The Secure Boot code currently reads the kernel from disk, validates the
signature and then reads it from disk again. A sufficiently exciting storage
device could modify the kernel between these two events and trigger the
execution of an untrusted kernel. Avoid re-reading it in order to ensure
this isn't a problem, and in the process speed up boot by not reading the
kernel twice.
Regression from commit:
loader/linux: do not pad initrd with zeroes at the end
a8c473288d
Wimboot fails since the change above because it expects the "trailer"
initrd element on an aligned address.
This issue shows only when newc_name is used and the last initrd
entry has a not aligned size.
While in theory permitted by the spec, modules rarely fit in low memory
anyway and not every kernel is able to handle modules in low memory anyway.
At least VMWare is known not to be able to handle modules at arbitrary
locations.
Syslinux memdisk is using initrd image and needs to know uncompressed
size in advance. For gzip uncompressed size is at the end of compressed
stream. Grub padded each input file to 4 bytes at the end, which means
syslinux got wrong size.
Linux initramfs loader apparently does not care about trailing alignment.
So change code to align beginning of each file instead which atomatically
gives us the correct size for single file.
Reported-By: David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
If grub is signed with a key that's in the trusted EFI keyring, an attacker
can point a boot entry at grub rather than at shim and grub will fail to
locate the shim verification protocol. This would then allow booting an
arbitrary kernel image. Fail validation if Secure Boot is enabled and we
can't find the shim protocol in order to prevent this.
struct ... foo = { 0, } is valid initializer, but older GCC emits
warning which is fatal error due to -Werror=missing-field-initializer.
So simply use full initializer to avoid these errors. This was fixed
probably in GCC 4.7.
See https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=36750
Currently, if "linux" fails, the "goto fail;" in grub_cmd_initrd sends us
into grub_initrd_close() without grub_initrd_init() being called, and thus
it never clears initrd_ctx->components. grub_initrd_close() then frees that
address, which is stale data from the stack. If the stack happens to have a
stale *address* there that matches a recent allocation, then you'll get a
double free later.
So initialize the memory up front.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
