pull in containers/image deps

Signed-off-by: Antonio Murdaca <runcom@redhat.com>

vendor/golang.org/x/net/lex/httplex/httplex.go

@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package httplex contains rules around lexical matters of various
+// HTTP-related specifications.
+//
+// This package is shared by the standard library (which vendors it)
+// and x/net/http2. It comes with no API stability promise.
+package httplex
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"unicode/utf8"
+)
+
+var isTokenTable = [127]bool{
+	'!':  true,
+	'#':  true,
+	'$':  true,
+	'%':  true,
+	'&':  true,
+	'\'': true,
+	'*':  true,
+	'+':  true,
+	'-':  true,
+	'.':  true,
+	'0':  true,
+	'1':  true,
+	'2':  true,
+	'3':  true,
+	'4':  true,
+	'5':  true,
+	'6':  true,
+	'7':  true,
+	'8':  true,
+	'9':  true,
+	'A':  true,
+	'B':  true,
+	'C':  true,
+	'D':  true,
+	'E':  true,
+	'F':  true,
+	'G':  true,
+	'H':  true,
+	'I':  true,
+	'J':  true,
+	'K':  true,
+	'L':  true,
+	'M':  true,
+	'N':  true,
+	'O':  true,
+	'P':  true,
+	'Q':  true,
+	'R':  true,
+	'S':  true,
+	'T':  true,
+	'U':  true,
+	'W':  true,
+	'V':  true,
+	'X':  true,
+	'Y':  true,
+	'Z':  true,
+	'^':  true,
+	'_':  true,
+	'`':  true,
+	'a':  true,
+	'b':  true,
+	'c':  true,
+	'd':  true,
+	'e':  true,
+	'f':  true,
+	'g':  true,
+	'h':  true,
+	'i':  true,
+	'j':  true,
+	'k':  true,
+	'l':  true,
+	'm':  true,
+	'n':  true,
+	'o':  true,
+	'p':  true,
+	'q':  true,
+	'r':  true,
+	's':  true,
+	't':  true,
+	'u':  true,
+	'v':  true,
+	'w':  true,
+	'x':  true,
+	'y':  true,
+	'z':  true,
+	'|':  true,
+	'~':  true,
+}
+
+func IsTokenRune(r rune) bool {
+	i := int(r)
+	return i < len(isTokenTable) && isTokenTable[i]
+}
+
+func isNotToken(r rune) bool {
+	return !IsTokenRune(r)
+}
+
+// HeaderValuesContainsToken reports whether any string in values
+// contains the provided token, ASCII case-insensitively.
+func HeaderValuesContainsToken(values []string, token string) bool {
+	for _, v := range values {
+		if headerValueContainsToken(v, token) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// isOWS reports whether b is an optional whitespace byte, as defined
+// by RFC 7230 section 3.2.3.
+func isOWS(b byte) bool { return b == ' ' || b == '\t' }
+
+// trimOWS returns x with all optional whitespace removes from the
+// beginning and end.
+func trimOWS(x string) string {
+	// TODO: consider using strings.Trim(x, " \t") instead,
+	// if and when it's fast enough. See issue 10292.
+	// But this ASCII-only code will probably always beat UTF-8
+	// aware code.
+	for len(x) > 0 && isOWS(x[0]) {
+		x = x[1:]
+	}
+	for len(x) > 0 && isOWS(x[len(x)-1]) {
+		x = x[:len(x)-1]
+	}
+	return x
+}
+
+// headerValueContainsToken reports whether v (assumed to be a
+// 0#element, in the ABNF extension described in RFC 7230 section 7)
+// contains token amongst its comma-separated tokens, ASCII
+// case-insensitively.
+func headerValueContainsToken(v string, token string) bool {
+	v = trimOWS(v)
+	if comma := strings.IndexByte(v, ','); comma != -1 {
+		return tokenEqual(trimOWS(v[:comma]), token) || headerValueContainsToken(v[comma+1:], token)
+	}
+	return tokenEqual(v, token)
+}
+
+// lowerASCII returns the ASCII lowercase version of b.
