when RAS is implemented
{ do_sea, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 2 synchronous parity error (translation table walk)" }, // Reserved when RAS is implemented
{ do_sea, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 3 synchronous parity error (translation table walk)" }, // Reserved when RAS is implemented
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 32" },
{ do_alignment_fault, SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, "alignment fault" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 34" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 35" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 36" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 37" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 38" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 39" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 40" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 41" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 42" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 43" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 44" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 45" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 46" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 47" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "TLB conflict abort" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "Unsupported atomic hardware update fault" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 50" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 51" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "implementation fault (lockdown abort)" },
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_OBJERR, "implementation fault (unsupported exclusive)" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 54" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 55" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 56" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 57" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 58" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 59" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 60" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "section domain fault" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "page domain fault" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 63" },
};
void do_mem_abort(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
const struct fault_info *inf = esr_to_fault_info(esr);
unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(far);
if (!inf->fn(far, esr, regs))
return;
if (!user_mode(regs))
die_kernel_fault(inf->name, addr, esr, regs);
/*
* At this point we have an unrecognized fault type whose tag bits may
* have been defined as UNKNOWN. Therefore we only expose the untagged
* address to the signal handler.
*/
arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, inf->sig, inf->code, addr, esr);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_mem_abort);
void do_sp_pc_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
arm64_notify_die("SP/PC alignment exception", regs, SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN,
addr, esr);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_sp_pc_abort);
/*
* __refdata because early_brk64 is __init, but the reference to it is
* clobbered at arch_initcall time.
* See traps.c and debug-monitors.c:debug_traps_init().
*/
static struct fault_info __refdata debug_fault_info[] = {
{ do_bad, SIGTRAP, TRAP_HWBKPT, "hardware breakpoint" },
{ do_bad, SIGTRAP, TRAP_HWBKPT, "hardware single-step" },
{ do_bad, SIGTRAP, TRAP_HWBKPT, "hardware watchpoint" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 3" },
{ do_bad, SIGTRAP, TRAP_BRKPT, "aarch32 BKPT" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "aarch32 vector catch" },
{ early_brk64, SIGTRAP, TRAP_BRKPT, "aarch64 BRK" },
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 7" },
};
void __init hook_debug_fault_code(int nr,
int (*fn)(unsigned long, unsigned long, struct pt_regs *),
int sig, int code, const char *name)
{
BUG_ON(nr < 0 || nr >= ARRAY_SIZE(debug_fault_info));
debug_fault_info[nr].fn = fn;
debug_fault_info[nr].sig = sig;
debug_fault_info[nr].code = code;
debug_fault_info[nr].name = name;
}
/*
* In debug exception context, we explicitly disable preemption despite
* having interrupts disabled.
* This serves two purposes: it makes it much less likely that we would
* accidentally schedule in exception context and it will force a warning
* if we somehow manage to schedule by accident.
*/
static void debug_exception_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
preempt_disable();
/* This code is a bit fragile. Test it. */
RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_is_watching(), "exception_enter didn't work");
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(debug_exception_enter);
static void debug_exception_exit(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
preempt_enable_no_resched();
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(debug_exception_exit);
void do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr_if_watchpoint, unsigned long esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
const struct fault_info *inf = esr_to_debug_fault_info(esr);
unsigned long pc = instruction_pointer(regs);
debug_exception_enter(regs);
if (user_mode(regs) && !is_ttbr0_addr(pc))
arm64_apply_bp_hardening();
if (inf->fn(addr_if_watchpoint, esr, regs)) {
arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, inf->sig, inf->code, pc, esr);
}
debug_exception_exit(regs);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_debug_exception);
/*
* Used during anonymous page fault handling.
*/
struct folio *vma_alloc_zeroed_movable_folio(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long vaddr)
{
gfp_t flags = GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE | __GFP_ZERO;
/*
* If the page is mapped with PROT_MTE, initialise the tags at the
* point of allocation and page zeroing as this is usually faster than
* separate DC ZVA and STGM.
*/
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MTE)
flags |= __GFP_ZEROTAGS;
return vma_alloc_folio(flags, 0, vma, vaddr, false);
}
void tag_clear_highpage(struct page *page)
{
/* Newly allocated page, shouldn't have been tagged yet */
WARN_ON_ONCE(!try_page_mte_tagging(page));
mte_zero_clear_page_tags(page_address(page));
set_page_mte_tagged(page);
}