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b073d7f8ae
Insert KMSAN hooks that make the necessary bookkeeping changes: - poison page shadow and origins in alloc_pages()/free_page(); - clear page shadow and origins in clear_page(), copy_user_highpage(); - copy page metadata in copy_highpage(), wp_page_copy(); - handle vmap()/vunmap()/iounmap(); Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-15-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
106 lines
2.9 KiB
C
106 lines
2.9 KiB
C
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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#ifndef _ASM_X86_PAGE_64_H
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#define _ASM_X86_PAGE_64_H
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#include <asm/page_64_types.h>
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#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
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#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
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#include <asm/alternative.h>
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#include <linux/kmsan-checks.h>
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/* duplicated to the one in bootmem.h */
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extern unsigned long max_pfn;
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extern unsigned long phys_base;
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extern unsigned long page_offset_base;
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extern unsigned long vmalloc_base;
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extern unsigned long vmemmap_base;
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static __always_inline unsigned long __phys_addr_nodebug(unsigned long x)
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{
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unsigned long y = x - __START_KERNEL_map;
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/* use the carry flag to determine if x was < __START_KERNEL_map */
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x = y + ((x > y) ? phys_base : (__START_KERNEL_map - PAGE_OFFSET));
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return x;
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL
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extern unsigned long __phys_addr(unsigned long);
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extern unsigned long __phys_addr_symbol(unsigned long);
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#else
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#define __phys_addr(x) __phys_addr_nodebug(x)
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#define __phys_addr_symbol(x) \
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((unsigned long)(x) - __START_KERNEL_map + phys_base)
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#endif
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#define __phys_reloc_hide(x) (x)
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#ifdef CONFIG_FLATMEM
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#define pfn_valid(pfn) ((pfn) < max_pfn)
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#endif
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void clear_page_orig(void *page);
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void clear_page_rep(void *page);
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void clear_page_erms(void *page);
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static inline void clear_page(void *page)
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{
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/*
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* Clean up KMSAN metadata for the page being cleared. The assembly call
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* below clobbers @page, so we perform unpoisoning before it.
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*/
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kmsan_unpoison_memory(page, PAGE_SIZE);
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alternative_call_2(clear_page_orig,
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clear_page_rep, X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD,
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clear_page_erms, X86_FEATURE_ERMS,
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"=D" (page),
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"0" (page)
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: "cc", "memory", "rax", "rcx");
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}
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void copy_page(void *to, void *from);
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
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/*
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* User space process size. This is the first address outside the user range.
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* There are a few constraints that determine this:
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*
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* On Intel CPUs, if a SYSCALL instruction is at the highest canonical
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* address, then that syscall will enter the kernel with a
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* non-canonical return address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously.
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* We avoid this particular problem by preventing anything
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* from being mapped at the maximum canonical address.
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*
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* On AMD CPUs in the Ryzen family, there's a nasty bug in which the
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* CPUs malfunction if they execute code from the highest canonical page.
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* They'll speculate right off the end of the canonical space, and
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* bad things happen. This is worked around in the same way as the
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* Intel problem.
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*
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* With page table isolation enabled, we map the LDT in ... [stay tuned]
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*/
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static __always_inline unsigned long task_size_max(void)
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{
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unsigned long ret;
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alternative_io("movq %[small],%0","movq %[large],%0",
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X86_FEATURE_LA57,
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"=r" (ret),
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[small] "i" ((1ul << 47)-PAGE_SIZE),
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[large] "i" ((1ul << 56)-PAGE_SIZE));
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return ret;
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL */
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#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION
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# define __HAVE_ARCH_GATE_AREA 1
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#endif
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#endif /* _ASM_X86_PAGE_64_H */
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