+func lowerASCII(b byte) byte {
+	if 'A' <= b && b <= 'Z' {
+		return b + ('a' - 'A')
+	}
+	return b
+}
+
+// tokenEqual reports whether t1 and t2 are equal, ASCII case-insensitively.
+func tokenEqual(t1, t2 string) bool {
+	if len(t1) != len(t2) {
+		return false
+	}
+	for i, b := range t1 {
+		if b >= utf8.RuneSelf {
+			// No UTF-8 or non-ASCII allowed in tokens.
+			return false
+		}
+		if lowerASCII(byte(b)) != lowerASCII(t2[i]) {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// isLWS reports whether b is linear white space, according
+// to http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec2.html#sec2.2
+//      LWS            = [CRLF] 1*( SP | HT )
+func isLWS(b byte) bool { return b == ' ' || b == '\t' }
+
+// isCTL reports whether b is a control byte, according
+// to http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec2.html#sec2.2
+//      CTL            = <any US-ASCII control character
+//                       (octets 0 - 31) and DEL (127)>
+func isCTL(b byte) bool {
+	const del = 0x7f // a CTL
+	return b < ' ' || b == del
+}
+
+// ValidHeaderFieldName reports whether v is a valid HTTP/1.x header name.
+// HTTP/2 imposes the additional restriction that uppercase ASCII
+// letters are not allowed.
+//
+//  RFC 7230 says:
+//   header-field   = field-name ":" OWS field-value OWS
+//   field-name     = token
+//   token          = 1*tchar
+//   tchar = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "'" / "*" / "+" / "-" / "." /
+//           "^" / "_" / "`" / "|" / "~" / DIGIT / ALPHA
+func ValidHeaderFieldName(v string) bool {
+	if len(v) == 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, r := range v {
+		if !IsTokenRune(r) {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// ValidHostHeader reports whether h is a valid host header.
+func ValidHostHeader(h string) bool {
+	// The latest spec is actually this:
+	//
+	// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-5.4
+	//     Host = uri-host [ ":" port ]
+	//
+	// Where uri-host is:
+	//     http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.2.2
+	//
+	// But we're going to be much more lenient for now and just
+	// search for any byte that's not a valid byte in any of those
+	// expressions.
+	for i := 0; i < len(h); i++ {
+		if !validHostByte[h[i]] {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// See the validHostHeader comment.
+var validHostByte = [256]bool{
+	'0': true, '1': true, '2': true, '3': true, '4': true, '5': true, '6': true, '7': true,
+	'8': true, '9': true,
+
+	'a': true, 'b': true, 'c': true, 'd': true, 'e': true, 'f': true, 'g': true, 'h': true,
+	'i': true, 'j': true, 'k': true, 'l': true, 'm': true, 'n': true, 'o': true, 'p': true,
+	'q': true, 'r': true, 's': true, 't': true, 'u': true, 'v': true, 'w': true, 'x': true,
+	'y': true, 'z': true,
+
+	'A': true, 'B': true, 'C': true, 'D': true, 'E': true, 'F': true, 'G': true, 'H': true,
+	'I': true, 'J': true, 'K': true, 'L': true, 'M': true, 'N': true, 'O': true, 'P': true,
+	'Q': true, 'R': true, 'S': true, 'T': true, 'U': true, 'V': true, 'W': true, 'X': true,
+	'Y': true, 'Z': true,
+
+	'!':  true, // sub-delims
+	'$':  true, // sub-delims
+	'%':  true, // pct-encoded (and used in IPv6 zones)
+	'&':  true, // sub-delims
+	'(':  true, // sub-delims
+	')':  true, // sub-delims
+	'*':  true, // sub-delims
+	'+':  true, // sub-delims
+	',':  true, // sub-delims
+	'-':  true, // unreserved
+	'.':  true, // unreserved
+	':':  true, // IPv6address + Host expression's optional port
+	';':  true, // sub-delims
+	'=':  true, // sub-delims
+	'[':  true,
+	'\'': true, // sub-delims
+	']':  true,
+	'_':  true, // unreserved
+	'~':  true, // unreserved
+}
+
+// ValidHeaderFieldValue reports whether v is a valid "field-value" according to
+// http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec4.html#sec4.2 :
+//
