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d710fc16ff
We check whether the multiplies will overflow prior to calling kmalloc_array so that we can respond with -EINVAL for the invalid user arguments rather than treating it as an -ENOMEM that would otherwise occur. However, as Dan Carpenter pointed out, we did an addition on the unsigned int prior to passing to kmalloc_array where it would be promoted to size_t for the calculation, thereby allowing it to overflow and underallocate. v2: buffer_count is currently limited to INT_MAX because we treat it as signaled variable for LUT_HANDLE in eb_lookup_vma v3: Move common checks for eb1/eb2 into the same function v4: Put the check back for nfence*sizeof(user_fence) overflow v5: access_ok uses ULONG_MAX but kvmalloc_array uses SIZE_MAX v6: size_t and unsigned long are not type-equivalent on 32b Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20171116105059.25142-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com> |
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