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![Eric Biggers](/assets/img/avatar_default.png)
It is a bug for fscrypt_put_master_key_activeref() to see a NULL keyring. But it used to be possible due to the bug, now fixed, where fscrypt_destroy_keyring() was called before security_sb_delete(). To be consistent with how fscrypt_destroy_keyring() uses WARN_ON for the same issue, WARN and leak the fscrypt_master_key if the keyring is NULL instead of dereferencing the NULL pointer. This is a robustness improvement, not a fix. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230313221231.272498-4-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
1204 lines
36 KiB
C
1204 lines
36 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* Filesystem-level keyring for fscrypt
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*
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* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
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*/
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/*
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* This file implements management of fscrypt master keys in the
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* filesystem-level keyring, including the ioctls:
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*
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* - FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY
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* - FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY
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* - FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS
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* - FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS
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*
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* See the "User API" section of Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst for more
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* information about these ioctls.
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*/
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#include <asm/unaligned.h>
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#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
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#include <linux/key-type.h>
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#include <linux/random.h>
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#include <linux/seq_file.h>
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#include "fscrypt_private.h"
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/* The master encryption keys for a filesystem (->s_master_keys) */
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struct fscrypt_keyring {
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/*
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* Lock that protects ->key_hashtable. It does *not* protect the
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* fscrypt_master_key structs themselves.
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*/
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spinlock_t lock;
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/* Hash table that maps fscrypt_key_specifier to fscrypt_master_key */
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struct hlist_head key_hashtable[128];
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};
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static void wipe_master_key_secret(struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret)
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{
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fscrypt_destroy_hkdf(&secret->hkdf);
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memzero_explicit(secret, sizeof(*secret));
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}
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static void move_master_key_secret(struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *dst,
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struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *src)
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{
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memcpy(dst, src, sizeof(*dst));
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memzero_explicit(src, sizeof(*src));
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}
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static void fscrypt_free_master_key(struct rcu_head *head)
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{
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struct fscrypt_master_key *mk =
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container_of(head, struct fscrypt_master_key, mk_rcu_head);
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/*
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* The master key secret and any embedded subkeys should have already
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* been wiped when the last active reference to the fscrypt_master_key
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* struct was dropped; doing it here would be unnecessarily late.
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* Nevertheless, use kfree_sensitive() in case anything was missed.
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*/
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kfree_sensitive(mk);
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}
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void fscrypt_put_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
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{
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if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&mk->mk_struct_refs))
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return;
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/*
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* No structural references left, so free ->mk_users, and also free the
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* fscrypt_master_key struct itself after an RCU grace period ensures
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* that concurrent keyring lookups can no longer find it.
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*/
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WARN_ON(refcount_read(&mk->mk_active_refs) != 0);
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key_put(mk->mk_users);
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mk->mk_users = NULL;
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call_rcu(&mk->mk_rcu_head, fscrypt_free_master_key);
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}
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void fscrypt_put_master_key_activeref(struct super_block *sb,
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struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
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{
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size_t i;
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if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&mk->mk_active_refs))
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return;
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/*
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* No active references left, so complete the full removal of this
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* fscrypt_master_key struct by removing it from the keyring and
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* destroying any subkeys embedded in it.
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*/
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if (WARN_ON(!sb->s_master_keys))
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return;
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spin_lock(&sb->s_master_keys->lock);
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hlist_del_rcu(&mk->mk_node);
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spin_unlock(&sb->s_master_keys->lock);
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/*
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* ->mk_active_refs == 0 implies that ->mk_secret is not present and
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* that ->mk_decrypted_inodes is empty.
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*/
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WARN_ON(is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret));
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WARN_ON(!list_empty(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes));
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for (i = 0; i <= FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX; i++) {
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fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key(
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sb, &mk->mk_direct_keys[i]);
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fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key(
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sb, &mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_keys[i]);
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fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key(
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sb, &mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_32_keys[i]);
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}
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memzero_explicit(&mk->mk_ino_hash_key,
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sizeof(mk->mk_ino_hash_key));
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mk->mk_ino_hash_key_initialized = false;
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/* Drop the structural ref associated with the active refs. */
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fscrypt_put_master_key(mk);
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}
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static inline bool valid_key_spec(const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *spec)
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{
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if (spec->__reserved)
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return false;
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return master_key_spec_len(spec) != 0;
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}
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static int fscrypt_user_key_instantiate(struct key *key,
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struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
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{
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/*
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* We just charge FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE bytes to the user's key quota for
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* each key, regardless of the exact key size. The amount of memory
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* actually used is greater than the size of the raw key anyway.
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*/
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return key_payload_reserve(key, FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE);
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}
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static void fscrypt_user_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
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{
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seq_puts(m, key->description);
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}
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/*
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* Type of key in ->mk_users. Each key of this type represents a particular
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* user who has added a particular master key.
