linux-stable/arch/x86/kernel/espfix_64.c
Tom Lendacky 21729f81ce x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
Changes to the existing page table macros will allow the SME support to
be enabled in a simple fashion with minimal changes to files that use these
macros.  Since the memory encryption mask will now be part of the regular
pagetable macros, we introduce two new macros (_PAGE_TABLE_NOENC and
_KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC) to allow for early pagetable creation/initialization
without the encryption mask before SME becomes active.  Two new pgprot()
macros are defined to allow setting or clearing the page encryption mask.

The FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE define is introduced for use with MMIO.  SME does
not support encryption for MMIO areas so this define removes the encryption
mask from the page attribute.

Two new macros are introduced (__sme_pa() / __sme_pa_nodebug()) to allow
creating a physical address with the encryption mask.  These are used when
working with the cr3 register so that the PGD can be encrypted. The current
__va() macro is updated so that the virtual address is generated based off
of the physical address without the encryption mask thus allowing the same
virtual address to be generated regardless of whether encryption is enabled
for that physical location or not.

Also, an early initialization function is added for SME.  If SME is active,
this function:

 - Updates the early_pmd_flags so that early page faults create mappings
   with the encryption mask.

 - Updates the __supported_pte_mask to include the encryption mask.

 - Updates the protection_map entries to include the encryption mask so
   that user-space allocations will automatically have the encryption mask
   applied.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b36e952c4c39767ae7f0a41cf5345adf27438480.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-18 11:38:00 +02:00