+//        message-header = field-name ":" [ field-value ]
+//        field-value    = *( field-content | LWS )
+//        field-content  = <the OCTETs making up the field-value
+//                         and consisting of either *TEXT or combinations
+//                         of token, separators, and quoted-string>
+//
+// http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec2.html#sec2.2 :
+//
+//        TEXT           = <any OCTET except CTLs,
+//                          but including LWS>
+//        LWS            = [CRLF] 1*( SP | HT )
+//        CTL            = <any US-ASCII control character
+//                         (octets 0 - 31) and DEL (127)>
+//
+// RFC 7230 says:
+//  field-value    = *( field-content / obs-fold )
+//  obj-fold       =  N/A to http2, and deprecated
+//  field-content  = field-vchar [ 1*( SP / HTAB ) field-vchar ]
+//  field-vchar    = VCHAR / obs-text
+//  obs-text       = %x80-FF
+//  VCHAR          = "any visible [USASCII] character"
+//
+// http2 further says: "Similarly, HTTP/2 allows header field values
+// that are not valid. While most of the values that can be encoded
+// will not alter header field parsing, carriage return (CR, ASCII
+// 0xd), line feed (LF, ASCII 0xa), and the zero character (NUL, ASCII
+// 0x0) might be exploited by an attacker if they are translated
+// verbatim. Any request or response that contains a character not
+// permitted in a header field value MUST be treated as malformed
+// (Section 8.1.2.6). Valid characters are defined by the
+// field-content ABNF rule in Section 3.2 of [RFC7230]."
+//
+// This function does not (yet?) properly handle the rejection of
+// strings that begin or end with SP or HTAB.
+func ValidHeaderFieldValue(v string) bool {
+	for i := 0; i < len(v); i++ {
+		b := v[i]
+		if isCTL(b) && !isLWS(b) {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/proxy/direct.go

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package proxy
+
+import (
+	"net"
+)
+
+type direct struct{}
+
+// Direct is a direct proxy: one that makes network connections directly.
+var Direct = direct{}
+
+func (direct) Dial(network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
+	return net.Dial(network, addr)
+}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/proxy/per_host.go

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package proxy
+
+import (
+	"net"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// A PerHost directs connections to a default Dialer unless the hostname
+// requested matches one of a number of exceptions.
+type PerHost struct {
+	def, bypass Dialer
+
+	bypassNetworks []*net.IPNet
+	bypassIPs      []net.IP
+	bypassZones    []string
+	bypassHosts    []string
+}
+
+// NewPerHost returns a PerHost Dialer that directs connections to either
+// defaultDialer or bypass, depending on whether the connection matches one of
+// the configured rules.
+func NewPerHost(defaultDialer, bypass Dialer) *PerHost {
+	return &PerHost{
+		def:    defaultDialer,
+		bypass: bypass,
+	}
+}
+
+// Dial connects to the address addr on the given network through either
+// defaultDialer or bypass.
+func (p *PerHost) Dial(network, addr string) (c net.Conn, err error) {
+	host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return p.dialerForRequest(host).Dial(network, addr)
+}
+
+func (p *PerHost) dialerForRequest(host string) Dialer {
+	if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
+		for _, net := range p.bypassNetworks {
+			if net.Contains(ip) {
+				return p.bypass
+			}
+		}
+		for _, bypassIP := range p.bypassIPs {
+			if bypassIP.Equal(ip) {
+				return p.bypass
+			}
+		}
+		return p.def
+	}
+
+	for _, zone := range p.bypassZones {
+		if strings.HasSuffix(host, zone) {
+			return p.bypass
+		}
+		if host == zone[1:] {
+			// For a zone "example.com", we match "example.com"
+			// too.