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*
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* Note that the name of this key type really should be something like
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* ".fscrypt-user" instead of simply ".fscrypt". But the shorter name is chosen
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* mainly for simplicity of presentation in /proc/keys when read by a non-root
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* user. And it is expected to be rare that a key is actually added by multiple
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* users, since users should keep their encryption keys confidential.
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*/
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static struct key_type key_type_fscrypt_user = {
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.name = ".fscrypt",
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.instantiate = fscrypt_user_key_instantiate,
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.describe = fscrypt_user_key_describe,
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};
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#define FSCRYPT_MK_USERS_DESCRIPTION_SIZE \
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(CONST_STRLEN("fscrypt-") + 2 * FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE + \
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CONST_STRLEN("-users") + 1)
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#define FSCRYPT_MK_USER_DESCRIPTION_SIZE \
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(2 * FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE + CONST_STRLEN(".uid.") + 10 + 1)
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static void format_mk_users_keyring_description(
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char description[FSCRYPT_MK_USERS_DESCRIPTION_SIZE],
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const u8 mk_identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE])
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{
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sprintf(description, "fscrypt-%*phN-users",
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FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE, mk_identifier);
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}
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static void format_mk_user_description(
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char description[FSCRYPT_MK_USER_DESCRIPTION_SIZE],
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const u8 mk_identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE])
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{
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sprintf(description, "%*phN.uid.%u", FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE,
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mk_identifier, __kuid_val(current_fsuid()));
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}
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/* Create ->s_master_keys if needed. Synchronized by fscrypt_add_key_mutex. */
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static int allocate_filesystem_keyring(struct super_block *sb)
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{
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struct fscrypt_keyring *keyring;
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if (sb->s_master_keys)
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return 0;
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keyring = kzalloc(sizeof(*keyring), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!keyring)
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return -ENOMEM;
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spin_lock_init(&keyring->lock);
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/*
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* Pairs with the smp_load_acquire() in fscrypt_find_master_key().
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* I.e., here we publish ->s_master_keys with a RELEASE barrier so that
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* concurrent tasks can ACQUIRE it.
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*/
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smp_store_release(&sb->s_master_keys, keyring);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Release all encryption keys that have been added to the filesystem, along
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* with the keyring that contains them.
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*
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* This is called at unmount time, after all potentially-encrypted inodes have
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* been evicted. The filesystem's underlying block device(s) are still
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* available at this time; this is important because after user file accesses
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* have been allowed, this function may need to evict keys from the keyslots of
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* an inline crypto engine, which requires the block device(s).
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*/
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void fscrypt_destroy_keyring(struct super_block *sb)
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{
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struct fscrypt_keyring *keyring = sb->s_master_keys;
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size_t i;
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if (!keyring)
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return;
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(keyring->key_hashtable); i++) {
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struct hlist_head *bucket = &keyring->key_hashtable[i];
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struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
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struct hlist_node *tmp;
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hlist_for_each_entry_safe(mk, tmp, bucket, mk_node) {
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/*
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* Since all potentially-encrypted inodes were already
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* evicted, every key remaining in the keyring should
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* have an empty inode list, and should only still be in
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* the keyring due to the single active ref associated
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* with ->mk_secret. There should be no structural refs
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* beyond the one associated with the active ref.
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*/
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WARN_ON(refcount_read(&mk->mk_active_refs) != 1);
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WARN_ON(refcount_read(&mk->mk_struct_refs) != 1);
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WARN_ON(!is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret));
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wipe_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret);
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fscrypt_put_master_key_activeref(sb, mk);
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}
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}
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kfree_sensitive(keyring);
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sb->s_master_keys = NULL;
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}
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static struct hlist_head *
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fscrypt_mk_hash_bucket(struct fscrypt_keyring *keyring,
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const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec)
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{
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/*
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* Since key specifiers should be "random" values, it is sufficient to
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* use a trivial hash function that just takes the first several bits of
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* the key specifier.
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*/
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unsigned long i = get_unaligned((unsigned long *)&mk_spec->u);
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return &keyring->key_hashtable[i % ARRAY_SIZE(keyring->key_hashtable)];
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}
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/*
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* Find the specified master key struct in ->s_master_keys and take a structural
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* ref to it. The structural ref guarantees that the key struct continues to
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* exist, but it does *not* guarantee that ->s_master_keys continues to contain
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* the key struct. The structural ref needs to be dropped by
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* fscrypt_put_master_key(). Returns NULL if the key struct is not found.
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*/
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struct fscrypt_master_key *
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fscrypt_find_master_key(struct super_block *sb,
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const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec)
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{
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struct fscrypt_keyring *keyring;
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struct hlist_head *bucket;
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struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
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/*
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* Pairs with the smp_store_release() in allocate_filesystem_keyring().
