vendor.conf: update vbatts/tar-split to v0.10.2

Fix CVE-2017-14992

Signed-off-by: Antonio Murdaca <runcom@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Antonio Murdaca 2017-11-09 11:50:34 +01:00
parent 66586603b9
commit b63b96722c
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: B2BEAD150DE936B9
3 changed files with 31 additions and 17 deletions

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@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ github.com/emicklei/go-restful-swagger12 1.0.1
github.com/pkg/errors v0.8.0
github.com/godbus/dbus a389bdde4dd695d414e47b755e95e72b7826432c
github.com/urfave/cli v1.20.0
github.com/vbatts/tar-split v0.10.1
github.com/vbatts/tar-split v0.10.2
github.com/renstrom/dedent v1.0.0
github.com/hpcloud/tail v1.0.0
gopkg.in/fsnotify.v1 v1.4.2

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@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
# tar-split
[![Build Status](https://travis-ci.org/vbatts/tar-split.svg?branch=master)](https://travis-ci.org/vbatts/tar-split)
[![Go Report Card](https://goreportcard.com/badge/github.com/vbatts/tar-split)](https://goreportcard.com/report/github.com/vbatts/tar-split)
Pristinely disassembling a tar archive, and stashing needed raw bytes and offsets to reassemble a validating original archive.
@ -50,7 +51,7 @@ For example stored sparse files that have "holes" in them, will be read as a
contiguous file, though the archive contents may be recorded in sparse format.
Therefore when adding the file payload to a reassembled tar, to achieve
identical output, the file payload would need be precisely re-sparsified. This
is not something I seek to fix imediately, but would rather have an alert that
is not something I seek to fix immediately, but would rather have an alert that
precise reassembly is not possible.
(see more http://www.gnu.org/software/tar/manual/html_node/Sparse-Formats.html)

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@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package asm
import (
"io"
"io/ioutil"
"github.com/vbatts/tar-split/archive/tar"
"github.com/vbatts/tar-split/tar/storage"
@ -119,21 +118,35 @@ func NewInputTarStream(r io.Reader, p storage.Packer, fp storage.FilePutter) (io
}
}
// it is allowable, and not uncommon that there is further padding on the
// end of an archive, apart from the expected 1024 null bytes.
remainder, err := ioutil.ReadAll(outputRdr)
if err != nil && err != io.EOF {
// It is allowable, and not uncommon that there is further padding on
// the end of an archive, apart from the expected 1024 null bytes. We
// do this in chunks rather than in one go to avoid cases where a
// maliciously crafted tar file tries to trick us into reading many GBs
// into memory.
const paddingChunkSize = 1024 * 1024
var paddingChunk [paddingChunkSize]byte
for {
var isEOF bool
n, err := outputRdr.Read(paddingChunk[:])
if err != nil {
if err != io.EOF {
pW.CloseWithError(err)
return
}
isEOF = true
}
_, err = p.AddEntry(storage.Entry{
Type: storage.SegmentType,
Payload: remainder,
Payload: paddingChunk[:n],
})
if err != nil {
pW.CloseWithError(err)
return
}
if isEOF {
break
}
}
pW.Close()
}()