// +build linux package libcontainer import ( "fmt" "os" "os/exec" "syscall" //only for Exec "github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/apparmor" "github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs" "github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/keys" "github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/seccomp" "github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/system" "github.com/opencontainers/selinux/go-selinux/label" "golang.org/x/sys/unix" ) type linuxStandardInit struct { pipe *os.File consoleSocket *os.File parentPid int fifoFd int config *initConfig } func (l *linuxStandardInit) getSessionRingParams() (string, uint32, uint32) { var newperms uint32 if l.config.Config.Namespaces.Contains(configs.NEWUSER) { // With user ns we need 'other' search permissions. newperms = 0x8 } else { // Without user ns we need 'UID' search permissions. newperms = 0x80000 } // Create a unique per session container name that we can join in setns; // However, other containers can also join it. return fmt.Sprintf("_ses.%s", l.config.ContainerId), 0xffffffff, newperms } func (l *linuxStandardInit) Init() error { if !l.config.Config.NoNewKeyring { ringname, keepperms, newperms := l.getSessionRingParams() // Do not inherit the parent's session keyring. sessKeyId, err := keys.JoinSessionKeyring(ringname) if err != nil { return err } // Make session keyring searcheable. if err := keys.ModKeyringPerm(sessKeyId, keepperms, newperms); err != nil { return err } } if err := setupNetwork(l.config); err != nil { return err } if err := setupRoute(l.config.Config); err != nil { return err } label.Init() // prepareRootfs() can be executed only for a new mount namespace. if l.config.Config.Namespaces.Contains(configs.NEWNS) { if err := prepareRootfs(l.pipe, l.config); err != nil { return err } } // Set up the console. This has to be done *before* we finalize the rootfs, // but *after* we've given the user the chance to set up all of the mounts // they wanted. if l.config.CreateConsole { if err := setupConsole(l.consoleSocket, l.config, true); err != nil { return err } if err := system.Setctty(); err != nil { return err } } // Finish the rootfs setup. if l.config.Config.Namespaces.Contains(configs.NEWNS) { if err := finalizeRootfs(l.config.Config); err != nil { return err } } if hostname := l.config.Config.Hostname; hostname != "" { if err := unix.Sethostname([]byte(hostname)); err != nil { return err } } if err := apparmor.ApplyProfile(l.config.AppArmorProfile); err != nil { return err } if err := label.SetProcessLabel(l.config.ProcessLabel); err != nil { return err } for key, value := range l.config.Config.Sysctl { if err := writeSystemProperty(key, value); err != nil { return err } } for _, path := range l.config.Config.ReadonlyPaths { if err := readonlyPath(path); err != nil { return err } } for _, path := range l.config.Config.MaskPaths { if err := maskPath(path); err != nil { return err } } pdeath, err := system.GetParentDeathSignal() if err != nil { return err } if l.config.NoNewPrivileges { if err := unix.Prctl(unix.PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0); err != nil { return err } } // Tell our parent that we're ready to Execv. This must be done before the // Seccomp rules have been applied, because we need to be able to read and // write to a socket. if err := syncParentReady(l.pipe); err != nil { return err } // Without NoNewPrivileges seccomp is a privileged operation, so we need to // do this before dropping capabilities; otherwise do it as late as possible // just before execve so as few syscalls take place after it as possible. if l.config.Config.Seccomp != nil && !l.config.NoNewPrivileges { if err := seccomp.InitSeccomp(l.config.Config.Seccomp); err != nil { return err } } if err := finalizeNamespace(l.config); err != nil { return err } // finalizeNamespace can change user/group which clears the parent death // signal, so we restore it here. if err := pdeath.Restore(); err != nil { return err } // Compare the parent from the initial start of the init process and make // sure that it did not change. if the parent changes that means it died // and we were reparented to something else so we should just kill ourself // and not cause problems for someone else. if unix.Getppid() != l.parentPid { return unix.Kill(unix.Getpid(), unix.SIGKILL) } // Check for the arg before waiting to make sure it exists and it is // returned as a create time error. name, err := exec.LookPath(l.config.Args[0]) if err != nil { return err } // Close the pipe to signal that we have completed our init. l.pipe.Close() // Wait for the FIFO to be opened on the other side before exec-ing the // user process. We open it through /proc/self/fd/$fd, because the fd that // was given to us was an O_PATH fd to the fifo itself. Linux allows us to // re-open an O_PATH fd through /proc. fd, err := unix.Open(fmt.Sprintf("/proc/self/fd/%d", l.fifoFd), unix.O_WRONLY|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0) if err != nil { return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "open exec fifo") } if _, err := unix.Write(fd, []byte("0")); err != nil { return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "write 0 exec fifo") } // Close the O_PATH fifofd fd before exec because the kernel resets // dumpable in the wrong order. This has been fixed in newer kernels, but // we keep this to ensure CVE-2016-9962 doesn't re-emerge on older kernels. // N.B. the core issue itself (passing dirfds to the host filesystem) has // since been resolved. // https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/v4.9/fs/exec.c#L1290-L1318 unix.Close(l.fifoFd) // Set seccomp as close to execve as possible, so as few syscalls take // place afterward (reducing the amount of syscalls that users need to // enable in their seccomp profiles). if l.config.Config.Seccomp != nil && l.config.NoNewPrivileges { if err := seccomp.InitSeccomp(l.config.Config.Seccomp); err != nil { return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "init seccomp") } } if err := syscall.Exec(name, l.config.Args[0:], os.Environ()); err != nil { return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "exec user process") } return nil }