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* I.e., another task can publish ->s_master_keys concurrently,
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* executing a RELEASE barrier. We need to use smp_load_acquire() here
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* to safely ACQUIRE the memory the other task published.
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*/
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keyring = smp_load_acquire(&sb->s_master_keys);
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if (keyring == NULL)
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return NULL; /* No keyring yet, so no keys yet. */
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bucket = fscrypt_mk_hash_bucket(keyring, mk_spec);
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rcu_read_lock();
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switch (mk_spec->type) {
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case FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR:
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hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(mk, bucket, mk_node) {
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if (mk->mk_spec.type ==
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FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR &&
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memcmp(mk->mk_spec.u.descriptor,
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mk_spec->u.descriptor,
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FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 &&
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refcount_inc_not_zero(&mk->mk_struct_refs))
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goto out;
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}
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break;
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case FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER:
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hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(mk, bucket, mk_node) {
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if (mk->mk_spec.type ==
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FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER &&
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memcmp(mk->mk_spec.u.identifier,
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mk_spec->u.identifier,
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FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE) == 0 &&
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refcount_inc_not_zero(&mk->mk_struct_refs))
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goto out;
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}
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break;
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}
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mk = NULL;
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out:
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return mk;
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}
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static int allocate_master_key_users_keyring(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
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{
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char description[FSCRYPT_MK_USERS_DESCRIPTION_SIZE];
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struct key *keyring;
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format_mk_users_keyring_description(description,
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mk->mk_spec.u.identifier);
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keyring = keyring_alloc(description, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
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current_cred(), KEY_POS_SEARCH |
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KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_VIEW,
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KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
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if (IS_ERR(keyring))
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return PTR_ERR(keyring);
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mk->mk_users = keyring;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Find the current user's "key" in the master key's ->mk_users.
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* Returns ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) if not found.
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*/
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static struct key *find_master_key_user(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
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{
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char description[FSCRYPT_MK_USER_DESCRIPTION_SIZE];
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key_ref_t keyref;
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format_mk_user_description(description, mk->mk_spec.u.identifier);
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/*
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* We need to mark the keyring reference as "possessed" so that we
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* acquire permission to search it, via the KEY_POS_SEARCH permission.
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*/
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keyref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(mk->mk_users, true /*possessed*/),
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&key_type_fscrypt_user, description, false);
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if (IS_ERR(keyref)) {
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if (PTR_ERR(keyref) == -EAGAIN || /* not found */
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PTR_ERR(keyref) == -EKEYREVOKED) /* recently invalidated */
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keyref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
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return ERR_CAST(keyref);
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}
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return key_ref_to_ptr(keyref);
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}
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/*
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* Give the current user a "key" in ->mk_users. This charges the user's quota
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* and marks the master key as added by the current user, so that it cannot be
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* removed by another user with the key. Either ->mk_sem must be held for
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* write, or the master key must be still undergoing initialization.
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*/
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static int add_master_key_user(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
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{
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char description[FSCRYPT_MK_USER_DESCRIPTION_SIZE];
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struct key *mk_user;
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int err;
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format_mk_user_description(description, mk->mk_spec.u.identifier);
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mk_user = key_alloc(&key_type_fscrypt_user, description,
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current_fsuid(), current_gid(), current_cred(),
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KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_USR_VIEW, 0, NULL);
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if (IS_ERR(mk_user))
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return PTR_ERR(mk_user);
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err = key_instantiate_and_link(mk_user, NULL, 0, mk->mk_users, NULL);
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key_put(mk_user);
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return err;
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}
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/*
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* Remove the current user's "key" from ->mk_users.
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* ->mk_sem must be held for write.
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*
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* Returns 0 if removed, -ENOKEY if not found, or another -errno code.
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*/
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static int remove_master_key_user(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
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{
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struct key *mk_user;
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int err;
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mk_user = find_master_key_user(mk);
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if (IS_ERR(mk_user))
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return PTR_ERR(mk_user);
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err = key_unlink(mk->mk_users, mk_user);
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key_put(mk_user);
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return err;
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}
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|
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/*
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* Allocate a new fscrypt_master_key, transfer the given secret over to it, and
|
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* insert it into sb->s_master_keys.
