linux-stable/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-glue.c
Eric Biggers 674f368a95 crypto: remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.

However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.

Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc.  But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.

Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length.  For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.

So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly.  But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.

So just remove this flag.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-01-09 11:30:53 +08:00

179 lines
4.4 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* aes-ce-cipher.c - core AES cipher using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions
*
* Copyright (C) 2013 - 2017 Linaro Ltd <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
*/
#include <asm/neon.h>
#include <asm/simd.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include "aes-ce-setkey.h"
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Synchronous AES cipher using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
struct aes_block {
u8 b[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
};
asmlinkage void __aes_ce_encrypt(u32 *rk, u8 *out, const u8 *in, int rounds);
asmlinkage void __aes_ce_decrypt(u32 *rk, u8 *out, const u8 *in, int rounds);
asmlinkage u32 __aes_ce_sub(u32 l);
asmlinkage void __aes_ce_invert(struct aes_block *out,
const struct aes_block *in);
static int num_rounds(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx)
{
/*
* # of rounds specified by AES:
* 128 bit key 10 rounds
* 192 bit key 12 rounds
* 256 bit key 14 rounds
* => n byte key => 6 + (n/4) rounds
*/
return 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
}
static void aes_cipher_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 dst[], u8 const src[])
{
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
if (!crypto_simd_usable()) {
aes_encrypt(ctx, dst, src);
return;
}
kernel_neon_begin();
__aes_ce_encrypt(ctx->key_enc, dst, src, num_rounds(ctx));
kernel_neon_end();
}
static void aes_cipher_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 dst[], u8 const src[])
{
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
if (!crypto_simd_usable()) {
aes_decrypt(ctx, dst, src);
return;
}
kernel_neon_begin();
__aes_ce_decrypt(ctx->key_dec, dst, src, num_rounds(ctx));
kernel_neon_end();
}
int ce_aes_expandkey(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key,
unsigned int key_len)
{
/*
* The AES key schedule round constants
*/
static u8 const rcon[] = {
0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 0x1b, 0x36,
};
u32 kwords = key_len / sizeof(u32);
struct aes_block *key_enc, *key_dec;
int i, j;
if (key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 &&
key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_256)
return -EINVAL;
ctx->key_length = key_len;
for (i = 0; i < kwords; i++)
ctx->key_enc[i] = get_unaligned_le32(in_key + i * sizeof(u32));
kernel_neon_begin();
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rcon); i++) {
u32 *rki = ctx->key_enc + (i * kwords);
u32 *rko = rki + kwords;
rko[0] = ror32(__aes_ce_sub(rki[kwords - 1]), 8) ^ rcon[i] ^ rki[0];
rko[1] = rko[0] ^ rki[1];
rko[2] = rko[1] ^ rki[2];
rko[3] = rko[2] ^ rki[3];
if (key_len == AES_KEYSIZE_192) {
if (i >= 7)
break;
rko[4] = rko[3] ^ rki[4];
rko[5] = rko[4] ^ rki[5];
} else if (key_len == AES_KEYSIZE_256) {
if (i >= 6)
break;
rko[4] = __aes_ce_sub(rko[3]) ^ rki[4];
rko[5] = rko[4] ^ rki[5];
rko[6] = rko[5] ^ rki[6];
rko[7] = rko[6] ^ rki[7];
}
}
/*
* Generate the decryption keys for the Equivalent Inverse Cipher.
* This involves reversing the order of the round keys, and applying
* the Inverse Mix Columns transformation on all but the first and
* the last one.
*/
key_enc = (struct aes_block *)ctx->key_enc;
key_dec = (struct aes_block *)ctx->key_dec;
j = num_rounds(ctx);
key_dec[0] = key_enc[j];
for (i = 1, j--; j > 0; i++, j--)
__aes_ce_invert(key_dec + i, key_enc + j);
key_dec[i] = key_enc[0];
kernel_neon_end();
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ce_aes_expandkey);
int ce_aes_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
unsigned int key_len)
{
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
return ce_aes_expandkey(ctx, in_key, key_len);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ce_aes_setkey);
static struct crypto_alg aes_alg = {
.cra_name = "aes",
.cra_driver_name = "aes-ce",
.cra_priority = 250,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx),
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
.cra_cipher = {
.cia_min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
.cia_max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
.cia_setkey = ce_aes_setkey,
.cia_encrypt = aes_cipher_encrypt,
.cia_decrypt = aes_cipher_decrypt
}
};
static int __init aes_mod_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_alg(&aes_alg);
}
static void __exit aes_mod_exit(void)
{
crypto_unregister_alg(&aes_alg);
}
module_cpu_feature_match(AES, aes_mod_init);
module_exit(aes_mod_exit);