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a46f60d760
Currently KASLR is enabled on three regions: the direct mapping of physical memory, vamlloc and vmemmap. However the EFI region is also mistakenly included for VA space randomization because of misusing EFI_VA_START macro and assuming EFI_VA_START < EFI_VA_END. (This breaks kexec and possibly other things that rely on stable addresses.) The EFI region is reserved for EFI runtime services virtual mapping which should not be included in KASLR ranges. In Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt, we can see: ffffffef00000000 - fffffffeffffffff (=64 GB) EFI region mapping space EFI uses the space from -4G to -64G thus EFI_VA_START > EFI_VA_END, Here EFI_VA_START = -4G, and EFI_VA_END = -64G. Changing EFI_VA_START to EFI_VA_END in mm/kaslr.c fixes this problem. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Acked-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #4.8+ Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1490331592-31860-1-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
194 lines
6.1 KiB
C
194 lines
6.1 KiB
C
/*
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* This file implements KASLR memory randomization for x86_64. It randomizes
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* the virtual address space of kernel memory regions (physical memory
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* mapping, vmalloc & vmemmap) for x86_64. This security feature mitigates
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* exploits relying on predictable kernel addresses.
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*
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* Entropy is generated using the KASLR early boot functions now shared in
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* the lib directory (originally written by Kees Cook). Randomization is
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* done on PGD & PUD page table levels to increase possible addresses. The
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* physical memory mapping code was adapted to support PUD level virtual
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* addresses. This implementation on the best configuration provides 30,000
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* possible virtual addresses in average for each memory region. An additional
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* low memory page is used to ensure each CPU can start with a PGD aligned
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* virtual address (for realmode).
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*
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* The order of each memory region is not changed. The feature looks at
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* the available space for the regions based on different configuration
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* options and randomizes the base and space between each. The size of the
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* physical memory mapping is the available physical memory.
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*/
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/random.h>
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#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
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#include <asm/pgtable.h>
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#include <asm/setup.h>
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#include <asm/kaslr.h>
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#include "mm_internal.h"
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#define TB_SHIFT 40
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/*
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* Virtual address start and end range for randomization. The end changes base
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* on configuration to have the highest amount of space for randomization.
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* It increases the possible random position for each randomized region.
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*
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* You need to add an if/def entry if you introduce a new memory region
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* compatible with KASLR. Your entry must be in logical order with memory
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* layout. For example, ESPFIX is before EFI because its virtual address is
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* before. You also need to add a BUILD_BUG_ON() in kernel_randomize_memory() to
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* ensure that this order is correct and won't be changed.
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*/
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static const unsigned long vaddr_start = __PAGE_OFFSET_BASE;
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#if defined(CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64)
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static const unsigned long vaddr_end = ESPFIX_BASE_ADDR;
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#elif defined(CONFIG_EFI)
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static const unsigned long vaddr_end = EFI_VA_END;
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#else
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static const unsigned long vaddr_end = __START_KERNEL_map;
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#endif
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/* Default values */
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unsigned long page_offset_base = __PAGE_OFFSET_BASE;
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(page_offset_base);
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unsigned long vmalloc_base = __VMALLOC_BASE;
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(vmalloc_base);
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unsigned long vmemmap_base = __VMEMMAP_BASE;
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(vmemmap_base);
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/*
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* Memory regions randomized by KASLR (except modules that use a separate logic
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* earlier during boot). The list is ordered based on virtual addresses. This
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* order is kept after randomization.
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*/
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static __initdata struct kaslr_memory_region {
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unsigned long *base;
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unsigned long size_tb;
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} kaslr_regions[] = {
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{ &page_offset_base, 64/* Maximum */ },
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{ &vmalloc_base, VMALLOC_SIZE_TB },
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{ &vmemmap_base, 1 },
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};
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/* Get size in bytes used by the memory region */
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static inline unsigned long get_padding(struct kaslr_memory_region *region)
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{
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return (region->size_tb << TB_SHIFT);
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}
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/*
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* Apply no randomization if KASLR was disabled at boot or if KASAN
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* is enabled. KASAN shadow mappings rely on regions being PGD aligned.
