cri-o/vendor/github.com/containers/image/signature/policy_eval.go
Daniel J Walsh 63a218a458 Move to new github.com/sirupsen/logrus.
Need to mv to latest released and supported version of logrus
switch github.com/Sirupsen/logrus github.com/sirupsen/logrus

Also vendor in latest containers/storage and containers/image

Signed-off-by: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
2017-08-07 11:50:04 -04:00

289 lines
12 KiB
Go

// This defines the top-level policy evaluation API.
// To the extent possible, the interface of the fuctions provided
// here is intended to be completely unambiguous, and stable for users
// to rely on.
package signature
import (
"context"
"github.com/containers/image/types"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
// PolicyRequirementError is an explanatory text for rejecting a signature or an image.
type PolicyRequirementError string
func (err PolicyRequirementError) Error() string {
return string(err)
}
// signatureAcceptanceResult is the principal value returned by isSignatureAuthorAccepted.
type signatureAcceptanceResult string
const (
sarAccepted signatureAcceptanceResult = "sarAccepted"
sarRejected signatureAcceptanceResult = "sarRejected"
sarUnknown signatureAcceptanceResult = "sarUnknown"
)
// PolicyRequirement is a rule which must be satisfied by at least one of the signatures of an image.
// The type is public, but its definition is private.
type PolicyRequirement interface {
// FIXME: For speed, we should support creating per-context state (not stored in the PolicyRequirement), to cache
// costly initialization like creating temporary GPG home directories and reading files.
// Setup() (someState, error)
// Then, the operations below would be done on the someState object, not directly on a PolicyRequirement.
// isSignatureAuthorAccepted, given an image and a signature blob, returns:
// - sarAccepted if the signature has been verified against the appropriate public key
// (where "appropriate public key" may depend on the contents of the signature);
// in that case a parsed Signature should be returned.
// - sarRejected if the signature has not been verified;
// in that case error must be non-nil, and should be an PolicyRequirementError if evaluation
// succeeded but the result was rejection.
// - sarUnknown if if this PolicyRequirement does not deal with signatures.
// NOTE: sarUnknown should not be returned if this PolicyRequirement should make a decision but something failed.
// Returning sarUnknown and a non-nil error value is invalid.
// WARNING: This makes the signature contents acceptable for futher processing,
// but it does not necessarily mean that the contents of the signature are
// consistent with local policy.
// For example:
// - Do not use a true value to determine whether to run
// a container based on this image; use IsRunningImageAllowed instead.
// - Just because a signature is accepted does not automatically mean the contents of the
// signature are authorized to run code as root, or to affect system or cluster configuration.
isSignatureAuthorAccepted(image types.UnparsedImage, sig []byte) (signatureAcceptanceResult, *Signature, error)
// isRunningImageAllowed returns true if the requirement allows running an image.
// If it returns false, err must be non-nil, and should be an PolicyRequirementError if evaluation
// succeeded but the result was rejection.
// WARNING: This validates signatures and the manifest, but does not download or validate the
// layers. Users must validate that the layers match their expected digests.
isRunningImageAllowed(image types.UnparsedImage) (bool, error)
}
// PolicyReferenceMatch specifies a set of image identities accepted in PolicyRequirement.
// The type is public, but its implementation is private.
type PolicyReferenceMatch interface {
// matchesDockerReference decides whether a specific image identity is accepted for an image
// (or, usually, for the image's Reference().DockerReference()). Note that
// image.Reference().DockerReference() may be nil.
matchesDockerReference(image types.UnparsedImage, signatureDockerReference string) bool
}
// PolicyContext encapsulates a policy and possible cached state
// for speeding up its evaluation.
type PolicyContext struct {
Policy *Policy
state policyContextState // Internal consistency checking
}
// policyContextState is used internally to verify the users are not misusing a PolicyContext.
type policyContextState string
const (
pcInvalid policyContextState = ""
pcInitializing policyContextState = "Initializing"
pcReady policyContextState = "Ready"
pcInUse policyContextState = "InUse"
pcDestroying policyContextState = "Destroying"
pcDestroyed policyContextState = "Destroyed"
)
// changeContextState changes pc.state, or fails if the state is unexpected
func (pc *PolicyContext) changeState(expected, new policyContextState) error {
if pc.state != expected {
return errors.Errorf(`"Invalid PolicyContext state, expected "%s", found "%s"`, expected, pc.state)
}
pc.state = new
return nil
}
// NewPolicyContext sets up and initializes a context for the specified policy.
// The policy must not be modified while the context exists. FIXME: make a deep copy?
// If this function succeeds, the caller should call PolicyContext.Destroy() when done.
func NewPolicyContext(policy *Policy) (*PolicyContext, error) {
pc := &PolicyContext{Policy: policy, state: pcInitializing}
// FIXME: initialize
if err := pc.changeState(pcInitializing, pcReady); err != nil {
// Huh?! This should never fail, we didn't give the pointer to anybody.
// Just give up and leave unclean state around.
return nil, err
}
return pc, nil
}
// Destroy should be called when the user of the context is done with it.
func (pc *PolicyContext) Destroy() error {
if err := pc.changeState(pcReady, pcDestroying); err != nil {
return err
}
// FIXME: destroy
return pc.changeState(pcDestroying, pcDestroyed)
}
// policyIdentityLogName returns a string description of the image identity for policy purposes.
// ONLY use this for log messages, not for any decisions!
func policyIdentityLogName(ref types.ImageReference) string {
