Commit 08abce60d6 ("security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook")
introduced security_path_post_mknod(), to replace the IMA-specific call
to ima_post_path_mknod().
For symmetry with security_path_mknod(), security_path_post_mknod() was
called after a successful mknod operation, for any file type, rather
than only for regular files at the time there was the IMA call.
However, as reported by VFS maintainers, successful mknod operation does
not mean that the dentry always has an inode attached to it (for
example, not for FIFOs on a SAMBA mount).
If that condition happens, the kernel crashes when
security_path_post_mknod() attempts to verify if the inode associated to
the dentry is private.
Move security_path_post_mknod() where the ima_post_path_mknod() call was,
which is obviously correct from IMA/EVM perspective. IMA/EVM are the only
in-kernel users, and only need to inspect regular files.
Reported-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kernel/CAH2r5msAVzxCUHHG8VKrMPUKQHmBpE6K9_vjhgDa1uAvwx4ppw@mail.gmail.com/
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: 08abce60d6 ("security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
701b38995e