211 lines
6.5 KiB
C

/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- *
*
* Copyright 2014 Intel Corporation; author: H. Peter Anvin
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
* version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for
* more details.
*
* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/*
* The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only
* restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This
* causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state
* to user space.
*
* This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which
* is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is
* on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the
* relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped
* readonly, so if the IRET fault we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST
* vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF
* handler.
*
* This file sets up the ministacks and the related page tables. The
* actual ministack invocation is in entry_64.S.
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/init_task.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/espfix.h>
/*
* Note: we only need 6*8 = 48 bytes for the espfix stack, but round
* it up to a cache line to avoid unnecessary sharing.
*/
#define ESPFIX_STACK_SIZE (8*8UL)
#define ESPFIX_STACKS_PER_PAGE (PAGE_SIZE/ESPFIX_STACK_SIZE)
/* There is address space for how many espfix pages? */
#define ESPFIX_PAGE_SPACE (1UL << (P4D_SHIFT-PAGE_SHIFT-16))
#define ESPFIX_MAX_CPUS (ESPFIX_STACKS_PER_PAGE * ESPFIX_PAGE_SPACE)
#if CONFIG_NR_CPUS > ESPFIX_MAX_CPUS
# error "Need more virtual address space for the ESPFIX hack"
#endif
#define PGALLOC_GFP (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO)
/* This contains the *bottom* address of the espfix stack */
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(unsigned long, espfix_stack);
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(unsigned long, espfix_waddr);
/* Initialization mutex - should this be a spinlock? */
static DEFINE_MUTEX(espfix_init_mutex);
/* Page allocation bitmap - each page serves ESPFIX_STACKS_PER_PAGE CPUs */
#define ESPFIX_MAX_PAGES DIV_ROUND_UP(CONFIG_NR_CPUS, ESPFIX_STACKS_PER_PAGE)
static void *espfix_pages[ESPFIX_MAX_PAGES];
static __page_aligned_bss pud_t espfix_pud_page[PTRS_PER_PUD]
__aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
static unsigned int page_random, slot_random;
/*
* This returns the bottom address of the espfix stack for a specific CPU.
* The math allows for a non-power-of-two ESPFIX_STACK_SIZE, in which case
* we have to account for some amount of padding at the end of each page.
*/
static inline unsigned long espfix_base_addr(unsigned int cpu)
{
unsigned long page, slot;
unsigned long addr;
page = (cpu / ESPFIX_STACKS_PER_PAGE) ^ page_random;
slot = (cpu + slot_random) % ESPFIX_STACKS_PER_PAGE;
addr = (page << PAGE_SHIFT) + (slot * ESPFIX_STACK_SIZE);
addr = (addr & 0xffffUL) | ((addr & ~0xffffUL) << 16);
addr += ESPFIX_BASE_ADDR;
return addr;
}
#define PTE_STRIDE (65536/PAGE_SIZE)
#define ESPFIX_PTE_CLONES (PTRS_PER_PTE/PTE_STRIDE)
#define ESPFIX_PMD_CLONES PTRS_PER_PMD
#define ESPFIX_PUD_CLONES (65536/(ESPFIX_PTE_CLONES*ESPFIX_PMD_CLONES))
#define PGTABLE_PROT ((_KERNPG_TABLE & ~_PAGE_RW) | _PAGE_NX)
static void init_espfix_random(void)
{
unsigned long rand;
/*
* This is run before the entropy pools are initialized,
* but this is hopefully better than nothing.
*/
if (!arch_get_random_long(&rand)) {
/* The constant is an arbitrary large prime */
rand = rdtsc();
rand *= 0xc345c6b72fd16123UL;
}
slot_random = rand % ESPFIX_STACKS_PER_PAGE;
page_random = (rand / ESPFIX_STACKS_PER_PAGE)
& (ESPFIX_PAGE_SPACE - 1);
}
void __init init_espfix_bsp(void)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
p4d_t *p4d;
/* Install the espfix pud into the kernel page directory */
pgd = &init_top_pgt[pgd_index(ESPFIX_BASE_ADDR)];
p4d = p4d_alloc(&init_mm, pgd, ESPFIX_BASE_ADDR);
p4d_populate(&init_mm, p4d, espfix_pud_page);
/* Randomize the locations */
init_espfix_random();
/* The rest is the same as for any other processor */
init_espfix_ap(0);
}
void init_espfix_ap(int cpu)
{
unsigned int page;
unsigned long addr;
pud_t pud, *pud_p;
pmd_t pmd, *pmd_p;
pte_t pte, *pte_p;
int n, node;
void *stack_page;
pteval_t ptemask;
/* We only have to do this once... */
if (likely(per_cpu(espfix_stack, cpu)))
return; /* Already initialized */
addr = espfix_base_addr(cpu);
page = cpu/ESPFIX_STACKS_PER_PAGE;
/* Did another CPU already set this up? */
stack_page = ACCESS_ONCE(espfix_pages[page]);
if (likely(stack_page))
goto done;
mutex_lock(&espfix_init_mutex);
/* Did we race on the lock? */
stack_page = ACCESS_ONCE(espfix_pages[page]);
if (stack_page)
goto unlock_done;
node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
ptemask = __supported_pte_mask;
pud_p = &espfix_pud_page[pud_index(addr)];
pud = *pud_p;
if (!pud_present(pud)) {
struct page *page = alloc_pages_node(node, PGALLOC_GFP, 0);
pmd_p = (pmd_t *)page_address(page);
pud = __pud(__pa(pmd_p) | (PGTABLE_PROT & ptemask));
paravirt_alloc_pmd(&init_mm, __pa(pmd_p) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
for (n = 0; n < ESPFIX_PUD_CLONES; n++)
set_pud(&pud_p[n], pud);
}
pmd_p = pmd_offset(&pud, addr);
pmd = *pmd_p;
if (!pmd_present(pmd)) {
struct page *page = alloc_pages_node(node, PGALLOC_GFP, 0);
pte_p = (pte_t *)page_address(page);
pmd = __pmd(__pa(pte_p) | (PGTABLE_PROT & ptemask));
paravirt_alloc_pte(&init_mm, __pa(pte_p) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
for (n = 0; n < ESPFIX_PMD_CLONES; n++)
set_pmd(&pmd_p[n], pmd);
}
pte_p = pte_offset_kernel(&pmd, addr);
stack_page = page_address(alloc_pages_node(node, GFP_KERNEL, 0));
pte = __pte(__pa(stack_page) | ((__PAGE_KERNEL_RO | _PAGE_ENC) & ptemask));
for (n = 0; n < ESPFIX_PTE_CLONES; n++)
set_pte(&pte_p[n*PTE_STRIDE], pte);
/* Job is done for this CPU and any CPU which shares this page */
ACCESS_ONCE(espfix_pages[page]) = stack_page;
unlock_done:
mutex_unlock(&espfix_init_mutex);
done:
per_cpu(espfix_stack, cpu) = addr;
per_cpu(espfix_waddr, cpu) = (unsigned long)stack_page
+ (addr & ~PAGE_MASK);
}