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Fix thirty five typos in dm-integrity.rst, dm-raid.rst, dm-zoned.rst, verity.rst, writecache.rst, tsx_async_abort.rst, md.rst, bttv.rst, dvb_references.rst, frontend-cardlist.rst, gspca-cardlist.rst, ipu3.rst, remote-controller.rst, mm/index.rst, numaperf.rst, userfaultfd.rst, module-signing.rst, imx-ddr.rst, intel-speed-select.rst, intel_pstate.rst, ramoops.rst, abi.rst, kernel.rst, vm.rst Signed-off-by: Andrew Klychkov <andrew.a.klychkov@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201204072848.GA49895@spblnx124.lan Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
285 lines
11 KiB
ReStructuredText
285 lines
11 KiB
ReStructuredText
Kernel module signing facility
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------------------------------
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.. CONTENTS
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..
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.. - Overview.
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.. - Configuring module signing.
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.. - Generating signing keys.
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.. - Public keys in the kernel.
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.. - Manually signing modules.
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.. - Signed modules and stripping.
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.. - Loading signed modules.
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.. - Non-valid signatures and unsigned modules.
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.. - Administering/protecting the private key.
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========
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Overview
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========
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The kernel module signing facility cryptographically signs modules during
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installation and then checks the signature upon loading the module. This
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allows increased kernel security by disallowing the loading of unsigned modules
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or modules signed with an invalid key. Module signing increases security by
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making it harder to load a malicious module into the kernel. The module
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signature checking is done by the kernel so that it is not necessary to have
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trusted userspace bits.
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This facility uses X.509 ITU-T standard certificates to encode the public keys
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involved. The signatures are not themselves encoded in any industrial standard
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type. The facility currently only supports the RSA public key encryption
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standard (though it is pluggable and permits others to be used). The possible
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hash algorithms that can be used are SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and
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SHA-512 (the algorithm is selected by data in the signature).
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==========================
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Configuring module signing
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==========================
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The module signing facility is enabled by going to the
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:menuselection:`Enable Loadable Module Support` section of
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the kernel configuration and turning on::
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CONFIG_MODULE_SIG "Module signature verification"
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This has a number of options available:
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(1) :menuselection:`Require modules to be validly signed`
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(``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE``)
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This specifies how the kernel should deal with a module that has a
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signature for which the key is not known or a module that is unsigned.
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If this is off (ie. "permissive"), then modules for which the key is not
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available and modules that are unsigned are permitted, but the kernel will
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be marked as being tainted, and the concerned modules will be marked as
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tainted, shown with the character 'E'.
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If this is on (ie. "restrictive"), only modules that have a valid
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signature that can be verified by a public key in the kernel's possession
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will be loaded. All other modules will generate an error.
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Irrespective of the setting here, if the module has a signature block that
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cannot be parsed, it will be rejected out of hand.
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(2) :menuselection:`Automatically sign all modules`
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(``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL``)
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If this is on then modules will be automatically signed during the
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modules_install phase of a build. If this is off, then the modules must
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be signed manually using::
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scripts/sign-file
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(3) :menuselection:`Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?`
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This presents a choice of which hash algorithm the installation phase will
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sign the modules with:
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=============================== ==========================================
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``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA1`` :menuselection:`Sign modules with SHA-1`
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``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA224`` :menuselection:`Sign modules with SHA-224`
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``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA256`` :menuselection:`Sign modules with SHA-256`
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``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA384`` :menuselection:`Sign modules with SHA-384`
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``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512`` :menuselection:`Sign modules with SHA-512`
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=============================== ==========================================
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The algorithm selected here will also be built into the kernel (rather
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than being a module) so that modules signed with that algorithm can have
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their signatures checked without causing a dependency loop.
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(4) :menuselection:`File name or PKCS#11 URI of module signing key`
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(``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY``)
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Setting this option to something other than its default of
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``certs/signing_key.pem`` will disable the autogeneration of signing keys
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and allow the kernel modules to be signed with a key of your choosing.
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The string provided should identify a file containing both a private key
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and its corresponding X.509 certificate in PEM form, or — on systems where
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the OpenSSL ENGINE_pkcs11 is functional — a PKCS#11 URI as defined by
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RFC7512. In the latter case, the PKCS#11 URI should reference both a
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certificate and a private key.
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If the PEM file containing the private key is encrypted, or if the
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PKCS#11 token requires a PIN, this can be provided at build time by
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means of the ``KBUILD_SIGN_PIN`` variable.
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(5) :menuselection:`Additional X.509 keys for default system keyring`
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(``CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS``)
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This option can be set to the filename of a PEM-encoded file containing
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additional certificates which will be included in the system keyring by
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default.
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Note that enabling module signing adds a dependency on the OpenSSL devel
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packages to the kernel build processes for the tool that does the signing.
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=======================
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Generating signing keys
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=======================
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Cryptographic keypairs are required to generate and check signatures. A
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private key is used to generate a signature and the corresponding public key is
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used to check it. The private key is only needed during the build, after which
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it can be deleted or stored securely. The public key gets built into the
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kernel so that it can be used to check the signatures as the modules are
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loaded.