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*/
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static int add_new_master_key(struct super_block *sb,
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struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret,
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const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec)
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{
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struct fscrypt_keyring *keyring = sb->s_master_keys;
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struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
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int err;
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|
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mk = kzalloc(sizeof(*mk), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!mk)
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return -ENOMEM;
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|
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init_rwsem(&mk->mk_sem);
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refcount_set(&mk->mk_struct_refs, 1);
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mk->mk_spec = *mk_spec;
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INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes);
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spin_lock_init(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
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|
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if (mk_spec->type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER) {
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err = allocate_master_key_users_keyring(mk);
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if (err)
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goto out_put;
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err = add_master_key_user(mk);
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|
if (err)
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goto out_put;
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}
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move_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret, secret);
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refcount_set(&mk->mk_active_refs, 1); /* ->mk_secret is present */
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spin_lock(&keyring->lock);
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hlist_add_head_rcu(&mk->mk_node,
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fscrypt_mk_hash_bucket(keyring, mk_spec));
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spin_unlock(&keyring->lock);
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return 0;
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out_put:
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fscrypt_put_master_key(mk);
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return err;
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}
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|
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#define KEY_DEAD 1
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|
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static int add_existing_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
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struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret)
|
|
{
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|
int err;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the current user is already in ->mk_users, then there's nothing to
|
|
* do. Otherwise, we need to add the user to ->mk_users. (Neither is
|
|
* applicable for v1 policy keys, which have NULL ->mk_users.)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (mk->mk_users) {
|
|
struct key *mk_user = find_master_key_user(mk);
|
|
|
|
if (mk_user != ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY)) {
|
|
if (IS_ERR(mk_user))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(mk_user);
|
|
key_put(mk_user);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
err = add_master_key_user(mk);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Re-add the secret if needed. */
|
|
if (!is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret)) {
|
|
if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&mk->mk_active_refs))
|
|
return KEY_DEAD;
|
|
move_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret, secret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int do_add_master_key(struct super_block *sb,
|
|
struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret,
|
|
const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec)
|
|
{
|
|
static DEFINE_MUTEX(fscrypt_add_key_mutex);
|
|
struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&fscrypt_add_key_mutex); /* serialize find + link */
|
|
|
|
mk = fscrypt_find_master_key(sb, mk_spec);
|
|
if (!mk) {
|
|
/* Didn't find the key in ->s_master_keys. Add it. */
|
|
err = allocate_filesystem_keyring(sb);
|
|
if (!err)
|
|
err = add_new_master_key(sb, secret, mk_spec);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Found the key in ->s_master_keys. Re-add the secret if
|
|
* needed, and add the user to ->mk_users if needed.
|
|
*/
|
|
down_write(&mk->mk_sem);
|
|
err = add_existing_master_key(mk, secret);
|
|
up_write(&mk->mk_sem);
|
|
if (err == KEY_DEAD) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We found a key struct, but it's already been fully
|
|
* removed. Ignore the old struct and add a new one.
|
|
* fscrypt_add_key_mutex means we don't need to worry
|
|
* about concurrent adds.
|
|
*/
|
|
err = add_new_master_key(sb, secret, mk_spec);
|
|
}
|
|
fscrypt_put_master_key(mk);
|
|
}
|
|
mutex_unlock(&fscrypt_add_key_mutex);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int add_master_key(struct super_block *sb,
|
|
struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret,
|
|
struct fscrypt_key_specifier *key_spec)
|
|
{
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
if (key_spec->type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER) {
|
|
err = fscrypt_init_hkdf(&secret->hkdf, secret->raw,
|
|
secret->size);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now that the HKDF context is initialized, the raw key is no
|
|
* longer needed.
|
|
*/
|
|
memzero_explicit(secret->raw, secret->size);
|
|
|
|
/* Calculate the key identifier */
|
|
err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&secret->hkdf,
|
|
HKDF_CONTEXT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, NULL, 0,
|
|
key_spec->u.identifier,
|
|
FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
return do_add_master_key(sb, secret, key_spec);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int fscrypt_provisioning_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload *payload = prep->data;
|
|
|
|
if (prep->datalen < sizeof(*payload) + FSCRYPT_MIN_KEY_SIZE ||
|
|
prep->datalen > sizeof(*payload) + FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (payload->type != FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR &&
|
|
payload->type != FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (payload->__reserved)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
prep->payload.data[0] = kmemdup(payload, prep->datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!prep->payload.data[0])
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
prep->quotalen = prep->datalen;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void fscrypt_provisioning_key_free_preparse(
|
|
struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
|
|
{
|
|
kfree_sensitive(prep->payload.data[0]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void fscrypt_provisioning_key_describe(const struct key *key,
|
|
struct seq_file *m)
|
|
{
|
|
seq_puts(m, key->description);
|
|
if (key_is_positive(key)) {
|
|
const struct fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload *payload =
|
|
key->payload.data[0];
|
|
|
|
seq_printf(m, ": %u [%u]", key->datalen, payload->type);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void fscrypt_provisioning_key_destroy(struct key *key)
|
|
{
|
|
kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[0]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct key_type key_type_fscrypt_provisioning = {
|
|
.name = "fscrypt-provisioning",
|
|
.preparse = fscrypt_provisioning_key_preparse,
|
|
.free_preparse = fscrypt_provisioning_key_free_preparse,
|
|
.instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
|
|
.describe = fscrypt_provisioning_key_describe,
|
|
.destroy = fscrypt_provisioning_key_destroy,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Retrieve the raw key from the Linux keyring key specified by 'key_id', and
|
|
* store it into 'secret'.