return ref.Transport().Name() + ":" + ref.PolicyConfigurationIdentity()
}
// requirementsForImageRef selects the appropriate requirements for ref.
func (pc *PolicyContext) requirementsForImageRef(ref types.ImageReference) PolicyRequirements {
// Do we have a PolicyTransportScopes for this transport?
transportName := ref.Transport().Name()
if transportScopes, ok := pc.Policy.Transports[transportName]; ok {
// Look for a full match.
identity := ref.PolicyConfigurationIdentity()
if req, ok := transportScopes[identity]; ok {
logrus.Debugf(` Using transport "%s" policy section %s`, transportName, identity)
return req
}
// Look for a match of the possible parent namespaces.
for _, name := range ref.PolicyConfigurationNamespaces() {
if req, ok := transportScopes[name]; ok {
logrus.Debugf(` Using transport "%s" specific policy section %s`, transportName, name)
return req
}
}
// Look for a default match for the transport.
if req, ok := transportScopes[""]; ok {
logrus.Debugf(` Using transport "%s" policy section ""`, transportName)
return req
}
}
logrus.Debugf(" Using default policy section")
return pc.Policy.Default
}
// GetSignaturesWithAcceptedAuthor returns those signatures from an image
// for which the policy accepts the author (and which have been successfully
// verified).
// NOTE: This may legitimately return an empty list and no error, if the image
// has no signatures or only invalid signatures.
// WARNING: This makes the signature contents acceptable for futher processing,
// but it does not necessarily mean that the contents of the signature are
// consistent with local policy.
// For example:
// - Do not use a an existence of an accepted signature to determine whether to run
// a container based on this image; use IsRunningImageAllowed instead.
// - Just because a signature is accepted does not automatically mean the contents of the
// signature are authorized to run code as root, or to affect system or cluster configuration.
func (pc *PolicyContext) GetSignaturesWithAcceptedAuthor(image types.UnparsedImage) (sigs []*Signature, finalErr error) {
if err := pc.changeState(pcReady, pcInUse); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer func() {
if err := pc.changeState(pcInUse, pcReady); err != nil {
sigs = nil
finalErr = err
}
}()
logrus.Debugf("GetSignaturesWithAcceptedAuthor for image %s", policyIdentityLogName(image.Reference()))
reqs := pc.requirementsForImageRef(image.Reference())
// FIXME: rename Signatures to UnverifiedSignatures
// FIXME: pass context.Context
unverifiedSignatures, err := image.Signatures(context.TODO())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
res := make([]*Signature, 0, len(unverifiedSignatures))
for sigNumber, sig := range unverifiedSignatures {
var acceptedSig *Signature // non-nil if accepted
rejected := false
// FIXME? Say more about the contents of the signature, i.e. parse it even before verification?!
logrus.Debugf("Evaluating signature %d:", sigNumber)
interpretingReqs:
for reqNumber, req := range reqs {
// FIXME: Log the requirement itself? For now, we use just the number.
// FIXME: supply state
switch res, as, err := req.isSignatureAuthorAccepted(image, sig); res {
case sarAccepted:
if as == nil { // Coverage: this should never happen
logrus.Debugf(" Requirement %d: internal inconsistency: sarAccepted but no parsed contents", reqNumber)
rejected = true
break interpretingReqs
}
logrus.Debugf(" Requirement %d: signature accepted", reqNumber)
if acceptedSig == nil {
acceptedSig = as
} else if *as != *acceptedSig { // Coverage: this should never happen
// Huh?! Two ways of verifying the same signature blob resulted in two different parses of its already accepted contents?
logrus.Debugf(" Requirement %d: internal inconsistency: sarAccepted but different parsed contents", reqNumber)
rejected = true
acceptedSig = nil
break interpretingReqs
}
case sarRejected:
logrus.Debugf(" Requirement %d: signature rejected: %s", reqNumber, err.Error())
rejected = true
break interpretingReqs
case sarUnknown:
if err != nil { // Coverage: this should never happen
logrus.Debugf(" Requirement %d: internal inconsistency: sarUnknown but an error message %s", reqNumber, err.Error())
rejected = true
break interpretingReqs
}
logrus.Debugf(" Requirement %d: signature state unknown, continuing", reqNumber)
default: // Coverage: this should never happen
logrus.Debugf(" Requirement %d: internal inconsistency: unknown result %#v", reqNumber, string(res))
rejected = true
break interpretingReqs
}
}
// This also handles the (invalid) case of empty reqs, by rejecting the signature.
if acceptedSig != nil && !rejected {
logrus.Debugf(" Overall: OK, signature accepted")
res = append(res, acceptedSig)
} else {
logrus.Debugf(" Overall: Signature not accepted")
}
}
return res, nil
}
// IsRunningImageAllowed returns true iff the policy allows running the image.
// If it returns false, err must be non-nil, and should be an PolicyRequirementError if evaluation
// succeeded but the result was rejection.
// WARNING: This validates signatures and the manifest, but does not download or validate the
// layers. Users must validate that the layers match their expected digests.
func (pc *PolicyContext) IsRunningImageAllowed(image types.UnparsedImage) (res bool, finalErr error) {
if err := pc.changeState(pcReady, pcInUse); err != nil {
return false, err
}
defer func() {
if err := pc.changeState(pcInUse, pcReady); err != nil {
res = false
finalErr = err
}
}()
logrus.Debugf("IsRunningImageAllowed for image %s", policyIdentityLogName(image.Reference()))
reqs := pc.requirementsForImageRef(image.Reference())
if len(reqs) == 0 {
return false, PolicyRequirementError("List of verification policy requirements must not be empty")
}
for reqNumber, req := range reqs {
// FIXME: supply state
allowed, err := req.isRunningImageAllowed(image)
if !allowed {
logrus.Debugf("Requirement %d: denied, done", reqNumber)
return false, err
}
logrus.Debugf(" Requirement %d: allowed", reqNumber)
}
// We have tested that len(reqs) != 0, so at least one req must have explicitly allowed this image.
logrus.Debugf("Overall: allowed")
return true, nil
}