cri-o/vendor/github.com/containers/image/signature/signature.go
Mrunal Patel 8e5b17cf13 Switch to github.com/golang/dep for vendoring
Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com>
2017-01-31 16:45:59 -08:00

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// Note: Consider the API unstable until the code supports at least three different image formats or transports.
package signature
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
"github.com/containers/image/version"
"github.com/opencontainers/go-digest"
)
const (
signatureType = "atomic container signature"
)
// InvalidSignatureError is returned when parsing an invalid signature.
type InvalidSignatureError struct {
msg string
}
func (err InvalidSignatureError) Error() string {
return err.msg
}
// Signature is a parsed content of a signature.
// The only way to get this structure from a blob should be as a return value from a successful call to verifyAndExtractSignature below.
type Signature struct {
DockerManifestDigest digest.Digest
DockerReference string // FIXME: more precise type?
}
// untrustedSignature is a parsed content of a signature.
type untrustedSignature struct {
UntrustedDockerManifestDigest digest.Digest
UntrustedDockerReference string // FIXME: more precise type?
UntrustedCreatorID *string
// This is intentionally an int64; the native JSON float64 type would allow to represent _some_ sub-second precision,
// but not nearly enough (with current timestamp values, a single unit in the last place is on the order of hundreds of nanoseconds).
// So, this is explicitly an int64, and we reject fractional values. If we did need more precise timestamps eventually,
// we would add another field, UntrustedTimestampNS int64.
UntrustedTimestamp *int64
}
// UntrustedSignatureInformation is information available in an untrusted signature.
// This may be useful when debugging signature verification failures,
// or when managing a set of signatures on a single image.
//
// WARNING: Do not use the contents of this for ANY security decisions,
// and be VERY CAREFUL about showing this information to humans in any way which suggest that these values “are probably” reliable.
// There is NO REASON to expect the values to be correct, or not intentionally misleading
// (including things like “✅ Verified by $authority”)
type UntrustedSignatureInformation struct {
UntrustedDockerManifestDigest digest.Digest
UntrustedDockerReference string // FIXME: more precise type?
UntrustedCreatorID *string
UntrustedTimestamp *time.Time
UntrustedShortKeyIdentifier string
}
// newUntrustedSignature returns an untrustedSignature object with
// the specified primary contents and appropriate metadata.
func newUntrustedSignature(dockerManifestDigest digest.Digest, dockerReference string) untrustedSignature {
// Use intermediate variables for these values so that we can take their addresses.
// Golang guarantees that they will have a new address on every execution.
creatorID := "atomic " + version.Version
timestamp := time.Now().Unix()
return untrustedSignature{
UntrustedDockerManifestDigest: dockerManifestDigest,
UntrustedDockerReference: dockerReference,
UntrustedCreatorID: &creatorID,
UntrustedTimestamp: &timestamp,
}
}
// Compile-time check that untrustedSignature implements json.Marshaler
var _ json.Marshaler = (*untrustedSignature)(nil)
// MarshalJSON implements the json.Marshaler interface.
func (s untrustedSignature) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
if s.UntrustedDockerManifestDigest == "" || s.UntrustedDockerReference == "" {
return nil, errors.New("Unexpected empty signature content")
}
critical := map[string]interface{}{
"type": signatureType,
"image": map[string]string{"docker-manifest-digest": s.UntrustedDockerManifestDigest.String()},
"identity": map[string]string{"docker-reference": s.UntrustedDockerReference},
}
optional := map[string]interface{}{}
if s.UntrustedCreatorID != nil {
optional["creator"] = *s.UntrustedCreatorID
}
if s.UntrustedTimestamp != nil {
optional["timestamp"] = *s.UntrustedTimestamp
}
signature := map[string]interface{}{
"critical": critical,
"optional": optional,
}
return json.Marshal(signature)
}
// Compile-time check that untrustedSignature implements json.Unmarshaler
var _ json.Unmarshaler = (*untrustedSignature)(nil)
// UnmarshalJSON implements the json.Unmarshaler interface
func (s *untrustedSignature) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
err := s.strictUnmarshalJSON(data)
if err != nil {
if _, ok := err.(jsonFormatError); ok {
err = InvalidSignatureError{msg: err.Error()}
}
}
return err
}
// strictUnmarshalJSON is UnmarshalJSON, except that it may return the internal jsonFormatError error type.