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Under normal conditions, when ``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY`` is unchanged from its
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default, the kernel build will automatically generate a new keypair using
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openssl if one does not exist in the file::
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certs/signing_key.pem
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during the building of vmlinux (the public part of the key needs to be built
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into vmlinux) using parameters in the::
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certs/x509.genkey
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file (which is also generated if it does not already exist).
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It is strongly recommended that you provide your own x509.genkey file.
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Most notably, in the x509.genkey file, the req_distinguished_name section
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should be altered from the default::
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[ req_distinguished_name ]
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#O = Unspecified company
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CN = Build time autogenerated kernel key
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#emailAddress = unspecified.user@unspecified.company
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The generated RSA key size can also be set with::
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[ req ]
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default_bits = 4096
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It is also possible to manually generate the key private/public files using the
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x509.genkey key generation configuration file in the root node of the Linux
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kernel sources tree and the openssl command. The following is an example to
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generate the public/private key files::
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openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha256 -days 36500 -batch -x509 \
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-config x509.genkey -outform PEM -out kernel_key.pem \
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-keyout kernel_key.pem
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The full pathname for the resulting kernel_key.pem file can then be specified
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in the ``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY`` option, and the certificate and key therein will
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be used instead of an autogenerated keypair.
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=========================
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Public keys in the kernel
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=========================
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The kernel contains a ring of public keys that can be viewed by root. They're
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in a keyring called ".builtin_trusted_keys" that can be seen by::
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[root@deneb ~]# cat /proc/keys
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...
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223c7853 I------ 1 perm 1f030000 0 0 keyring .builtin_trusted_keys: 1
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302d2d52 I------ 1 perm 1f010000 0 0 asymmetri Fedora kernel signing key: d69a84e6bce3d216b979e9505b3e3ef9a7118079: X509.RSA a7118079 []
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...
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Beyond the public key generated specifically for module signing, additional
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trusted certificates can be provided in a PEM-encoded file referenced by the
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``CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS`` configuration option.
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Further, the architecture code may take public keys from a hardware store and
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add those in also (e.g. from the UEFI key database).
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Finally, it is possible to add additional public keys by doing::
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keyctl padd asymmetric "" [.builtin_trusted_keys-ID] <[key-file]
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e.g.::
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keyctl padd asymmetric "" 0x223c7853 <my_public_key.x509
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Note, however, that the kernel will only permit keys to be added to
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``.builtin_trusted_keys`` **if** the new key's X.509 wrapper is validly signed by a key
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that is already resident in the ``.builtin_trusted_keys`` at the time the key was added.
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========================
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Manually signing modules
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========================
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To manually sign a module, use the scripts/sign-file tool available in
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the Linux kernel source tree. The script requires 4 arguments:
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1. The hash algorithm (e.g., sha256)
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2. The private key filename or PKCS#11 URI
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3. The public key filename
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4. The kernel module to be signed
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The following is an example to sign a kernel module::
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scripts/sign-file sha512 kernel-signkey.priv \
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kernel-signkey.x509 module.ko
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The hash algorithm used does not have to match the one configured, but if it
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doesn't, you should make sure that hash algorithm is either built into the
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kernel or can be loaded without requiring itself.
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If the private key requires a passphrase or PIN, it can be provided in the
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$KBUILD_SIGN_PIN environment variable.
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============================
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Signed modules and stripping
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============================
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A signed module has a digital signature simply appended at the end. The string
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``~Module signature appended~.`` at the end of the module's file confirms that a
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signature is present but it does not confirm that the signature is valid!
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Signed modules are BRITTLE as the signature is outside of the defined ELF
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container. Thus they MAY NOT be stripped once the signature is computed and
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attached. Note the entire module is the signed payload, including any and all
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debug information present at the time of signing.
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======================
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Loading signed modules
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======================
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Modules are loaded with insmod, modprobe, ``init_module()`` or
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``finit_module()``, exactly as for unsigned modules as no processing is
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done in userspace. The signature checking is all done within the kernel.
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=========================================
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Non-valid signatures and unsigned modules
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=========================================
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If ``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE`` is enabled or module.sig_enforce=1 is supplied on
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the kernel command line, the kernel will only load validly signed modules
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for which it has a public key. Otherwise, it will also load modules that are
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unsigned. Any module for which the kernel has a key, but which proves to have
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a signature mismatch will not be permitted to load.
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Any module that has an unparseable signature will be rejected.
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=========================================
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Administering/protecting the private key
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=========================================
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Since the private key is used to sign modules, viruses and malware could use
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the private key to sign modules and compromise the operating system. The
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private key must be either destroyed or moved to a secure location and not kept
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in the root node of the kernel source tree.
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If you use the same private key to sign modules for multiple kernel
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configurations, you must ensure that the module version information is
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sufficient to prevent loading a module into a different kernel. Either
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set ``CONFIG_MODVERSIONS=y`` or ensure that each configuration has a different
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kernel release string by changing ``EXTRAVERSION`` or ``CONFIG_LOCALVERSION``.
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