+			return p.bypass
+		}
+	}
+	for _, bypassHost := range p.bypassHosts {
+		if bypassHost == host {
+			return p.bypass
+		}
+	}
+	return p.def
+}
+
+// AddFromString parses a string that contains comma-separated values
+// specifying hosts that should use the bypass proxy. Each value is either an
+// IP address, a CIDR range, a zone (*.example.com) or a hostname
+// (localhost). A best effort is made to parse the string and errors are
+// ignored.
+func (p *PerHost) AddFromString(s string) {
+	hosts := strings.Split(s, ",")
+	for _, host := range hosts {
+		host = strings.TrimSpace(host)
+		if len(host) == 0 {
+			continue
+		}
+		if strings.Contains(host, "/") {
+			// We assume that it's a CIDR address like 127.0.0.0/8
+			if _, net, err := net.ParseCIDR(host); err == nil {
+				p.AddNetwork(net)
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
+			p.AddIP(ip)
+			continue
+		}
+		if strings.HasPrefix(host, "*.") {
+			p.AddZone(host[1:])
+			continue
+		}
+		p.AddHost(host)
+	}
+}
+
+// AddIP specifies an IP address that will use the bypass proxy. Note that
+// this will only take effect if a literal IP address is dialed. A connection
+// to a named host will never match an IP.
+func (p *PerHost) AddIP(ip net.IP) {
+	p.bypassIPs = append(p.bypassIPs, ip)
+}
+
+// AddNetwork specifies an IP range that will use the bypass proxy. Note that
+// this will only take effect if a literal IP address is dialed. A connection
+// to a named host will never match.
+func (p *PerHost) AddNetwork(net *net.IPNet) {
+	p.bypassNetworks = append(p.bypassNetworks, net)
+}
+
+// AddZone specifies a DNS suffix that will use the bypass proxy. A zone of
+// "example.com" matches "example.com" and all of its subdomains.
+func (p *PerHost) AddZone(zone string) {
+	if strings.HasSuffix(zone, ".") {
+		zone = zone[:len(zone)-1]
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(zone, ".") {
+		zone = "." + zone
+	}
+	p.bypassZones = append(p.bypassZones, zone)
+}
+
+// AddHost specifies a hostname that will use the bypass proxy.
+func (p *PerHost) AddHost(host string) {
+	if strings.HasSuffix(host, ".") {
+		host = host[:len(host)-1]
+	}
+	p.bypassHosts = append(p.bypassHosts, host)
+}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/proxy/proxy.go

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package proxy provides support for a variety of protocols to proxy network
+// data.
+package proxy
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"net"
+	"net/url"
+	"os"
+)
+
+// A Dialer is a means to establish a connection.
+type Dialer interface {
+	// Dial connects to the given address via the proxy.
+	Dial(network, addr string) (c net.Conn, err error)
+}
+
+// Auth contains authentication parameters that specific Dialers may require.
+type Auth struct {
+	User, Password string
+}
+
+// FromEnvironment returns the dialer specified by the proxy related variables in
+// the environment.
+func FromEnvironment() Dialer {
+	allProxy := os.Getenv("all_proxy")
+	if len(allProxy) == 0 {
+		return Direct
+	}
+
+	proxyURL, err := url.Parse(allProxy)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Direct
+	}
+	proxy, err := FromURL(proxyURL, Direct)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Direct
+	}
+
+	noProxy := os.Getenv("no_proxy")
+	if len(noProxy) == 0 {
+		return proxy
+	}
+
+	perHost := NewPerHost(proxy, Direct)
+	perHost.AddFromString(noProxy)
+	return perHost
+}
+
+// proxySchemes is a map from URL schemes to a function that creates a Dialer
+// from a URL with such a scheme.
