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![Eric Biggers](/assets/img/avatar_default.png)
If the file size is almost S64_MAX, the calculated number of Merkle tree levels exceeds FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS, causing FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY to fail. This is unintentional, since as the comment above the definition of FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS states, it is enough for over U64_MAX bytes of data using SHA-256 and 4K blocks. (Specifically, 4096*128**8 >= 2**64.) The bug is actually that when the number of blocks in the first level is calculated from i_size, there is a signed integer overflow due to i_size being signed. Fix this by treating i_size as unsigned. This was found by the new test "generic: test fs-verity EFBIG scenarios" (https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b1d116cd4d0ea74b9cd86f349c672021e005a75c.1631558495.git.boris@bur.io). This didn't affect ext4 or f2fs since those have a smaller maximum file size, but it did affect btrfs which allows files up to S64_MAX bytes. Reported-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Fixes:3fda4c617e
("fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl") Fixes:fd2d1acfca
("fs-verity: add the hook for file ->open()") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.4+ Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210916203424.113376-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
418 lines
12 KiB
C
418 lines
12 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* Ioctl to enable verity on a file
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*
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* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
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*/
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#include "fsverity_private.h"
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#include <crypto/hash.h>
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#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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#include <linux/pagemap.h>
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#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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/*
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* Read a file data page for Merkle tree construction. Do aggressive readahead,
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* since we're sequentially reading the entire file.
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*/
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static struct page *read_file_data_page(struct file *filp, pgoff_t index,
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struct file_ra_state *ra,
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unsigned long remaining_pages)
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{
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struct page *page;
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page = find_get_page_flags(filp->f_mapping, index, FGP_ACCESSED);
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if (!page || !PageUptodate(page)) {
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if (page)
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put_page(page);
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else
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page_cache_sync_readahead(filp->f_mapping, ra, filp,
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index, remaining_pages);
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page = read_mapping_page(filp->f_mapping, index, NULL);
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if (IS_ERR(page))
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return page;
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}
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if (PageReadahead(page))
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page_cache_async_readahead(filp->f_mapping, ra, filp, page,
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index, remaining_pages);
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return page;
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}
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static int build_merkle_tree_level(struct file *filp, unsigned int level,
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u64 num_blocks_to_hash,
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const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
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u8 *pending_hashes,
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struct ahash_request *req)
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{
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struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
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const struct fsverity_operations *vops = inode->i_sb->s_vop;
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struct file_ra_state ra = { 0 };
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unsigned int pending_size = 0;
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u64 dst_block_num;
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u64 i;
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int err;
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if (WARN_ON(params->block_size != PAGE_SIZE)) /* checked earlier too */
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return -EINVAL;
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if (level < params->num_levels) {
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dst_block_num = params->level_start[level];
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} else {
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if (WARN_ON(num_blocks_to_hash != 1))
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return -EINVAL;
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dst_block_num = 0; /* unused */
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}
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file_ra_state_init(&ra, filp->f_mapping);
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for (i = 0; i < num_blocks_to_hash; i++) {
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struct page *src_page;
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if ((pgoff_t)i % 10000 == 0 || i + 1 == num_blocks_to_hash)
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pr_debug("Hashing block %llu of %llu for level %u\n",
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i + 1, num_blocks_to_hash, level);
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if (level == 0) {
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/* Leaf: hashing a data block */
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src_page = read_file_data_page(filp, i, &ra,
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num_blocks_to_hash - i);
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if (IS_ERR(src_page)) {
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err = PTR_ERR(src_page);
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fsverity_err(inode,
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"Error %d reading data page %llu",
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err, i);
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return err;
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}
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} else {
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unsigned long num_ra_pages =
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min_t(unsigned long, num_blocks_to_hash - i,
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inode->i_sb->s_bdi->io_pages);
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/* Non-leaf: hashing hash block from level below */
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src_page = vops->read_merkle_tree_page(inode,
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params->level_start[level - 1] + i,
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num_ra_pages);
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if (IS_ERR(src_page)) {
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err = PTR_ERR(src_page);
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fsverity_err(inode,
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"Error %d reading Merkle tree page %llu",
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err, params->level_start[level - 1] + i);
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return err;
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}
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}
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err = fsverity_hash_page(params, inode, req, src_page,
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&pending_hashes[pending_size]);
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put_page(src_page);
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if (err)
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return err;
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pending_size += params->digest_size;
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if (level == params->num_levels) /* Root hash? */
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return 0;
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if (pending_size + params->digest_size > params->block_size ||
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i + 1 == num_blocks_to_hash) {
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/* Flush the pending hash block */
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memset(&pending_hashes[pending_size], 0,
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params->block_size - pending_size);
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err = vops->write_merkle_tree_block(inode,
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pending_hashes,
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dst_block_num,
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params->log_blocksize);
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if (err) {
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fsverity_err(inode,
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"Error %d writing Merkle tree block %llu",
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err, dst_block_num);
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return err;
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}
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dst_block_num++;
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pending_size = 0;
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}
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if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
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return -EINTR;
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cond_resched();
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Build the Merkle tree for the given file using the given parameters, and
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* return the root hash in @root_hash.
