mirror of
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
synced 2024-08-23 17:30:02 +00:00
![Yonghong Song](/assets/img/avatar_default.png)
Commit 31fd85816d
("bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program
context fields") permits narrower load for certain ctx fields.
The commit however will already generate a masking even if
the prog-specific ctx conversion produces the result with
narrower size.
For example, for __sk_buff->protocol, the ctx conversion
loads the data into register with 2-byte load.
A narrower 2-byte load should not generate masking.
For __sk_buff->vlan_present, the conversion function
set the result as either 0 or 1, essentially a byte.
The narrower 2-byte or 1-byte load should not generate masking.
To avoid unnecessary masking, prog-specific *_is_valid_access
now passes converted_op_size back to verifier, which indicates
the valid data width after perceived future conversion.
Based on this information, verifier is able to avoid
unnecessary marking.
Since we want more information back from prog-specific
*_is_valid_access checking, all of them are packed into
one data structure for more clarity.
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
112 lines
3.6 KiB
C
112 lines
3.6 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
|
|
*
|
|
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
|
|
* modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
|
|
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation.
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifndef _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H
|
|
#define _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H 1
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/bpf.h> /* for enum bpf_reg_type */
|
|
#include <linux/filter.h> /* for MAX_BPF_STACK */
|
|
|
|
/* Just some arbitrary values so we can safely do math without overflowing and
|
|
* are obviously wrong for any sort of memory access.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE (1024 * 1024 * 1024)
|
|
#define BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE -1
|
|
|
|
struct bpf_reg_state {
|
|
enum bpf_reg_type type;
|
|
union {
|
|
/* valid when type == CONST_IMM | PTR_TO_STACK | UNKNOWN_VALUE */
|
|
s64 imm;
|
|
|
|
/* valid when type == PTR_TO_PACKET* */
|
|
struct {
|
|
u16 off;
|
|
u16 range;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* valid when type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP | PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE |
|
|
* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL
|
|
*/
|
|
struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
|
|
};
|
|
u32 id;
|
|
/* Used to determine if any memory access using this register will
|
|
* result in a bad access. These two fields must be last.
|
|
* See states_equal()
|
|
*/
|
|
s64 min_value;
|
|
u64 max_value;
|
|
u32 min_align;
|
|
u32 aux_off;
|
|
u32 aux_off_align;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
enum bpf_stack_slot_type {
|
|
STACK_INVALID, /* nothing was stored in this stack slot */
|
|
STACK_SPILL, /* register spilled into stack */
|
|
STACK_MISC /* BPF program wrote some data into this slot */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#define BPF_REG_SIZE 8 /* size of eBPF register in bytes */
|
|
|
|
/* state of the program:
|
|
* type of all registers and stack info
|
|
*/
|
|
struct bpf_verifier_state {
|
|
struct bpf_reg_state regs[MAX_BPF_REG];
|
|
u8 stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK];
|
|
struct bpf_reg_state spilled_regs[MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE];
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* linked list of verifier states used to prune search */
|
|
struct bpf_verifier_state_list {
|
|
struct bpf_verifier_state state;
|
|
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *next;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
|
|
union {
|
|
enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type; /* pointer type for load/store insns */
|
|
struct bpf_map *map_ptr; /* pointer for call insn into lookup_elem */
|
|
};
|
|
int ctx_field_size; /* the ctx field size for load insn, maybe 0 */
|
|
int converted_op_size; /* the valid value width after perceived conversion */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#define MAX_USED_MAPS 64 /* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */
|
|
|
|
struct bpf_verifier_env;
|
|
struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops {
|
|
int (*insn_hook)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
|
|
int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* single container for all structs
|
|
* one verifier_env per bpf_check() call
|
|
*/
|
|
struct bpf_verifier_env {
|
|
struct bpf_prog *prog; /* eBPF program being verified */
|
|
struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *head; /* stack of verifier states to be processed */
|
|
int stack_size; /* number of states to be processed */
|
|
bool strict_alignment; /* perform strict pointer alignment checks */
|
|
struct bpf_verifier_state cur_state; /* current verifier state */
|
|
struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_states; /* search pruning optimization */
|
|
const struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops *analyzer_ops; /* external analyzer ops */
|
|
void *analyzer_priv; /* pointer to external analyzer's private data */
|
|
struct bpf_map *used_maps[MAX_USED_MAPS]; /* array of map's used by eBPF program */
|
|
u32 used_map_cnt; /* number of used maps */
|
|
u32 id_gen; /* used to generate unique reg IDs */
|
|
bool allow_ptr_leaks;
|
|
bool seen_direct_write;
|
|
bool varlen_map_value_access;
|
|
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux_data; /* array of per-insn state */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
int bpf_analyzer(struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops *ops,
|
|
void *priv);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H */
|