+var proxySchemes map[string]func(*url.URL, Dialer) (Dialer, error)
+
+// RegisterDialerType takes a URL scheme and a function to generate Dialers from
+// a URL with that scheme and a forwarding Dialer. Registered schemes are used
+// by FromURL.
+func RegisterDialerType(scheme string, f func(*url.URL, Dialer) (Dialer, error)) {
+	if proxySchemes == nil {
+		proxySchemes = make(map[string]func(*url.URL, Dialer) (Dialer, error))
+	}
+	proxySchemes[scheme] = f
+}
+
+// FromURL returns a Dialer given a URL specification and an underlying
+// Dialer for it to make network requests.
+func FromURL(u *url.URL, forward Dialer) (Dialer, error) {
+	var auth *Auth
+	if u.User != nil {
+		auth = new(Auth)
+		auth.User = u.User.Username()
+		if p, ok := u.User.Password(); ok {
+			auth.Password = p
+		}
+	}
+
+	switch u.Scheme {
+	case "socks5":
+		return SOCKS5("tcp", u.Host, auth, forward)
+	}
+
+	// If the scheme doesn't match any of the built-in schemes, see if it
+	// was registered by another package.
+	if proxySchemes != nil {
+		if f, ok := proxySchemes[u.Scheme]; ok {
+			return f(u, forward)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil, errors.New("proxy: unknown scheme: " + u.Scheme)
+}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/proxy/socks5.go

@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package proxy
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"net"
+	"strconv"
+)
+
+// SOCKS5 returns a Dialer that makes SOCKSv5 connections to the given address
+// with an optional username and password. See RFC 1928.
+func SOCKS5(network, addr string, auth *Auth, forward Dialer) (Dialer, error) {
+	s := &socks5{
+		network: network,
+		addr:    addr,
+		forward: forward,
+	}
+	if auth != nil {
+		s.user = auth.User
+		s.password = auth.Password
+	}
+
+	return s, nil
+}
+
+type socks5 struct {
+	user, password string
+	network, addr  string
+	forward        Dialer
+}
+
+const socks5Version = 5
+
+const (
+	socks5AuthNone     = 0
+	socks5AuthPassword = 2
+)
+
+const socks5Connect = 1
+
+const (
+	socks5IP4    = 1
+	socks5Domain = 3
+	socks5IP6    = 4
+)
+
+var socks5Errors = []string{
+	"",
+	"general failure",
+	"connection forbidden",
+	"network unreachable",
+	"host unreachable",
+	"connection refused",
+	"TTL expired",
+	"command not supported",
+	"address type not supported",
+}
+
+// Dial connects to the address addr on the network net via the SOCKS5 proxy.
+func (s *socks5) Dial(network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
+	switch network {
+	case "tcp", "tcp6", "tcp4":
+	default:
+		return nil, errors.New("proxy: no support for SOCKS5 proxy connections of type " + network)
+	}
+
+	conn, err := s.forward.Dial(s.network, s.addr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	closeConn := &conn
+	defer func() {
+		if closeConn != nil {
+			(*closeConn).Close()
+		}
+	}()
+
+	host, portStr, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	port, err := strconv.Atoi(portStr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("proxy: failed to parse port number: " + portStr)
+	}
+	if port < 1 || port > 0xffff {
+		return nil, errors.New("proxy: port number out of range: " + portStr)
+	}
+
+	// the size here is just an estimate
+	buf := make([]byte, 0, 6+len(host))
+
+	buf = append(buf, socks5Version)
+	if len(s.user) > 0 && len(s.user) < 256 && len(s.password) < 256 {
+		buf = append(buf, 2 /* num auth methods */, socks5AuthNone, socks5AuthPassword)
+	} else {
+		buf = append(buf, 1 /* num auth methods */, socks5AuthNone)
+	}
+
+	if _, err := conn.Write(buf); err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("proxy: failed to write greeting to SOCKS5 proxy at " + s.addr + ": " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(conn, buf[:2]); err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("proxy: failed to read greeting from SOCKS5 proxy at " + s.addr + ": " + err.Error())
+	}
+	if buf[0] != 5 {
+		return nil, errors.New("proxy: SOCKS5 proxy at " + s.addr + " has unexpected version " + strconv.Itoa(int(buf[0])))
+	}
+	if buf[1] == 0xff {
+		return nil, errors.New("proxy: SOCKS5 proxy at " + s.addr + " requires authentication")
+	}
+
+	if buf[1] == socks5AuthPassword {
+		buf = buf[:0]
+		buf = append(buf, 1 /* password protocol version */)
+		buf = append(buf, uint8(len(s.user)))
+		buf = append(buf, s.user...)