|
|
*
|
|
* The key must be of type "fscrypt-provisioning" and must have the field
|
|
* fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload::type set to 'type', indicating that it's
|
|
* only usable with fscrypt with the particular KDF version identified by
|
|
* 'type'. We don't use the "logon" key type because there's no way to
|
|
* completely restrict the use of such keys; they can be used by any kernel API
|
|
* that accepts "logon" keys and doesn't require a specific service prefix.
|
|
*
|
|
* The ability to specify the key via Linux keyring key is intended for cases
|
|
* where userspace needs to re-add keys after the filesystem is unmounted and
|
|
* re-mounted. Most users should just provide the raw key directly instead.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int get_keyring_key(u32 key_id, u32 type,
|
|
struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret)
|
|
{
|
|
key_ref_t ref;
|
|
struct key *key;
|
|
const struct fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload *payload;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
ref = lookup_user_key(key_id, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(ref))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(ref);
|
|
key = key_ref_to_ptr(ref);
|
|
|
|
if (key->type != &key_type_fscrypt_provisioning)
|
|
goto bad_key;
|
|
payload = key->payload.data[0];
|
|
|
|
/* Don't allow fscrypt v1 keys to be used as v2 keys and vice versa. */
|
|
if (payload->type != type)
|
|
goto bad_key;
|
|
|
|
secret->size = key->datalen - sizeof(*payload);
|
|
memcpy(secret->raw, payload->raw, secret->size);
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
goto out_put;
|
|
|
|
bad_key:
|
|
err = -EKEYREJECTED;
|
|
out_put:
|
|
key_ref_put(ref);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add a master encryption key to the filesystem, causing all files which were
|
|
* encrypted with it to appear "unlocked" (decrypted) when accessed.
|
|
*
|
|
* When adding a key for use by v1 encryption policies, this ioctl is
|
|
* privileged, and userspace must provide the 'key_descriptor'.
|
|
*
|
|
* When adding a key for use by v2+ encryption policies, this ioctl is
|
|
* unprivileged. This is needed, in general, to allow non-root users to use
|
|
* encryption without encountering the visibility problems of process-subscribed
|
|
* keyrings and the inability to properly remove keys. This works by having
|
|
* each key identified by its cryptographically secure hash --- the
|
|
* 'key_identifier'. The cryptographic hash ensures that a malicious user
|
|
* cannot add the wrong key for a given identifier. Furthermore, each added key
|
|
* is charged to the appropriate user's quota for the keyrings service, which
|
|
* prevents a malicious user from adding too many keys. Finally, we forbid a
|
|
* user from removing a key while other users have added it too, which prevents
|
|
* a user who knows another user's key from causing a denial-of-service by
|
|
* removing it at an inopportune time. (We tolerate that a user who knows a key
|
|
* can prevent other users from removing it.)
|
|
*
|
|
* For more details, see the "FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY" section of
|
|
* Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst.
|
|
*/
|
|
int fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct super_block *sb = file_inode(filp)->i_sb;
|
|
struct fscrypt_add_key_arg __user *uarg = _uarg;
|
|
struct fscrypt_add_key_arg arg;
|
|
struct fscrypt_master_key_secret secret;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
if (!valid_key_spec(&arg.key_spec))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (memchr_inv(arg.__reserved, 0, sizeof(arg.__reserved)))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Only root can add keys that are identified by an arbitrary descriptor
|
|
* rather than by a cryptographic hash --- since otherwise a malicious
|
|
* user could add the wrong key.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (arg.key_spec.type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR &&
|
|
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
|
return -EACCES;
|
|
|
|
memset(&secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
|
|
if (arg.key_id) {
|
|
if (arg.raw_size != 0)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
err = get_keyring_key(arg.key_id, arg.key_spec.type, &secret);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto out_wipe_secret;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (arg.raw_size < FSCRYPT_MIN_KEY_SIZE ||
|
|
arg.raw_size > FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
secret.size = arg.raw_size;
|
|
err = -EFAULT;
|
|
if (copy_from_user(secret.raw, uarg->raw, secret.size))
|
|
goto out_wipe_secret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = add_master_key(sb, &secret, &arg.key_spec);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto out_wipe_secret;
|
|
|
|
/* Return the key identifier to userspace, if applicable */
|
|
err = -EFAULT;
|
|
if (arg.key_spec.type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER &&
|
|
copy_to_user(uarg->key_spec.u.identifier, arg.key_spec.u.identifier,
|
|
FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE))
|
|
goto out_wipe_secret;
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
out_wipe_secret:
|
|
wipe_master_key_secret(&secret);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_add_key);
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
fscrypt_get_test_dummy_secret(struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret)
|
|
{
|
|
static u8 test_key[FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
get_random_once(test_key, FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
memset(secret, 0, sizeof(*secret));
|
|
secret->size = FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE;
|
|
memcpy(secret->raw, test_key, FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int fscrypt_get_test_dummy_key_identifier(
|
|
u8 key_identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE])
|
|
{
|
|
struct fscrypt_master_key_secret secret;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
fscrypt_get_test_dummy_secret(&secret);
|
|
|
|