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*
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* The tree is written to a filesystem-specific location as determined by the
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* ->write_merkle_tree_block() method. However, the blocks that comprise the
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* tree are the same for all filesystems.
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*/
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static int build_merkle_tree(struct file *filp,
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const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
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u8 *root_hash)
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{
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struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
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u8 *pending_hashes;
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struct ahash_request *req;
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u64 blocks;
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unsigned int level;
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int err = -ENOMEM;
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if (inode->i_size == 0) {
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/* Empty file is a special case; root hash is all 0's */
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memset(root_hash, 0, params->digest_size);
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return 0;
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}
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/* This allocation never fails, since it's mempool-backed. */
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req = fsverity_alloc_hash_request(params->hash_alg, GFP_KERNEL);
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pending_hashes = kmalloc(params->block_size, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!pending_hashes)
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goto out;
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/*
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* Build each level of the Merkle tree, starting at the leaf level
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* (level 0) and ascending to the root node (level 'num_levels - 1').
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* Then at the end (level 'num_levels'), calculate the root hash.
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*/
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blocks = ((u64)inode->i_size + params->block_size - 1) >>
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params->log_blocksize;
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for (level = 0; level <= params->num_levels; level++) {
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err = build_merkle_tree_level(filp, level, blocks, params,
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pending_hashes, req);
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if (err)
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goto out;
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blocks = (blocks + params->hashes_per_block - 1) >>
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params->log_arity;
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}
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memcpy(root_hash, pending_hashes, params->digest_size);
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err = 0;
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out:
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kfree(pending_hashes);
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fsverity_free_hash_request(params->hash_alg, req);
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return err;
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}
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static int enable_verity(struct file *filp,
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const struct fsverity_enable_arg *arg)
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{
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struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
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const struct fsverity_operations *vops = inode->i_sb->s_vop;
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struct merkle_tree_params params = { };
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struct fsverity_descriptor *desc;
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size_t desc_size = sizeof(*desc) + arg->sig_size;
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struct fsverity_info *vi;
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int err;
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/* Start initializing the fsverity_descriptor */
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desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!desc)
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return -ENOMEM;
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desc->version = 1;
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desc->hash_algorithm = arg->hash_algorithm;
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desc->log_blocksize = ilog2(arg->block_size);
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/* Get the salt if the user provided one */
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if (arg->salt_size &&
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copy_from_user(desc->salt, u64_to_user_ptr(arg->salt_ptr),
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arg->salt_size)) {
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err = -EFAULT;
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goto out;
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}
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desc->salt_size = arg->salt_size;
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/* Get the signature if the user provided one */
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if (arg->sig_size &&
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copy_from_user(desc->signature, u64_to_user_ptr(arg->sig_ptr),
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arg->sig_size)) {
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err = -EFAULT;
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goto out;
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}
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desc->sig_size = cpu_to_le32(arg->sig_size);
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desc->data_size = cpu_to_le64(inode->i_size);
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/* Prepare the Merkle tree parameters */
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err = fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(¶ms, inode,
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arg->hash_algorithm,
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desc->log_blocksize,
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desc->salt, desc->salt_size);
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if (err)
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goto out;
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/*
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* Start enabling verity on this file, serialized by the inode lock.
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* Fail if verity is already enabled or is already being enabled.
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*/
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inode_lock(inode);
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if (IS_VERITY(inode))
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err = -EEXIST;
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else
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err = vops->begin_enable_verity(filp);
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inode_unlock(inode);
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if (err)
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goto out;
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/*
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* Build the Merkle tree. Don't hold the inode lock during this, since
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* on huge files this may take a very long time and we don't want to
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* force unrelated syscalls like chown() to block forever. We don't
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* need the inode lock here because deny_write_access() already prevents
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* the file from being written to or truncated, and we still serialize
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* ->begin_enable_verity() and ->end_enable_verity() using the inode
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* lock and only allow one process to be here at a time on a given file.
