// Policy evaluation for prSignedBy. package signature import ( "fmt" "io/ioutil" "os" "strings" "github.com/pkg/errors" "github.com/containers/image/manifest" "github.com/containers/image/types" "github.com/opencontainers/go-digest" ) func (pr *prSignedBy) isSignatureAuthorAccepted(image types.UnparsedImage, sig []byte) (signatureAcceptanceResult, *Signature, error) { switch pr.KeyType { case SBKeyTypeGPGKeys: case SBKeyTypeSignedByGPGKeys, SBKeyTypeX509Certificates, SBKeyTypeSignedByX509CAs: // FIXME? Reject this at policy parsing time already? return sarRejected, nil, errors.Errorf(`"Unimplemented "keyType" value "%s"`, string(pr.KeyType)) default: // This should never happen, newPRSignedBy ensures KeyType.IsValid() return sarRejected, nil, errors.Errorf(`"Unknown "keyType" value "%s"`, string(pr.KeyType)) } if pr.KeyPath != "" && pr.KeyData != nil { return sarRejected, nil, errors.New(`Internal inconsistency: both "keyPath" and "keyData" specified`) } // FIXME: move this to per-context initialization var data []byte if pr.KeyData != nil { data = pr.KeyData } else { d, err := ioutil.ReadFile(pr.KeyPath) if err != nil { return sarRejected, nil, err } data = d } // FIXME: move this to per-context initialization dir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "skopeo-signedBy-") if err != nil { return sarRejected, nil, err } defer os.RemoveAll(dir) mech, err := newGPGSigningMechanismInDirectory(dir) if err != nil { return sarRejected, nil, err } trustedIdentities, err := mech.ImportKeysFromBytes(data) if err != nil { return sarRejected, nil, err } if len(trustedIdentities) == 0 { return sarRejected, nil, PolicyRequirementError("No public keys imported") } signature, err := verifyAndExtractSignature(mech, sig, signatureAcceptanceRules{ validateKeyIdentity: func(keyIdentity string) error { for _, trustedIdentity := range trustedIdentities { if keyIdentity == trustedIdentity { return nil } } // Coverage: We use a private GPG home directory and only import trusted keys, so this should // not be reachable. return PolicyRequirementError(fmt.Sprintf("Signature by key %s is not accepted", keyIdentity)) }, validateSignedDockerReference: func(ref string) error { if !pr.SignedIdentity.matchesDockerReference(image, ref) { return PolicyRequirementError(fmt.Sprintf("Signature for identity %s is not accepted", ref)) } return nil }, validateSignedDockerManifestDigest: func(digest digest.Digest) error { m, _, err := image.Manifest() if err != nil { return err } digestMatches, err := manifest.MatchesDigest(m, digest) if err != nil { return err } if !digestMatches { return PolicyRequirementError(fmt.Sprintf("Signature for digest %s does not match", digest)) } return nil }, }) if err != nil { return sarRejected, nil, err } return sarAccepted, signature, nil } func (pr *prSignedBy) isRunningImageAllowed(image types.UnparsedImage) (bool, error) { sigs, err := image.Signatures() if err != nil { return false, err } var rejections []error for _, s := range sigs { var reason error switch res, _, err := pr.isSignatureAuthorAccepted(image, s); res { case sarAccepted: // One accepted signature is enough. return true, nil case sarRejected: reason = err case sarUnknown: // Huh?! This should not happen at all; treat it as any other invalid value. fallthrough default: reason = errors.Errorf(`Internal error: Unexpected signature verification result "%s"`, string(res)) } rejections = append(rejections, reason) } var summary error switch len(rejections) { case 0: summary = PolicyRequirementError("A signature was required, but no signature exists") case 1: summary = rejections[0] default: var msgs []string for _, e := range rejections { msgs = append(msgs, e.Error()) } summary = PolicyRequirementError(fmt.Sprintf("None of the signatures were accepted, reasons: %s", strings.Join(msgs, "; "))) } return false, summary }