err = fscrypt_init_hkdf(&secret.hkdf, secret.raw, secret.size);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&secret.hkdf, HKDF_CONTEXT_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
|
|
NULL, 0, key_identifier,
|
|
FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE);
|
|
out:
|
|
wipe_master_key_secret(&secret);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* fscrypt_add_test_dummy_key() - add the test dummy encryption key
|
|
* @sb: the filesystem instance to add the key to
|
|
* @key_spec: the key specifier of the test dummy encryption key
|
|
*
|
|
* Add the key for the test_dummy_encryption mount option to the filesystem. To
|
|
* prevent misuse of this mount option, a per-boot random key is used instead of
|
|
* a hardcoded one. This makes it so that any encrypted files created using
|
|
* this option won't be accessible after a reboot.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
|
|
*/
|
|
int fscrypt_add_test_dummy_key(struct super_block *sb,
|
|
struct fscrypt_key_specifier *key_spec)
|
|
{
|
|
struct fscrypt_master_key_secret secret;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
fscrypt_get_test_dummy_secret(&secret);
|
|
err = add_master_key(sb, &secret, key_spec);
|
|
wipe_master_key_secret(&secret);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Verify that the current user has added a master key with the given identifier
|
|
* (returns -ENOKEY if not). This is needed to prevent a user from encrypting
|
|
* their files using some other user's key which they don't actually know.
|
|
* Cryptographically this isn't much of a problem, but the semantics of this
|
|
* would be a bit weird, so it's best to just forbid it.
|
|
*
|
|
* The system administrator (CAP_FOWNER) can override this, which should be
|
|
* enough for any use cases where encryption policies are being set using keys
|
|
* that were chosen ahead of time but aren't available at the moment.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note that the key may have already removed by the time this returns, but
|
|
* that's okay; we just care whether the key was there at some point.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return: 0 if the key is added, -ENOKEY if it isn't, or another -errno code
|
|
*/
|
|
int fscrypt_verify_key_added(struct super_block *sb,
|
|
const u8 identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE])
|
|
{
|
|
struct fscrypt_key_specifier mk_spec;
|
|
struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
|
|
struct key *mk_user;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
mk_spec.type = FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER;
|
|
memcpy(mk_spec.u.identifier, identifier, FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
mk = fscrypt_find_master_key(sb, &mk_spec);
|
|
if (!mk) {
|
|
err = -ENOKEY;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
down_read(&mk->mk_sem);
|
|
mk_user = find_master_key_user(mk);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(mk_user)) {
|
|
err = PTR_ERR(mk_user);
|
|
} else {
|
|
key_put(mk_user);
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
up_read(&mk->mk_sem);
|
|
fscrypt_put_master_key(mk);
|
|
out:
|
|
if (err == -ENOKEY && capable(CAP_FOWNER))
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Try to evict the inode's dentries from the dentry cache. If the inode is a
|
|
* directory, then it can have at most one dentry; however, that dentry may be
|
|
* pinned by child dentries, so first try to evict the children too.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void shrink_dcache_inode(struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
struct dentry *dentry;
|
|
|
|
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
|
|
dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
|
|
if (dentry) {
|
|
shrink_dcache_parent(dentry);
|
|
dput(dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
d_prune_aliases(inode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void evict_dentries_for_decrypted_inodes(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
|
|
{
|
|
struct fscrypt_info *ci;
|
|
struct inode *inode;
|
|
struct inode *toput_inode = NULL;
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(ci, &mk->mk_decrypted_inodes, ci_master_key_link) {
|
|
inode = ci->ci_inode;
|
|
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
|
|
if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) {
|
|
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
__iget(inode);
|
|
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
|
|
spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
|
|
|
|
shrink_dcache_inode(inode);
|
|
iput(toput_inode);
|
|
toput_inode = inode;
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
|
|
iput(toput_inode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_for_busy_inodes(struct super_block *sb,
|
|
struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
|
|
{
|
|
struct list_head *pos;
|
|
size_t busy_count = 0;
|
|
unsigned long ino;
|
|
char ino_str[50] = "";
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
|
|
|
|
list_for_each(pos, &mk->mk_decrypted_inodes)
|
|
busy_count++;
|
|
|
|
if (busy_count == 0) {
|
|
spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
/* select an example file to show for debugging purposes */
|
|
struct inode *inode =
|
|
list_first_entry(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes,
|
|
struct fscrypt_info,
|
|
ci_master_key_link)->ci_inode;
|
|
ino = inode->i_ino;
|
|
}
|
|
spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
|
|
|
|
/* If the inode is currently being created, ino may still be 0. */
|
|
if (ino)
|
|
snprintf(ino_str, sizeof(ino_str), ", including ino %lu", ino);
|
|
|
|
fscrypt_warn(NULL,
|
|
"%s: %zu inode(s) still busy after removing key with %s %*phN%s",
|
|
sb->s_id, busy_count, master_key_spec_type(&mk->mk_spec),
|
|
master_key_spec_len(&mk->mk_spec), (u8 *)&mk->mk_spec.u,
|
|
ino_str);
|
|
return -EBUSY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int try_to_lock_encrypted_files(struct super_block *sb,
|
|
struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
|
|
{
|
|
int err1;
|
|
int err2;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* An inode can't be evicted while it is dirty or has dirty pages.
