linux-stable/security
Serge E. Hallyn 8ec2328f11 file capabilities: don't prevent signaling setuid root programs
An unprivileged process must be able to kill a setuid root program started
by the same user.  This is legacy behavior needed for instance for xinit to
kill X when the window manager exits.

When an unprivileged user runs a setuid root program in !SECURE_NOROOT
mode, fP, fI, and fE are set full on, so pP' and pE' are full on.  Then
cap_task_kill() prevents the user from signaling the setuid root task.
This is a change in behavior compared to when
!CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES.

This patch introduces a special check into cap_task_kill() just to check
whether a non-root user is signaling a setuid root program started by the
same user.  If so, then signal is allowed.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-11-29 09:24:53 -08:00
..
keys KEYS: Make request_key() and co fundamentally asynchronous 2007-10-17 08:42:57 -07:00
selinux SELinux: add more validity checks on policy load 2007-11-08 08:56:23 +11:00
capability.c Implement file posix capabilities 2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00
commoncap.c file capabilities: don't prevent signaling setuid root programs 2007-11-29 09:24:53 -08:00
dummy.c V3 file capabilities: alter behavior of cap_setpcap 2007-10-18 14:37:24 -07:00
inode.c security/ cleanups 2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00
Kconfig Implement file posix capabilities 2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00
Makefile [PATCH] LSM: remove BSD secure level security module 2006-09-29 09:18:10 -07:00
root_plug.c security: Convert LSM into a static interface 2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00
security.c security/ cleanups 2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00