// Splitting it into a separate function allows us to do the jsonFormatError → InvalidSignatureError in a single place, the caller.
func (s *untrustedSignature) strictUnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
var untyped interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &untyped); err != nil {
return err
}
o, ok := untyped.(map[string]interface{})
if !ok {
return InvalidSignatureError{msg: "Invalid signature format"}
}
if err := validateExactMapKeys(o, "critical", "optional"); err != nil {
return err
}
c, err := mapField(o, "critical")
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := validateExactMapKeys(c, "type", "image", "identity"); err != nil {
return err
}
optional, err := mapField(o, "optional")
if err != nil {
return err
}
if _, ok := optional["creator"]; ok {
creatorID, err := stringField(optional, "creator")
if err != nil {
return err
}
s.UntrustedCreatorID = &creatorID
}
if _, ok := optional["timestamp"]; ok {
timestamp, err := int64Field(optional, "timestamp")
if err != nil {
return err
}
s.UntrustedTimestamp = &timestamp
}
t, err := stringField(c, "type")
if err != nil {
return err
}
if t != signatureType {
return InvalidSignatureError{msg: fmt.Sprintf("Unrecognized signature type %s", t)}
}
image, err := mapField(c, "image")
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := validateExactMapKeys(image, "docker-manifest-digest"); err != nil {
return err
}
digestString, err := stringField(image, "docker-manifest-digest")
if err != nil {
return err
}
s.UntrustedDockerManifestDigest = digest.Digest(digestString)
identity, err := mapField(c, "identity")
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := validateExactMapKeys(identity, "docker-reference"); err != nil {
return err
}
reference, err := stringField(identity, "docker-reference")
if err != nil {
return err
}
s.UntrustedDockerReference = reference
return nil
}
// Sign formats the signature and returns a blob signed using mech and keyIdentity
// (If it seems surprising that this is a method on untrustedSignature, note that there
// isnt a good reason to think that a key used by the user is trusted by any component
// of the system just because it is a private key — actually the presence of a private key
// on the system increases the likelihood of an a successful attack on that private key
// on that particular system.)
func (s untrustedSignature) sign(mech SigningMechanism, keyIdentity string) ([]byte, error) {
json, err := json.Marshal(s)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return mech.Sign(json, keyIdentity)
}
// signatureAcceptanceRules specifies how to decide whether an untrusted signature is acceptable.
// We centralize the actual parsing and data extraction in verifyAndExtractSignature; this supplies
// the policy. We use an object instead of supplying func parameters to verifyAndExtractSignature
// because the functions have the same or similar types, so there is a risk of exchanging the functions;
// named members of this struct are more explicit.
type signatureAcceptanceRules struct {
validateKeyIdentity func(string) error
validateSignedDockerReference func(string) error
validateSignedDockerManifestDigest func(digest.Digest) error
}
// verifyAndExtractSignature verifies that unverifiedSignature has been signed, and that its principial components
// match expected values, both as specified by rules, and returns it
func verifyAndExtractSignature(mech SigningMechanism, unverifiedSignature []byte, rules signatureAcceptanceRules) (*Signature, error) {
signed, keyIdentity, err := mech.Verify(unverifiedSignature)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := rules.validateKeyIdentity(keyIdentity); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var unmatchedSignature untrustedSignature
if err := json.Unmarshal(signed, &unmatchedSignature); err != nil {
return nil, InvalidSignatureError{msg: err.Error()}
}
if err := rules.validateSignedDockerManifestDigest(unmatchedSignature.UntrustedDockerManifestDigest); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := rules.validateSignedDockerReference(unmatchedSignature.UntrustedDockerReference); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// signatureAcceptanceRules have accepted this value.
return &Signature{
DockerManifestDigest: unmatchedSignature.UntrustedDockerManifestDigest,
DockerReference: unmatchedSignature.UntrustedDockerReference,
}, nil
}
// GetUntrustedSignatureInformationWithoutVerifying extracts information available in an untrusted signature,
// WITHOUT doing any cryptographic verification.
// This may be useful when debugging signature verification failures,
// or when managing a set of signatures on a single image.
//
// WARNING: Do not use the contents of this for ANY security decisions,
// and be VERY CAREFUL about showing this information to humans in any way which suggest that these values “are probably” reliable.
// There is NO REASON to expect the values to be correct, or not intentionally misleading
// (including things like “✅ Verified by $authority”)
func GetUntrustedSignatureInformationWithoutVerifying(untrustedSignatureBytes []byte) (*UntrustedSignatureInformation, error) {
// NOTE: This should eventualy do format autodetection.
mech, err := NewGPGSigningMechanism()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
untrustedContents, shortKeyIdentifier, err := mech.UntrustedSignatureContents(untrustedSignatureBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var untrustedDecodedContents untrustedSignature
if err := json.Unmarshal(untrustedContents, &untrustedDecodedContents); err != nil {
return nil, InvalidSignatureError{msg: err.Error()}
}
var timestamp *time.Time // = nil
if untrustedDecodedContents.UntrustedTimestamp != nil {
ts := time.Unix(*untrustedDecodedContents.UntrustedTimestamp, 0)
timestamp = &ts
}
return &UntrustedSignatureInformation{
UntrustedDockerManifestDigest: untrustedDecodedContents.UntrustedDockerManifestDigest,
UntrustedDockerReference: untrustedDecodedContents.UntrustedDockerReference,
UntrustedCreatorID: untrustedDecodedContents.UntrustedCreatorID,
UntrustedTimestamp: timestamp,
UntrustedShortKeyIdentifier: shortKeyIdentifier,
}, nil
}