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*/
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pr_debug("Building Merkle tree...\n");
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BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(desc->root_hash) < FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
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err = build_merkle_tree(filp, ¶ms, desc->root_hash);
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if (err) {
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fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d building Merkle tree", err);
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goto rollback;
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}
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pr_debug("Done building Merkle tree. Root hash is %s:%*phN\n",
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params.hash_alg->name, params.digest_size, desc->root_hash);
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/*
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* Create the fsverity_info. Don't bother trying to save work by
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* reusing the merkle_tree_params from above. Instead, just create the
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* fsverity_info from the fsverity_descriptor as if it were just loaded
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* from disk. This is simpler, and it serves as an extra check that the
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* metadata we're writing is valid before actually enabling verity.
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*/
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vi = fsverity_create_info(inode, desc, desc_size);
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if (IS_ERR(vi)) {
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err = PTR_ERR(vi);
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goto rollback;
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}
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if (arg->sig_size)
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pr_debug("Storing a %u-byte PKCS#7 signature alongside the file\n",
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arg->sig_size);
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/*
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* Tell the filesystem to finish enabling verity on the file.
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* Serialized with ->begin_enable_verity() by the inode lock.
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*/
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inode_lock(inode);
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err = vops->end_enable_verity(filp, desc, desc_size, params.tree_size);
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inode_unlock(inode);
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if (err) {
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fsverity_err(inode, "%ps() failed with err %d",
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vops->end_enable_verity, err);
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fsverity_free_info(vi);
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} else if (WARN_ON(!IS_VERITY(inode))) {
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err = -EINVAL;
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fsverity_free_info(vi);
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} else {
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/* Successfully enabled verity */
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/*
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* Readers can start using ->i_verity_info immediately, so it
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* can't be rolled back once set. So don't set it until just
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* after the filesystem has successfully enabled verity.
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*/
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fsverity_set_info(inode, vi);
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}
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out:
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kfree(params.hashstate);
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kfree(desc);
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return err;
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rollback:
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inode_lock(inode);
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(void)vops->end_enable_verity(filp, NULL, 0, params.tree_size);
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inode_unlock(inode);
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goto out;
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}
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/**
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* fsverity_ioctl_enable() - enable verity on a file
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* @filp: file to enable verity on
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* @uarg: user pointer to fsverity_enable_arg
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*
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* Enable fs-verity on a file. See the "FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY" section of
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* Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the documentation.
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*
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* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
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*/
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int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg)
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{
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struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
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struct fsverity_enable_arg arg;
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int err;
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if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg)))
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return -EFAULT;
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if (arg.version != 1)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (arg.__reserved1 ||
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memchr_inv(arg.__reserved2, 0, sizeof(arg.__reserved2)))
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return -EINVAL;
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if (arg.block_size != PAGE_SIZE)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (arg.salt_size > sizeof_field(struct fsverity_descriptor, salt))
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return -EMSGSIZE;
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if (arg.sig_size > FS_VERITY_MAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE)
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return -EMSGSIZE;
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/*
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* Require a regular file with write access. But the actual fd must
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* still be readonly so that we can lock out all writers. This is
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* needed to guarantee that no writable fds exist to the file once it
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* has verity enabled, and to stabilize the data being hashed.
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*/
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err = file_permission(filp, MAY_WRITE);
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if (err)
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return err;
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if (IS_APPEND(inode))
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return -EPERM;
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if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
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return -EISDIR;
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if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
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return -EINVAL;
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err = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
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if (err) /* -EROFS */
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return err;
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err = deny_write_access(filp);
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if (err) /* -ETXTBSY */
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goto out_drop_write;
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err = enable_verity(filp, &arg);
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if (err)
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goto out_allow_write_access;
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/*
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* Some pages of the file may have been evicted from pagecache after
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* being used in the Merkle tree construction, then read into pagecache
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* again by another process reading from the file concurrently. Since
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* these pages didn't undergo verification against the file digest which
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* fs-verity now claims to be enforcing, we have to wipe the pagecache
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* to ensure that all future reads are verified.
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*/
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filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
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invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping);
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/*
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* allow_write_access() is needed to pair with deny_write_access().
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* Regardless, the filesystem won't allow writing to verity files.
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*/
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out_allow_write_access:
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allow_write_access(filp);
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out_drop_write:
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mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
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return err;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_ioctl_enable);
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