+		buf = append(buf, uint8(len(s.password)))
+		buf = append(buf, s.password...)
+
+		if _, err := conn.Write(buf); err != nil {
+			return nil, errors.New("proxy: failed to write authentication request to SOCKS5 proxy at " + s.addr + ": " + err.Error())
+		}
+
+		if _, err := io.ReadFull(conn, buf[:2]); err != nil {
+			return nil, errors.New("proxy: failed to read authentication reply from SOCKS5 proxy at " + s.addr + ": " + err.Error())
+		}
+
+		if buf[1] != 0 {
+			return nil, errors.New("proxy: SOCKS5 proxy at " + s.addr + " rejected username/password")
+		}
+	}
+
+	buf = buf[:0]
+	buf = append(buf, socks5Version, socks5Connect, 0 /* reserved */)
+
+	if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
+		if ip4 := ip.To4(); ip4 != nil {
+			buf = append(buf, socks5IP4)
+			ip = ip4
+		} else {
+			buf = append(buf, socks5IP6)
+		}
+		buf = append(buf, ip...)
+	} else {
+		if len(host) > 255 {
+			return nil, errors.New("proxy: destination hostname too long: " + host)
+		}
+		buf = append(buf, socks5Domain)
+		buf = append(buf, byte(len(host)))
+		buf = append(buf, host...)
+	}
+	buf = append(buf, byte(port>>8), byte(port))
+
+	if _, err := conn.Write(buf); err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("proxy: failed to write connect request to SOCKS5 proxy at " + s.addr + ": " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(conn, buf[:4]); err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("proxy: failed to read connect reply from SOCKS5 proxy at " + s.addr + ": " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	failure := "unknown error"
+	if int(buf[1]) < len(socks5Errors) {
+		failure = socks5Errors[buf[1]]
+	}
+
+	if len(failure) > 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("proxy: SOCKS5 proxy at " + s.addr + " failed to connect: " + failure)
+	}
+
+	bytesToDiscard := 0
+	switch buf[3] {
+	case socks5IP4:
+		bytesToDiscard = net.IPv4len
+	case socks5IP6:
+		bytesToDiscard = net.IPv6len
+	case socks5Domain:
+		_, err := io.ReadFull(conn, buf[:1])
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, errors.New("proxy: failed to read domain length from SOCKS5 proxy at " + s.addr + ": " + err.Error())
+		}
+		bytesToDiscard = int(buf[0])
+	default:
+		return nil, errors.New("proxy: got unknown address type " + strconv.Itoa(int(buf[3])) + " from SOCKS5 proxy at " + s.addr)
+	}
+
+	if cap(buf) < bytesToDiscard {
+		buf = make([]byte, bytesToDiscard)
+	} else {
+		buf = buf[:bytesToDiscard]
+	}
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(conn, buf); err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("proxy: failed to read address from SOCKS5 proxy at " + s.addr + ": " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	// Also need to discard the port number
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(conn, buf[:2]); err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("proxy: failed to read port from SOCKS5 proxy at " + s.addr + ": " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	closeConn = nil
+	return conn, nil
+}