|
|
* Thus, we first have to clean the inodes in ->mk_decrypted_inodes.
|
|
*
|
|
* Just do it the easy way: call sync_filesystem(). It's overkill, but
|
|
* it works, and it's more important to minimize the amount of caches we
|
|
* drop than the amount of data we sync. Also, unprivileged users can
|
|
* already call sync_filesystem() via sys_syncfs() or sys_sync().
|
|
*/
|
|
down_read(&sb->s_umount);
|
|
err1 = sync_filesystem(sb);
|
|
up_read(&sb->s_umount);
|
|
/* If a sync error occurs, still try to evict as much as possible. */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Inodes are pinned by their dentries, so we have to evict their
|
|
* dentries. shrink_dcache_sb() would suffice, but would be overkill
|
|
* and inappropriate for use by unprivileged users. So instead go
|
|
* through the inodes' alias lists and try to evict each dentry.
|
|
*/
|
|
evict_dentries_for_decrypted_inodes(mk);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* evict_dentries_for_decrypted_inodes() already iput() each inode in
|
|
* the list; any inodes for which that dropped the last reference will
|
|
* have been evicted due to fscrypt_drop_inode() detecting the key
|
|
* removal and telling the VFS to evict the inode. So to finish, we
|
|
* just need to check whether any inodes couldn't be evicted.
|
|
*/
|
|
err2 = check_for_busy_inodes(sb, mk);
|
|
|
|
return err1 ?: err2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Try to remove an fscrypt master encryption key.
|
|
*
|
|
* FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY (all_users=false) removes the current user's
|
|
* claim to the key, then removes the key itself if no other users have claims.
|
|
* FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS (all_users=true) always removes the
|
|
* key itself.
|
|
*
|
|
* To "remove the key itself", first we wipe the actual master key secret, so
|
|
* that no more inodes can be unlocked with it. Then we try to evict all cached
|
|
* inodes that had been unlocked with the key.
|
|
*
|
|
* If all inodes were evicted, then we unlink the fscrypt_master_key from the
|
|
* keyring. Otherwise it remains in the keyring in the "incompletely removed"
|
|
* state (without the actual secret key) where it tracks the list of remaining
|
|
* inodes. Userspace can execute the ioctl again later to retry eviction, or
|
|
* alternatively can re-add the secret key again.
|
|
*
|
|
* For more details, see the "Removing keys" section of
|
|
* Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int do_remove_key(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg, bool all_users)
|
|
{
|
|
struct super_block *sb = file_inode(filp)->i_sb;
|
|
struct fscrypt_remove_key_arg __user *uarg = _uarg;
|
|
struct fscrypt_remove_key_arg arg;
|
|
struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
|
|
u32 status_flags = 0;
|
|
int err;
|
|
bool inodes_remain;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
if (!valid_key_spec(&arg.key_spec))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (memchr_inv(arg.__reserved, 0, sizeof(arg.__reserved)))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Only root can add and remove keys that are identified by an arbitrary
|
|
* descriptor rather than by a cryptographic hash.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (arg.key_spec.type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR &&
|
|
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
|
return -EACCES;
|
|
|
|
/* Find the key being removed. */
|
|
mk = fscrypt_find_master_key(sb, &arg.key_spec);
|
|
if (!mk)
|
|
return -ENOKEY;
|
|
down_write(&mk->mk_sem);
|
|
|
|
/* If relevant, remove current user's (or all users) claim to the key */
|
|
if (mk->mk_users && mk->mk_users->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree != 0) {
|
|
if (all_users)
|
|
err = keyring_clear(mk->mk_users);
|
|
else
|
|
err = remove_master_key_user(mk);
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
up_write(&mk->mk_sem);
|
|
goto out_put_key;
|
|
}
|
|
if (mk->mk_users->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree != 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Other users have still added the key too. We removed
|
|
* the current user's claim to the key, but we still
|
|
* can't remove the key itself.