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*/
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static inline bool kaslr_memory_enabled(void)
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{
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return kaslr_enabled() && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN);
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}
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/* Initialize base and padding for each memory region randomized with KASLR */
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void __init kernel_randomize_memory(void)
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{
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size_t i;
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unsigned long vaddr = vaddr_start;
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unsigned long rand, memory_tb;
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struct rnd_state rand_state;
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unsigned long remain_entropy;
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/*
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* All these BUILD_BUG_ON checks ensures the memory layout is
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* consistent with the vaddr_start/vaddr_end variables.
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*/
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BUILD_BUG_ON(vaddr_start >= vaddr_end);
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BUILD_BUG_ON(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64) &&
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vaddr_end >= EFI_VA_END);
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BUILD_BUG_ON((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64) ||
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IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI)) &&
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vaddr_end >= __START_KERNEL_map);
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BUILD_BUG_ON(vaddr_end > __START_KERNEL_map);
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if (!kaslr_memory_enabled())
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return;
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/*
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* Update Physical memory mapping to available and
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* add padding if needed (especially for memory hotplug support).
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*/
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BUG_ON(kaslr_regions[0].base != &page_offset_base);
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memory_tb = DIV_ROUND_UP(max_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT, 1UL << TB_SHIFT) +
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CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING;
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/* Adapt phyiscal memory region size based on available memory */
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if (memory_tb < kaslr_regions[0].size_tb)
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kaslr_regions[0].size_tb = memory_tb;
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/* Calculate entropy available between regions */
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remain_entropy = vaddr_end - vaddr_start;
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kaslr_regions); i++)
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remain_entropy -= get_padding(&kaslr_regions[i]);
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prandom_seed_state(&rand_state, kaslr_get_random_long("Memory"));
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kaslr_regions); i++) {
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unsigned long entropy;
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/*
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* Select a random virtual address using the extra entropy
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* available.
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*/
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entropy = remain_entropy / (ARRAY_SIZE(kaslr_regions) - i);
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prandom_bytes_state(&rand_state, &rand, sizeof(rand));
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entropy = (rand % (entropy + 1)) & PUD_MASK;
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vaddr += entropy;
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*kaslr_regions[i].base = vaddr;
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/*
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* Jump the region and add a minimum padding based on
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* randomization alignment.
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*/
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vaddr += get_padding(&kaslr_regions[i]);
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vaddr = round_up(vaddr + 1, PUD_SIZE);
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remain_entropy -= entropy;
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}
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}
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/*
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* Create PGD aligned trampoline table to allow real mode initialization
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* of additional CPUs. Consume only 1 low memory page.
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*/
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void __meminit init_trampoline(void)
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{
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unsigned long paddr, paddr_next;
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pgd_t *pgd;
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pud_t *pud_page, *pud_page_tramp;
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int i;
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if (!kaslr_memory_enabled()) {
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init_trampoline_default();
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return;
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}
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pud_page_tramp = alloc_low_page();
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paddr = 0;
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pgd = pgd_offset_k((unsigned long)__va(paddr));
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pud_page = (pud_t *) pgd_page_vaddr(*pgd);
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for (i = pud_index(paddr); i < PTRS_PER_PUD; i++, paddr = paddr_next) {
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pud_t *pud, *pud_tramp;
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unsigned long vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(paddr);
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pud_tramp = pud_page_tramp + pud_index(paddr);
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pud = pud_page + pud_index(vaddr);
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paddr_next = (paddr & PUD_MASK) + PUD_SIZE;
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*pud_tramp = *pud;
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}
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set_pgd(&trampoline_pgd_entry,
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__pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(pud_page_tramp)));
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}
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