efi: Add EFI shim lock verifier

This module provides shim lock verification for various kernels
if UEFI secure boot is enabled on a machine.

It is recommended to put this module into GRUB2 standalone image
(avoid putting iorw and memrw modules into it; they are disallowed
if UEFI secure boot is enabled). However, it is also possible to use
it as a normal module. Though such configurations are more fragile
and less secure due to various limitations.

If the module is loaded and UEFI secure boot is enabled then:
  - module itself cannot be unloaded (persistent module),
  - the iorw and memrw modules cannot be loaded,
  - if the iorw and memrw modules are loaded then
    machine boot is disabled,
  - GRUB2 defers modules and ACPI tables verification to
    other verifiers.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
This commit is contained in:
Daniel Kiper 2018-08-03 13:25:44 +02:00
parent ee7808e219
commit 878398c1a3
3 changed files with 162 additions and 0 deletions

View file

@ -5544,6 +5544,7 @@ environment variables and commands are listed in the same order.
@menu
* Authentication and authorisation:: Users and access control
* Using digital signatures:: Booting digitally signed code
* UEFI secure boot and shim:: Booting digitally signed PE files
@end menu
@node Authentication and authorisation
@ -5706,6 +5707,20 @@ or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different
(attacker-controlled) device. GRUB is at best only one link in a
secure boot chain.
@node UEFI secure boot and shim
@section UEFI secure boot and shim support
The GRUB, except the @command{chainloader} command, works with the UEFI secure
boot and the shim. This functionality is provided by the shim_lock module. It
is recommend to build in this and other required modules into the @file{core.img}.
All modules not stored in the @file{core.img} and the ACPI tables for the
@command{acpi} command have to be signed, e.g. using PGP. Additionally, the
@command{iorw} and the @command{memrw} commands are prohibited if the UEFI
secure boot is enabled. This is done due to security reasons. All above
mentioned requirements are enforced by the shim_lock module. And itself it
is a persistent module which means that it cannot be unloaded if it was
loaded into the memory.
@node Platform limitations
@chapter Platform limitations

View file

@ -899,6 +899,12 @@ module = {
common = commands/verifiers.c;
};
module = {
name = shim_lock;
common = commands/efi/shim_lock.c;
enable = x86_64_efi;
};
module = {
name = hdparm;
common = commands/hdparm.c;

View file

@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
/*
* GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
* Copyright (C) 2017 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
* EFI shim lock verifier.
*/
#include <grub/dl.h>
#include <grub/efi/efi.h>
#include <grub/err.h>
#include <grub/file.h>
#include <grub/misc.h>
#include <grub/verify.h>
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
#define GRUB_EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID \
{ 0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, \
{ 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23 } \
}
struct grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol
{
grub_efi_status_t
(*verify) (void *buffer, grub_uint32_t size);
};
typedef struct grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol_t;
static grub_efi_guid_t shim_lock_guid = GRUB_EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
static grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol_t *sl;
/* List of modules which cannot be loaded if UEFI secure boot mode is enabled. */
static const char * const disabled_mods[] = {"iorw", "memrw", NULL};
static grub_err_t
shim_lock_init (grub_file_t io, enum grub_file_type type,
void **context __attribute__ ((unused)),
enum grub_verify_flags *flags)
{
const char *b, *e;
int i;
*flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SKIP_VERIFICATION;
if (!sl)
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
switch (type & GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MASK)
{
case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GRUB_MODULE:
/* Establish GRUB module name. */
b = grub_strrchr (io->name, '/');
e = grub_strrchr (io->name, '.');
b = b ? (b + 1) : io->name;
e = e ? e : io->name + grub_strlen (io->name);
e = (e > b) ? e : io->name + grub_strlen (io->name);
for (i = 0; disabled_mods[i]; i++)
if (!grub_strncmp (b, disabled_mods[i], grub_strlen (b) - grub_strlen (e)))
{
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED,
N_("module cannot be loaded in UEFI secure boot mode: %s"),
io->name);
return GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
/* Fall through. */
case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_ACPI_TABLE:
*flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_DEFER_AUTH;
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LINUX_KERNEL:
case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MULTIBOOT_KERNEL:
case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_BSD_KERNEL:
case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_KERNEL:
case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PLAN9_KERNEL:
for (i = 0; disabled_mods[i]; i++)
if (grub_dl_get (disabled_mods[i]))
{
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED,
N_("cannot boot due to dangerous module in memory: %s"),
disabled_mods[i]);
return GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
*flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SINGLE_CHUNK;
/* Fall through. */
default:
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
}
static grub_err_t
shim_lock_write (void *context __attribute__ ((unused)), void *buf, grub_size_t size)
{
if (sl->verify (buf, size) != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, N_("bad shim signature"));
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
struct grub_file_verifier shim_lock =
{
.name = "shim_lock",
.init = shim_lock_init,
.write = shim_lock_write
};
GRUB_MOD_INIT(shim_lock)
{
sl = grub_efi_locate_protocol (&shim_lock_guid, 0);
grub_verifier_register (&shim_lock);
if (!sl)
return;
grub_dl_set_persistent (mod);
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI(shim_lock)
{
grub_verifier_unregister (&shim_lock);
}