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![David Howells](/assets/img/avatar_default.png)
Simplify KEYRING_SEARCH_{NO,DO}_STATE_CHECK flags to be two variations of the same flag. They are effectively mutually exclusive and one or the other should be provided, but not both. Keyring cycle detection and key possession determination are the only things that set NO_STATE_CHECK, except that neither flag really does anything there because neither purpose makes use of the keyring_search_iterator() function, but rather provides their own. For cycle detection we definitely want to check inside of expired keyrings, just so that we don't create a cycle we can't get rid of. Revoked keyrings are cleared at revocation time and can't then be reused, so shouldn't be a problem either way. For possession determination, we *might* want to validate each keyring before searching it: do you possess a key that's hidden behind an expired or just plain inaccessible keyring? Currently, the answer is yes. Note that you cannot, however, possess a key behind a revoked keyring because they are cleared on revocation. keyring_search() sets DO_STATE_CHECK, which is correct. request_key_and_link() currently doesn't specify whether to check the key state or not - but it should set DO_STATE_CHECK. key_get_instantiation_authkey() also currently doesn't specify whether to check the key state or not - but it probably should also set DO_STATE_CHECK. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
276 lines
6.9 KiB
C
276 lines
6.9 KiB
C
/* Request key authorisation token key definition.
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
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* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* See Documentation/security/keys-request-key.txt
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <linux/seq_file.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <asm/uaccess.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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#include <keys/user-type.h>
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static int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
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static void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
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static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *,
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struct key_preparsed_payload *);
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static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *);
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static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *);
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static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *);
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static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t);
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/*
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* The request-key authorisation key type definition.
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*/
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struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = {
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.name = ".request_key_auth",
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.def_datalen = sizeof(struct request_key_auth),
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.preparse = request_key_auth_preparse,
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.free_preparse = request_key_auth_free_preparse,
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.instantiate = request_key_auth_instantiate,
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.describe = request_key_auth_describe,
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.revoke = request_key_auth_revoke,
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.destroy = request_key_auth_destroy,
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.read = request_key_auth_read,
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};
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static int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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static void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
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{
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}
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/*
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* Instantiate a request-key authorisation key.
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*/
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static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key,
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struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
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{
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key->payload.data = (struct request_key_auth *)prep->data;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Describe an authorisation token.
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*/
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static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key,
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struct seq_file *m)
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{
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struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data;
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seq_puts(m, "key:");
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seq_puts(m, key->description);
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if (key_is_instantiated(key))
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seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len);
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}
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/*
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* Read the callout_info data (retrieves the callout information).
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* - the key's semaphore is read-locked
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*/
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static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key,
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char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
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{
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struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data;
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size_t datalen;
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long ret;
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datalen = rka->callout_len;
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ret = datalen;
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/* we can return the data as is */
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if (buffer && buflen > 0) {
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if (buflen > datalen)
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buflen = datalen;
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if (copy_to_user(buffer, rka->callout_info, buflen) != 0)
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ret = -EFAULT;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Handle revocation of an authorisation token key.
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*
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* Called with the key sem write-locked.
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*/
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static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key)
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{
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struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data;
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kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
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if (rka->cred) {
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put_cred(rka->cred);
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rka->cred = NULL;
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}
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}
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/*
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* Destroy an instantiation authorisation token key.
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*/
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static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key)
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{
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struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data;
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kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
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if (rka->cred) {
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put_cred(rka->cred);
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rka->cred = NULL;
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}
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key_put(rka->target_key);
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key_put(rka->dest_keyring);
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kfree(rka->callout_info);
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kfree(rka);
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}
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/*
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* Create an authorisation token for /sbin/request-key or whoever to gain
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* access to the caller's security data.
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*/
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struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
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size_t callout_len, struct key *dest_keyring)
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{
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struct request_key_auth *rka, *irka;
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const struct cred *cred = current->cred;
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struct key *authkey = NULL;
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char desc[20];
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int ret;
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kenter("%d,", target->serial);
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/* allocate a auth record */
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rka = kmalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!rka) {
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kleave(" = -ENOMEM");
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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}
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rka->callout_info = kmalloc(callout_len, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!rka->callout_info) {
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kleave(" = -ENOMEM");
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kfree(rka);
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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}
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/* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of
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* another process */
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if (cred->request_key_auth) {
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/* it is - use that instantiation context here too */
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down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
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/* if the auth key has been revoked, then the key we're
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* servicing is already instantiated */
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if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &cred->request_key_auth->flags))
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goto auth_key_revoked;
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irka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
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rka->cred = get_cred(irka->cred);
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rka->pid = irka->pid;
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up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
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}
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else {
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/* it isn't - use this process as the context */
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rka->cred = get_cred(cred);
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rka->pid = current->pid;
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}
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rka->target_key = key_get(target);
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rka->dest_keyring = key_get(dest_keyring);
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memcpy(rka->callout_info, callout_info, callout_len);
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rka->callout_len = callout_len;
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/* allocate the auth key */
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sprintf(desc, "%x", target->serial);
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authkey = key_alloc(&key_type_request_key_auth, desc,
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cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
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KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH |
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KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
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if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(authkey);
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goto error_alloc;
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}
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/* construct the auth key */
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ret = key_instantiate_and_link(authkey, rka, 0, NULL, NULL);
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if (ret < 0)
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goto error_inst;
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kleave(" = {%d,%d}", authkey->serial, atomic_read(&authkey->usage));
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return authkey;
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auth_key_revoked:
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up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
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kfree(rka->callout_info);
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kfree(rka);
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kleave("= -EKEYREVOKED");
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return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
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error_inst:
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key_revoke(authkey);
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key_put(authkey);
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error_alloc:
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key_put(rka->target_key);
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key_put(rka->dest_keyring);
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kfree(rka->callout_info);
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kfree(rka);
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kleave("= %d", ret);
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return ERR_PTR(ret);
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}
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/*
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* Search the current process's keyrings for the authorisation key for
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* instantiation of a key.
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*/
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struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
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{
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char description[16];
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struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
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.index_key.type = &key_type_request_key_auth,
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.index_key.description = description,
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.cred = current_cred(),
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.match_data.cmp = key_default_cmp,
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.match_data.raw_data = description,
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.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
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.flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK,
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};
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struct key *authkey;
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key_ref_t authkey_ref;
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sprintf(description, "%x", target_id);
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authkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
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if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {
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authkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);
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if (authkey == ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN))
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authkey = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
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goto error;
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}
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authkey = key_ref_to_ptr(authkey_ref);
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if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags)) {
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key_put(authkey);
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authkey = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
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}
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error:
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return authkey;
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}
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