|
|
*/
|
|
status_flags |=
|
|
FSCRYPT_KEY_REMOVAL_STATUS_FLAG_OTHER_USERS;
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
up_write(&mk->mk_sem);
|
|
goto out_put_key;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* No user claims remaining. Go ahead and wipe the secret. */
|
|
err = -ENOKEY;
|
|
if (is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret)) {
|
|
wipe_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret);
|
|
fscrypt_put_master_key_activeref(sb, mk);
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
inodes_remain = refcount_read(&mk->mk_active_refs) > 0;
|
|
up_write(&mk->mk_sem);
|
|
|
|
if (inodes_remain) {
|
|
/* Some inodes still reference this key; try to evict them. */
|
|
err = try_to_lock_encrypted_files(sb, mk);
|
|
if (err == -EBUSY) {
|
|
status_flags |=
|
|
FSCRYPT_KEY_REMOVAL_STATUS_FLAG_FILES_BUSY;
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* We return 0 if we successfully did something: removed a claim to the
|
|
* key, wiped the secret, or tried locking the files again. Users need
|
|
* to check the informational status flags if they care whether the key
|
|
* has been fully removed including all files locked.
|
|
*/
|
|
out_put_key:
|
|
fscrypt_put_master_key(mk);
|
|
if (err == 0)
|
|
err = put_user(status_flags, &uarg->removal_status_flags);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key(struct file *filp, void __user *uarg)
|
|
{
|
|
return do_remove_key(filp, uarg, false);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key);
|
|
|
|
int fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key_all_users(struct file *filp, void __user *uarg)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
|
return -EACCES;
|
|
return do_remove_key(filp, uarg, true);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key_all_users);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Retrieve the status of an fscrypt master encryption key.
|
|
*
|
|
* We set ->status to indicate whether the key is absent, present, or
|
|
* incompletely removed. "Incompletely removed" means that the master key
|
|
* secret has been removed, but some files which had been unlocked with it are
|
|
* still in use. This field allows applications to easily determine the state
|
|
* of an encrypted directory without using a hack such as trying to open a
|
|
* regular file in it (which can confuse the "incompletely removed" state with
|
|
* absent or present).
|
|
*
|
|
* In addition, for v2 policy keys we allow applications to determine, via
|
|
* ->status_flags and ->user_count, whether the key has been added by the
|
|
* current user, by other users, or by both. Most applications should not need
|
|
* this, since ordinarily only one user should know a given key. However, if a
|
|
* secret key is shared by multiple users, applications may wish to add an
|
|
* already-present key to prevent other users from removing it. This ioctl can
|
|
* be used to check whether that really is the case before the work is done to
|
|
* add the key --- which might e.g. require prompting the user for a passphrase.
|
|
*
|
|
* For more details, see the "FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS" section of
|
|
* Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst.
|
|
*/
|
|
int fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status(struct file *filp, void __user *uarg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct super_block *sb = file_inode(filp)->i_sb;
|
|
struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg arg;
|
|
struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
if (!valid_key_spec(&arg.key_spec))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (memchr_inv(arg.__reserved, 0, sizeof(arg.__reserved)))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
arg.status_flags = 0;
|
|
arg.user_count = 0;
|
|
memset(arg.__out_reserved, 0, sizeof(arg.__out_reserved));
|
|
|
|
mk = fscrypt_find_master_key(sb, &arg.key_spec);
|
|
if (!mk) {
|
|
arg.status = FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_ABSENT;
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
down_read(&mk->mk_sem);
|
|
|
|
if (!is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret)) {
|
|
arg.status = refcount_read(&mk->mk_active_refs) > 0 ?
|
|
FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_INCOMPLETELY_REMOVED :
|
|
FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_ABSENT /* raced with full removal */;
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
goto out_release_key;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
arg.status = FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_PRESENT;
|
|
if (mk->mk_users) {
|
|
struct key *mk_user;
|
|
|
|
arg.user_count = mk->mk_users->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree;
|
|
mk_user = find_master_key_user(mk);
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(mk_user)) {
|
|
arg.status_flags |=
|
|
FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_FLAG_ADDED_BY_SELF;
|
|
key_put(mk_user);
|
|
} else if (mk_user != ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY)) {
|
|
err = PTR_ERR(mk_user);
|
|
goto out_release_key;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
out_release_key:
|
|
up_read(&mk->mk_sem);
|
|
fscrypt_put_master_key(mk);
|
|
out:
|
|
if (!err && copy_to_user(uarg, &arg, sizeof(arg)))
|
|
err = -EFAULT;
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status);
|
|
|
|
int __init fscrypt_init_keyring(void)
|
|
{
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
err = register_key_type(&key_type_fscrypt_user);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
err = register_key_type(&key_type_fscrypt_provisioning);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto err_unregister_fscrypt_user;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
err_unregister_fscrypt_user:
|
|
unregister_key_type(&key_type_fscrypt_user);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|